Transport Committee on April 22nd, 2010

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you.

Mr. Volpe.

[Joe Volpe, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

I'm going to share my time with Madam Crombie. She can finish with some of the other questions.

I'm intrigued by the repeated issue of setting up the system that Mr. Sela talks about. Has anyone asked him to sketch an outline of such a system for Canadian airports?

[Rafi Sela]

No. I gave presentations on the system and the highlights of the system at two aviation security conferences and about five TSA conferences.

I think the major problem you are looking at--Professor Salter said it very nicely, the tail that waggles the dog--is that the TSA is actually calling the shots here.

First of all, there's been no TSA chief in the United States for a year and a half, so Napolitano probably thinks it's not important.

The second thing is that Mr. Kip Hawley, who was the last TSA commissioner, took a stand that said don't confuse me with the facts. We know best, we do what we do, and that's it. You can do whatever you want to do in Israel, and that's it.

I don't think it's a good approach. I think you need to look at what we have, what the Germans have, what the Brits have, what the Singaporeans have, and whatever your allies have as technology. I know you have intelligent people. Look at those systems and have some consultants come to consult with you. You can then decide on which system fits your style of life, your laws, and the way in which you want to conduct security at the airport.

[Joe Volpe, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Does a system in the way that Mr. Sela points out make sense for Canada? Is it possible for us to say to the Americans that we're following a different system, even if many of our flights fly over American territory?

[Dr. Mark Salter]

Thank you.

I'm not against systems. I'm not against systems by their very nature. I think there's a real opportunity. if not for greater coordination then for greater transparency among the different agencies.

I think the way in which Canadians have decided to screen hold baggage is radically different from the U.S. way. The U.S. screens everyone with their most advanced technology. The Europeans use a risk-based system, and so do we. You only go to the next level of technology if the first one fails.

We've managed to maintain that standard in the face of American pressure to adopt their standard. That is an actual case of airport screening where we have managed to maintain a different standard in the face of American pressure.

[Bonnie Crombie, Liberal, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

Actually, Mr. Salter, that's a perfect segue for me, because I wanted to ask you in particular how we can better integrate our safety and security management systems with other governments. You have spoken about the U.S. government necessitates us following their lead on their aviation security, and I'm wondering if we shouldn't actually better integrate it with the U.S. and their risk management approach, and with others, particularly European governments as well. Shouldn't there be better coordination to our approach, and why isn't there? Is it because the risk assessment is different, the techniques are different, the philosophies are different? And which one body would be responsible for coordinating all of that?

[Dr. Mark Salter]

I think you have identified it perfectly. There's a fundamental disagreement at the philosophical level about the degree of risk that governments are willing to accept. The Americans want to try to have a zero-risk policy, which leads them to a sort of impossible standard. The Europeans have accepted a risk management perspective. Canada is stuck between these two philosophical differences, and I would say is benefiting from neither.

Who would be in charge of that? You'd need someone else.

Perhaps Mr. Sela knows of....

[Bonnie Crombie, Liberal, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

Yes, I'd be interested in hearing from Mr. Sela too, with regard to better integration.

[Rafi Sela]

I will say again: if you want worldwide coordination, you have to go to the ICAO. The International Civil Aviation Organization has done a great job in safety. I think they can do the same in security. But nobody right now needs it--not Canada, not the United States, not anybody else.

You need to go to ICAO and demand, and say to them, look, safety and security are now the same issue; I don't care if a plane comes down because the engine failed or because a bomb went off; you have the authority and the responsibility to put up the rules and regulations, the standards and technologies, that ought to be used in order to create a well-established aviation security system cross-global and cross-country.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Mr. Mayes.

[Colin Mayes, Conservative, Okanagan—Shuswap, BC]

Thank you to the witnesses for being here today, even if through video conferencing.

Mr. Salter, you talked about the concerns regarding the privacy of the individual. Yet those who work in airports have restricted area identification cards. There is obviously some screening done and maybe some compromise of some of the privacy of those employed in airports.

Shouldn't the air passenger be given that opportunity to give up some of that privacy in order to be identified as a safe traveller? Sometimes I feel like I'm discriminated against in the security lineup when I am put in the category of being a threat and really I'm not a threat. I am being treated differently because there might be a threat. I'm just wondering what your feelings are about having the option of being identified and moved more quickly through the airport.

