Thank you.
Mr. Chair, thank you for this opportunity to discuss chapter 7 of our 2013 fall report on the oversight of rail safety.
Joining me at the table are Maurice Laplante, assistant auditor general, and Régent Chouinard, principal, who were responsible for the audit.
The primary responsibility for the safety of day-to-day rail operations rests with federal railways. Transport Canada is responsible for the regulatory framework required for rail safety in Canada. It is also responsible for overseeing whether federal railways have complied with that framework, and for taking enforcement action when necessary.
We examined whether the department has adequately overseen the management of rail safety risks by federal railways. We focused on Transport Canada's regulatory framework, oversight activities, human resources and quality assurance program. We did not examine the safety of Canada's rail industry or the safety of the railways' operations. Our audit was not an investigation into the tragic accident at Lac-Mégantic, Quebec, or any other rail accidents.
Transport Canada has implemented a regulatory framework for rail transportation that includes a safety management system approach for identifying, analyzing, and responding to rail safety risks. It has made progress in working with federal railways to implement such systems. For example, it published guidance on safety management systems in 2010 and 2012. It has also made progress in addressing many recommendations from the 2007 Railway Safety Act review and those of the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities.
However, despite discussions with the industry and progress over the past 20 years, a number of long-standing and important safety issues remain, including trespassing, grade crossings, and the implementation and oversight of safety management systems. It's taking too long to resolve them.
We found that Transport Canada has conducted many inspections and some audits to identify non-compliance with rail safety regulations, rules and engineering standards. However, the department is missing key performance and risk data to target higher-risk railways and the most significant safety risks.
Fourteen years ago, Transport Canada recognized the need to shift from an inspection-based oversight approach to one that integrates the oversight of safety management systems. This shift is still ongoing, much work remains to be done, and the transition is taking too long.
Transport Canada has done only 26% of its planned audits of federal railways over a three-year period, and the audits it did complete were too narrowly focused. At that rate, it will take many years to audit all the key components of safety management system regulations, including the key safety systems of each of the 31 federal railways.
We concluded that Transport Canada needs to address the significant weaknesses we found in each aspect of the department's oversight of the safety management systems implemented by federal railway companies. Otherwise, it may not have the assurance it needs that they are effectively managing safety risks on a day-to-day basis.
Mr. Chair, we're pleased to report that Transport Canada agreed with our recommendations. The department expressed its commitment to implement all of them by early 2016. Transport Canada shared its action plan with us late last week, but we have not had the opportunity to review it yet.
Transport Canada needs to have robust reporting on its actions and be accountable for progress made against the plan. Your committee may wish to explore the progress made since we completed our audit work, including on the adequacy of Transport Canada's action plan and timelines to address the issues raised in this chapter.
Mr. Chair, that concludes my opening remarks. We would be pleased to answer any questions the committee may have. Thank you.