Transport Committee on Feb. 25th, 2020

[Nicholas Robinson]

Absolutely. I think a perfect example is the work that we're doing with the 737 Max right now. We've grown the amount of involvement that we have—

[Xavier Barsalou-Duval, Bloc, Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC]

You are talking about planes in general.

[Nicholas Robinson]

Absolutely, but this is the plane that we are validating with the FAA right now, and what we've done is grow the process. We're involved in multiple stages of the testing process. We're asking questions, and we're asking for additional information with regard to this process. This will be reflective of our risk assessments, as you mentioned, as an auditor, ensuring that we will be looking at this when we're engaging with the FAA on other certification projects and making sure that we're addressing all the areas of risk that we identify. Where we do identify areas of risk, we will be involving ourselves in order to—to refer to another committee member—be able to say with confidence that this plane is safe to fly in Canada.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Bachrach, you have two and a half minutes.

[Taylor Bachrach, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

At the hearings in the United States, there were emails revealed through whistle-blowers which showed that Boeing was aware of the safety risks of the MCAS anti-stall system and failed to disclose the significance of those risks to the regulators. Do you believe that Boeing misled the FAA and the airlines concerning the safety of the 737 Max?

[Nicholas Robinson]

I'm not going to speak specifically to the relationship between a U.S. manufacturer and the U.S. authority that's working with that, but what I will speak to is this.

The first question that we had from this committee was with regard to the JATR report and the 12 recommendations that have come out. The members of that review board were all the certification management team partners that have been referenced, and what we've all committed to is to look at those recommendations. The FAA will lead—and I give credit to the FAA for conducting this JATR review—and we'll be looking at ensuring that those recommendations are addressed and that actions are taken. The information that's come out about the relationship between the authority and the manufacturer will also be something that we'll keep in mind as we do a risk assessment on the areas of involvement that we want to have with regard to the validation of a project.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Mr. Bachrach.

[Taylor Bachrach, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

I have a quick follow-up question that gets back to the validation process and what's driving the rationale behind the harmonization of these certification processes.

You mentioned earlier that this is a very costly process for the manufacturers to go through. My concern is that cost is in some way a factor in striving towards harmonization and towards validation versus certification. Can you speak about the core rationale behind the harmonization road map?

[Nicholas Robinson]

First and foremost, let me assure this committee that safety is of the utmost importance and our number one priority. Transport Canada is to ensure the safety of Canadians travelling. Safety is our driver. That's why we have a very clear, stringent set of rules and areas of compliance that we're going to require all aircraft to meet prior to operation in Canada. What these rules allow us to do, though, is to review and ensure that products as well as aircraft reach and allow Canadians to benefit from these products in a more streamlined fashion.

If we share a common set of expertise on an avionics system, as we do with our counterparts in EASA, and EASA has done the software on it and has clearly said that this system works in this aircraft, and we understand the process that EASA takes and the meticulous methods they have in place, then there is no benefit for us to do the exact same set of testing. We know what EASA does and their stringent set of compliance rules, so we would say, “No, we don't see a risk here; we'll focus on where we see risk.”

Does that benefit the industry and the manufacturers? Absolutely. They will be able to access markets more readily than if every single state was to certify their product. But that benefit does not supersede safety, which is our number one priority. That's why it doesn't matter; if there is a remote question of it not meeting the safety standard that we expect, that aircraft doesn't get validated in Canada, not until it meets that.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Mr. Robinson and Mr. Bachrach.

Mr. Baldinelli.

[Tony Baldinelli, Conservative, Niagara Falls, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Again, thank you, Mr. Robinson and Mr. Turnbull, for being here as we seek to rebuild some confidence in our oversight systems and to provide some answers to the families. I have three quick questions.

Mr. Turnbull, this is with regard to what you and Mr. Davidson are undertaking with the OER and the technical requirements and training manuals that are required for pilots when you're doing the OER. When you're presenting that document to the public, in terms of transparency in the OER report that's published, does the public get that detailed background, or are they able to see that these are the requirements we're asking?

