Debates of Sept. 29th, 1994

Supply

[François Langlois, Bloc, Bellechasse, QC]

Mr. Speaker, through you, I would like to tell the hon. member for Scarborough-Rouge River that I share his views regarding the powers of the sub-committee he is chairing and the authority of Parliament to review all decisions made by government agencies.

The problem is neither with the Sub-committee on National Security nor with the hon. member for Scarborough-Rouge River, the problem is with the people who make up the review committee, SIRC, who, when they appeared before the sub-committee on September 13, hid behind a particular interpretation of section 54 of the act when refusing to answer the questions of members duly elected to this House.

This is the problem, a problem which will last as long as this Parliament: How to get answers from these people? This is why a royal commission of inquiry seems appropriate. Looking at what goes on in the United States before parliamentary commissions reviewing national agencies, we can probably say that if American witnesses were to behave the way our witnesses behaved before the sub-committee, they would be sent away for a while to think about it.

[Derek Lee, Liberal, Scarborough—Rouge River, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I suppose it is fair to say that my colleagues in putting the matter the way he has, makes a point. I cannot disagree that the Security Intelligence Review Committee appears to be less than forthcoming when it comes to the subcommittee's needs.

I hope he will acknowledge that there is a certain amount of bridge building and educating going on, both with respect to the goals and powers of the subcommittee.

I would not expect that everybody who comes in the front door of a committee room is going to know right away the extent of the powers that committees may have from time to time, especially in light of the history of this place.

These powers have not been used effectively or clearly over the last several decades. As a result not only do ordinary Canadians not realize the under utilization, but in my view looking in other areas it appears that the courts themselves are not fully aware of parliamentary law and of the implications of sections 4 and 5 of the Parliament of Canada Act. It is not their fault. This is perhaps the fault of Parliament itself, which may have over the last few decades, maybe the last 50 years or so, failed to develop in the modern context. This is a challenge for all of us now. I hope the current exercise will play a part in that development.

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Kilger)]

Could the member for Kamouraska-Rivière-du-Loup tell the Chair whether he his going to share his time with his colleague? Ten minutes followed by five minutes for questions and comments?

[Paul Crête, Bloc, Kamouraska—Rivière-Du-Loup, QC]

Yes, Mr. Speaker, we will be sharing our time.

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Kilger)]

Fine.

[Paul Crête, Bloc, Kamouraska—Rivière-Du-Loup, QC]

Mr. Speaker, let there be no doubt about it, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service is a good thing per se. We are not questioning the fact that we need such an agency. The problem is that somehow CSIS is the offspring of the RCMP. If the past is any indication of the future, there is trouble ahead. This is the reason why we want to make sure the agency is properly monitored.

There are many examples illustrating the fact that with this kind of agency, it is important to have appropriate safeguards to differentiate between a security mandate and the mandate to defend a particular government or party.

In the past, on several occasions, the RCMP interfered with the democratic activities of political parties, which resulted in the creation of CSIS. When the membership list of the Parti Quebecois was stolen in 1973, I was probably on it together with a number of members of this House. It was totally illegal and irrelevant.

Following that, CSIS was created, but it seems that history repeats itself. We now have a critical situation in which a well-known political party, an opposition party, the Reform Party, is being spied on and we do not seem to be able to shed light on the whole thing. This is not due to bad faith on the part of parliamentarians or the committee members, but rather because not enough light is being shed.

When we ask for a royal commission, the argument regarding its costs is no more valid that in the case of the Canadian justice system. You could say that it would be easier to solve problems by chopping off people's heads and hands than by bringing them to court and allowing them to present their defence. You could easily say that. Similarly, you could say that a royal commission is not worth it because it costs too much. Some principles are not a matter of cost and, in all fairness, it has to be mentioned.

For example, in the present case, if someone acting for CSIS has infiltrated the Reform Party and in so doing ultimately influenced the election results, even if only in a limited way, it is casting doubt on the very basis of our system and I believe it warrants a thorough examination. We must ensure there is no unacceptable situation casting a shadow on our democratic system.

