Transport Committee on Nov. 9th, 2006

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Don Bell]

We now have a quorum, so I'll call this Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities to order. The orders of the day are, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), for an examination of security issues at the Montreal-Trudeau airport.

We have witnesses appearing today from the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority. We have: Mr. Jacques Duchesneau, president and chief executive officer; Mark Duncan, executive vice-president and chief operating Officer; Kevin McGarr, vice-president and chief technology officer.

From Aéroports de Montréal, we have James Cherry, president and chief executive officer, and Normand Boivin, vice-president, airport operations.

There will also be, at the end of the meeting, approximately 10 minutes' committee business for the question of estimates.

Before we proceed, I want to mention that we had a notification from the Parliamentary Press Gallery of the intention to video-record today's meeting. This is not for television for CPAC; it would be for Radio Canada.

I'll just read this out:

The Parliamentary Press Gallery, in following the guidelines set out by the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, can with reasonable notice advise the Clerk of the Committee of their intent to video-record a committee meeting.

Notification was provided two hours in advance of the meeting, as the Notice had been amended the previous day on account of a change in meeting room. It is up to the members of the Committee to decide if reasonable notice has been given.

In other words, if there is objection to the video-recording, we should state so at this time; otherwise, we will just proceed.

Do I hear any objection? Hearing none, we'll just move ahead.

We'll move to the witnesses now. Mr. Duchesneau, I presume you're leading off for your group.

[Jacques Duchesneau, President and Chief Executive Officer, Canadian Air Transport Security Authority]

Yes, I am, Mr. Chair.

We're pleased to be here with you today.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, for the purposes of our appearance today, I would like to reiterate that CATSA's main objective is to protect the public and to provide a level of service in air transport security that is professional, effective and uniform across the country.

For your information, I will begin with a brief overview of the six responsibilities contained in the mandate of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority. Those six responsibilities are described in the folder which was distributed to you. I will talk about them briefly.

The six responsibilities are: pre-board screening of passengers and their carry-on baggage; hold baggage screening; non-passenger screening in restricted areas of Class I and II airports; development of a restricted area identification card; administration of the Canadian Air Carrier Protective Program; and administration of Government of Canada funding agreements for supplementary police services.

Through these various security activities and elements, we have succeeded in accomplishing two things: reducing the risk of attacks against civil aviation and regaining the public's confidence in air transport. According to a survey conducted by Decima Research for CATSA in March 2006, 94% of the travelling public said they have confidence in the system in place to ensure air transportation security in Canadian airports.

I believe that this increased confidence comes from the fact that travellers who transit Canadian airports are protected by one of the most advanced air security systems in the world. Incidentally, CATSA has met ICAO—International Civil Aviation Organization—international security standards by screening 100% of checked baggage on international flights. In so doing, CATSA also met a national standard for domestic commercial flights in 89 Canadian airports.

Having said this, we must understand that in order to be truly effective, a security system must be viable. To create such a system, we must strike a balance between sufficient screening measures and detections of threats and risk on the one hand, and an efficient flow of travellers and baggage through screening points on the other. In order to maintain the efficiency of the air transport system, I believe it is unrealistic to have an environment of air transport security that is 100% infallible, an opinion shared by many experts in air transport security.

Why? It's because it is unrealistic to think we can eliminate 100% of the threats in civil aviation. In fact, such a screening would encumber the air transport network to the point of paralyzing it. That is why we have a multi-layered security system.

I would also argue that we must assign resources and staff according to threats and risks, whether it is through screening techniques or technologies. I would add that human capital must be integrated into the system and be used to its full potential. I firmly believe that any new security screening layer must, above all, improve the efficiency of the system. It must not encumber it in any way. It must never be superficial and bring no added value.

As the authority providing air transport security screening, CATSA strives to act in a preventive and proactive fashion. In this respect, we use the following model to guide our actions and strategies. We call it the AGILE model. Because terrorists are not static, we need to be agile.

AGILE is a five-part concept of action rather than reaction. It is based on flexibility rather than rigidity, and coordination rather than isolation.

