Mr. Chair and members of the committee, thank you very much for having me here today.
I sent you my bio earlier. I did 32-plus years in the Canadian Armed Forces. I retired because of the way they were treating ill and injured people in the transition program.
I have a prepared statement, and then a PowerPoint if we have time. With that, I'll get to it.
The seam of injured military transition remains open, because three successive chiefs of the defence staff have kept it open like an ugly wound on the good reputation of the Canadian Armed Forces. It's a wound that has swallowed many a good, injured soldier, sailor, airman and airwoman, veteran and military family, be it a spouse, a child, a parent, extended family, or friends. It is a wound that has been allowed to fester for close to a decade, while the senior officers of the Canadian Armed Forces put a higher emphasis on more important, to them, priorities, such as redesigning their military dress uniforms.
In doing so, senior officers of the Canadian Forces and the office of the chief of the defence staff have fostered the environment for suicide to which many Canadian Forces members have succumbed. It is not the soldier's fault, nor is it the fault of the family of the fallen soldier. The blame lies squarely at the feet of the senior military commanders, and more specifically, the office of the chief of the defence staff, which has put such a low priority on injured soldier transition, now as in the past. To say they have done otherwise, as the current CDS has stated recently, can only be the result of three actions.
First, the office of the CDS has been ordered not to act on the injured soldier transition issue by the Minister of National Defence and is purposely misinforming the public.
Second, the office of the chief of the defence staff is defying ministerial direction on injured soldier transition, ordering subordinate staff to delay the action, and is purposely misinforming the government and the public.
Third, the office of the chief of the defence staff is incompetent and cannot fulfill the direction of the Minister of National Defence, and it is purposely misleading the government and the public.
There are no other possibilities, only these three. There are no other reasons available. One needs to look no further than the length of time the office of the chief of the defence staff has taken in not addressing the injured soldier transition issue. With the ongoing CF review now in place, it will be nine years before the JPSU situation is addressed, if it is ever addressed at all.
Our armed forces can complete an impressive number of achievements in that span of time. For example, the combined span of two world wars is 10 years. However, during almost the same time frame, the Canadian Forces brass has fumbled, bungled, and delayed its injured soldier transition program, a program that hasn't even reached the starting line yet. It's not that the Canadian Forces are unmotivated or incapable in this current day and age. The CF has established, from the ground up, the complete infrastructure—hangars, machinery, personnel, and procurement—training, and completed operational readiness verification for an entire heavy-lift helicopter squadron, 450 Squadron in Petawawa. This is a very impressive accomplishment, indicative of a motivated CAF led by an equally motivated chief of the defence staff.
It's just that the CAF is unmotivated or incapable in the area of injured soldier transition. The most tragic indicators of this are the rash of suicides associated with the joint personnel support unit and the Canadian Forces' continued lack of interest in a workable injured soldier transition plan. The cost of this lack of interest has been exceedingly high.
For example, the Canadian Forces couldn't manage to get a JPSU staff member to meet an injured soldier, Corporal Collins, who had summoned up the courage to finally seek assistance from the JPSU. I quote from an article, and I'll supply this later to you.
On Cpl. Collins’s first day in the JPSU, the platoon warrant officer and service co-ordinator were not there to meet with him. He left the support unit frustrated and went drinking at a bar on base for junior-rank soldiers. A bartender tried to stop him from driving off in his SUV, but the corporal didn’t listen. As he drove away, the bartender called military police.
Not long after this took place, Corporal Collins took his life in an MP jail cell, which, it would seem, was poorly equipped to have a person like him in there. This incident happened during a time when the shortcomings of the JPSU had been strongly and clearly articulated to senior commanders, including the office of the joint personnel support unit commanding officer and the director of casualty support management, as detailed in my email from February 2011. This is before Corporal Collins's suicide, and I quote:
Consequences of In-Action. At this juncture, the consequences of in-action will be felt, or in some cases are being felt, primarily at the IPSC level. For example, if expansion is not factored in it will effect:
(1) Ability to effectively carry out our mission [to support injured personnel] - If our focus shifts from personnel support, to staffing for positions/infrastructure, our ability to carry out our mission will suffer;
(2) Staff Burn Out - If the ratio of staff to supported personnel [that's our ill and injured] become unsupportable, the IPSC staff themselves will eventually become prime candidates for the JPSU;
This actually did take place when our staff burned out to the point they became members of the JPSU.