There is another reason for ensuring that members of Parliament are able to verify more directly and specifically if agencies like the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service abide by their mandate. Let me read a few excerpts from the agency's 1993 public report. We can see that, sometimes, members of agencies such as this one share opinions that are very close to being partisan or akin to a particular vision about the country's evolution. Those who do not think the same way are outlawed. They can no longer be full members of society.

For instance, we can read that "more important is the fact that the increase in the number of independent power centres in the world brings forth an increase in the number of potential threats". In other words, everything would be fine if there was only one country in the world and if everyone was alike. It would be so much easier to administer, but that is not the way it is. There is a value judgment about a society's future in that kind of statement. I think that if, on the one hand, an agency like the Canadian Security Intelligence Service is going to adopt such

an attitude, we, on the other hand, should make sure that a good eye is kept on it and that changes be made if need be.

There is another excerpt that makes me wonder and, in my view, argues for monitoring. It says that, while the RCMP is responsible for enforcing the law, CSIS collects information and provides operational or tactical advice on individuals, groups or activities that may constitute threats to the security of Canada to enable the government and police authorities to act.

It would be important to know what they mean in that kind of agency by "groups or activities that can constitute threats to the security of Canada". I could be of the personal view that what constitutes the greatest threat to the security of Canada is the way the country is run, a view the government would certainly not share. The agency may consider that such or such political party constitutes a threat to Canada, as seems to have been the case. That too is unacceptable.

So, based on the experience of past abuses by the RCMP and the attempt to remedy the problem by establishing CSIS, one critical step remains to be taken: we must get to the bottom of the matter and know everything there is to know about the agency, its mandate, the way it carries it out and all this information must be made available to the people in whom the public has placed its confidence, that is, the elected members of Parliament.

Some may say that reports are made to the Solicitor General CSIS activities, but these reports are confidential. We can understand that certain aspects must remain confidential, that certain matters must not be debated publicly, but reports could be submitted in camera to a parliamentary committee responsible for ensuring that things are done according to the law and depending on the circumstances.

I will give you examples of reports filed by the SIRC, the Security Intelligence Review Committee, which are classified secret or top secret. That is how they are classified. They deal with security screening on university campuses. It is rather important to know why this kind of agency is involved in security screening on campus. Is there another witch hunt on? Is what happened in the United States 30 or 35 years ago going to happen here now? What makes one person on campus a threat to the security of Canada and not another? There may be very clear-cut cases as well as abuse. We need to make sure appropriate control is exercised over all this.

There is another study whose title in itself is so ambiguous, it would be worthwhile to look into it. I am talking about the CSIS regional studies. What do they need regional studies for? Did they find that the people living in a region where the unemployment rate reaches 20, 25 per cent are more dangerous than the residents of a community with an unemployment rate of 10 or 12 per cent? What is in these studies? These are things we should be able to look into.

There is another document I would like to mention, namely the review by SIRC of CSIS activities involving Aboriginal Canadians. Why should Aboriginal Canadians be the subject of separate investigations? Why are such investigations being conducted? When they told us the titles of these studies and said they received studies on this, they suggested that there were specific reasons for investigating these groups, that is, university campuses, Aboriginal Canadians and various other groups, although there is no evidence that the report eventually submitted contains any accusations. All we know is that there was an investigation.

It is a little like when someone is accused of something in a newspaper, only to be acquitted three months later. The acquittal headline is one inch high while the accusation is announced in two-inch-high letters but the effect is the same. The decision has already had a negative effect, which I think is quite unacceptable.

I would like to give you another quote from the public report which outlines what we should expect in the future. It says that in general, the world has become less predictable and the power, more diffuse. It means that our society is undergoing all kinds of changes so that the people monitoring them must follow global developments closely and be able to understand exactly what they mean.