The first phase of this model is assess. We have to better understand the environment we are working in by working closely with our partners in air transport security to keep abreast of the constantly changing threats to air transport throughout the world, and more particularly in Canada.

The second phase is to guard. By adding enhanced layers of security, we are better able to protect the travelling public, our airports, and our airplanes against potential attacks.

The third phase is to intervene. We need to ensure that we have sufficient mechanisms to intervene in the event of any incidents that threaten the security of our operations and travels.

The fourth and fifth phases are to learn and to evolve. These two phases are essential for ensuring that our practices and procedures remain relevant and effective.

In the area of continuous improvement, allow me to draw your attention to the following CATSA achievements.

First, screening services contracts include important clauses that encourage an improved uniform control process, an enhanced performance management program, and improvements in the code of ethics and bilingualism requirements.

Second, CATSA has developed the restricted area identification card, or RAIC, incorporating technology that identifies the fingerprints and iris of the card holder. By the end of December 2006, the authorities of 29 Class I and II airports will have replaced the previous restricted area pass with this new biometric identification card.

Third, with regard to non-passenger screening in restricted areas of airports, CATSA conducts random screening in 29 Class I and II airports in Canada of all persons with access to restricted areas under the authorization of Transport Canada and its security screening. CATSA applies this screening consistently to pilots, plumbers and maintenance staff. This is just one of the many air transport security measures in Canada.

Mr. Chair, if we are determined to maintain a safe and efficient air transport system, I definitely believe that what is most important is to continually improve our screening methods and procedures. Although screening devices, barriers, and detectors are important, it is our courage and determination to preserve the values we cherish and to overcome adversity that remain our true instruments of action.

That is my testimony, Mr. Chair.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Don Bell]

Thank you.

Is Mr. Duncan or Mr. McGarr going to speak at this time?

[Jacques Duchesneau]

No. Put the burden on me.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Don Bell]

Thank you. That's fine. I gave you a little extra time anyhow because your presentation was concise.

Mr. Cherry.

[James Cherry, President and Chief Executive Officer, Aéroports de Montréal (Dorval and Mirabel)]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Members of the committee, ladies and gentlemen, my name is James Cherry and I am President and Chief Executive Officer of Aéroports de Montréal. I am accompanied today by Normand Boivin, Vice-President of Airport Operations.

We would like to thank you for giving us this opportunity to provide an overview of the system implemented at Montréal-Trudeau Airport to protect the public, civil aviation and airport facilities. We would like to begin, however, with a few definitions and clarifications.

We draw a distinction between the terms security and safety. Security consists in the prevention of unlawful acts, for example those perpetrated by organized crime or by terrorists, while airport or airline safety consists of the prevention of accidents. The two notions are often overlapping; a measure may cover both security and safety.

Risk is another notion that is closely tied to security and safety. At Montreal-Trudeau the risks are not the same in all areas of the airport facility. The security and safety measures deployed vary from one sector to the next according to the anticipated risk level.

As you can also appreciate, our security and safety system consists of several layers. Intelligence gathering is an initial line of defence and perimeter control is the second. Within the perimeter we have surveillance, which also involves several levels, and so on, down to searches, screening, and detection equipment.

Lastly, while security and safety are certainly major concerns, in our capacity as administrators our job is also to oversee efficient airport operations.

Members of the travelling public are willing to submit to all manner of requirements in terms of security and safety, but when they choose to fly, it is because they want to get from Point A to Point B in the shortest possible time. So fluidity of traffic and shorter wait times are also important considerations, as are costs.

Having made these clarifications, it is now my pleasure to present this overview of the key components of our security and safety system at Montreal-Trudeau.

Aéroports de Montréal is responsible for the management, operation and development of Montréal-Trudeau and Montréal,-Mirabel airports under the terms of a lease entered into with Transport Canada in 1992. Overseeing security and safety at the airports is an integral part of our mission. We ensure that relevant laws and regulations are applied by the various stakeholders operating at the airport, and we apply the laws and regulations that come under our own jurisdiction.