[David Turnbull]

With regard to the purpose of the report, once it's approved, it goes out as the recommended set of training that the operators will adopt. The actual training program for an airline, if we're talking about large aircraft, is approved at the local level, depending; there are a lot of unique situations within an airline. The way they choose to operate the aircraft may cause or necessitate slight changes to the training material. That is the baseline that's handed out to the airlines. It's not meant to be a public document. It's meant to go to the airlines and their local authority to determine what will be the training program for that airline.

[Tony Baldinelli, Conservative, Niagara Falls, ON]

As you undertake your examinations and your studies, you're dealing with companies as well as the other oversight bodies, nationally and internationally. In terms of the oversight and the examinations, do airline pilots and their associations play any part in this certification process? Do they have any ability to comment?

[David Turnbull]

They don't on the certification process itself. As I mentioned earlier, the certification of the design, the type design, as we call it, is carried out through a certification process. The OE is a separate and subsequent step. Once you've got your design and the functionality is there, the cockpit does what it does. The aircraft flight manual, which is part of the approved type design, explains and displays the basic procedures—warning systems, non-normal procedures and everything. All of that information from the flight manual goes into the training material. The design comes first.

[Tony Baldinelli, Conservative, Niagara Falls, ON]

Do they have an opportunity to provide input into that?

[David Turnbull]

At the training level, yes. I explained earlier the OE process with the naive candidates, which are sometimes airline pilots, that are invited to take place. We typically do not involve the operators directly in the certification process. That is a communication between the applicant, or the designer of the airplane, and the certifying authority. The operations and the airlines are generally kept out, to the extent where they may be inquiring about the status. They're anxious to get their aircraft because they want to enter service, but we typically don't involve them in the technical certification issues that we're working on with the applicant.

[Tony Baldinelli, Conservative, Niagara Falls, ON]

I have one last question, quickly.

In February, it was reported that on the 737 Max 8 jets, Boeing had discovered fuel tanks containing debris in several of its aircraft.

Has that been reviewed, or is there any indication from Transport Canada to our companies to examine that? Even though the fleets are grounded, are they examining planes for that problem?

[Nicholas Robinson]

This is the aircraft that were in Boeing facilities waiting for distribution.

As part of the process, we're right now looking at the validation of this aircraft for it to return to service. That will be a process that we'll be looking to the FAA for, and asking how they are addressing it in those facilities. We'll also be working with our operators to see if they've seen any instances there. It's part of our continuing process on the fleet itself.

However, from a certification perspective right now, it's not something that we have focused on for the validation process.

[David Turnbull]

That's a result of a manufacturing issue as opposed to a design issue, more than likely.

[Tony Baldinelli, Conservative, Niagara Falls, ON]

We can't say, for example, that it may be an existing problem on those planes that are grounded now. We don't know that.

[Nicholas Robinson]

We'll be looking at our operators as part of their inspection that will get this....

These aircraft have been sitting on the ground for 11 months. Prior to their returning to service, the FAA will certify the design. We will validate it. We will go through that JOEB process to determine the training requirements. There will also be quite a significant amount of preparation for getting these aircraft back into service and back to airworthiness so that they can fly.

That's part of the reason—and I know there is a great deal of attention on it—that we allowed many of our operators to ferry those aircraft into parts of the U.S., warmer climates. They are not meant to sit on the ground and not operate. They're not meant to not fly.

That will be part of the process for getting them back up—

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Mr. Baldinelli.

Mr. Sidhu.

[Maninder Sidhu, Liberal, Brampton East, ON]

I'd like to start off by thanking Mr. Robinson and Mr. Turnbull for their time and their expertise. A lot of the members are thankful for your being here today.

I'm trying to understand your perspective on the safety record as a whole, especially with air travel in Canada. What measures do you use and, in your opinion, what's the safety record on air travel?

[Nicholas Robinson]

Thank you. First let me speak to the record.

Mr. Chair, I began my comments to the committee about Canada having one of the safest aviation systems in the world, and we have the data to prove it.

In 2018, we had 151 aviation accidents, which was down from 190 in 2017 and is a 29% decrease from the previous 10-year average. That's a trend we continue to see. The accident rate is in steady decline, and we are proud of that record. We have a very, very low accident record in Canada, with very minimal fatalities. There were three 705—that's the large commercial aircraft category, the Air Canadas, the Air Transat—accidents in 2018 with regard to those aircraft.

That's the average we see over the 10-year span.

[David Turnbull]

And there were no fatalities.