Without judging the quality of SIRC's current membership, it can be said that the current situation is rather hard to accept because some of these people have been appointed on the recommendation of parties sitting in the House of Commons during the last Parliament. No Bloc or Reform member was involved in appointing these people. SIRC members have very few links with the current Parliament, even with the Liberals, because most of them were appointed from the Tories' list.

For all these reasons, I think that the government should agree to the opposition's request so that we can meet the goal set when CSIS was founded, namely to achieve the most appropriate level of transparency in the delicate field of security and prevent past excesses from occurring again in the future, especially now that Canada faces major political challenges. The democratic debate must in no way be undermined by institutions exceeding their mandates.

[Patrick Gagnon, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to Solicitor General]

Mr. Speaker, I find it very strange that reference is again made to history being a guide to what will happen in the future. To be sure, the United States had the McCarthy affair and the Rosenbergs. France was involved in sinking Greenpeace's ship, the Rainbow Warrior . We have seen all sorts of abuses in other countries but nothing like that has happened here.

Certainly, if someone wants to make a comment-and this is getting to the question which I would like to ask the hon. member-last night, Bernard Landry was on the CBC talking about Quebec's delegates general abroad and he wanted to know if they were true sovereignists. I think he threatened them with dismissal if they were not.

This is another demonstration of intolerance towards the opinions of all Quebecers, if their opinions do not suit the party in power. But I can tell you this, Mr. Speaker; at least we set up a committee of inquiry, a sub-committee, chaired by one of our own people, but also with members of the Bloc Quebecois and Reform Party represented, which will shed light on this matter. Nevertheless, I would like to remind the hon. member that some of his colleagues in Quebec want to investigate good Quebecers whom they do not think are true Quebecers.

[Paul Crête, Bloc, Kamouraska—Rivière-Du-Loup, QC]

Mr. Speaker, what the member for Bonaventure-Îles-de-la-Madeleine says makes me even more suspicious, because there is a very big difference between that and saying publicly: "We will ensure that appointees conform to our objective as a government, which the people gave us; our objective is to make Quebec sovereign and we will give ourselves the democratic means to achieve this result."

This is very different from giving a mandate to an agency whose composition you do not control that will investigate subjects that you do not know-you do not know what they are investigating or how they will do it. Between these two ways of governing, I have just found another reason to make Quebec a very different country from Canada.

[Patrick Gagnon, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to Solicitor General]

Mr. Speaker, I find these comments very regrettable. Canada is a tolerant society, but it is not right, now that there has been a change of government, to point a finger at people who have served in the Quebec government, who have tried to promote Quebec's development outside that province and who have convinced foreign investors to come here. There is a lack of continuity and, unfortunately, I think all this is beginning to sound like McCarthyism: you are not true Americans, you are not real capitalists, etc.

It is unfortunate. This is what makes that argument a dangerous one. This is the reason why the government seeks to promote tolerance and welcomes opposition members and stakeholders to come and voice their concern and views on how to manage CSIS.

[Paul Crête, Bloc, Kamouraska—Rivière-Du-Loup, QC]

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Bonaventure-Îles-de-la-Madeleine is comparing apples and oranges. We are talking here about a dramatic situation. We are not talking, as I said earlier, about people who have been mandated by the public and who form a proper and transparent organization.

We are talking about situations such as investigating the CBC, a national broadcasting network, or Mr. Bristow having infiltrated the Reform Party. In my opinion, CSIS is an organization which, in a way, chooses its own clientele. In the seventies barns and farms had to be set on fire before investigators were hired to set up the security intelligence service. Nowadays, they try to influence recognized political parties, enough to warrant investigation.

There is a true lack of transparency which must be corrected. Indeed, in a society, it is important to know what is going on, otherwise perceptions from the past will persist in the future.

[Benoît Sauvageau, Bloc, Terrebonne, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to preface my speech by pointing out that a review committee was set up in 1990 precisely to reform the CSIS Act. The committee members were astonished to find out about another organization called the Communications Security Establishment, commonly known as CSE, and the extent of its powers.