As you can imagine, this is a very important and significant task. An airport such as Trudeau has a territory of about 13.5 square kilometres, including nearly 8.5 square kilometres of restricted area; a perimeter of 30 km, including 24 km of fence; more than 11 million passengers, and one million meeters and greeters annually; more than 150,000 tonnes of cargo annually; 550 daily flights; more than 20,000 employees; and 270 businesses, several of which also have direct runway access. There are also three million vehicle movements in and around the property every year.

Security and safety encompass several areas, including aircraft security; passenger and bag security; cargo security; safety of civil aviation operations; crime prevention--theft, drug trafficking, etc.; border protection--the airport is a port of entry; security of employees; public safety; and road safety.

The mandates of stakeholders involved in security and safety at Montréal-Trudeau are determined under Canadian laws and regulations. ADM is responsible for coordinating actions within its territory and facilities.

There is a chart in the papers you have in front of you. It shows a breakdown of the security responsibilities. Ultimate responsibility for civil aviation security rests with the Government of Canada. They've chosen to delegate certain of those authorities, as you can see in the chart, to other agencies within the government, and in the case of ADM, by virtue of a lease for certain portions as well. I'll get into the details a little bit of how those responsibilities break down, but you might want to make reference to that chart at page 5, which will be useful throughout.

First, we have the CBSA, the Canadian Border Services Agency, which is responsible for the Customs program; we have Citizenship and Immigration Canada's Intelligence, Interdiction and Enforcement program; the Canadian Food Inspection Agency's Import Inspection at Ports of Entry program; and the presence of inspectors and specialized units in the passenger terminal, cargo area and sometimes on aircraft.

The RCMP has responsibility under the current system for federal airport investigation services, including organized crime and drug trafficking; the immigration and passport section, responsible for illegal immigrants and human trafficking; the customs and excise section of the RCMP that's responsible for smuggling; and the integrated national security enforcement team. As well, as part of the Canadian air carrier protection program, the RCMP is responsible for the air marshalls program.

Transport Canada has retained full responsibility for the regulation of air transport safety and security, the establishment of security and safety standards at all airports, the tests and audits of that system, and the reliability screening of airport staff. Together with the RCMP and CSIS, it is they who issue the directive to the airports to issue an airside pass.

CATSA, Mr. Duchesneau's organization, is responsible for passenger searches in Montreal's airports for three pre-boarding checkpoints, all the searches of checked baggage, supply of search and explosives-detection equipment, and the search of employees at main access points to the restricted areas. Their workforce is provided by Garda, a subcontractor.

The ADM Airport Patrol is a specialized law-enforcement agency with about 200 staff members. It is the only Canadian airport agency accredited by CALEA, a body that is similar to ISO for law enforcement agencies. The Airport Patrol's role includes surveillance, prevention, intervention and law enforcement. It is important to note that its members are unarmed.

Airport Patrol members are responsible for patrolling the entire territory, and act as first responders. The Patrol applies traffic and road safety regulations, and issues airside driver's permits. It possesses and operates specialized equipment for detecting explosives, managing bomb threats and suspicious packages, as well as threat information and assessment. Following a screening process by Transport Canada, it issues employee passes, and searches employees at access points to restricted areas in facilities under ADM control. Lastly, the Patrol develops emergency plans and procedures.

ADM also has a Fire Service.

ADM has a close relationship with the City of Montreal Police Force. The City of Montreal police officers are responsible for providing 911 services as first responders, including all criminal aspects. They are also responsible for public safety. Under a special agreement with ADM, they also have a series of specific responsibilities, including the responding to alarms at security checkpoints, ensuring a police presence in the U.S. customs pre-clearance section, and ensuring a police presence in the boarding area for flights to Ronald Reagan National Airport in Washington.

Another portion of our responsibility that's quite important is related to, as I mentioned, the large number of tenants that are on the airport property and that in fact form part of the perimeter. They are responsible--it's clearly indicated in their leases--for compliance with regulations and, if applicable, control of access to restricted areas within their own facilities. They are also subject to Transport Canada security intrusion testing--it happens frequently--and they're subject to the intrusion testing by the airport's own patrol visits program.

