Transport Committee on Nov. 26th, 2020

[Nicholas Robinson]

I'll refer back to the variety of reports and reviews that have been undertaken to look at that exact question: What went wrong?

My colleague Mr. Turnbull has already highlighted one piece that went wrong and that needs to change, which is how we look at the incorporation of change in the aircraft and how it interacts or affects the upstream of the aircraft—the changed product rule. We have to look at that. That's something on which we'll see change moving.

We also have to look at the interaction between different authorities and their manufacturers. As my colleague Mr. Turnbull said, it's public record that information was not forthcoming with regard to particular aspects of this aircraft. That circumstance meant that validating authorities could not make a full decision or fully understand the impacts of a particular system on an aircraft. That will have to change. It's something that the congressional report hits on directly in the U.S.

We'll also look at our engagement with regard to validation. As we said at the beginning, the system.... To give a rough sense, when Canada moved forward and certified the Bombardier C Series aircraft, when it was a Bombardier product—it's since become an Airbus product—about 160,000 hours were put into that certification. About 160,000 hours of Canadian time and Canadian certification expertise went into the review and certification of that aircraft. We rely on states to apply the same amount of rigour to their certification standard, but I'll let you know, in this case, from a validating authority, from the time the aircraft was grounded to now, we've contributed about 15,000 hours just to the modifications to this system that are being proposed.

We'll see a greater involvement in validation, but we have to keep with the system where the state of design certifies the aircraft and the other leading authorities go ahead and validate the aircraft independently.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Kram.

[Michael Kram, Conservative, Regina—Wascana, SK]

It's my understanding that Transport Canada has what are called “concern papers”. When test pilots encounter problems or issues when they are certifying the aircraft, those are written down on concern papers and sent to the manufacturer. What does Transport Canada do to ensure that any outstanding serious issues in the concern papers are answered before the aircraft is certified as safe?

[Nicholas Robinson]

I'll begin by reviewing what Mr. Turnbull provided a few moments ago. The concern paper is a note. It's to determine that there has been an area where further clarification is needed in order for the validating authority to fully understand how the certifying authority has said the manufacturer achieved compliance. It's not to specify that there is a particular safety issue. It's to specify that more information is needed.

Throughout the iterations of the concern paper, the validating authority will make a determination. Is this an issue that needs to be closed prior to issuing a validation, or is this an issue that does not pose a safety risk but might be an issue, where the four certifying authorities have to regroup and say, “How are we harmonizing the standard? We're looking at it from this way. You're looking at it from this way, and we need to make sure we have a common understanding”?

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Mr. Robinson, and thank you, Mr. Kram.

Mr. Rogers, you have the floor for five minutes.

[Churence Rogers, Liberal, Bonavista—Burin—Trinity, NL]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thanks to our guests, Mr. Robinson and Mr. Turnbull, for being here today.

Gentlemen, either one of you could respond to these questions. It has been reported that the FAA conducted a transport aircraft risk assessment methodology analysis after the Lion Air accident. When did Transport Canada first learn of this FAA analysis? I understand that this analysis was not received by the department until after the second crash. Why was it not requested earlier?

[Nicholas Robinson]

The transport airplane risk assessment methodology, also called the TARAM, is an analysis tool the FAA uses to quantify unsafe conditions when safety-related occurrences are reported. Transport Canada was made aware of the existence of the FAA TARAM analysis but did not receive the analysis itself until the FAA provided it to the department after it requested it, after the Ethiopian Airlines accident in 2019.

Transport Canada does not routinely request this detailed analysis that the FAA does, but does request the information and the findings from it. That's what was requested and reviewed after the Lion Air accident. After the Ethiopian Airlines accident, we recognized that there was something that we did not have. It was the information that we determined was not present during the validation exercise. That's when we asked the FAA to provide us with the full analysis, which they did provide after the Ethiopian Airlines accident.

[Churence Rogers, Liberal, Bonavista—Burin—Trinity, NL]

You noted, Mr. Robinson, in your opening remarks that the TC certification experts were instrumental in shaping the ultimate design changes for the Boeing 737 Max that have now received FAA approval. Could you or Mr. Turnbull provide an overview of the changes that TC influenced and the impact those have on the safety of the aircraft?

