Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.
As a public interest researcher and frequent access user, I've spent 25 years battling to get various air safety reports made public, including going all the way to the court of appeal.
My concern is that air safety public reporting is being ambushed and essentially eliminated under Bill C-6. The reasoning is that confidential reporting is needed under a safety management system and therefore officials with airline companies believe they must end having publicly available inspection reports done. This secrecy focus must immediately be challenged and changed in the interests of the public and the travelling public.
If left intact in Bill C-6, the effect is public mistrust in air safety. There will be no more publicly available Air Canada, or WestJet, or any other audits. It will also skew Transportation Safety Board accident reports, and, possibly worse, safety errors, because there is too close a reliance on a confidential reporting relationship between airlines and Transport Canada.
The public's right to know about air safety, from repair maintenance to engine problems to human error, is in jeopardy. Fliers must feel safe on planes and be able to choose the best carrier based on up-to-date reliable information.
It is most serious that Transport Canada opts for a veil of secrecy in our skies, airports, and repair facilities.
Bill C-6, clause 43, places air safety reports in a permanent secrecy category via schedule II, section 24, of the Access to Information Act. It's being placed in the same category as tax information. Even cabinet confidences are only 20 years, and security intelligence information doesn't get exempted forever.
There are exemptions, there are public interest overrides, there are injury tests, but not in this case, and that's wrong.
Section 2 of the Access to Information Act says that the laws of this country are extended to try to open up and disclose information. Section 24, things within the act, eliminates any possibility of ever getting that information.
Part of the study of the accountability act, on which I was a witness, had this very discussion of whether we should have a public interest override section within the Access to Information Act, and even whether section 24 should be abolished. It wasn't, and this is going to be the end result if you go down this path.
Already, the effect of the SMS system is felt on access because I've already been denied the first SMS report on Air Transat done in 2003. I got documents, which were dated November, from Transport Canada. They said that as of then there were already 200 secret SMS investigation reports that the public will never get to see, however serious some of the infractions may be.
I noticed in the committee that the minister and officials came to you and said there were only 100 files. Where are the hundreds of SMS reports? When are they going to be made public?
Dozens of regulatory audits were stopped in their tracks, which I or any member of the public could have applied for, but no, they're gone because they've now been transferred, in part, to SMS. This is a power play of the worst order.
It all sounds familiar to me, though, because back in the 1990s, Transport Canada tried to implement a confidential reporting system in partnership with airlines. But when I discovered that from 1990 to 1994 they had done dozens of these studies with the industry, they immediately, once I applied for them under access and I had given the clerk the cancellation order, cancelled them in October of 1994.
Now Transport Canada has ordered that all public regulatory audits be cancelled so that work can “proceed in confidence”.
The gravity, Mr. Chairman and members, of the changes in Bill C-6 can be further illustrated by another past experience. Transport Canada tried to hide from me another confidential air safety post-accident safety survey for which I had to go all the way, for seven years, to the Federal Court of Appeal, the Nationair report where 14 Canadian crew members and 240 Nigerian Muslim pilgrims lost their lives in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on July 11, 1991. That crash occurred after takeoff and occurred because of an improperly serviced DC-8 Nationair plane.
Transport Canada at the time argued against me that revealing the Nationair report would affect the trust relationship with all airlines and any chance in future of getting confidential materials.
Well, that report, when it was revealed--and I shared it with next of kin and the media--catalogued many serious past maintenance and other deficiencies at Nationair. It also revealed that there were problems known to the regulators well in advance of the crash.
Under Bill C-6, I would never have gained access to the Nationair report. Under Bill C-6's sweeping confidentiality reporting systems, I would never get the reporting system being promoted. I would never get the cockpit tapes from the Swissair crash off the Nova Scotia coast, or any other black box tapes, so crucial for understanding what happened.
There are four fatal myths associated with this 100% confidentiality SMS reporting system that the Harper government and many in the airline industry seem, for some reason, to support, when it's going to come crashing down on them too.
One is that the airline industry will always report and always tell the truth via a confidential voluntary reporting system. I think it was Justice Dubin who destroyed that myth many years ago.
The second assumes that Transport Canada itself will maintain a healthy distance from the industry and will be diligent and always do its enforcement job in secret.
The third myth assumes that there's no need for whistle-blowing provisions because the reputed positive benefits of an immunity-based industry-government cooperative reporting system will eliminate any need for people to tell the truth.
Finally, there's a bit of a myth that there'll be more substantive records created through Transport Canada's changing to this confidential system. It's going to be like check-offs of performance standards, and not what you think is going to be the real substantive material.
The underlying problem, by way of conclusion, is that Transport Canada's minister, under the Aeronautics Act, has a dual role: one part is to protect the public when it comes to air safety and one part is to promote the expansion and commerce associated with the airline industry. In my opinion, the transport minister's primary function under Bill C-6, which should be revised, should be on air safety.
Regular, much improved, substantive, and regular air safety regulatory audits need to be done and released in a timely fashion. Air safety reporting by the industry must be transparent, must be made publicly available in objective government summary form, and must be subject to coverage under access legislation. Whistle-blowing protection guarantees must be incorporated too, under a revised Bill C-6.
Transport Minister Lawrence Cannon cannot claim that he and his officials, as they said in front of the committee, are simply adding, via an industry-government confidential non-punitive SMS reporting system, just another protective layer to improve air safety and are implementing a system far removed from airline self-regulation. Rather, they are attempting to circumvent public scrutiny and abdicating their public regulatory responsibilities.
I wouldn't feel this strongly if I hadn't got the Air Ontario regulatory audit a month after the Dryden air crash, which showed what a poor maintenance record that airline had. If that had been reviewed beforehand under access, maybe those people wouldn't have died. But you know what? Under Bill C-6, I'd never get that kind of stuff.
Bill C-6 needs to be seriously amended to bring in proactive disclosure policies and tougher air safety inspection and enforcement reporting to Transport Canada.
Thank you, members.