CSE comes directly under the Department of National Defence. It is a collateral organization similar to CSIS. According to the sub-committee's estimates, CSE has a supposedly secret budget of about $200 million, even though the House of Commons or any of its committees or sub-committees has no say in CSE's activities.

As I said, CSE's budget is buried away in the overall budget of the Department of National Defence so that we cannot come up with an exact figure. Using estimates, the sub-committee reckoned at the time that CSE had a budget of about $200 million over which we have no control.

Even worse, the members of this 1990 review committee reported that even SIRC had no say in CSE's intelligence activities. In 1990, this committee made 117 specific recommendations.

Since then, only two or three of these recommendations have been adopted, and by the previous government at that. Why? Because the committee recommended that the Communications Security Establishment be formally set up by a piece of legislation that we could oversee, examine and review.

The committee also wanted SIRC to ensure that CSE's activities were carried out in accordance with the law and to report to Parliament.

Why were the members of the 1990 review committee so concerned, and what exactly is CSE? In an article published last May, the daily newspaper Le Droit explained a little bit what could be learned about CSE and I quote: ``The Communications Security Establishment carries out its activities in total secrecy, resorting to electronic surveillance to pick up messages from many areas of the world. This high-tech equipment, which is worth tens of millions of dollars-and is apparently among the most sophisticated in the world-can pick up messages to

troops stationed in Siberia or even listen to your own private telephone conversations with friends overseas." All that in the name of security.

CSE provides intelligence services akin to those of CSIS, but without reporting to Parliament. Both agencies also signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation. The activities that are carried out in the Chomley Building, in Ottawa, where hundreds of CSE employees work on nine floors full of top secret electronic surveillance equipment, are very similar to those of the CSIS.

The same year, the Ottawa Citizen reported that a device supposedly allowed CSE to listen to 10,000 telephone conversations all at the same time and to tape specific ones on Iran'' orsovereignty'', for example, just by entering these words in a computer. But it seems we are safe.

Does CSE communicate its intelligence to CSIS? We do not know. Does CSE violate Canadian laws? We do not know. No citizen, no member of Parliament and no member of SIRC knows. Nobody knows. Yet, according to the Solicitor General and his parliamentary secretary, the hon. member for Bonaventure-Îles-de-la-Madeleine, SIRC is supposed to review intelligence services on behalf of the members of Parliament who are democratically elected by the people.

How many untold Bristow cases are still to be unveiled inside CSE? It is difficult to say. One has to wonder if ministers across the aisle know more about this than Opposition members. We do not believe they do.

CSE has a staff of 900 civilians and about 1,000 members of the Canadian Armed Forces. It has facilities everywhere in Canada: in Ottawa, in the North and in large cities.

I would like to read another excerpt from the article published in Le Droit which says: ``The work of the CSE is so secret that its 1,000 or so employees are asked never to travel on commercial flights in case the plane is hijacked or they are taken hostage''. But there is nothing to worry about, right?

Does the CSE gather information on legitimate political parties such as the Reform Party and the Bloc Quebecois? We do not know. Can a citizen make a formal complaint to a monitoring agency? The answer is no. Why do we have a charter of rights and freedoms if CSE employees can, whenever they wish, listen to our phone conversations without prior judicial authorization and without ever having to report to a parliamentary body or an intelligence agency?

In short, the CSE is not monitored by Parliament nor by any other body. The government does not want to ask SIRC to review the activities of the CSE. Nobody knows why. And the Sub-Committee on National Security that everybody on the government side is raving about cannot get any answers from members of SIRC and, I will say it again, has no authority over the CSE.

But there is nothing to worry about. Or so we are told.

That is why we need a royal commission of inquiry to explain to all Canadians and Quebecers as well as to members of this House how intelligence agencies and secret services are constantly keeping track of what we say and do.

[John Bryden, Liberal, Hamilton—Wentworth, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure to hear my hon. colleague's remarks because I am particularly qualified to answer at least some of them.