The airlines themselves have a great deal of responsibility in the system as well. They're responsible for the security of their aircraft. They're responsible for cargo security. They're responsible for the access control to their aircraft, and they're also responsible for the searches of their aircraft in threat situations.

One of the things that has been put in place that is relatively unique to Montreal is the significant network of information and intelligence sharing. We have three key committees involved in that. One is the airport operators committee, which groups ADM, the airlines, government agencies, Nav Canada, and the aviation service suppliers. It's the coordination of all operations.

We also have--I believe this is still unique to Montreal--a committee of law enforcement agency managers. All of the people who have any law enforcement responsibility at our airports have regular meetings to have information exchanges and coordination.

As well, our committee of partners for airport protection regroups law enforcement agencies, public security services, and CATSA. Its objective, obviously, is public safety.

We have a fully staffed operations coordination centre with a calls and distribution centre operational 24/7. It's managed by our airport patrol people as well. They're responsible also for emergency response coordination, which brings all internal and external players under a single command centre in the event of a crisis. When necessary, it can be supported by a mobile command post, which we control as well.

In conclusion, we would like to remind honourable members that major improvements have been made to the system over the years, notably in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001. Indeed, the security system in place at all major Canadian airports has been considerably strengthened.

Among other things, surveillance has been tightened for the entire airport territory and in all facilities. We have sophisticated equipment designed to protect civil aviation in this country. The police presence has been beefed up, enabling faster response times in case of incidents. Access by non-passengers to restricted areas is better controlled, and we are expecting delivery of the new biometrics-based restricted area passes, as mentioned earlier by Mr. Duchesneau.

Passenger and baggage searches have been made more systematic. For example, explosives-detection systems have been installed to ensure all checked baggage is inspected. Moreover, the list of items prohibited on board aircraft has been adjusted in response to new threats. Lastly, new coordination mechanisms have been created.

I should add that, in the wake of recent media reports, without waiting to hear the results of the Transport Canada inquiry, we met individually with each of our tenants to remind them of their responsibilities with respect to control of access to restricted areas.

The system is therefore dynamic and is being constantly upgraded, and of course, additional enhancements can be made to it in the future. For example, we have previously suggested some avenues for improvement, such as part of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority's five-year review, on which we made recommendations to this same committee in 2001. We've also noted that cargo security could be rendered more systematic by applying the same formula for the sharing of responsibilities as for passenger searches.

Finally, we remain open to any other initiative that aims to provide for enhanced cooperation among all stakeholders and improved security and safety in our airports.

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for listening.

We are now ready to answer any questions you may have—provided, of course—that the information requested is not of a sensitive nature, and that it lies directly within our purview.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Don Bell]

Thank you.

Mr. Boivin, I presume you're available for questions. You don't have a presentation this time.

I would like to acknowledge that we have joining us Jeff Watson, who I gather is a new member of this committee. Welcome, Jeff.

We have, as replacement members, Stephen Owen from the Liberal side and Larry Miller from the Conservatives. Welcome.

Going into questions, Mr. McGuinty.

[David McGuinty, Liberal, Ottawa South, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. We had been waiting for you for some time. I very much enjoyed your presentations.

I'd like to start, if I could, by recalling what shocked Canadians in September in a series of articles in Le Journal de Montréal. A journalist had covertly entered restricted areas of a major Canadian airport, borrowed a non-passenger uniform, potentially tampered with food, accessed a secure tarmac, reached the runway perimeter, got behind the wheel of a ground vehicle, got airside by borrowing a genuine CATSA uniform from a former employee. For most Canadians who saw this story, there are some serious questions about the security of our airports.

Also in September, a former airport screener, hired and employed by the private company Garda, blew the whistle because he was concerned about Canadian airport security. He still had his uniform because no one had bothered to ask for it back. Garda refused to comment about the story, citing their contractual relationship with the government, and the minister, who was asked twice to comment on it, declined to comment and said nothing about it. Eight weeks later, on November 6, Garda's contracts were all renewed--28 airports, $220 million over two years to 2009.

