Transport Committee on April 6th, 2017

[The Chair (Hon. Judy A. Sgro (Humber River—Black Creek, Lib.)), Liberal, Judy Sgro]

I'm calling to order the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities in the 42nd Parliament, meeting 53. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are currently doing a study of aviation safety.

To our witnesses, welcome. Thank you very much for being here.

Mr. McKenna, perhaps you would start. Please introduce yourself.

[John McKenna, President and Chief Executive Officer, Air Transport Association of Canada]

Good morning. Bonjour. My name is John McKenna, and I'm president of the Air Transport Association of Canada.

ATAC has represented Canada's commercial air transport industry since 1934. We have approximately 190 members engaged in commercial aviation operating in every region of Canada. We welcome the opportunity to present our comments on aviation safety.

I will limit my comments to four key issues—namely, fatigue risk management, safety management systems, fitness to fly, and Transport Canada level of service. From the outset, however, I want to stress that Canada enjoys one of the best aviation safety records in the world, and is an innovator in terms of safety management systems.

Being an ICAO signatory country, Canada strives to be compliant with the standards and recommended practices set by that organization. In actual fact, however, developed countries only use these standards largely as guidelines to develop what is applicable to them. In Canada the vast majority of air carriers do not engage in ultra long-haul international flights targeted by the ICAO standards on which the proposed Transport Canada regulations are based. We've long been asking Transport Canada to better consider the size and complexity of the many types of carriers operating in Canada.

While we certainly agree that it is important to manage fatigue, we are asking the minister to pause, seriously listen to stakeholders, and, rather than dictate to industry, develop new regulations that while compliant with the spirit of the ICAO standards also consider the huge socio-economic and financial costs associated with them.

ATAC insists that the proposed new regulations will not enhance safety but will erode it through many unintended consequences, including wasting such valuable and limited resources as experienced flight crew members. The proposed regulations will require that large airlines poach these resources from smaller carriers, leaving a huge vacuum of experienced pilots.

ATAC is a long-time supporter of safety management systems, or SMS, and has been urging Transport Canada to impose a SMS culture on all segments of our industry. We cannot endorse Transport Canada's recent decision to shelve SMS implementation indefinitely for smaller operators for lack of resources to oversee its application.

The safety culture present in Canadian operators and the economic and safety benefits associated with SMS have motivated many operators to implement SMS regardless of the regulator's decision. Smaller operators would benefit the most from SMS, yet Transport Canada prefers to concentrate on imposing badly planned fatigue risk management regulations devoid of any cost analysis and input resulting from industry consultations.

Fitness of flight crews has been an area of interest for ATAC long before the Germanwings accident. Our insistence is that there needs to be a better dialogue between Transport Canada and the employers on loss of privileges.

Where do you draw the line between the protection of privacy and the safety of the public? While demand for air services in Canada has been growing at an annual rate of almost 5%, the Transport Canada aviation safety budget has been consistently cut. Total aviation safety estimates for 2017-18 were set at $185.5 million, down from $248.5 million in 2011-12. That is a cut of $63 million, or 25%, in six years, making it increasingly difficult for Transport Canada to properly carry out its mandate.

In the face of such cuts, Transport Canada needs to delegate administrative duties and concentrate on improving the level of service on those key safety-related oversight activities. We implore the House of Commons to support Transport Canada by increasing the funding for this crucial mandate.

In closing, there are many other issues of major interest to our industry that we hope the committee will study. Airport privatization, carbon taxes, laser attacks, foreign ownership, and passenger protection legislation are just a few examples of issues that we feel passionately about. We are eager to share our comments with the committee should you decide to address them.

Thank you for your attention.

[The Chair, Liberal, Judy Sgro]

Thank you very much, Mr. McKenna.

Mr. Toering.

[Rudy Toering, President and Chief Executive Officer, Canadian Business Aviation Association]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair and committee members. I am honoured to have the opportunity to address the subject of aviation safety. I represent over 400 members with the CBAA, and 200 operators in a $10.7-billion industry.

Business aviation is the use of aircraft to meet a wide range of business and community needs that are not met by scheduled commercial service. It is an essential component of Canadian transportation infrastructure. In the world of for-profit commercial scheduled carriers, routes and frequencies have to be considered through a lens of profitability. Business aviation, on the other hand, is an investment. The number of passengers is irrelevant. Even if there is only one single passenger on board, that person may close a deal that would mean hundreds of millions of dollars and thousands of jobs, or that one passenger could receive urgent medical treatment.