I am the author of a book called Best Kept Secret that deals with the early history of the CSE and brings it up to the present. It was published last November. The member is welcome to get it. I regret however it was published only in English, but I would greatly appreciate it if the member could find me a French publisher, a Quebec publisher, so it would be available to him in the language of his choice.

The history of the CSE goes back to the second world war. I will help the hon. member by giving him some background. It was part of the allied effort in code and cipher breaking during the second world war. It began with the examination unit that was in the house next door to the Prime Minister's residence during the second world war.

It was engaged in breaking codes and ciphers primarily Japanese and Vichy French. The breaking of codes and ciphers was a shared arrangement, both diplomatic, economic and military during the second world war. The Americans specialized in Japanese ciphers in particular and the British specialized in German and Italian. The Canadians were left with some Japanese and Vichy French.

The reason Canadians got involved-and this is important so the member will understand the perspective right now-was that Canada was the best country in the world for picking up radio signals. It was because of the radio skip phenomenon where the radio waves bounce in the atmosphere and come down in various parts of the world at focal points. Canada was excellently situated to pick up all kinds of messages. That is how we got involved.

Naturally during the second world war this was a highly secret endeavour. It went into the post war period. Canada continued to be involved first as the communications branch under the National Research Council and subsequently it became the Communications Security Establishment.

There is no secret about what the Communications Security Establishment does. If the member would look at my book, I cite in it a particular presentation before a committee, the name of which is in my book, by the deputy clerk for security intelligence, Ward Alcock, a couple of years ago. He explained that the mandate of the Communications Security Establishment was to listen in on telecommunications worldwide, just as do the Americans, the Australians and the British. The idea was to try to pick up intelligence that may have a bearing on Canada's political and economic security.

There might be a case where Canada has entered into international agreements and one party or another is not obeying those agreements. Am I going on too long, Mr. Speaker?

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Kilger)]

Does the member have a question or a comment?

[John Bryden, Liberal, Hamilton—Wentworth, ON]

I am coming to it. I will speed it up. I am sure my hon. colleague is interested because it is apparently-

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Kilger)]

With the greatest of respect to all colleagues in the House, the member spoke for 10 minutes and we have 5 minutes for questions or comments. When I rose for questions or comments there was more than one member rising. I would like to keep the debate flowing as much as I possibly can, for and against, so we might have the best possible debate in the Chamber.

I would ask the member for Hamilton-Wentworth to conclude his remark or ask the question directly to the member for Terrebonne.

[John Bryden, Liberal, Hamilton—Wentworth, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I will try to make it a very quick question then. I am sorry for the delay.

In a situation where an organization is charged with monitoring foreign intelligence sources, does the member agree it is very difficult to bring it before a parliamentary committee for open examination because of the tremendous political, social and economic implications of possible leaks of confidentiality?

[Benoît Sauvageau, Bloc, Terrebonne, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I think that, as elected representatives, we are entitled to know the main organizations who manage this country and Quebec.

The hon. member opposite said: "We monitor conversations that can be detrimental to national unity". Given what we hear in this House, does that mean they can eavesdrop on conversations in Quebec? Surely not, but one has to wonder.

Concerning the translation of his book, he could have done like one of his former colleagues, Senator Hébert, and have it translated in the Senate. Our only question is: Why should we have a security intelligence service without any supervision scanning the airwaves and recording conversations around us?

My hon. colleague wrote a book on secret services. I would like to know why the 117 recommendations made by the committee have never been implemented. If there is no secret, why do we read things like this: "The CSE headquarters is located in the south end of Ottawa in a building surrounded by a high fence topped by barbed wire. The roof is covered with a myriad of antennas, but the name of the occupant is nowhere to be seen. If you try to take a picture-and let this be a warning to Canadians-you will most probably be challenged within minutes". But there is nothing secret.