I think you know where I'm going with this. I want to ask you about accountability. Our Senate colleagues on all sides of the House have been asking questions about this for two years.

First, what is CATSA's responsibility here? Second, who failed? And third, do you have enough money to do what you've been mandated to do as an organization?

[Jacques Duchesneau]

In relation to the incident in Montreal, I can give you part of the answer, and my colleague Mr. Cherry will complete the answer.

On accountability, CATSA is accountable. We're not pleased with the situation, and we took action. As a matter of fact, we took action back in 2005 when we were asked by a reporter to give certain details about uniforms. As of April 2005, we issued a security bulletin explaining the importance of the uniform, but I need to stress the point right away that the uniform itself does not give access to the restricted area. A uniform is a way to represent CATSA, but it's really the restricted area pass that gives access to the restricted area.

As of December 31 of this year, not only will we have a pass, but we will have a pass with biometrics. So even though you have a uniform, no matter what kind of uniform, you will not be in a position to access the restricted area.

From April 2005 on, we have put the onus on the service provider to get the uniforms back. As a matter of fact, in the bulletin that I referred to, we have a fine of $900 for uniforms that are not returned. It so happened that they took action, and now we have uniform representatives working out of major airports for each of the service providers.

In September 2005, we did a first review, an audit, of 15 airports. There were some problems that were dealt with quickly, and solutions were brought forward. In December 2005, one of the major problems we had was shields, metal shields, that were held on a shirt with Velcro. The Velcro was not good enough, so they kept losing them. Now if you go through airports, you will see that we don't have metal shields anymore; it's all embroidered. CATSA's logo is embroidered on the shirt. So we solved that problem.

I need to refer to the article that brought all this together. They talked about over 1,000 uniforms being stolen. It was not 1,000 uniforms stolen, it was parts of the uniform, so the shield, and the name tag that you could have done anywhere around town. These were parts of the uniform. We could not have enough pieces to put one uniform together, and I think it is important for me to underline that aspect.

We did a second review of the uniform program in February 2006 at 20 other airports, and the note we have now is that this program is under control.

That's for the uniforms, and as I said in my opening remarks, we are responsible for six specific mandates. The other issues that you raise are the airports' responsibility.

[James Cherry]

I am going to respond to the portion of the question Mr. McGuinty asked with respect to the intrusions that took place in September 2006.

Let me begin, if you don't mind, by correcting some of the misperceptions in that event. There were a couple of things that were misstated. First of all, the journalist did in fact get hold of a vehicle, but it was on the ground side of the airport. It was never in a restricted zone. It was a Handlex vehicle, and it's well documented that the vehicle was not in the restricted zone, it was outside the restricted zone.

Most of the interventions he made were in areas in tenants' properties, where he got inside the building and there were open doors at the far end of the building--hangar doors, frankly--which would have given him access to the runway. He never did actually get access to the runway in any of those instances.

There were two times when he did get access to what we call the restricted zone. One time he went underneath the fence, on Ryan Avenue, which is in the general aviation area. This is about a mile and a half from the main terminal, to the east of the main terminal, where private airplanes land and take off. He went underneath the fence, had his picture taken and escaped back underneath the fence before the patrol came around and found him. But he was a long way from the operational area of the main tarmac and he didn't even approach the runway, didn't approach the taxiway. He was only on the other side of a restricted zone fence.

As I mentioned at the outset, we have about 30 kilometres of perimeter that are patrolled regularly, frequently, but we don't have somebody at every point along that perimeter constantly.

The other time he made an intrusion into what we call the restricted area, he was actually accompanied by somebody from one of our tenants. The tenant did not follow the protocol, because you're not allowed to bring somebody out on the tarmac unless...he was escorted, but he didn't have a “with escort” pass on. So he did gain access to the tarmac, but he was escorted. There was somebody with him. So he wasn't walking by himself on the tarmac at that point.

The one you made reference to, which frankly I do find the most troubling and the one that we've reacted.... We've reacted in all instances, by the way, but I want to reassure people that the one everybody has taken very seriously was the intrusion in Cara, even though that's not even inside the restricted zone. The Cara kitchens are outside the restricted area of the airport.

