moved:
That, in the opinion of this House, the government should recognize the conclusion of the Bélanger-Campeau Commission, which proposed, in 1991, that the National Assembly of Quebec adopt legislation on holding a referendum and the offer of a new partnership, and that no federal legislation or regulations should be incompatible with achieving this conclusion.
Madam Speaker, I want to say how proud I am to speak about the Bélanger-Campeau commission, since it will be 10 years on March 27 that the commission tabled its report.
Before getting to the heart of the matter, however, I wish to welcome a friend of mine who is taking a law course with me. Twice a week I attend lectures to be able to better understand the bills that are brought before us. I know that, Madam Speaker, you have a law degree.
I want to welcome one of my colleagues, Clément Bélanger, who wants to hear today's debate. I am glad he is here, even though I do not always share his views on Canada's future. I am very happy to see him here.
First, as members will recall, the Bélanger-Campeau commission was created as a result of the failure of the Meech Lake accord. Speaking about that as a Quebecer, it is hard to forget that this was the first time in the history of Quebec that a head of government, Robert Bourassa, asked for so little in terms of collective powers.
The 1987 Meech Lake accord, which the provinces had three years to ratify, was based on five main conditions. They were the minimum we could accept. Asking for less collective powers would have reduced us to the status of a municipality.
There were five main conditions in Meech: that Quebec be recognized as a distinct society and that this should be given an interpretative value in the preamble of an act; that provinces have a veto, especially with regard to changes to federal institutions; That Quebec could submit a list of judges who, more faithful to the civil law tradition, would be appointed to the supreme court on the recommendation of the national assembly; that spending power would be limited with regard to new shared cost programs; and that Quebec would have its fair share of immigration quotas, that is 23% or 24%.
As we can see, this was much less than what previous premiers had asked for. Members will remember that the Meech Lake accord was defeated by two provinces, namely Newfoundland and Manitoba. Why should we remember the Meech Lake accord? Why should we remember Bélanger-Campeau commission?
I felt rather happy last night to hear that the premier of Quebec wished to bring the various studies up to date. Fifty-five experts, of every persuasion, of every leaning, of every allegiance, tabled submissions before the Bélanger-Campeau commission.
I want to point one thing out. It is incredible that it has to be remembered, 10 years after the Meech Lake accord failed, that if Robert Bourassa were alive and still active in public life, he could not have held a referendum along the very terms of the Bélanger-Campeau commission.
I want to remind my hon. colleagues, particularly those from English Canada, that the Bélanger-Campeau commission is not a trivial fact of our history.
When the federal government through the federal-provincial relations office, run by the Privy Council, refers to the Bélanger-Campeau commission in its own documents, it refers to it as a constitutional commission, which represents a moment of the history of Quebec, the most intense moment of our collective history, when we came close to having something similar to a constituent assembly.
Thirty-six commissioners, 34 of whom are still alive, sat on the Bélanger-Campeau commission, and everything that is stirring in Quebec, everything that we love in Quebec, everything that thinks in Quebec, was represented, including municipalities, school boards, political movements, mostly from Quebec, and artists. Everything that is stirring in Quebec was represented on the Bélanger-Campeau commission.
In its conclusion the Bélanger-Campeau commission reminded us that there are two major options for Quebec's future. Let me quote in its entirety the main conclusion of the Bélanger-Campeau commission:
Only two solutions are open to Quebec in redefining its status: firstly, making a new, last, attempt to redefine its status within the federal system; and, secondly, achieving sovereignty.
Ten years after the Bélanger-Campeau commission, after the failure of the Meech Lake accord, after the failure of the Charlottetown accord and after the referral to the supreme court, I am telling the House that the evidence is now there: Canadian federalism cannot be renewed to further the legitimate aspirations of Quebecers, and the only relevant, valid, appropriate and credible conclusion is Quebec's sovereignty.
A number of elements support such a statement. I was a member of parliament in 1995; many members who are here now were not back then, but I was. The Prime Minister had a motion passed to recognize the distinct character of Quebec, a motion in which he even gave Quebec a veto. What happened since 1995?
