Transport Committee on April 30th, 2007

[Todd Cotie]

Yes, for 12 years I was a maintenance worker, a machine operator, the guy who cleared snow on the track or things like that--spikers, on maintenance crews. This is a position I've had just recently.

[Robert Carrier, Bloc, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

All right.

I want to get back to the safety management system that others, including my colleague, talked about earlier. I believe this system was put in place by Transport Canada in 2000 and has been implemented by CN Rail for the past five years. We were told about a system that enhances safety and was applied in cooperation with Transport Canada to make sure the company has an adequate safety management system. We were also told that inspections are still being carried out by Transport Canada inspectors.

Is this the situation, as you perceive it, in your company?

[Todd Cotie]

I'm not sure of the frequency of their inspections. I have worked in local areas where track inspectors inspect it every second day, and then, depending on weather conditions, maybe every day.

My point was about slowing trains down. In that area, when we're working a night shift, there are fewer inspections at night, and these things happen like that. At minus 40, a rail can break fairly easily, and the track conditions aren't being inspected always...maybe daily, maybe twice a day, but not always.

[Robert Carrier, Bloc, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

So inspections are being carried out. The management system is based on self-regulation, as Mr. Chudnovsky said. The company manages its own safety.

Did you see how this system is applied in companies? Can you confirm all the improvements it brought about, apart from the inspections?

[Todd Cotie]

I can't say that allowing CN to govern their own safety has worked. For example, the contractors are allowing the company to wash their hands of the liability. They may manage us, as unionized employees, but not the contractors. We had an incident in which one of our employees was dismissed for not abiding by the drug and alcohol policy of CN. He was working unsafely. So he was dismissed, and then he came back on the property as a contractor, and he was on the property for--I don't know--six months before anybody saw this. He wasn't good enough to work as a CN employee, but he was hidden through the contracting system.

So CN, through that, can wash their hands of that type of thing.

[Robert Carrier, Bloc, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

Thank you. This is somewhat disturbing as it relates to this safety management system. And they are considering implementing it in air transport.

I want to get back to what Mr. Chudnovsky said about the sale of B.C. Rail. You give us examples proving that the sale of B.C. Rail to CN Rail led to the lowering of many safety standards, such as dynamic brakes, that the department had to reinstate later on. You can almost conclude that the safety requirements of Transport Canada, which is the department that we, as parliamentarians, have to count on to apply these standards—It seems to me that this sale has considerably reduced safety and that Transport Canada tolerates this situation.

Is this accurate?

[David Chudnovsky]

I think that's correct, and that is what has been reported to me by people who do this work in our province.

[Robert Carrier, Bloc, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you.

Mr. Watson.

[Jeff Watson, Conservative, Essex, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses for appearing.

Where to begin here? Of course, we did have CN before the committee last week. I didn't find their testimony particularly helpful.

Mr. Cotie, you said CN thinks that accidents are the fault of bad individual workers. The union's perspective is that the change needs to be made at the top in safety culture. I'm inclined to believe you after CN's testimony here last week.

They performed what they said was an efficiency audit. I was rather alarmed that they don't call it a safety audit. I think that's probably some indicator into the culture at CN. I hope we're all alarmed that they call it an efficiency audit rather than a safety audit.

They said there was massive failure among workers to comply. They were alarmed at how widespread it was. I had contended with them that if there was that much failure to comply by workers, that's a systems problem, that's higher up--those who actually have oversight of the workers.

I don't know whether any of you can lend some insight into this. Perhaps the union would have some understanding of it. If I have the wrong union, maybe it's a union out west.

I asked the question, how many workers have been disciplined for safety problems? As well, I asked, how many middle or upper management have been disciplined over safety problems? They didn't provide that kind of information to this committee. Can you shed some light on that? I'd be interested to know who in fact is paying for the problem with the safety culture at CN.

[Todd Cotie]

They don't necessarily say they discipline for violating...well, I guess what it means is that even if they injure themselves, they'll find a way to discipline the employee because it's their fault. “Human behaviour” is the catchphrase right now. It's human behaviour.

I was told before the vice-presidents came here, because I was in that health and safety meeting, that had the employee who got killed in Cornwall done her train inspection properly, which is a rule violation, she would have lived. You would get disciplined for not doing that inspection. She died.

Now, they would talk about this for five or ten minutes, but it was never brought up.... I did bring it up. I said, “Why was she working by herself?” This is a case of a lone worker. Had she been with somebody else, likely she would have been alive. They would have done their inspection. There would have been more sets of eyes and things like that. But that's the kind of thing I'm saying: it's our fault.

As for the rule 42 that I was talking about, the flagging system, the entire onus of that system is based on the employee getting out of the way. The operational part is non-existent. That's why we're asking for the slowdown. I mean, the thing there is that you could die if you don't get out of the way.

[Jeff Watson, Conservative, Essex, ON]

Can the union be of any assistance in getting some of those numbers to this committee?

[Todd Cotie]

Sure.

[Jeff Watson, Conservative, Essex, ON]

I'd appreciate that.

I asked a question of Mr. Creel about CN's GOI. We had heard from Mr. Rhodes before this committee that safety used to be number one when you flipped open your book for the GOI. He says it's now number four.