(3) Supported Personnel - If our staff is stretched too thin, this will be felt at the supported persons level through reduction of support services/leadership to mbrs posted to the JPSU;
An example is what happened to Corporal Collins, and we know the result of that.
Rather than address the forecasted issues with rational, tangible, and effective responses, the JPSU brass put out what could be described as an FOB document, the suicide mitigation strategy, which has been handed out to you kind folks. The JPSU suicide mitigation strategy was a particularly cruel document as the JPSU staff had absolutely no means of carrying out this important and potentially life-saving strategy because of their undermanned and overtasked situation.
However, the issuance of this strategy to these people made the responsibility of employing it and the responsibility of its failure theirs and theirs alone. By 2013, the situation that Corporal Collins faced in 2011 was now the norm. The senior officers and staff would still not address a now critical and well-known situation in the joint personnel support unit, and their front-line staff had to employ a logistical triage to deal with the transitioning injured personnel. In an excerpt from the JPSU platoon commander's email, it states:
Due to the current manning levels of the [JPSU] Support Platoon (Sp Pl) Staff we have had to take a different approach when it comes to dealing with our posted in ill and injured soldiers as well as some of the routine administration. ...solders posted to the [JPSU] Sp Pl will not necessarily be assigned to a specific Section or Section Commander.
The document goes on to explain the situation that faced these people in 2013.
This email was issued after yet another JPSU member suicide, Master Corporal Matiru, a Canadian Forces Base Kingston IPSC, a grossly overwhelmed JPSU detachment. I'll supply the numbers for that.
The well-known shortcomings in the joint personnel support unit did not only impact living military members and families, families of those recently released to the JPSU, like that of Corporal Brumsey, and I'll give you the reference. The situation came to light in 2015, and I quote:
A retired member of the Canadian military with a mental illness lay dead in his home for up to four months before he was discovered, says his sister.
It continues:
Lisa Brumsey blames National Defence and Veterans Affairs Canada for not doing more to help her brother, but officials with both departments said there's only so much they can do.
“I want them to put something in place so this never happens,” she said.
“I don't want any other family to go through this or any other soldier or anybody in the military. It's [so] traumatic.”
I'll repeat the words from Veterans Affairs Canada and the Canadian Forces, “There's only so much that they can do.” This is a truism. I agree with that. There's only so much one can do, but this statement doesn't apply when they are knowingly not doing enough. That was the case for Corporal Brumsey as indicated from the email from the chief of defence staff, a reference which I'm including in this package, which says that we have to do more for post-release.
The JPSU's mandate includes post-release follow-up where ill or injured persons, more specifically those more complex, are contacted after release to see how they're doing. Being so understaffed, JPSU cannot even accomplish that.
The situation of military family transition has been an unresolved issue since 2008, when the joint personnel support unit was first on the drawing board, and much attention has been drawn to the shortcomings of that unit since then, including the Canadian Armed Forces Ombudsman's recommendation, comments from the Veterans Affairs Ombudsman, the Hitachi report, General Anderson's report, many media reports, and internal media communications.
To close the seam, which you want for transitional support, the Government of Canada must send a strong message to the chief of defence staff that any further delay of addressing the injured military transition support system will no longer be tolerated.
Here are some actions that could be included. There should be further recruiting or transitioning in by the Canadian Armed Forces. There should be no further OUTCAN missions or missions out of Canada by the Canadian Armed Forces or deployments of Canadian Armed Forces personnel. The Canadian Armed Forces must offer an extension to those military families currently in the transition-out stream of the Canadian Armed Forces. Staff in Veterans Affairs front-line offices must be staffed appropriately with full-time positions, not part-time.
A Veterans Affairs Canada review of recently released military families must be conducted to ascertain their health. A contingency fund is needed for Veterans Affairs Canada staff to assist needy military families, to be used at their discretion at the time of need. The VAC critical injury benefit should be issued as compensation to all military families medically transitioned out of the Canadian Forces since the stand-up of the JPSU in 2009 and up to the date that it's fixed and operating respectfully.
It is totally irresponsible for the Canadian Armed Forces to continue recruiting and deploying our Canadian Armed Forces personnel when, if anyone were to be injured, the system needed to support them does not exist. The documents I've tabled today and passed to you earlier on indicate a means to resolve that situation.
I look forward to any questions you may have, and thank you for allowing me this opportunity.