Science and Research Committee on Nov. 22nd, 2023

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair, this is part of the complex environment, and this is why it's so important to work with the institutions.

We've seen attacks through traditional espionage activities. We see it through cyber-espionage. We've seen it through collaboration on research projects. Sometimes we'll have people with different affiliations come in overtly and have access to information that should probably be kept a bit more discreet. We also have seen people misrepresenting themselves to have access to that information.

What you're looking at is an ecosystem with the clear intent of trying to get information, and whatever tool is at the disposal of the foreign state will be used to get to that information. I think this is what represents the most significant challenge for all of us: We need to be able to address and mitigate the threat coming from many different vectors at the same time.

[Valerie Bradford, Liberal, Kitchener South—Hespeler, ON]

How does CSIS support the work of the granting agencies?

[David Vigneault]

Since the government's introduction of new guidelines and regulations, we have done a few things.

One, we have done a number of engagements with the research councils to share with them our perspective of the environment and of the threat. Also, Mr. Chair, we have done part of the review process, so the granting councils are referring a number of the applications to the government. We at CSIS are part of the review, from a national security point of view, to determine if they are indeed risks to national security and if potentially critical information would be leaving the country if such an application would be granted.

I would describe it as a very good relationship now, a productive relationship, and I would venture to say that in a number of years to come, we will see an improvement in and a deepening of that relationship to continue to address those threats.

[Valerie Bradford, Liberal, Kitchener South—Hespeler, ON]

What role do the post-secondary institutions play in ensuring the security of Canadian research when they plan to collaborate with international research partners?

[Shawn Tupper]

I think that's part of the importance of the framework and the guidance and regulations that we have put in place. It informs and educates the universities on the kinds of indicators they need to look at when they're investing in research and identifying partners. It is helping them to understand those threats and to make informed decisions in terms of who they partner with.

As we move forward in terms of identifying external institutions and identifying those sensitive areas, that will further equip universities to make sound decisions in those areas.

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

We're just about done on time. You have about five seconds.

[Valerie Bradford, Liberal, Kitchener South—Hespeler, ON]

Okay. I'm fine. Thanks.

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

Thank you.

Mr. Blanchette-Joncas, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to welcome the witnesses who are joining us today for this important study.

Mr. Vigneault, I have a fairly simple question for you: can you confirm that China directly or indirectly funds Canadian universities and provides private funding?

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, there are limits to what I can reveal publicly.

That said, we are more concerned with research than with general university funding. In fact, we can see examples in the public domain of the various tactics of the Chinese government. More importantly, there are more and more third parties trying to hide their affiliation in order to be able to donate money and contribute to research projects that can lead to threats to Canada's security.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Vigneault.

I understand that you cannot confirm everything for us today, but I imagine that, if you warn a university, as you have done recently, it is because there is a threat. That's my understanding.

I would like to quote what you said in a CBC article published on October 17:

“We have the Chinese government engaged in the most sustained, scaled and sophisticated theft of intellectual property and acquisition of expertise that is unprecedented in human history”.

My question is quite simple. In the face of intellectual property theft and blatant predatory behaviour, do you feel that the federal government is doing enough to protect Canadian universities, researchers and discoveries?

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair, I thank the member for his question.

I believe that was said by one of my colleagues from the Five Eyes at the meeting described in the article. Having said that, I fully support the argument that's being made.

There are indeed threats to Canadian universities. In Canada, we are very fortunate to have cutting-edge universities. People come from all over the world to study at our universities. That has to be maintained. It is thanks to this international collaboration that we make advances in research.

The problem we have, especially with regard to the People's Republic of China and the government of Xi Jinping, is that all parts of that government are involved in seeking information, either openly or surreptitiously, in order to serve the interests of the Chinese Communist Party. Unfortunately, that also includes reviewing all the technologies to see if there is a way to modify them for the military purposes of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, which is a direct threat to Canada.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Vigneault.

You're well informed. Yes, that was a quote from Mike Burgess, head of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization.

The federal government announced last February that it was going to draw up a list of high-risk institutions. Eight months later, we are still waiting for that list. I asked the minister about this last Monday, as well as the people who were here today. Witnesses come and go, the committee keeps on holding meetings, and everyone expresses their concerns, but the delay in publishing this list creates uncertainty for applicants and for the protection of Canadian research.

Why do you think that list hasn't been published yet? Do you work with international partners that have such lists?

[Shawn Tupper]

First of all, the collaboration is extremely important, and with our Five Eyes partners we absolutely collaborate and try to learn from our respective best practices in this area. Absolutely those discussions occur.

