Thank you for the invitation.
I greatly value your committee's work. I actually used it as inspiration when I was drafting my report.
During my previous appearances before the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence and before the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence, I mainly insisted on the responsibilities the Sexual Misconduct Response Centre should have had, in my opinion. I am specifically talking about the authority needed to receive complaints and reports, be they confidential or not. I also insisted on the need to support victims throughout the process, including the process used to discipline the perpetrator. I also insisted on the expertise the centre should have to be able to assist the Canadian Armed Forces in terms of training programs. Finally, I especially insisted on the fact that it would be important for the centre to act as the central point of data collection. In fact, without data, we will never know what is happening in terms of sexual assault or sexual harassment.
Today, I would rather like to talk to you about something else.
There are two other issues that I discussed in my report but on which I never insisted. The first is leadership. It is a very well-known management rule that without personal engagement of the senior leadership, there will be no change of culture. I made that point in my report.
I'll read the first sentence of section 4.4.2, which I titled “Proactive Leadership”:
In order to bring about cultural change in an organization, and to reduce the occurrence of sexual harassment and sexual assault, it is essential that senior leaders, and particularly those with general oversight responsibilities, become directly engaged in cultural reform.
As soon as August 2015, the then chief of the defence staff issued an operation order in which he stated that he would establish a global strategy and an action plan for responding to sexual misconduct. I thought my message had been heard, but it took more than five years before we got to see this global strategy. I have already made some comments on this strategy. Amongst my other comments, I said that I thought it lacked concrete measures. Apparently, this is in the action plan, but the action plan, I understand, is not public.
I want to repeat here that without strong engagement from the senior leaders, the armed forces culture will not change. The years that passed only made it more difficult to restore the trust in the leadership. I can only hope that the new leaders will have understood the situation and will rise to the challenge. That's my point on leadership.
My second point concerns the lack of clarity of the policies and procedures on intimate relationships. That, I understand, was mentioned by the current acting chief of the defence staff. On that issue, I refer to section 6.2 of my report, where I expressed the view that the policies needed to be clarified to address more explicitly the power imbalance, including by creating an administrative presumption that where the relationship is not properly disclosed, the relationship should be considered to be an adverse personal relationship.
To my knowledge, the policy on personal relationships—that's DAOD 5019-1—has not been changed.
The text of that policy is a source of confusion. The organizational structure of the Canadian Armed Forces is the reason behind an inherent risk of abuse of power. That is what my recommendation on the presumption of harmful relationships was intended to remedy. I can only note that there appeared to be a lack of will to change in 2015. I hope the message is now clear.
I am available to answer your questions.