Mr. Speaker, I rise on behalf of the people of Surrey Central to express opposition to Bill C-65, an act to amend the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act. Many of my colleagues have spoken very well from different angles and I shall be looking at some of the technicalities in the bill.
The subject matter of the bill is commonly referred to as the federal-provincial equalization payment arrangement. Every five years since 1957 the federal government through the finance department reviews the equalization program. Bill C-65 deals with the period from 1999 to the year 2004.
The purpose of the equalization program is to equalize the provincial revenue raising capacity which enables provinces to provide reasonably comparable levels of the public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation. In the absence of equalization payments wealthier provinces would be able to provide more services to their residents than poorer provinces with the same level of taxation. The equalization program is important to the Canadian Confederation. This program is only as good as the process that allows it to keep pace with the provincial tax system.
Let us look at the process. The key element in the equalization formula is the representative tax system commonly called RTS. The RTS is a hypothetical tax system which is representative of the actual systems of the separate provinces. The key to success rests on how well the RTS reflects provincial tax systems. The RTS ought to be comprehensive, representative, accurate and appropriately categorized.
The RTS should include all revenue sources used to support public services comprehensively. Also a partial coverage of the revenue sources yields a biased picture of relative fiscal capacities of the provinces. The RTS should use definitions of tax bases that reflect the tax structure actually used by the provinces to reflect what governments actually do. It should not represent imaginary, unfair or unrealistic measures. It should be representative of the actual tax system.
The data used to measure the various tax bases must be as accurate as possible for it to be a reliable measure. The items in the RTS that make up a category or revenue source should have common characteristics, the ability to be taxed at a similar rate and should be appropriately categorized.
The finance department currently uses such criteria for its assessment of the RTS but nowhere is it explicitly set out. The finance department has not formalized the set of principles to guide its review of the RTS. It is necessary to arrive at a common way of estimating the tax base.
For many of the 33 revenue sources used by the department the bases are not straightforward and no consensus exists. I will give six examples to prove what I am saying. For example, some provinces calculate their payroll taxes on the total payroll of a business while others tax only a portion above a certain threshold. Still other provinces charge no tax at all. For the purpose of RTS the base chosen across all provinces must be common.
For sales taxes the base used in the RTS is no longer representative of the tax structure used by all provinces. The four provinces that account for a third of Canada's population use a common sales tax base, the GST, which is different from the one used in the RTS. We are comparing apples to oranges. They are not equivalent. There is a need to review the way the sales tax base is currently measured.
Another example is user fees. User fees are not part of the current federal-provincial discussions for the 1999 renewal. It is very important to mention here that governments at every level are resorting to alternative revenue sources such as user fees. It is a tax with only a semantic distinction.
Provincial and local governments receipts from user fees doubled from $6 billion in 1984 to $12 billion in 1994. In just 10 years it doubled. How these revenues are treated in the equalization formula can have a significant effect on overall equalization payments. User fees imposed by the provinces have been part of the equalization of the RTS since 1967.
Similar fees imposed by the municipalities were brought in with the 1982 renewal. Currently they are included under the miscellaneous revenue category of the RTS. This is a category that is altogether different and impacts on the calculations of the complicated equalization formula.
The fourth example is that since 1977 lottery revenues have been treated as a separate revenue source in the RTS, with gross revenues from the sale of lottery tickets constituting the lottery base. It worked well until the provincial gaming sector became significantly transformed.
Today provinces are operating video games, casinos, bingos, VLTs, break-open tickets and other games of chance. The RTS base does not cover these newer gaming activities. The revenues are treated differently for equalization purposes. Where a casino is operated by a provincial lottery corporation profits are equalized under the lottery revenue source. If the casino is operated by a government department the gross revenues of the casino are equalized under the miscellaneous revenue source in the RTS. Again we are mixing apples with oranges.
Similar inequities arise in the treatment of revenues from other games. The RTS has become less representative of the provincial taxing policy. We will see if the government is addressing these gaming inequities in the bill.
The fifth example is resource taxation. Resource taxation is an area where the ground is always shifting. The resource revenue bases in the RTS are measured on the basis of the value or volume of production. Ideally they would be measured on the basis of economic rent or the value of the resource over its cost of production. Rent is a measure of taxable potential, not actual but potential. It consists of a value that can be taxed without affecting production because natural resources in different locations can differ in quality and production costs. Rent associated with them can also differ significantly. These differences are not captured by the value or volume of production.
Also, there are separate sources, for example, new oil, old oil, heavy oil or mined oil.
Saskatchewan argues that the current equalization formula lumps together oil sources that have much different profit potential. The resulting national average tax rate overstates the extent to which the low profit oil can be taxed. Royalties generated from low profit oil may not be sufficient to compensate for the loss in equalization payments associated with the production of that oil. Production of such oil may cause a province to lose more in equalization transfers than it gains in oil revenues.
Similarly, forestry revenues include income from logging plus royalties, licences, rentals or fees. The tax base used in the RTS for forestry revenues is cubic metres of wood cut on crown land. The province of Quebec argues that trees are not a homogeneous product and I agree. Spruce grown in Quebec is not equivalent in value to the cedar grown in B.C. The revenue used for forestry products is related more to the value of the product than the volume of production.