Mr. Sela, I just want to ask a question about airport security. I was in the airport in Narita, Japan. Actually, they stopped the vehicles. Some of the security is actually performed outside the compound of the airport. I thought that was a good approach, where they used sniffing dogs and had the ability to check people as they go through and maybe speed up that process. I say this because security can sometimes choke the free flow of passengers to where they want to get.

First, Mr. Salter, could you talk a little bit about the privacy of the individual and maybe the opportunity for them to be identified as a safe risk?

[Dr. Mark Salter]

Thank you. I think a powerful argument has been made by air pilots, members of Parliament, members of the armed forces, and members of the police who say they've already been through security clearance and there's no utility in having them go through the same line.

If there is a previous government security clearance connected to that trusted traveller, then that makes sense to me. One of the things the RAIC process does is it goes through Transport Canada. So Transport Canada does an investigation through the RCMP and it's thus connected to the government.

I think my worry is with entirely voluntary citizen-driven, because we simply don't have enough reliable intelligence on individuals. So they may give up their privacy but to no avail.

If we think about the 9/11 hijackers, they all had credit histories that were fine, the majority of them had appropriate federal documentation, and several of them had frequent flyer things, which would all naturally lead us to think they were low-risk even though they were not.

Again I make the point that until we have reliable intelligence, voluntarism only will not lead to a good system.

[Colin Mayes, Conservative, Okanagan—Shuswap, BC]

Mr. Sela, could you let us know about perimeter security around the airport?

[Rafi Sela]

I first want to comment on what Professor Salter just said.

There is no intelligence involved in the trusted traveller program in Israel--none whatsoever. We do give trusted travellers to foreigners; we don't know anything about them. But I can tell you this about the 9/11 people: we would have caught them one by one, because they had something to hide, and we find out if you have something to hide. This is a very good system, and I do hope that somebody will take note of it.

For the perimeter security, I don't want to scare you guys, but I can take a pickup truck today, fill it with 500 kilos of explosives, drive to the front door of the terminal at Pearson, and blow it up. You will have an aviation disaster almost as big as it was in Europe with the ash. You don't even mind that all this glass that is built in the airport is not blastproof. People won't be killed by the blast. They will be killed by the glass.

You do have to know who is entering your airport. If you have a suspicious vehicle, you have to stop it. You have to stop it at such a distance that if, God forbid, it is a suicide bomber, then you can mitigate it before it creates any harm.

I can go on and on. You know the security lines you have at the airports? It's the biggest threat to aviation ever. You do not want many people to stand in one place. You want them to flow. If you stop the flow and have them wait three hours in line for a 10-second security, this is not a security measure. This is a security risk.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

We're going to go to one more round of five minutes each.

I'll start with Ms. Crombie.

[Bonnie Crombie, Liberal, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

Mr. Volpe and I were discussing the profile of the trusted traveller, Mr. Sela. Could you enlighten us all on what exactly that means?

[Rafi Sela]

I can't get into too much detail. I would be happy to send, after this session, a detailed presentation--for your eyes only--that could elaborate on how we do things.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

If I may interrupt, if you would send any of that pertinent information through the clerk, we would share it with our committee.

[Rafi Sela]

Thank you very much. I will do that.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Ms. Crombie.

[Bonnie Crombie, Liberal, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

Mr. Salter, what is the difference between the trusted traveller philosophy and approach that the Israelis take and the system we have in place here in North America, really, and would you advocate taking a similar approach?

[Dr. Mark Salter]

There are three models for the trusted traveller system. The first is the simplifying passenger travel initiative, which is being run by IATA, the International Air Transport Association, which has connected technology companies, airports, and governments to provide essentially an express route between London and Hong Kong so that your travel credentials follow you through the airport.

The second is the national version, which is like the NEXUS or the CANPASS, in which both countries' police forces agree on a number of security checks. This is always linked to biometric information, because while one's documents can be changed, it's hard to change one's retina or one's iris or one's face for verification.

The third is the kind that is in place at Ben Gurion, at Schiphol, that has been tried in the United States, which is airport-specific systems, where one does not apply for the aviation system as a whole but rather for specific airports. The “Privium” system at Schiphol airport and the “Clear” program in the United States are airport-run. There are also checks, but they are local rather than national.

[Bonnie Crombie, Liberal, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

So if I were a tourist traveller to Israel, maybe with my family, would I be profiled? Would I be subject to some secondary screening?

[Dr. Mark Salter]

I think you'll have to ask Mr. Sela about the Israeli procedure.

[Bonnie Crombie, Liberal, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

Mr. Sela.