We are indeed preparing advice. As I mentioned earlier, the government has stated its intention to release both an institutions list and a sensitive technologies list. That work is under way. I cannot steal the thunder of my minister in terms of when that announcement will occur, but suffice it to say that work is well under way.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Can you clarify what your organization is currently doing to keep sensitive information from leaking out?

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair, I thank the member for that very important question.

First of all, CSIS works with a lot of federal government agencies. Specifically, CSIS works directly with universities and some researchers.

We provide information directly to universities and research centres, to the extent possible, within the limits imposed on CSIS by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. We also conduct international investigations with our partners, the Five Eyes, of course, but also with many other partners around the world. We also do threat mitigation.

CSIS's mandate allows us to take direct action to mitigate threats. This is very important. We will never be able to reduce all threats, but, as I said in my opening remarks, teamwork is essential. Everyone has to work together to mitigate threats as much as possible.

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

Thank you very much. That's six minutes. Now it's over to Mr. Cannings for the final six minutes on this round.

[Richard Cannings, NDP, South Okanagan—West Kootenay, BC]

Thank you to everyone here today, especially Mr. Vigneault. Thank you for coming on such a day.

During this study, over the past number of weeks we've heard a lot of concerns about Canadian research and IP leaving the country—being stolen or leaking out in various ways. We've heard a lot from the university “ecosystem”, as we've been calling it, and though the tri-council about this business of whether we should fund, or how we can stop funding, risky researchers.

A lot of research is, obviously, carried out by the private sector. I'm wondering how you monitor that. Is there a direct way you do that with industry groups? I read something in the media about Hydro-Québec having an incident with a Chinese researcher.

Without divulging secrets, what kinds of measures do you take to ensure that those very important research results and IP stay in Canada where they belong?

[David Vigneault]

When we look at the way the theft of intellectual property through state-sponsored activity occurs, we realize we need to address all aspects of the ecosystem, to use your word.

One thing CSIS has been doing is talking about this issue more publicly. I welcome the work of this committee to enlighten Canadians about this phenomenon.

We work directly with industry associations. We also work with some specific elements of the economic sector. I'll give you a very concrete example.

During the pandemic, we knew through our own intelligence—I think it was also fairly evident—that threats to the health research sector, in terms of pandemic research being done for a vaccine and so on, would become increasingly problematic. At CSIS, we were able to work with partners and map out the key industry companies and research labs in Canada involved in this work. We reached out to them directly and gave them some fairly practical advice. We didn't necessarily know a threat was coming to them specifically, but we said, “This is the modus operandi. If you were to be a victim of it, this is how it would likely work.” I can tell you that within a few weeks of those briefings taking place, we were approached by one of these companies. They told us the PRC had indeed used the exact modus operandi for this crime. Because the company had taken the right steps to protect themselves, they were able to prevent the theft of their intellectual property.

It is a multiple-partner engagement, I would say.

[Richard Cannings, NDP, South Okanagan—West Kootenay, BC]

Sir, perhaps I can jump in.

This may go to you, Mr. Tupper.

I'm interested in how you find out what the key information is. Who is advising you? Do you have scientists within CSIS, or are scientists in other public sector agencies interacting with CSIS? How does that work? How do you figure out what's important and what may be irrelevant?

[Shawn Tupper]

I think part of the work of the Research Security Centre is exactly that.

It's a whole-of-government endeavour. Our key partners beyond our portfolio would include ISED, Health Canada and other science departments. We want to pay attention to their expertise and capacity to give us advice. There is a whole-of-government structure that allows us to come together and collaborate on how we identify those areas.

Through the centre, we do a lot of public engagements. I have half of my centre here and half across the country. It's not a huge bunch of people. We do a ton of outreach as well. We're working with universities and industry. We run workshops and whatnot. This allows us to identify areas of priority external to government. Through this whole-of-government approach, we're able to build those bridges.

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair, can we add one point, please?

[Richard Cannings, NDP, South Okanagan—West Kootenay, BC]

Sure.

[The Chair, Liberal, Lloyd Longfield]

It's up to the member.

[Dr. Nicole Giles, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy and Strategic Partnerships, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Just to maybe put a couple of numbers around that, CSIS has briefed more than 200 organizations and 1,000 individuals about possible threats, so it's a continuous engagement that's absolutely critical.

We're also leveraging our expertise and our footprint in every region in the country to make sure that we're raising awareness, and we're doing a number of publications, including in local languages. This document, for example, is “Protect Your Research” in Inuktitut.