[Roger Pomerleau, Bloc, Anjou—Rivière-Des-Prairies, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I listened carefully to what my colleague, the member for Terrebonne, had to say and it frightens me in a way. We all know that the SIRC was created following enquiries. I am talking particularly about the Keable enquiry which was held in Quebec towards the end of the 1970s. It was sparked by a unimportant event. A former RCMP officer had been caught placing a bomb. Somehow this expanded and led us to find out about very disturbing facts.

The RCMP had set fire to a barn, stolen lists of Parti Quebecois members, illegally opened mail-a totally democratic way of doing things after all-placed bombs and written false press releases in the name of the FLQ. Those events made us realize the need for a special service, one which would be totally independent from the RCMP, the Security Intelligence Review Committee.

Given what we are learning today, given the reasons why the committee was established, given the fact that it is totally impossible to know what is happening there, even though we repeatedly made requests, does the member feel that security is now better, worse or equivalent to what it was in those days?

[Benoît Sauvageau, Bloc, Terrebonne, QC]

Mr. Speaker, first, I would like to thank my colleague from Anjou-Rivière-des-Prairies. I want to tell him that I feel less secure, especially when we hear the number one officer of CSIS say to the committee which is supposed to solve all the problems: "I have learned never to say yes or no."

That is what the number one officer of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service says. He says to the subcommittee which is supposed to solve all the problems: "We do not need any royal commission because we have a subcommittee. I have learned never to say yes or no." The other witnesses appearing before the subcommittee never want to answer the questions.

Therefore, do I feel secure? No. Do we need a royal inquiry commission that would be independent instead of a subcommittee with a majority of Liberals? My answer is yes.

[Maria Minna, Liberal, Beaches—Woodbine, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak to the opposition motion. The motion is to denounce the government for not appointing a royal commission to inquire into the "illegal activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service".

The hon. member is putting the cart before the horse. Why would the government wish to mount a royal commission when there has been no evidence of illegal activities? It is true there have been allegations of wrongdoing but they are just that, allegations.

Yet on the strength of unproven allegations the member wishes the government to mount a royal commission which would cost the taxpayers of the country hundreds of thousands of dollars. The hon. member may be prepared to take such liberties with the public purse, but the government has made it clear that it is committed to a program of fiscal responsibility.

Fiscal considerations aside, there is a more serious concern raised by the hon. member's motion. Implicit in the wording of the motion is the idea that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service is an organization that is not subject to the authority of Parliament or to any type oversight mechanism. This motion, by suggesting such an idea, does a grave disservice to the reputation of CSIS and to the House which in 1984 put in place an extensive array of legislative safeguards and oversight mechanisms to ensure accountability, control and review of CSIS activities. Operating within this legislative framework, CSIS has proven itself to be a responsible security intelligence agency on a professional par with those of other western democracies.

Central to the control and direction of CSIS are the principles of ministerial control and accountability which are also central to Canadian parliamentary democracy. The CSIS act ensured that the minister would have full knowledge and power of direction over the policies, operations and management of CSIS. Subsection 6(1) of the CSIS act is unequivocal in its message that the minister provides direction to the director of the service.

The CSIS act also supplied the minister with the means to control and guide the service. Ministerial control is to be distinguished from ministerial accountability. Though they are sometimes used interchangeably, the terms have distinct meanings. Control refers to the minister's power of approval, the minister's ability to set policy and give direction and the means at the minister's disposal to ensure that decisions are implemented.

Accountability refers to the minister's obligation to answer before Parliament and the duty of officials to answer to the minister. A principal means by which the minister exercises control over CSIS is through the power of approval. By the normal rules of government, a minister must be consulted on all important matters related to the minister's portfolio.

In addition, the CSIS act and ministerial directions issued to the service require the minister to personally approve a wide variety of operational activities, particularly sensitive operations. The CSIS act stipulates that the minister must personally approve all applications for judicial warrants, all CSIS arrangements with other federal agencies and departments, provincial authorities and foreign governments, and the service's assistance in the coalition of foreign intelligence in Canada.