Because of the nature of that intrusion, we were very concerned about it, as were the people from Cara, as were the people who use their food, the airlines. You can rest assured that steps have been taken to make certain there will not be a repeat of that. We have stepped up our vigilance in the case.... We have always been visiting these people and looking into their compliance with our rules, but we've stepped up those procedures to make sure there will not be a repeat of that.

Having said that, is a 30-kilometre perimeter absolutely leak proof? No, it is not. It is not armed, it is not electrified. It is a fence with barbed wire, but as you know, there are ways to get through or around fences like that. This is why I mentioned during the course of my presentation that there are layers of measures put into place. If somebody gets through that fence, there are patrols, and the patrols are frequent, and we can and do catch people who get over the fences with those patrols. It's a long way from Ryan Avenue, where this person got into the airport and over that fence to have his famous picture taken, to where the operational end of the airport is. A lot of opportunities to have him apprehended before that would have happened. As I said, he wasn't in there very long. He went in, had his picture snapped, and jumped back underneath again.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Don Bell]

Thank you.

Mr. Laframboise.

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, in spite of everything you have said, one fact remains: on September 11 of last year, a single man—journalist Fabrice de Pierrebourg—succeeded in circumventing all your security systems. That is a fact. That is why we are here today, and why you are here today.

[An hon. member]

Did you understand the answer—

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

I did understand the answer, but it remains that what happened did indeed happen. My first question is to Mr. Duchesneau.

Mr. Duchesneau, something is worrying me and has prompted me to push my investigations further. Before you took up your current position, you sat on the Garda board of directors. That is a known fact. Since 2004, Garda has been responsible for security at Montréal-Trudeau Airport, and probably supplanted the former security manager or company for all kinds of reasons that I do not wish to know. Nonetheless, it remains that, at the time, you were well aware that a number of uniforms were not returned. It was clear at the time that something was wrong. I know that you subsequently made a number of changes to the uniforms. But it was known that a number of uniforms were missing. There were also a number of people who were not happy because they had been supplanted.

Later, in June 2006, an audit was carried out—correct me if I'm wrong—and the report by the Department of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities stated once again that there was no policy, and that people themselves had called for a uniform return and control policy. There was no such policy in place yet.

Today, you tell us that there will be a policy in place as of September.

That worries me, Mr. Duchesneau. For all kinds of reasons, among other things because companies have obtained contracts, companies too close to you because you once sat on the board of directors—I don't want to ask you about conflict of interest issues here—people believe that their security is threatened. I am worried about the fact that there are uniforms outside your control. Today, you said in the brief you tabled that the services contract signed with Garda contains a clause on improving the uniform control process.

I understand that they are your friends, but nonetheless uniforms from the preceding company are still in circulation. That was a company which was not happy with the way things went. There are companies who are not happy. Your friends, once again... Companies were supplanted, evicted, and Garda was awarded contracts to provide security elsewhere, not just in Montreal.

So in the industry there are people who are not happy about the way things have turned out. That worries me, because I wouldn't want to see incidents happen, and I wouldn't want to see things go further.

So do you think you have full control, at least over uniforms, given the way things turned out with the former company, and given the situation with Garda today? Can you assure me that those circulating uniforms will not cause problems?

[Jacques Duchesneau]

I understand your concern, Mr. Chair, but because you focused on the expression “friends” twice, I would like to clarify something from the outset.

When I applied for the position I currently occupy, the first page of my CV stated that I had held an administrative position within Garda that, at the time, had a staff of approximately 2,000. Today, Garda has more than 20,000 employees. So, when you refer to my friends, remember that the company I was involved with at the time and the company that calls itself Garda today are as different as day and night.

I would not want to infer from your comments — because that would be very hurtful to me — that you were implying something negative in your use of the word friends.

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

But you know them very well. This begs another question. I did not think that you would react the way you did and I am compelled to mention that Unicom, another company whose board of directors you were a part of, was granted the airport's biometric monitoring contract.

I would be concerned if Unicom's competitors provided information, through technological means, to unreliable people. Do you understand?