Because our aircraft fly on demand, their operations are completely different from scheduled service. In the past, Transport Canada recognized that different aviation sectors required different regulations. Business aviation has been regulated under a safety management system since 2002. Scalability of the size of operations is embedded in that regulation, but our high level of safety is at risk as a direct result of Transport Canada's changed approach to regulations. Rather than regulating to meet the particular needs of an aviation sector as it did successfully in the past, Transport Canada has adopted a one-size-fits-all approach, applying rules intended for scheduled services that are completely inappropriate for business aviation, especially for small operators.

The CBAA is doing what it can to help operators work within the Canadian regulatory system. In 2014, the CBAA launched Partners in Safety, a program that provides our members, especially small operators, with a number of tools and templates that help them achieve compliance. There is also an urgent need to return Transport Canada to its original approach of creating tailored and right-sized regulation and ensuring that it has the resources and expertise it needs.

One example of how TC's lack of experience and use of one-size-fits-all regulation can harm all of aviation is the imposition of 705 flight and duty time regulations, aimed at long-haul international scheduled flights, on other aviation sectors. I am sure you have heard details from some of my colleagues. They are seriously alarmed, as am I, at the consequences of this action. This regulation may literally shut down some business aviation operations, particularly those relating to northern or emergency services like medevac.

As we knew that this committee was studying aviation safety, we asked the minister to allow you the full opportunity to examine this issue before taking action. Unfortunately, the department's decision has been to move forward with draft regulations in Canada Gazette, part I in June without the benefit of your study or the study of the TSB. We respectfully ask you to encourage the minister to take that much-needed pause and delay publication. The importance of getting it right is far greater than the importance of doing it quickly. The issue of flight and duty time regulations is part of larger, systemic issues stemming from a lack of expert resources throughout Transport Canada, which have a negative effect on, one, the application of standardized regulations and legislation at the regional level; and, two, the important role of experienced inspectors and auditors who understand the intricacies of risk management and safety management systems and who can interact collaboratively with business aviation operators in every region. Industry and government must work together to reverse this situation and ensure that Transport Canada has the personnel and expertise needed. Until this is addressed, we will continue to face problems related to poorly conceived and implemented regulations and the spectre of compromised safety.

This committee has a broad and powerful mandate, and we ask for your help to get Transport Canada back on track and to arm it with the resources it needs to create an intelligent and responsive service to industry. We are ready to work with you and will continue to work with Transport Canada officials to achieve this goal.

Thank you for your attention, and I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Judy Sgro]

Thank you very much.

We'll mov to the Honourable Mr. Justice Moshansky.

Please go ahead, sir.

[Virgil P. Moshansky, As an Individual]

Thank you for the privilege of being here today.

Some of you may know of me as the commissioner who led the three-year inquiry into the disaster that occurred at Dryden, Ontario, when an aircraft crashed shortly after takeoff, killing 24 people. In my four-volume final report, I made 191 recommendations for change, including the complete rewriting of Canada's antiquated aviation regulations. Subsequent to the release of my report, aviation safety improved. Transport Canada initiated appropriate oversight and inspection, and enforced safety requirements, but not so today.

For the past 15 years, Transport Canada has become complacent. Funding has been cut, and the inspectorate has dwindled to numbers not seen since the days before the Dryden crash. You'll hear a lot about safety management systems during your mini-study. My main message to you is that without properly funded direct operational oversight conducted by qualified and trained inspectors, SMS will not improve safety or protect air passengers. SMS was never intended to replace direct operational oversight, yet Transport Canada has done precisely that. Direct operational oversight through audits and no-notice inspections are the exception, not the rule.

For the past 15 years, Transport Canada has been progressively dismantling its oversight program, and now it is eliminating safety surveillance of entire sectors of the industry. After the private jet aircraft carrying Jim Prentice crashed outside Kelowna last summer, Transport Canada admitted it had ceased safety oversight of that sector of aviation four years before, in 2012.

As of August 17, 2016, it removed urban heliports, like the one in Foothills Hospital in Calgary, from its oversight program. Aircraft doing dangerous aerial work to maintain hydro facilities, fight fires, and the like will no longer be subject to any scheduled safety checks.

In addition, all airports in Canada will no longer be subject to full safety assessments. Inspections will now cover only one small part of an airport's safety plan, and those checks could be done as infrequently as once in every five years. By comparison, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration requires full inspections of airports annually.

Transport Canada did not publish those decisions in the Canada Gazette. They did not inform Parliament, MPs, or the public. These decisions were made by internal memo alone. They are now public only because a concerned party released them. I'm tabling with your committee the internal process bulletin 2016-09, in both official languages, where these decisions are documented.