The minister also exercises control over the service through statutory power to establish the policy guidelines for the service. This is achieved through the issuance of ministerial directions.

An act of Parliament can construct a legislative framework but legislation alone cannot provide detailed guidance covering every aspect of operational activity.

For this there needs to be a policy framework to assist interpretation and implementation. Legislation governing the creation of a security intelligence agency has a special need for such a policy framework if there is to be public confidence in how the agency operates.

Policy frameworks in support of legislation are normally achieved in two ways; through the formulation of regulations and the development of operation guidelines. Neither mechanism however is entirely satisfactory in the security intelligence context.

Regulations as public instruments are obviously unsuited for conveying detailed instructions on how secret operations are to be conducted. Internal agency rules on the other hand would not provide a sufficient level of confidence.

A third device was therefore embodied in the legislation in the form of ministerial direction issued pursuant to subsection 6(2) of the act. Ministerial direction helps to ensure that the Solicitor General is the linchpin of the legal and policy framework.

In practice the minister issues all instructions of consequence in written form regardless of subject. Through the experience of working with the CSIS act the government now defines direction pursuant to subsection 6(2) as "written instructions of a continuing nature issued at the prerogative of the minister that relates to policy standards or procedures".

The strategic work for ministerial direction is clear. Over the last 10 years a set of ministerial directions has been developed setting out the Solicitor General's governing principles for the service and its activities. The directions may be grouped into seven major categories relating to; arrangements to assist the director's accountability to the minister; the government's annual priorities for intelligence on threats to Canada's security, known as the "national requirements"; guidance on the service's statutory duties and functions; guidance on investigative

methods and techniques; instructions dealing with the service's corporate management practices; standards for negotiating co-operative arrangements with domestic and foreign organizations and, policy and file mismanagement issues, particularly the service's retention of files inherited from the RCMP security service.

Currently some 50 ministerial directions are in effect. Directions are converted by the service into operational procedures for use directly by CSIS staff. This logical progression from statute to ministerial direction to operational procedure provides a manageable and auditable means of ensuring that the service is fulfilling its duties and functions in an appropriate manner. I remind all members that SIRC is copied on all these directives.

There is also great provision in the act for accountability. A general direction also exists to ensure the director's accountability to the minister. It describes the roles and responsibilities of the Solicitor General, the Deputy Solicitor General and the director and outlines formal reporting requirements such as the director's obligation to prepare an annual report. The minister has also established guidelines for the scope and content of the director's annual report.

Direction on service operational policy in respect of the service's security intelligence mandate is particularly important to ministerial control. It ensures that the service's collection, analysis and reporting activities respond to the government's annual national requirements for security intelligence and provides practical guidance in interpreting important terminology of the CSIS act.

The operational methods also are clearly laid out. A general direction on the conduct of investigations serves as an umbrella for other more specific directions providing guidance on operational methods. It implicitly endorses the five fundamental principles for controlling investigations espoused by the McDonald commission. The rule of law must be observed at all times.

The investigative means used must be proportionate to the gravity of the threat posed and the probability of its occurrence. The need to use various investigative techniques must be weighed against possible damage to civil liberties or the valuable social institutions.

The more intrusive the technique, the higher the authority required to approve its use. Except in emergency circumstances, the least intrusive techniques of information collection must be used before more intrusive techniques are applied.

A direction on joint operations recognizes that in certain circumstances Canadian security interests may demand the active presence in Canada of investigators from foreign security and intelligence organizations. The principles that are to guide the service's activities in this field are that Canadian sovereignty and law are to be fully respected and protected; the objective and potential product of the co-operation must be of benefit to Canada and serve Canadian national interests; and CSIS must exercise effective control of the co-operative activity.

A direction on foreign investigation provides guidelines governing the service's foreign investigative activity in relation to threats to the security of Canada. It stipulates that the approval of the Solicitor General is required before CSIS may undertake operational activity abroad.

The direction applies to human source travel, foreign security intelligence investigations by CSIS officials and service operational assistance abroad to foreign security and intelligence organizations.