[Jacques Duchesneau]

I understand your reasoning.

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

They would be doing this to trap you because they are upset with you. I am concerned about this and that is why I am trying to determine what the situation is.

Are you comfortable with your relationship with the industry, in the position that you currently hold?

[Jacques Duchesneau]

Mr. Chairman, now it has been presented in that light I understand your concern. I can tell you, in fact, that given my commitment in the past, I am in no way responsible for awarding contracts.

I will let Mr. Duncan tell you how this works. I've withdrawn from those boards and declared those interests. Furthermore, when contracts are awarded, my organization's board replaces me, if you will. Nevertheless, my chief of operations is responsible for analyzing proposals and even drawing up the specifications, and proceeding with the analysis and presentation.

You're familiar with my past. Throughout my whole life I have been threatened in all sorts of ways by all sorts of people and I walk a straight line. I can look anyone in the eyes and tell them that I walk a straight line. That is not something I am worried about.

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

Just so that we understand each other, I am not questioning any possible interests on your part. I told you this from the outset. The problem is that uniforms disappeared; previous companies did not hand them all in and that is a known fact.

Can we therefore expect other incidents such as those? Let's go back to biometrics, because...

[Jacques Duchesneau]

With respect to the uniforms, we were worried about this when the article was published in the Regina newspaper and was then published throughout the country. We took steps and I am comfortable with the current measures. I will be even more comfortable with them when all the biometric cards will have been deployed throughout the country. That's probably the best insurance policy you can have. It doesn't mean anything for someone to simply wear uniform, even if their photograph is on the first page of the Journal de Montréal in one of our uniforms—you could do that the same thing with any organization that has employees in uniform: you lend a uniform and someone takes a photo.

What you should be concerned about and what we are also concerned about is the possibility of someone having access to the restricted zone, not only with a uniform but with a pass. We are concerned about that but I can tell you that that is not what happened.

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

Yet, given that we're talking about biometrics, we're being told that without any geosurveillance—because there is no surveillance nor are there any surveillance cameras—anybody could open the doors and get away, because you have no surveillance system. Geosurveillance is probably the responsibility of the ADM, the Montreal airport, but nobody has wanted to combine biometrics and geosurveillance. I'm not the only one who thinks that. There are people who are critical of biometric monitoring and who also want area surveillance to be used, that is, that cameras be installed for the purposes of surveillance at all the entrances; but that is not something you considered.

[Jacques Duchesneau]

And that isn't something that we will consider because we must not fall into the trap of magical thinking. I have here a biometric identification card. If we had geosurveillance, I could have left this at the office and you would have thought I was at the office all afternoon when I was here. So establishing security measures does not involve magical thinking. It's very important to point that out.

I heard a comment to the effect that geosurveillance would solve all our problems. But no, it won't solve all our problems. What I can tell you about this biometric card—and we often compare ourselves to other countries—is that in our case, it's not a dream, it's becoming a reality. By December 31st, all of our employees in the country's main airports will have this card. In other countries, tens of millions of dollars are being invested and they're still at the pilot project stage. So I think we should be given some credit for what has been accomplished.

In terms of the technological details, Mr. McGarr could provide you with more information.

Mr. McGarr.

[Kevin McGarr, Vice-President and Chief Technology Officer, Canadian Air Transport Security Authority]

With your permission, Mr. Chairman.

The technology that we developed for our identification card within regulated zones is the type of technology that can work with systems such as those you mentioned. We have conducted trials. This technology is compatible with geosurveillance, if ever people wanted to include that on the card.

Trials were conducted. It can work, but it is not our responsibility to include on that card more than two operations that were requested, that is, to, first, ensure through biometric monitoring that the person using the card is actually the person registered in the program and to, second, verify in real time that the card corresponds to a valid security code issued by Transport Canada. We conduct that verification through a central data bank. If the need or will existed, the card would be compatible with geosurveillance technologies.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Don Bell]

That's the time, Mr. Laframboise.

I've allowed both to go over, and I'll do the same for the Conservatives.

Mr. Fast.