[Nicholas Robinson]

I am extremely proud of the national aircraft certification team and the operational evaluation team in this process. From the beginning, in April 2019, we laid out the key areas that we needed to come to an absolute understanding on from the FAA and Boeing. Those included the acceptable levels of pilot workload, the integrity of the flight controls, the architecture or the makeup of the flight controls, the safety assessment and design assurance processes that were in place, and the procedures and training that were required by crews. We needed to understand and have an absolute confirmation of that. Right from the beginning, as this committee is likely aware, we were the first to advocate for simulator training to be incorporated as part of the training for the flight crews.

I'll turn to my colleague Mr. Turnbull to specify all the other areas where we helped shape this product that is being reviewed and proposed today by Boeing.

[David Turnbull]

Thank you.

Just to add to what Mr. Robinson was saying, because of our due diligence and our very careful investigation, it was Transport Canada that discovered the original simulators used for training were not programmed to actually allow the pilots to exercise and carry out the procedures associated with the runaway stabilizer events. In other words, the system had been designed in a way that required pilot input, yet we discovered that the simulators had not been capably equipped to run the pilots through those specific training scenarios. That problem has hence been fixed.

We were front and centre in pushing very hard for procedural emphasis to ensure that the pilot actions that were required were clarified and emphasized, such that when the design was dependent on a pilot action to mitigate a particular concern, the procedures associated with that would be sufficient to bring the pilot up to a sufficient level of awareness to be able to control the aircraft.

We also discovered that the testing of the aircraft without the speed trim system, which includes MCAS off, was not performed. It was our influence that caused the FAA to initiate a significant activity to re-evaluate the characteristics of the aircraft with those systems off. Fortunately for all, we discovered that the aircraft is in fact quite controllable with those systems unavailable.

Further, although the basic design change that we will be validating is technically identical to that which the FAA has approved, we are adding an additional procedural element that allows the deactivation of an erroneously firing stalled stick shaker system. We had deemed it through our own evaluation to be a considerable distraction to the pilot during these failure scenarios. This was recorded in the accident reports as well.

We participated significantly, and I think my team did a great job on the JATR study. We were front and centre in having a very strong voice to speak to the nature of the concerns that related to the application of the changed product rule, which is part of what Mr. Primeau incidentally was concerned about as well.

In addition, we were pushing for the need to acknowledge that, although we have and are about to validate a design change that makes the aircraft perfectly safe, we asked if Boeing could produce some additional changes that would come post-RTS to further enhance the safety of the aircraft. I think we were instrumental in having Boeing put a number of future modifications, which should be considered as product improvements, on the table.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Mr. Turnbull and Mr. Rogers.

I'm now going to move to Mr. Barsalou-Duval for two and a half minutes.

[Xavier Barsalou-Duval, Bloc, Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Turnbull, Mr. Robinson, this is probably my last opportunity to speak with you, because we will soon be coming to the end of this study.

In broad terms, my current understanding, in this study of the Boeing 737 MAX, is that the American civil aviation administration, the FAA, did not conduct its certification process adequately, to say the least. We were somewhat complicit because we are not in the habit of validating the work done in the United States, in any in-depth or significant way. Unfortunately, our system has some shortcomings.

Would you agree that, in terms of the organizations responsible, whether that is Transport Canada in matters of safety, or whether that is you, Mr. Turnbull, in matters of certification, more needs to be done to ensure the safety of people taking that aircraft here?

[David Turnbull]

Clearly, again, nobody is denying that there wasn't something missed. The ICAO regulations and signing up to an ICAO convention, which started in 1939, clearly states the responsibility of the state of design. I think the U.S. is going through what it needs to go through to investigate what happened. We, as a validating authority, are more than willing to collaborate, have been collaborating and will continue to collaborate with them as they investigate the many aspects, as included in the list of things that Mr. Robinson spelled out.

I am confident that our process from a validation perspective is adequate. We are looking at the areas that are new and novel. We are looking at the areas of risk, at the safety concerns, but a validating authority will always be subject to the information we are provided when we do our inquiry. The information has to be made available. A full understanding of the aircraft system and how it was certified must be provided to the validating authority. That is a principle we must uphold.