A direction on domestic liaison provides guidance on the establishment of arrangements between-

[Maria Minna, Liberal, Beaches—Woodbine, ON]

Shall I stop, Mr. Speaker, or continue?

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Kilger)]

We will suspend to the call of the Chair.

(The sitting of the House was suspended at 4.08 p.m.)

The House resumed at 4.25 p.m.

[Maria Minna, Liberal, Beaches—Woodbine, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I was talking about liaison and co-operation. Direction on domestic liaison provides guidance on the establishment of arrangements between the service and other federal or provincial institutions. A primary example is the ministerial direction on RCMP-CSIS co-operation.

The principles governing domestic liaison ensure that arrangements are consistent with the service's mandate and that they are in place when there is a requirement for access to information, operational support, information exchange or organizational consultation.

Similarly a direction on foreign liaison sets out principles to guide CSIS in the establishment and conduct of liaison with foreign security and intelligence organizations. The Solicitor General will issue new directions as necessary to ensure that Canada has a responsive and responsible security intelligence agency.

Other cornerstones of the accountability framework established by the CSIS act of 1984 were the review roles of the Security Intelligence Review Committee and the Inspector General of CSIS. SIRC has a mandate to review the propriety of CSIS activities, with emphasis on the delicate balance between national security and individual freedoms. Section 38 of the CSIS act directs SIRC to review generally its performance in the service of its duties and functions.

This includes reviewing such things as CSIS annual reports and certificates of the Inspector General, ministerial direction, CSIS arrangements with domestic and foreign governments and agencies, section 20 reports on unlawful conduct, and regulations.

Section 40 of the legislation makes SIRC responsible for reviewing the service's compliance with the CSIS act, its regulations and ministerial direction, as well as reviewing CSIS activities to ensure they do not involve an unreasonable or unnecessary exercise of powers.

An equally important review function is carried out by the Inspector General of CSIS. The post of Inspector General is unique; it has evolved over time in response to practical experience and ministerial expectations. The basic role of the Inspector General is to conduct independent internal reviews for the minister.

The CSIS act identifies three interlocking functions for the Inspector General: to review the operational activities of the service, to monitor the service's compliance with its operational policies and to submit certificates to the minister.

To ensure the Inspector General is able to exercise these functions effectively, the act stipulates that the Inspector General is entitled to have access to "any information under the control of the service" that relates to the performance of the functions of the office and to receive from the service "such information, reports and explanations" as the Inspector General deems necessary. Under section 31 no information other than cabinet confidences may be withheld on any grounds.

I have provided this detailed overview to illustrate the comprehensive type of legislative safeguards and oversight mechanisms in place to ensure that CSIS operates within its mandate and within the law at all times. Taken together these safeguards and oversight mechanisms provide a solid legislative foundation for CSIS that is in keeping with the best traditions and principles of a free and democratic nation.

The motion before the House would have us turn our backs on these traditions and principles and on the years of work and experience that went into creating a modern and effective legislative framework to govern Canada's national security system.

I am sure the hon. member's motion was prompted by concern for the wellbeing of our national security system. However I would suggest we wait for the SIRC review and the work of the standing committee, of which hon. members across the way are members, before we draw final conclusions.

[Roger Pomerleau, Bloc, Anjou—Rivière-Des-Prairies, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I listened carefully to the comments of my hon. colleague who just gave us a list of the legislative authorities which would allow us, according to her, to make sure that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service is a body that we can control to a certain extent.

She also said that, to some degree, CSIS is accountable to ministers who are empowered to control its activities.

I would like to repeat to my hon. colleague that the RCMP was also, in fact, a regulated body and accountable to ministers. That did not prevent it from committing inexplicable criminal abuses. We now have created a new Canadian Security Intelligence Service. We put into place legislative measures and we now pretend that the problem no longer exists. What difference does my hon. colleague see between the situation that existed from 1970 to 1980 and the current situation?