Thank you, Madam Chair. I'm very sorry that I can't be there with you in person.
I was privileged to work in the Canadian public service for 37 years, primarily in science and technology policy, programs and funding. In my last position before I retired in 2012, I was the executive vice-president of NSERC.
I joined the Institute for Science, Society and Policy at the University of Ottawa 14 years ago as a senior fellow, where I've been writing about China's innovation system. I started seeing a lot of problems as Xi Jinping introduced an indigenous innovation policy focused on taking western technologies and making them Chinese: the integration of military and civilian technology development, China's technologies in the Arctic, the number of Chinese military professors in Canadian universities and the many problems Canadian technology companies were having with their joint ventures in China.
Some of these risks posed real problems for Canadian universities, as well as to the Canadian government from a policy perspective. In 2020, I was very happy to see that NSERC had developed a very user-friendly checklist for professors as to how they could protect themselves from having their intellectual property taken in China.
Still, there were a lot of things going under the radar. I credit Bob Fife and Steve Chase for uncovering these, such as a machine learning lab at York University funded by iFlytek. The leaders of the lab were from China's National University of Defense Technology under the Central Military Commission. iFlytek is the company that uses voice recognition technology on the Uyghurs. All Uyghurs have to record their voices on iFlytek equipment in different modulations so the police know who is talking on the phone in any conversation. Queen's University had funding from iFlytek too.
Mr. Fife and Mr. Chase did another story when the University of Alberta signed an MOU to be a strategic partner with HKAI Lab. HKAI Lab is funded by Alibaba and SenseTime, a Beijing-based AI company blacklisted by the U.S. government for its surveillance role in the repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. They also did a story about Huawei selling its 5G equipment secretly to Telus at suppressed prices before the government made the decision whether to allow Huawei into our 5G systems. Telus went ahead and installed it anyway, explaining, “You didn't tell us not to do it.”
All these stories contributed directly to a government announcement in 2021 that there would be a new national security screening for NSERC projects. Two-thirds of the first projects in the screening were turned back. This was extended to CIHR and SSHRC as a tri-agency initiative. Understandably, many researchers did not want their own projects to be derailed. They appreciated funding from China for their work. Ultimately, most projects were not derailed. The system works as it should.
In 2023, Mr. Fife and Mr. Chase broke the story that there were more than 50 Canadian universities partnering with the National University of Defense Technology, the premier technology R and D feed to the People's Liberation Army. Again, the government responded quickly and developed a list of universities and institutes in China, Russia and Iran that would be off base to Canadian researchers with federal funding.
The government's quick action in each case has given our country a research security system that I've often called the gold standard for the world. We can't pull it back now that we have a strategic partnership. I agree with everything Mona Nemer just said. Just yesterday, the U.S. banned imports from BGI Genomics because its technology is made by Uyghur forced labour. BGI and Huawei have not given up their Canadian footprint. They have a presence on and beyond campuses. A few professors have even boasted about how they've gotten around the rules.
This is a complex problem that must be addressed, and I look forward to talking about it today.
Thank you.
