Transport Committee on April 11th, 2017

[Samuel Elfassy]

Madam Chair, first of all, I should say that Air Canada applauds Transport Canada's efforts to enhance the safety of commercial aviation through the rule-making process and the proposed amendments to the flight time, duty time limitations. We feel that they're generally on the right track.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Mr. Elfassy, I asked you a question and would appreciate it if you would answer, rather than praising Transport Canada for its efforts.

[Samuel Elfassy]

Madam Chair, I'm not sure I understand what the question was.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

I'm asking you, are there the same rules for all the pilots in Air Canada for the long flights—Air Canada Rouge, and Air Canada? Is there a difference between the rules for different companies under the Air Canada label?

[Samuel Elfassy]

Madam Chair, it's my understanding that the rules for Air Canada and Air Canada Rouge are the same for the flight time and duty time limitations.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Are the standards and obligations in the collective agreements governing Air Canada pilots who operate long-haul flights the same as those of all other Air Canada pilots?

They are not, according to what a number of union representatives have told me. If that's not true, I welcome your response.

[Samuel Elfassy]

Madam Chair, I would not be in a position to be able to provide comment on the differences in the collective agreement for Rouge versus main line. I can tell you that the flight time and duty time limitations and the provisions that are in the collective agreement account for long-haul flying and short-haul flying as well.

[The Chair, Liberal, Judy Sgro]

For the committee's information, the one o'clock vote has been cancelled, so we'll be able to do our normal six-minute rounds.

You can continue. You have two and a half minutes.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Thank you.

I will now turn to the WestJet representative.

Our meetings with union representatives also revealed extensive criticism of safety management systems. I have trouble distinguishing between what unions want and what are actual problems.

Why do people not have confidence in safety management systems?

I saw that in the case of Lac-Mégantic. It was a small company, and the situation becomes very challenging when inspections are not completed.

Why do you think safety management systems in place at companies like WestJet do not inspire public confidence?

[Darcy Granley]

From a WestJet perspective, SMS is something that is very mature. Safety is a core and foundational value at WestJet, and it applies to all WestJetters. SMS provides the opportunity to ensure that there are policies and programs in place and it allows for consultation. It encourages at all levels, whether from a front-line perspective up to senior leadership, active involvement in addressing safety issues, looking for continuous improvement, and ensuring there's documentation and training in place. From our perspective, it enhances safety, it has promoted safety, and in a regulated environment, it's something that we've been obliged to abide by and actually encourage because it's improved safety. The focus of the opportunities with SMS is for continual improvement. From top to bottom, it requires us and all WestJetters to be actively involved, and it supports the safety culture and validates that safety is a foundational, core value at WestJet.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

I see.

I could ask the Air Canada representative the same question about safety management systems. They are highly criticized.

Is there a way airlines could do a better job of explaining these systems to the public so that people had a better sense of your commitment to safety? I don't think airline executives start their day by hoping for an accident. The public needs greater reassurance when it comes to your efforts to ensure safety.

[Samuel Elfassy]

Again, Madam Chair, I'm not sure if there was a question there, but I'll try my best to answer by saying that we have confidence in the safety management system as it was implemented by Transport Canada back in 2005.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

It is fine. Thank you. No need to answer.

[The Chair, Liberal, Judy Sgro]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Hardie.

[Ken Hardie, Liberal, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Elfassy, I want to get back to the question on the difference between Air Canada pilots and Rouge pilots. We heard from your pilots association that the Air Canada pilots bargained an additional pilot for flights over nine hours. However, Air Canada Rouge pilots are currently expected to operate up to 14 hours, which could be extended to 17 hours in unforeseen circumstances.

With respect, sir, despite all the rhetoric about safety being your first priority, this seems to be quite a gap. Why is there a difference between Air Canada mainline and Rouge?

[Samuel Elfassy]

Madam Chair, I'm not in a position to comment on the difference in the collective bargaining, the differences in the rules between Rouge and Air Canada, and the differences in flight time and duty time limitations. I can tell you that they meet the regulatory requirements. The nature of Rouge and their operation versus aircraft mainline are, in fact, quite unique. It has been approved by Transport Canada, and it falls within the current flight time and duty time limitations that you'll find.

[Ken Hardie, Liberal, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

Okay, that's—

[The Chair, Liberal, Judy Sgro]

Mr. Elfassy, it's an issue that has been raised at the committee. I see you're having difficulty answering it to the satisfaction of the member. Could you submit something in writing in response to that question? It's clearly an issue that's been pointed out to the committee, and it would be helpful if we had very accurate information on that.

[Ken Hardie, Liberal, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

There are some significant discrepancies here, and the fact that the rules allow it doesn't necessarily or adequately explain the reason you treat two blocks of pilots quite differently.

I'll turn it over to Mr. Badawey.

[Vance Badawey, Liberal, Niagara Centre, ON]

Thank you Mr. Hardie. Thank you, Madam Chair.

I commend the three of you for showing up today and really discussing a lot of these issues with us. Again, I appreciate the safety promotion and education programs that all three of you have under way, as well as the regulatory and voluntary approaches you're moving forward with. All in all, I guess the expectation is to measure the performance on an ongoing basis. I think that's the new day of anything we do, to ensure that we consistently have performance measures put in place so that we're always getting better.

I'll go to my question now. Experience and research have indicated that the optimal results for increasing safety and best practices can be achieved by combining safety promotion efforts with well-targeted accident prevention objectives. Can I get some explanation from each of you on the moves afoot to accomplish that?

[Samuel Elfassy]

Perhaps I'll start. In terms of safety promotion and better understanding of some of our efforts, we participate quite extensively at the international level with various international carriers, both at the IATA level and specifically around safety discussions. This enables us to share best practice in a closed forum, to understand various incidents that have occurred at other airlines and incorporate that into our learning.

We study, unfortunately, the misfortune of others, the events that are investigated by the Transportation Safety Board. We look at their recommendations—

[The Chair, Liberal, Judy Sgro]

I'm sorry. My apologies. The vote apparently is now back on, but let's try to complete the first round. Sorry.

[Vance Badawey, Liberal, Niagara Centre, ON]

Thank you.

[Samuel Elfassy]

We take those lessons back into Air Canada—I'm speaking specifically here—and we share those key lessons. We look at our safety management system. We look at the weak signals associated with our performance and we incorporate those teachings. I could tell you that we have a relentless focus on failure and that's what our focus is on. By looking at those weak signals, we are able to anticipate, not react, so that we can be proactive in some of the measures we take to protect the travelling public, our employees, and our passengers.

[Glenn Priestley]

There are three things you might be interested in.

One of the problems in the north is getting adequately trained personnel. The demographic is about 200 to 300 people per year. Traditionally, people from the south go north and get some experience. They don't like it and leave. It's not working. We have shortages of personnel. We have now established, as of April 24 at the NATA 41 convention in Yellowknife, a northern training centre for northerners, out of Whitehorse. It's a college-level, two-year program for flight crew.

As I mentioned, the second issue is the runway conditions. Every year, five to ten runways collapse. It's nobody's fault, but it's a problem. The climate changes. We've got an alternate runway test project that's going to be announced and we're working that through the Nunavut government. Hopefully that's going to be at the Cambridge Bay high Arctic research station, where we will look at something other than gravel or tarmac, which is problematic to get in.

Finally, the third thing, as mentioned earlier by Mr. Lachance of Nav Canada, is working with Nav Canada, who is an excellent safety partner, in the development of ADS-B technology. They will be coming up and giving us a briefing on that technology for our membership.