The singular reliance on SMS and withdrawal from direct operational oversight has made flying less safe today than it was 15 years ago. I urge you to recommend to the government that it provide adequate funding for safety oversight, or a per ticket passenger safety fee.

Finally, I recommend the appointment of a commission of inquiry to investigate the state of aviation safety in Canada. I submit, with respect, that you ought to treat this issue with urgency, and not rest until you see meaningful steps to restore direct operational oversight. Among the lives you save could be your own.

[The Chair, Liberal, Judy Sgro]

Thank you very much, Justice Moshansky, and the others.

We will open it up for questioning. Mr. Berthold.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Thank you very much to our three witnesses for their short presentations. We have had the opportunity to read their documents previously.

Thank you very much to the Honourable Mr. Justice for being here today.

We understand that, since the publication of the report on the tragic accident in Dryden, your interest in Canada's aviation safety has continued. The statistics we have received from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada indicate that the number of incidents in the aviation industry have decreased. However, you are recommending to us today that a commission of inquiry into aviation safety be held. There is quite a difference between what we are seeing in the statistics and your recommendation.

Mr. Moshansky, your opinion matters to me because you have had the opportunity to study aviation safety for a very long time. Could you expand on why you think a commission of inquiry would be necessary and urgent?

[Virgil P. Moshansky]

Excuse me, is there a volume control on this? I have difficulty hearing this.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

I will speak in English just a little bit.

What I am asking you is why, after all you went through since the accident in Dryden, do you think it's so urgent to have a royal inquiry into aviation safety now? All the statistics, all the numbers we have in front of us, show us that the incidents in the air transportation industry have gone down.

[Virgil P. Moshansky]

Those are statistics regarding actual accidents. But have you seen the statistics with respect to incidents, near misses, and so forth? There are a lot of these that aren't being reported.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

According to the documents from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada that we have here, the incidents have also decreased.

Based on your experience, and in light of the commission of inquiry you presided over in the Dryden accident—your interest in aviation safety has been clear since that inquiry—I would like to know what might convince parliamentarians like us to support your call for an inquiry.

[Virgil P. Moshansky]

One of the foremost aviation experts in the world recommended that there should be a safety inquiry about every 10 years. We are now at the 28-year mark since Dryden, and I think that an aviation inquiry is long overdue in this country. It's the only way to really get to the root of the problem.

I spent three years on the Dryden crash inquiry. We came up with 191 recommendations, most of which have been implemented by Transport Canada. We only could have achieved that through an inquiry, which possesses a great deal of power. It has the authority of a superior court. You can put witnesses on the stand, swear them to tell the truth under oath, and subject them to cross-examination. That is the only really documented way of getting at the truth.

An inquiry is, in my opinion, the best way to look at the state of aviation safety in a country.

Is there anything else?

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

No, I was just listening to your answer.

Thank you.

Mr. Moshansky and gentlemen, what I am sensing in relation to the recommendation for an inquiry is perhaps a crisis of confidence. We are talking about the SMS, the safety management systems. In calling for more SMS inspections, more inspectors and money, we are indicating our lack of confidence in the current methods of airlines.

Perhaps I should ask Mr. McKenna this question. What makes people—be it the public or unions—to say that more SMS inspectors absolutely must be hired? Is it because airlines are not meeting their obligations?

[John McKenna]

Your question has several elements.

First, the change in culture, brought about by establishing safety management systems, leads to many changes in the activities of many people. A lot of people have reacted badly to these changes and do not share this philosophy of how to proceed. Imposing SMS in Canada has been very beneficial, even though adjustments are needed. The SMS have fostered within companies a safety culture that already existed but that is now more ubiquitous.

As for inspectors, they have had to change their approach, have had to study the safety procedure rather than be “in the field”, as we say, and do these inspections themselves. There are people who don't share this philosophy of the approach.

Furthermore, everyone involved in the safety management systems program feels it brings enormous benefits, both financially and in terms of safety.

[The Chair, Liberal, Judy Sgro]

Thank you very much. Sorry to interrupt, Mr. McKenna, we're trying to keep on track on our time here.

Mr. Iacono.

[Angelo Iacono, Liberal, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I would like to thank our three guests for sharing their expertise with us this morning.

My question is for the Honourable Mr. Justice.

You said that budget cuts had jeopardized air safety. The cuts since 2011 add up to nearly $76 million, an amount that was taken from the aviation safety program between 2011 and 2015. Since we came to power in 2015, we have increased aviation safety budgets, first by $9 million, and then by $6 million.