That is why in this particular case it is the FAA that is going back and re-examining what happened and will be implementing changes in the future, which we will adopt as well, because as we mentioned, for example, on the changed product rule and its interpretation, everybody is using it.

[Xavier Barsalou-Duval, Bloc, Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Turnbull.

I want to make sure that I fully understand. You are telling me that the problem lies in the design, that we ourselves have done everything required and that we have nothing to feel bad about.

I feel that some things need to change. Do you not agree with me?

[David Turnbull]

Things have changed in which regard? I'm sorry.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Mr. Barsalou-Duval, your time is up.

To the gentlemen, if you want to get that answer in, maybe you can get it in during the next round with Mr. Bachrach.

Mr. Bachrach, you have the floor for two and a half minutes.

[Taylor Bachrach, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

On the congressional House committee on transport, I'm sure you're both aware of its preliminary report and its more recent final report.

In the preliminary report, the congressional House committee on transport found some really concerning things in terms of the certification culture in the United States. It described how the financial pressure on Boeing to compete with Airbus led to decisions and assumptions that “jeopardized the safety of the flying public”, and it said that a culture of concealment saw Boeing withhold crucial information from the FAA, including hiding “the very existence of MCAS from 737 MAX pilots”.

On the culture it describes, you folks are in charge of validating the process in the United States. Before this preliminary report came out, were you at all aware of this culture of concealment in the American certification process?

[Nicholas Robinson]

This incident has provided us a much greater understanding of the process that occurs between the FAA and Boeing.

As was mentioned, the congressional report has made public the issues and the problems that are happening with that relationship, but I will emphasize that if we look at the relationships we have with our certifying companies, companies like Bell, Bombardier, Pratt & Whitney, Diamond and others—I know that this committee was able to meet and discuss the certification process with many of them—the information exchange we have with these companies is just not the same as what was discussed in the U.S. congressional report.

The information and the relationships we have with these companies.... It's one where, when we identify an issue with regard to a product they are certifying, we get into a room with these individuals and we find a solution, a safe solution, to make sure that these products can fly to our regulations—

[Taylor Bachrach, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

Mr. Robinson, I just have one more question and my time is very short. I apologize.

Mr. Bittle had you run through a list of organizations that have not called for a public inquiry into the Canadian involvement in the validation process.

Do you know of anyone apart from me who has called for a public inquiry? If so, who?

[Nicholas Robinson]

I can identify that I saw that two family members, very key representatives of the families that were impacted by Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, have called for a public inquiry. They did so on Tuesday. They have discussed that previously as well. Those are the two that I made most particular note of.

[Taylor Bachrach, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Mr. Bachrach.

I'm now going to go to a third round. We have Mr. Shipley.

You have the floor for five minutes.

[Doug Shipley, Conservative, Barrie—Springwater—Oro-Medonte, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'm learning a lot about concern papers. Being new to this committee and not having a lot of knowledge of this industry, concern papers are new to me. I would like to follow up on why concern papers would contain any references to a manufacturer's sales deadlines or sales targets.

Could I get some in-depth information on that, please?

[David Turnbull]

We are not certifying products in isolation of commercial realities. We have to take into account when certain manufacturers want to sell and operate their aircraft. Even for a certification program that would start and last five to six years, which, for example, was the case with the C Series certified in Canada, we were always working to a target date that was specified by the applicant. That is not unusual at all.

That said, we worked to that as a target date, but we are not necessarily constrained by that. There are cases where we have not met the target date as requested by the manufacturer because we simply weren't finished the job. That's all part of the judgment that my team and I apply as we approach these target dates as to whether, if there are any outstanding issues, they are of concern.

In some cases, as my colleague Mr. Robinson mentioned earlier, some of the disconnects we have with respect to issues on a validation pertain more to generic disharmonization of how we approach the rule, which we will deliberately take outside the project and work on through a harmonization venue versus effectively hold the recipient of the aircraft hostage. In some cases, it may take several years to iron out those differences, but in the end, our decision to validate is based on a degree of confidence that the aircraft is safe, and we rely on the state of design to make that determination.

[Doug Shipley, Conservative, Barrie—Springwater—Oro-Medonte, ON]

What would you say are some structural changes that need to happen in Transport Canada to ensure that commercial pressure is not put on the certification process?