To get technical, the revenue yield of forestry products is related more to the value of the product than the volume of production. The current RTS base for forestry revenues may exaggerate the fiscal capacity of Quebec and other provinces with large volumes of relatively low value wood products.
The Department of Finance has failed to find a way to accommodate provincial concerns in the area of resources taxes and appropriately categorize them.
The sixth example is property taxes. It produces $2 billion in this category, the second largest amount of entitlements in the equalization program, almost 22% of the total. When the RTS was first adopted, municipal property taxes had been left out of equalization because there was no suitable measure available to determine the base for the real property tax. Still the government has not developed a suitable measure. The government is using the wrong yardstick instead of the 36-inch one.
Comparable data on real property values across provinces has always been difficult to obtain. The base needs to be assessed rather than observed. The tax base is the income earned by the taxpayer, not the potential. The base is a stock of heterogeneous items, only a small portion of which changes hands each year. The value of the stock must be estimated or assessed.
Assessments inevitably involve judgment and judgments can differ. They can differ from item to item. The problem is compounded by the fact that the assessment practices differ from one class of property to another, from one province to another and from one municipality to another.
In addition, the assessments are infrequent and use different base years. Thus the assessments are not comparable within the same municipality either. The government therefore lacks a common measure of property values. There is no agreement on the appropriate base for taxing property. Market values are volatile and changes in the market value do not necessarily reflect changes in fiscal capacity. The current property tax base measures relative fiscal capacity.
The weights used in the formula to distribute property values across provinces are arbitrary and the formula is not sufficiently sensitive to changes in property values. The formula is not consistent with the basic RTS principle that the tax source used should closely represent what provinces actually tax. Not even one province levies property taxes on the basis used in the equalization program. Despite the red flag by the auditor general, the Liberal government has done nothing to rectify this problem. It continues to measure a yard with a 26-inch yardstick.
There are many flaws in the present equalization program. It should be completely reformed. We know the equalization's provision has limited the cumulative growth of total equalization payments to the cumulative growth of GNP from the base. Ceiling and floor levels were also introduced. I will not elaborate on that but it does not work favourably. Rather it would make it difficult for the provinces, particularly those close to the floor level, to plan their budgets.
There is asymmetrical treatment of underpayments and overpayments. The overpayments are treated as non-interest bearing loans to the provinces. Last year it cost the federal government $38 million. Free use of federal funds is not necessarily shared equally by all receiving provinces. The federal government does not charge interest on the underpayments.
The government has manipulated the program for political favours. Our leader reminded us that the premier of Newfoundland, Brian Tobin, was given a gift before the election. The program could be more effective if the federal-provincial committee on equalization began its review of outstanding issues earlier in each new equalization period.
The final decision about this program rests with parliament. The Department of Finance should have made a greater effort to educate parliament and the Canadian public in general. It could use parliament more effectively by soliciting advice from a wider circle of interested parties rather than just relying on the advice of a federal-provincial committee working behind closed doors.
The government has had five years. Just three days ago we received notice of this bill without draft legislation. I wonder what the government has been doing for five years. The Liberals have denied the opportunity for public consultation or academic input into this case. This process is characteristic of this government. We all know the Liberals are masters of the top down, arrogant, manipulative process. The least the government could do would be to establish a committee of parliamentarians to study this issue in detail.
The constituents of Surrey Central and I have some serious problems with the unnecessary and traditional way the political leadership of our country has handled the equalization program. Evolving over many decades, every five years the traditional political parties have given us an extremely convoluted and complex process. Its design is so archaic and cryptic that it defies logic and reason. It is not fair that our system is such a conundrum. There is no reason for that to be the case. This could be a simple series of calculations. That is where the problem begins.
Liberals are failing Canadians by not providing a system that is capable of providing measurements of provincial revenue raising capacities that are comparable from province to province. What is worse is that the Liberals are satisfied that the best measurements possible are being used. This is unacceptable.
The measurements should be accurate, reliable and sound. In this case they are not. Why would the Liberals allow such measurements to be used? In the five years the Liberals have had to prepare for the new equalization program they have done nothing but tinker with it.
The Reform Party has advanced the new Canada act which seeks to improve the Canadian political and economic system.
There is a need for a single social union agreement on transfers from the federal government to the provinces. The program presently costs $48 million. Eventually it will cost $242 million.
I and many Canadians wonder why every proposal from the government costs Canadian taxpayers more money. Equalization as it is structured is divisive. It pits one Canadian against another. The program is used as a political gift, as mentioned earlier in the case of Premier Brian Tobin of Newfoundland.
In conclusion, on behalf of the people of Surrey Central I am voting against the bill. The people of Surrey Central do not want me to rubber stamp my approval on the work that the government is doing on Bill C-65. I will not do that. I am proud to represent my constituents who would not do that either.
Like British Columbia and Alberta, Ontario is a contributing province. We will see how the 101 members from Ontario will vote and justify it to their constituents.
I oppose the bill until the whole equalization program is completely reformed.