However, what I'm hearing today is that we need to take more substantive measures than just increasing funding. What aspect of the aviation safety program do you think the government should focus on first? Would it be the SMS, the number of inspections, and the hiring of inspectors?

[Virgil P. Moshansky]

That's exactly the area I feel needs attention. The lack of adequate funding of Transport Canada's regulatory oversight branch in the 1980s was the root cause of the Dryden crash in 1989. It seems to me that it remains hanging like Damocles' sword over the Canadian air-travelling public today.

As I point out in my brief, the cost-cutting frenzy on the part of the federal government upon Transport Canada in the early 2000s resulted in the progressive and finally total abandonment by the department of hands-on regulatory oversight of air carriers since 2007. SMS itself is a wonderful program. I recommended it. It's one of my recommendations in the Dryden report. However, I recommended that it be subject only to the provision of adequate oversight of the airlines by a properly trained and funded aviation inspectorate.

What has happened in the meantime is cost-cutting, which has resulted in inadequate funding of Transport Canada's oversight regime. There are inspectors now who haven't flown an airplane for a year, or some even longer than that. They're supposed to be supervising the training and operational effectiveness of the pilots who are flying the airplanes, and they themselves are not flying now due to lack of resources to cover the cost of providing them with aircraft to fly, or time on the aircraft. I get calls all the time from captains of the major airlines, complaining about this particular situation.

I think one of the things this committee has to think about is recommending to the government an increase of resources to the aviation surveillance and inspection directorate. If they can't do that, then I have suggested in my brief, which I hope you've read, that there be—I hate to call it a tax—a fee imposed on each passenger on every flight that takes off in Canada. This would make up the shortfall so that, number one, these inspectors can be restored to the level of inspectors they had previously, which has gone down drastically, and second, funds are made available for the operation of the inspector regime.

[Angelo Iacono, Liberal, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

Do you have in mind any examples of countries that have an exemplary civil aviation regulatory framework and method of oversight that we could learn from?

[Virgil P. Moshansky]

Australia's the country I would suggest. I visited there at the invitation of the transport department some years ago. They have adopted SMS.

Many countries are adopting SMS, but no country in the world except Canada has implemented SMS without regulatory oversight as a requirement.

Some of my colleagues in some of the other countries with whom I've collaborated about aviation safety over the years are stunned by the fact that we have effectively abandoned regulatory oversight and imposed SMS. It is a good concept, but not without oversight.

[The Chair, Liberal, Judy Sgro]

Sorry Mr. Iacono, your time is up.

Mr. Aubin.

[Robert Aubin, NDP, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair. I would like to thank the witnesses for being with us this morning.

My first questions are for the Honourable Mr. Justice Moshansky.

In fact, when I asked my colleagues to do this study, I was already aware of the issue of aviation safety. I was rather alarmed when I read your report. The one thing we can't criticize you for is using doublespeak.

My first question is largely based on a paragraph on page 4 of your brief. You say that Transport Canada has now totally abandoned traditional hands-on regulatory oversight, in-flight inspections and audits across the aviation system, thereby eliminating expensive inspector personnel. You add that this is, “A decidedly pollyanna type of approach to aviation safety, which is in clear breach of international aviation safety requirements set by ICAO.”

Are there other countries that are moving so substantially away from the rules proposed by the ICAO?

[Virgil P. Moshansky]

We're the only country in the world that has strayed from that, to the best of my knowledge.

I've made inquiries of colleagues in several major countries. They are shocked by the fact that we have strayed from oversight.

[Robert Aubin, NDP, Trois-Rivières, QC]

I would also like to deal with another part of your text where you say that to relieve the financial pressure, Transport Canada is now eliminating entire sectors of aviation from its SMS surveillance program, entirely without regard to safety, without accordingly advising Parliament, MPs or the Canadian public. You add that this committee may want to look into this development.

My question is very clear. You mentioned the unfortunate accident that cost the lives of Jim Prentice and the flight crew. I have not checked the type of aircraft, but I think it might be the same situation as the one involving the fatal accident involving Jean Lapierre. I am talking about these two because they are known personalities, but a loss of life is always a loss of life.

Do you think these accidents could have been avoided if the SMS program applied to all aircraft and not just to certain categories?

[Virgil P. Moshansky]

The aircraft in which Mr. Prentice died was a private jet. I'm not sure of the make or model of the aircraft, however, it may have been the same as the one in which Mr. Lapierre was killed.

I have no comment on that.