Whenever it was time to recognize Quebec as a nation, this government always rejected what was passed in this House and what was asked by the Bélanger-Campeau commission. What is the point of adopting a motion saying that Quebec is a distinct society if we cannot even be recognized for who we are?
Let me give some examples. The review of the bill on immigration and citizenship was a complex issue, since francophones account for only 2% of immigrants in North America. Quebec has a citizenship policy. Whether we like it or not, from the moment people can take part in democratic institutions, citizenship becomes a reality.
During debates in committee and in this House, when we reviewed the issue of citizenship and immigration, we tabled an amendment requesting that Quebec hold its own citizenship ceremony because we all know the value of symbols. During the ceremony we would have given new immigrants choosing Quebec a copy of our charter of the French language, our Quebec charter of human rights and freedoms and our elections act.
How did the government reply to that motion? It spurned it. Through this lack of support for our request, once again, the government was showing that it does not seriously intend to recognize us as a nation.
What does Bill C-20 mean? Bill C-20 where the great democratic forces in Quebec isolated the government and reminded the government that it cannot legitimately expect to write the referendum question in lieu of the national assembly.
I remind members that if Robert Bourassa had wanted to hold a referendum on the Bélanger-Campeau commission's report, under Bill C-20, and more specifically clause 4, he would not have had the freedom to do so. I dare any member of parliament to prove to me that it would be possible to ask a two part referendum question under clause 4 of Bill C-20.
Worse yet, since the early 1990s we have seen an unprecedented attempt to deny Quebec's identity and reinforce the Canadian identity.
The House might recall that in 1995, the year of the referendum, the government did one of the most anti-democratic things that can be done politically.
I see that the Secretary of State for Amateur Sport is being very offhand about this. I ask him to remember that in 1995, the same year in which was held the referendum under the referendum act, René Lévesque's greatest legacy, this government did not even have the decency to respect the legislation in question. During the referendum campaign it spent five times more than the authorized ceiling in Quebec. Is that how it views democracy? It spent five times more than was allowed.
Worse yet, it used citizenship courts to promote its political option and to hand out vast numbers of citizenship certificates.
I believe in immigration because Quebec is condemned to be a land of immigration. When we look at which countries take in the most immigrants, Quebec is in fifth place. It is right after Australia, the United States and New Zealand. Quebecers' generosity and openness is well known.
Can there be any justification for a government not only failing to comply with the referendum act but also using citizenship courts to issue 43,000 citizenship certificates, 11,000 of them in one month? If that had been a lasting trend, we would have noticed it in 1996, 1997, and 1998. In 1996 citizenship certificate quotas dropped by 70%.
This is what is unacceptable in a democratic system. Instead of maintaining the separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial arms, instead of maintaining the historical perspective required in discussions of such matters, this government has breached one of the most time honoured principles of our democracy. It has used the judiciary to promote its political option. This is not acceptable.
In Quebec there are three issues on which everyone agrees, regardless of their political affiliations. Claude Ryan could call on the spirit of such a collective opinion and the Bélanger-Campeau commission has embodied them. What are these issues? Quebec is a nation, and all nations have the right to choose their destiny.
These last few years the federal government has put in place a formidable propaganda machine. Every year since 1996 the federal government has spent, on average, $100 million a year on initiatives promoting federalism, $100 million of which a part surely comes from taxes paid by Quebecers.
The intergovernmental affairs minister said yesterday, with his usual outraged tone, that the government is not legitimate. The government of Quebec, led by Robert Bourassa, held the first constituent assembly of our history, at which all the political forces were represented.
A certain amount of studies were made. It is the duty of the government to update those studies because we will not accept to be treated like a simple province because Quebec is not like Prince Edward Island. It is not like Saskatchewan. It is not like Alberta. With all the respect I have for their distinctiveness, but they are not like Quebec.
I see that my time has expired, but with the unanimous consent of the House I could complete my speech in five minutes.