Transport Committee on Feb. 25th, 2020

[Nicholas Robinson]

That measure reduced the reaction time of Canadian aircrews in recognizing a runaway trim stabilizer condition. It allowed the groundwork to reduce that reaction time. Thankfully, between the Lion Air accident and the Ethiopian Airlines accident, we didn't have any of those events happen in Canada, so we didn't have a real-life test of what those measures might have done on a Canadian flight deck.

[Fayçal El-Khoury, Liberal, Laval—Les Îles, QC]

Then we can be confident that the effort of Transport Canada can prevent such an accident.

[Nicholas Robinson]

I would say no. I would not say that this could have absolutely prevented one.

What we were doing was addressing a safety risk that we saw and identifying a way that we believed could reduce the reaction time of air crew and could help them address that situation. I don't think any measure you could put in place could say absolutely that an aircrew would be able to respond.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Mr. Robinson and Mr. El-Khoury.

Mr. Davidson.

[Scot Davidson, Conservative, York—Simcoe, ON]

I want to talk about the airplane itself.

You were talking about the NG, so let's assume I'm a pilot flying a 400, a 600 or an 800 Boeing aircraft. They all have their little different challenges that they each pose. Let's say you're flying an 800. It's got the big spoiler at the back in case there's a tail strike. Pilots are aware of going from a 400 to an 800, and the possibility of a tail strike is always in the back of your mind on takeoff. If I was all of a sudden put in a Max—and I'm allowed to fly the Max if I can fly an 800—some things are different in that airplane. I wondered why Transport Canada didn't ask beforehand for a separate type rating on that aircraft, so you'd have to be checked out and be current on a Max, as compared to the NG. This is just due to the fact that the cockpit has changed a little bit, and I think you have a different glass set up in the Max, do you not, where you have emergency lights that come off over where the engine gauges are, as opposed—

[David Turnbull]

There are some very discrete changes, but I wouldn't characterize it as a result—

[Scot Davidson, Conservative, York—Simcoe, ON]

I'm just questioning whether they were major changes in moving forward and if pilots should have been checked out on that aircraft in particular, instead of just the 800, when they make that jump. I don't know how different that aircraft is. Let's say if I'm in autopilot climbing through 15,000 feet, and I want to hand-fly it and I shut the autopilot off. The automatic trim, when you want to hand-fly it, is a little bit different from the 800, is it not?

[David Turnbull]

That is the basic purpose of the OE. As I said in response to one of the previous questions, you take the training material that is intended to bridge the gap between one and the other, and whatever those differences may be—be they how cockpit indications are displayed, the handling characteristics or whatever may be different between the two aircraft—that is the purpose of the delta training to make sure it bridges that gap. The conclusion of the OE is that this training was sufficient; therefore, the conclusion is it's operationally suitable. That's it.

[Scot Davidson, Conservative, York—Simcoe, ON]

I just wondered why, from when those incidents happened, no one looked back to when the first accident happened and.... Maybe we're looking at more than just shutting off the automatic trim. Maybe there's a cockpit question coupled with fatigue or with someone who has flown this aircraft only three times compared to 600. I'm wondering about those questions.

[David Turnbull]

I understand your question better now. In fact, it was mentioned earlier by one of our esteemed members that it was a software failure. Actually, it wasn't, and most aircraft accidents are a combination of various things.

In terms of one of the things we've learned and one of the things we questioned very early on—and I think this is more to your point—it's that given what we now understand and that we didn't as well as we should have, perhaps, about the MCAS, that system, its failure modes and the resulting effects in the cockpit with an AOA disconnect, an angle of attack indicator disconnect, what we've learned from there has implications with respect to the design itself, the basic architecture, but also with respect to whether the training was indeed sufficient.

In other words, were the changes between, in this case, the NG and the Max, adequately reflected in the training material? You see, the key to all of this is that the training material in the OE is a direct result of the design. It's not the other way around. You design the airplane, it has functionality, and you create training material that reflects the design. If there are aspects of the design that are not sufficiently covered by the training material, that may be what comes out of this.

[Scot Davidson, Conservative, York—Simcoe, ON]

In your professional opinion, do you believe that this aircraft should deserve a type certificate on your licence? Obviously, if I fly an 800 Boeing, I can't fly a 321 Airbus.

[David Turnbull]

Not necessarily.

[Scot Davidson, Conservative, York—Simcoe, ON]

Okay, not necessarily—

[David Turnbull]

But I do believe and understand—and this is part of the ongoing process that we're on right now—that not only is the aircraft being redesigned, I'll say, or that the problem areas deemed to be problematic are being addressed through software changes, a big part of it is a reflection of what we've learned in the training material.

Transport Canada has been a huge proponent right from the beginning—and I believe our own minister stated it publicly early on that he was a big fan—of full flight simulator training. Lo and behold, about two or three weeks ago, Boeing finally came out and said, “We're doing it.” It was a huge relief to us. We had been pushing for that from the beginning of our review—

[Scot Davidson, Conservative, York—Simcoe, ON]

Okay. Well, I'm not—

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Mr. Davidson.

Ms. Jaczek.

[Helena Jaczek, Liberal, Markham—Stouffville, ON]

Thank you, Chair, and thank you to our witnesses for coming today.