I asked the question to Mr. Creel. He then sent an e-mail to this committee—Mr. Chair, I believe you've received it as well. He says, “As Mr. Watson requested...”, and he quotes something out of the “Canadian Rail Operating Rules”, as if that's what I requested. That's not what I requested. What I requested was what does their GOI show.

I presume CN won't be forthcoming if I ask them again to give me another copy of that. Can the union be helpful in showing us what it actually says? Where does safety really...? I want this committee to see with its own eyes--

[Todd Cotie]

In the general operating instructions?

[Jeff Watson, Conservative, Essex, ON]

Yes. And can that be tabled with the committee at some point, in both official languages, so we can have it?

[Todd Cotie]

I do have it. This is a book. This is basically the request to slow trains down.

I take a lot from the GOI. The emphasis is on safety. The employee is responsible. The supervisor is responsible. The same language is in the Canada Labour Code. You'll see that in the GOI.

Actually, if you want, I think I have a copy of the GOI in this bag, so that can be easily done for you.

[Jeff Watson, Conservative, Essex, ON]

I think the committee would like to see that, because we certainly want to verify who's telling the truth on this one, whether it's Mr. Rhodes or whether it's CN. I'd love the committee to be able to determine that.

Last, I asked the CN officials whether they would admit that they had broken trust with Canadians. We got a very interesting reply from Mr. Creel. He said, “ I acknowledge that the perception is certainly there that we've broken trust with Canadians.” I don't think that gives an awful lot of confidence to those within the organization that CN in fact embraces a safety culture.

Now, there's a Railway Safety Act review under way. Is there any insight for us at the committee on what should be informed in that? Do you have any recommendations? Or if you'd like, in the future you could certainly send them to this committee. We'd be interested in your thoughts on informing that process for us.

That's all, Mr. Chair. Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you, Mr. Watson.

Monsieur Bélanger is next. He has given his time to Mr. Bell.

[Don Bell, Liberal, North Vancouver, BC]

Thank you.

We had a report from a railway worker, a conductor in North Vancouver, in fact, who had provided some material. Some of the issues he talked about related to B.C. Rail, and it's covered, Mr. Chudnovsky, in one of your reports as well. He said that B.C. Rail maintained a joint derailment prevention task force consisting of senior management, union reps, and government regulators, which met quarterly to discuss derailment prevention strategies and review derailment reports, and that CN cancelled this.

That concerned me, with the combination of the difference in terrain and basically applying what appears to be a GOI suited to water-grade railways, or to more or less level railways that follow the levels of the rivers, in B.C.

What concerned me as well was that when they had the spikes they did have, particularly in the west, they didn't seem to respond fast. They responded, but it looks, in my opinion, as though it wasn't fast enough and wasn't identified.

The phase two audit reported that there were systems in place, and an adequate system, I think it said—I don't know whether the word “adequate” was used, but it implied that there was a good system in place—to report things. It's a question of the follow-up, between when the thing gets reported and the action is taken to respond to the problem.

I don't know whether Mr. Kosinski or Mr. Cotie have heard or would comment. I guess you're not able to talk about B.C. as such, but when we hear about these other derailments, such as in Ontario—yesterday, I think it was, and there have been other derailments as well—it doesn't appear to be only CN. CN seems to be the one we've heard most prominently about, and the audit, of course, was there.

The final question, Mr. Chudnovsky, is this. You mentioned that you had asked for four different packages of information and got one of them. It was frustrating for us, because under Mr. Lapierre, the federal Minister of Transport in the previous government, these audits were ordered and were going to be made public, and then they weren't. I gather that's for a combination of reasons—perhaps the Railway Safety Act, under which the approval of the railway is apparently needed to release some of this. It was very frustrating. I don't know whether you have any comment on that.

[David Chudnovsky]

On the question of the release of the audit, what we were told, for what it's worth, is that, yes, the audits were to come at the end of, I think, 2005. Then there was a federal election campaign.

What I'm reporting to you is what our researchers heard from Transport Canada or the Transportation Safety Board.

We were told that the audits were late but were completed by December 2005, and that somebody had made the decision that because there was a federal election and they didn't want it to be grist for the political mill, it was going to be delayed.

Then when the election was over—I think the election was in January, if I remember correctly—our staff basically asked the question weekly: when is the audit coming? Eventually they were told that the new minister needed to be briefed on the audit and that after the briefing the audit would be made public. After that, we were told no, the audit isn't going to be made public. It was then that we made the access to information request, which subsequently this year resulted in the making public of the audits.

[Don Bell, Liberal, North Vancouver, BC]

Are there comments on the joint derailment from the other gentlemen? Do you have any familiarity with the B.C. situation on that derailment task force?

[Todd Cotie]

I'm not familiar with this.

[George Kosinski]

Neither am I, but I can say—this just occurred to me—that before CN took over B.C. Rail, I'm not sure I ever heard of a derailment on B.C. Rail. They certainly seemed to be quite rare, if they had them at all.

[Don Bell, Liberal, North Vancouver, BC]

Would you gentlemen say that safety management systems, as outlined in the phase two report, would seem, if implemented properly, to be an effective way of addressing rail safety; that it's a question of whether they're acted upon and implemented correctly?