Mr. Speaker, in intervening in this debate I must record that I at times felt I was attending one of Verdi's latter day operas, high opera. Marked sometimes with opera bouffe I find to some extent the levity that was introduced in the matter concerning the potential loss of privileges of a member of Parliament rather disquieting. I take it that it relates to the intensity and the passion of the debate.
I will focus on the roles and missions of Parliament today, which I believe is the issue we should be debating. This includes what the House is competent to do and what it is not competent to do.
The alleged remarks of the hon. member were not made in Parliament, nor were they made by legal definition within the rayon of Parliament which by extension has been known to include government departments and the like. They would probably not be covered by an argument of parliamentary privilege. To express my own opinion, they would not be covered by parliamentary privilege if the member was prosecuted in the ordinary courts.
One of the issues here concerns whether this is a matter for the ordinary courts. In the case of a member of Parliament it would be the civil courts. In the case of members of the armed forces, with whom it is alleged there was some species of collusion, it would be the military courts. I will return to that in a moment.
There has been a great deal of misunderstanding based perhaps on a too rigid and unimaginative reading of old precedents concerning the role of Parliament today. The phrase high court of Parliament has been used but without an understanding of its historical origins or the need to interpret it in the light of contemporary developments in Parliament and in other institutions that borrowed from the same British parliamentary model we borrowed from.
There was an extensive review of Parliament's criminal powers at the time of the impeachment issue in the United States, the so-called Watergate scandal. I was consulted in a pre-parliamentary capacity by the Senate Committee on Campaign Activities, the Watergate committee. I gave opinions which were published at the time. The great advantage of the Watergate scandal for our purposes is the opportunity for discussion of the inherited criminal powers of Parliament which the United States received as part of its general reception of British law.
The basic point revolves around this issue of the impeachment power which was written into the United States' constitution. There is no doubt that in medieval times these were opportunities for political fishing expeditions. There was no real pretence of a criminal offence or anything else involved. It was a judgment exercised by Parliament on the king's ministers in which the subjective evaluation of their motives in exercising their powers was at the core of the decision.
I mention this simply to say that the vestigial powers of Parliament as the high court of Parliament are essentially limited today by the evolution of the precedents and also by Parliament's own deliberate legislative act of passing legislation it is limited to the cluster of offences grouped around impeachment. There is a reason for this. It is the tyranny of the majority that caused successive Parliaments deliberately to limit by law the power to expel members of Parliament.
There is legislation. It sets it out. It sets out the necessity for convictions before the ordinary civil courts for specified offences,
but limited offences, what in contemporary terms we could still call the felonies as they were understood under the common law.
The correct procedure for a legislative body today would see the power of expulsion being limited to acting on a conviction made by the regular civil courts for a specified offence meeting the test of a felony as it existed under the old common law. This has been done simply to discipline the otherwise unregulated use of a majority's power to expel people it did not like. We saw examples of this in continental Europe between the two wars in the last days of the Weimar Republic when it was used disgracefully.
Impeachment as such is not available in the case of a member not being a government minister. Even if we go back to that, it is limited to officers of the crown. I was asked by a senator the other day, I presume not frivolously, whether it still availed. The answer is yes but it is limited to government ministers. In the British Parliament it has not been used since 1840 but is still there.
As to other matters, they are matters for the ordinary courts, but Parliament can act and properly will act if so inclined on the decisions of the civil courts. If a verdict of guilty were to be returned in such a process, Parliament could be seized and exercise its powers, including the powers to expel.
The problem that one sees in the present case is simply that one understands the matters were taken up with crown counsel. It would surprise me if they have not been because I received letters from constituents asking me if there was a prima facie case. I simply said consult or refer to crown counsel. They were referred to crown counsel and apparently crown counsel have decided not to pursue the matter.
If that is so, and it is beyond correction by senior crown counsel, then it seems to me Parliament cannot retry the matter. It is not simply a matter of the limits of competence of members of Parliament to decide difficult issues of the law of evidence and the like. It is a matter that the executive power has been used and exercised to the full, and that is the end of the matter.
I support the reference of this issue to the committee on procedure and House affairs mainly because I believe it will avoid further debates of this sort, which sometimes seem to be without any clear direction. A restatement by the committee of Parliament's power to discipline its own members stated clearly and concisely would be a help to this House.
I hope the committee will not assume it is its function to act as a court of law. I do not think it would do the job very effectively. If there are still remedies before the civil courts then it would be possible for opposition members to utilize those remedies and take the steps themselves. As far as Parliament is concerned, it is my
own opinion that we should obtain legal opinion at defining the constitutional role of Parliament today.
My personal opinion, as expressed in the past, is that Parliament's criminal law powers are limited to impeachment, narrowly construed. In the case of the attempted Nixon impeachment I came to the conclusion that judgment on political acts was no longer part of the impeachment power. These things became moot with the decision of the president to resign and the matter never proceeded.
There are advantages in going to the committee on procedure and House affairs. It may be that the committee, in spite of the opinions I have expressed, will decide that Parliament should resume criminal law powers, in effect control of members that have lapsed effectively with the transfer of erstwhile powers of Parliament to the ordinary courts.
In that case, I would be prepared to read the report and discuss it on its merits. But under the present circumstances I think it has been beyond Parliament's competence to discuss the merits of the alleged act. I think it is not a proper use of our functions. I therefore would welcome constitutional advice, a ruling from the committee on procedure and House affairs.