I think we all agree that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. As Ms. Block said, our job here is really to probe as much as we can in terms of how going forward, hopefully, we can avoid this type of tragedy happening again.

Following on the conversation that we've already had this afternoon, I'd like to understand better, in terms of the validation process, to what extent you involve pilots and their feedback. You obviously use pilots and so on. If we could go back to before the first crash, what kinds of conversations does Transport Canada have in terms of listening to the pilots about their experiences and incorporating additional requirements through that validation process?

[Nicholas Robinson]

We spoke about the JOEB process. That's where we have line pilots taking the training and evaluating it. Their results are telling us whether the training is adequate enough.

What we haven't spoken about is that we also have a great number of pilots in our own program. We have pilots as part of our national aircraft certification group who do test flights and participate in the certification process along with flying the aircraft or developing work plans with regard to the certification of the aircraft. We have our own inspectors as well, many of them pilots, who will be part of that JOEB process as well and will be looking at those aircraft manuals and mitigation procedures for evaluation. In a real-life scenario, are they going to work, are they workable? Pilots are a part of the regular process.

I want to specifically mention a bit of a difference that we also have in this process. There's been a great deal of review with regard to the Boeing 737 Max. At the beginning, we said that this wasn't a process where we were going to have Transport Canada focus and work with other authorities in our bilateral arrangements and let our Canadian authorities know what the outcomes were. From the beginning, the three operators who operate the Max as well as those three associations that have pilots operating the Max in Canada have been part of the process. They've been feeding us their input and feedback as part of the process. They're very interested, of course, as many of their livelihoods are tied to the Max, and they want to see how the validation process is proceeding, so we've been working with them on a regular basis. We often meet with our operators on a weekly basis to tell them how we're progressing. A lot of those individuals are pilots themselves, and many of them are typed on this aircraft and work with the aircrew associations to let them know the process.

They've had some questions. They've been briefed by Boeing and other authorities on the process. They've come to us and said, “I want to understand this particular mitigation procedure that you're exploring. I don't understand why Canada is looking or why we have an issue, and we want a different mitigation procedure. We think there's an issue here.” What we've done is taken those opportunities to sit down with them. We've reviewed all the things we have found and said this is what has led us to say that we're going to take a leadership role and demand that the FAA and others look at particular incidents that we see that need to be addressed. In many cases that's been very beneficial.

I hope that the committee may have some opportunity to speak to those Canadian operators as well as those Canadian associations to hear their involvement in this process, because they've been very much involved.

[Helena Jaczek, Liberal, Markham—Stouffville, ON]

Prior to the first accident, you were getting feedback. I know hindsight is 20/20, but you felt assured at that particular time that the training was sufficient and that mitigation measures were understood in terms of this new software.

Can you assure us of that?

[Nicholas Robinson]

I will say that we now have a much greater understanding of some of the key concerns with this aircraft. At the time we validated this aircraft, at the time that JOEB process was completed, we looked at our process, and we validated that aircraft. There was no particular pressure that we were under to validate that aircraft. We felt that the aircraft was safe to fly in Canada. There would have been absolutely no instance where we would have approved that aircraft to fly in Canada if we did not feel that it met and complied with what we expected an aircraft to have.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Ms. Jaczek.

Mr. Barsalou-Duval.

[Xavier Barsalou-Duval, Bloc, Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My question is for you, Mr. Robinson.

The first accident occurred on October 29, 2018, and the second on March 10, 2019. I think the public started to become quite concerned after the second accident since the first could have been a simple mistake.

In the wake of these incidents, in an article in La Presse in May 2019, you said, “We have full confidence in the FAA and its process”. Shortly thereafter, there was a lot of international news, including at Agence France-Presse and elsewhere.

In September 2019, Agence France-Presse reported that it was Boeing employees who inspected the MCAS anti-stall system in question in the accidents. We also learned that since 2016, under a new procedure referred to as ODA, Boeing selected the engineers who inspected its own planes and the FAA simply provided the seal of approval.

In February 2020, a former technical director who worked for the company for 30 years, said the company did as much work for as little money and as quickly as possible to get its planes in the air.

In the meantime, are you still as confident in the FAA's certification process?

[Nicholas Robinson]

Thank you for your question.

I do have confidence in the certification process that is outlined in annex 8 of ICAO's convention whereby the state of design is responsible for certifying the aircraft and other authorities are validating that aircraft.

[Xavier Barsalou-Duval, Bloc, Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC]

I think you answered my question. I have another for you.

Many people in the general public are currently scared to board a Boeing 737. Personally, I think that plane poses some risks, for now at least. There may be other Boeing planes that pose risks considering that since 2005, Boeing employees are the ones who have been certifying the planes built by their own company in the United States.

I am an accountant by training. I am not an aerospace expert. However, when I was working in an accounting office as an auditor, my role was to audit businesses based on the level of risk. My role also consisted of conducting tests to determine whether the figures presented by the business corresponded to reality in order to ensure that the shareholders, bankers and lenders were not being misinformed when it came time to making financial decisions. To some extent, the FAA's certification role being not unlike the role of an accounting firm. As such, are you going to increase oversight of FAA certified planes from Boeing or any other U.S. company? The public has concerns.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

You have 30 seconds, Mr. Robinson.