Mr. Speaker, the bill respecting the registration of charities and security information and to amend the Income Tax Act seeks to counter activities in support of terrorism as provided under the convention on the financing of terrorism which was approved by the United Nations.
Through its bill, the government wants to counter terrorism by preventing supporters of terrorism from engaging in fundraising or the transfer of money and materiel abroad.
The bill seeks to deny support to terrorist activities and to protect the integrity of the charity registration process through the fair and transparent use, to the extent that it is possible, of confidential information that could jeopardize national and human security.
Concretely, this bill seeks to prevent organizations that are related to terrorist groups from obtaining the status of charities. This should help reduce the funding of terrorist activities. The legislation would, among other things, facilitate the use of confidential information to determine the eligibility for registration as a charity or to revoke the registration of a registered charity.
It is interesting to note that the minister does not define what he means by "terrorism" even though the purpose of the bill is precisely to counter the funding of organizations that engage in such activities. Such an omission can of course lead to a broad or liberal interpretation of the term. This means that in a highly politicized context there is always a potential risk of abuse.
In that perspective, we have no guarantee that the criteria used for interpretation purposes will allow us to distinguish between the funding of legitimate activities, such as political protest, and that of violent activities. The word "terrorism" must be thoroughly defined.
As for the judicial review of the certificate, while the procedure is relatively simple, it does raise some concerns. First, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service will inform the solicitor general and the Minister of National Revenue that it has come to the conclusion that an organization is fundraising to finance terrorist activities.
On the basis of that notice the ministers can then start procedures to prevent that organization from getting the status of charity or to revoke its registration.
Given that this process is set in motion by an administrative notice to the political arm, which then issues a certificate, we feel that this approach is flawed by the absence of any possibility of judicial control.
As a result, the impossibility of filing an appeal places any organization faced with such a procedure at the mercy of errors or political and judicial administrative abuses which might arise from excessive alarmism. Knowing that CSIS practices are not above reproach, we are concerned.
In addition, there is the absence of control mentioned earlier. What reasons could the organization give for purposes of control or appeal, when it is not entitled to know the information giving rise to the certificate?
But there is no objection to giving it information which does not pose a threat to national security. In other words, it will be given information which is not really relevant because the denial or revocation of charitable status will be based on information which could pose a threat to national security.
Finally, the only procedural guarantee the organization is allowed is the audi alteram partem rule. But one might wonder just how useful that is since the organization will not have access to the facts and the reasons for the certificate being issued.
The section on evidence raises equally important concerns. First, under a procedure provided for in the bill a judge will be able to allow evidence regardless of its admissibility.
By disregarding specific rules of evidence the government is ignoring the contradictory nature of our judicial system. The bill would institute an inquisitional procedure which is unacceptable in a free and democratic society.
As we have only ten or so minutes each, I will skip over a few of my remarks and go to the heart of the issue.
We wonder how anyone could possibly think an accused would have the impression that justice had been done. For that to be the case, there would at least have to be the appearance of justice. The whole thing is hard to verify, when the evidence is revealed in camera, in the absence of the principal parties. It can be said therefore that in the case before us the procedure stands out because of its almost total lack of transparency.
The organization mentioned in a certificate will be able to apply for a review by showing that a material change has occurred in circumstances since the determination. This is an interesting possibility since the organization is permitted to mend its ways.
However, if we consider the problems raised previously it seems to me uncertain that an organization can prove this. In order to prove reform, a party must know the allegations against it.
Once the ministers have given their decision, the organization will have all the time in the world to apply to the federal court to review the decision. Once again this possibility appears to accord certain procedural guarantees.
Unfortunately, this is not entirely the case. In fact, the ministers do not seem to have to give reasons for the decision that is to be reviewed. In addition, the federal court will review the decision only if it was given under subclause 10(5)( b ) of the bill, that is, if the circumstances have changed but the certificate continues to have effect.
This implies therefore that when the ministers conclude that the situation has not changed materially, the federal court does not have real review power. In such a case it can only quash the decision on the grounds that the circumstances have materially changed and return the file to the ministers for another determination. In this way, there is no real control because the file goes back to those who made the original determination.
The aim of this bill is most worthy, but the means to achieving it are dubious. At the moment, as it is written it snags on too many principles of justice to be passed in its present form. The committee will have to improve it significantly, otherwise, it would set a dangerous precedent in terms of the violation of procedural guarantees.
Some will say that charities may be a disguise for terrorist organizations. Even if they are right, I do not believe the right thing is being targeted. It is somewhat absurd to think that the supporters of terrorist organizations want to take advantage of tax credits.
One may even wonder to what extent this bill is not a roundabout way of enabling the minister to control taxation. It must be kept in mind that terrorism is not financed exclusively through charitable organizations. Although the government is attempting to show that it is taking concrete actions against terrorism, with this bill it is opting for facility rather than really attacking the source of the problem.
In actual fact, all it is doing is making sure that tax receipts cannot be issued for financing terrorist activities.
I agree is a very real phenomenon and we must help fight it. On the other hand, do we need to recreate psychoses such as there were in the era of fear of the communist threat, or worse still, go back to the era of the Inquisition and its search for heretics? I think not.
I believe it would be far more effective for the criminal code to properly address the financing of criminal activities for this would focus directly on those involved in such acts.
In short, to conclude, Bill C-16 could be summarized as follows: suspicion, discretionary power, enigmatic proof, and lack of control.