Debates of Oct. 1st, 2002

Iraq

[Bill Casey, Progressive Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order. Considering the seriousness of the debate and the subject, I wonder if we could seek unanimous consent to have a little more time with the Minister of Foreign Affairs to ask questions on this very serious issue. We all have many questions. We need to know.

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Bélair)]

Is there unanimous consent to have more time?

Could I ask the member how much more time he would like?

[Bill Casey, Progressive Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

I would like about an hour, Mr. Speaker, but perhaps five minutes would be good.

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Bélair)]

I think you have just lost your unanimous consent.

Seriously, there is a request for having the minister answer more questions. Is there unanimous consent? Is five minutes agreeable?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

[Some hon. members]

No.

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Bélair)]

There is no consent. Resuming debate.

[John McCallum, Liberal, Minister of National Defence]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to speak to the motion today. I am honoured that my esteemed colleague and friend, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, has seen fit to share his time with me. In doing so, I reiterate the government's commitment to foster open debate and consultation on foreign and defence policy issues.

There is absolutely no question that each one of us is very concerned about the situation in Iraq. I see this among my constituents. I see this in my family. I know that all of us are very concerned about what unpredictable forces could be unleashed should there be military action, as my colleague has described very well.

We were certainly encouraged by the recent announcement that the Government of Iraq would allow the return of UN weapons inspectors, but we must remain vigilant in demanding their full and unfettered access. Anything less would be gambling with the safety of the Iraqi people, the stability of the region and the security of the international community.

Within the United Nations, Canada has played an active role on this issue. On several occasions, we have required that the Iraqi regime meet all its international obligations. In fact, we have constantly supported the UN's multilateral actions with respect to Iraq.

Canada's commitment to a multilateral, rules-based international system is long and deep, going back at least to Lester Pearson, rooted in our commitment to international law and extending not only to the United Nations but to the WTO, to NATO and to other international institutions. I think perhaps as an economist I could pose the question: Why are we so committed to this multilateral, rules-based system? I would say because the alternative is a unilateral, power-based system, which kind of means the law of the jungle. If we look at it in a trade situation, given that our neighbour is so large, when it is a unilateral, power-based system we will strike out every time. On a multilateral, rules-based system we at least have a fighting chance.

In that vein, I was in NATO last week at the NATO defence ministers meeting when Mr. Rumsfeld proposed the NATO rapid deployment force. While Canada's position will not be official until the Prague summit in November, I welcome that because that is a multilateral, NATO-based system which would still have to go to the UN for approval. What is the alternative to that? It is a unilateral, U.S.-led system of coalitions. We have a long history of favouring a multilateral, rules-based system. In many respects, that is what this debate is all about.

Fundamentally, as of now the ball is in the court of the UN and that is exactly where the ball ought to be, but I would like to add to what my colleague has said a few words about how Canada has deployed the Canadian Forces when necessary to help thwart Iraq's contravention of the international institutions. I will give just a few examples.

Even before the outbreak of the gulf war, Canada was helping ensure stability between Iran and Iraq. Between 1988 and 1991, 525 members of the Canadian Forces were deployed as part of the UN Iran-Iraq military observer group. A more significant military contribution would come only months later, when Canada acted with many other nations in a coalition to liberate Kuwait. As part of our contribution, naval and air capabilities, including 24 CF-18s, a field hospital and an infantry unit, were deployed to the Arabian gulf. In all, 6,000 Canadian Forces members took part in operations before, during and after hostilities, operating under the authority of several UN security council resolutions.

But our commitment did not end there because, during the following ten years, Canada put military equipment at the disposal of the UN for the enforcement of the sanctions.

Many Canadian warships have carried out maritime interdiction operations to enforce the UN embargo and force Iraq to respect the resolutions of the UN security council, and this has continued until the present.

During the same period, Canadian Forces specialists participated in the UN special commission charged with the inspection and destruction of Iraq's ballistic missiles as well as its chemical, nuclear and biological facilities, but as we all know this participation was brought to a sudden and unfortunate end when inspectors were forced to leave Iraq in 1998.

In the examples I have referred to today, Canada's first and foremost response was to seek resolution through diplomatic channels. That will continue to be the case. At the same time, it is clear that diplomatic efforts sometimes fail to yield results and military action becomes necessary.

Let no one think that Canada will hesitate to provide military support if the government deems it necessary. Canada is sometimes known as a peaceable kingdom but never as a pacifist kingdom. This has been demonstrated through generations and around the world. From World War I and World War II to Korea and most recently Afghanistan, where we were at one point the fourth largest contributor, we have consistently in our history done our part militarily when necessary in pursuit of democracy and freedom around the world. We will do the same if necessary, as we have done already in the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan.

In the case before us today, Canada has made clear our commitment to search for a diplomatic solution. We call again on the Government of Iraq to live up to its international obligations and allow full and unfettered access by UN inspectors. This has been stated by my colleague, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as by the Prime Minister. But Iraq must know that if it fails to comply there will be serious repercussions. We cannot let this regime flout the will of the international community any longer.

At this point, in case someone asks me a question about it, let me make it clear that Canada has not been asked to participate in any military action against Iraq. Therefore, any discussion of military action would be premature at this stage. Only by forcing the Iraqi government to allow full and unfettered access by weapons inspectors can we be sure that it will not be able to possess and use weapons of mass destruction against its own people, its neighbours or any other country.

[Leon Benoit, Canadian Alliance, Lakeland, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I have three quick questions for the minister.

First, he commented in his speech that if the NATO rapid reaction force which is being established were to take action, it would need United Nations approval for a mission. That is something different that is not normally required for NATO. I would like the minister to clarify that.

Second, he said that Canada would not hesitate to provide military support in Iraq if needed. I would like to ask the minister, with what has happened, with not being able to sustain a mission beyond six months in Afghanistan, with pulling navy and air force personnel out of the area, with reducing the size of the mission into the Balkans just because we simply do not have the people, who are worn out, what type of commitment could we realistically make in Iraq?

Third, for the minister, when asked by the media about a week or so ago to comment on his not having read Mr. Blair's evidence on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, I refused to comment but I would like to ask him if he has read that yet.

[John McCallum, Liberal, Markham, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is desirable if NATO interventions have UN sanction. This has not always been the case. I would acknowledge that.

In terms of a realistic intervention, we have to balance the stresses on the people versus the urgency of the action. The Canadian Forces has a significant, substantial surge capacity. Were there to be a very major incident where the government attached a very high priority to taking action, we would be able to mobilize significant forces but at some human cost. I might remind the hon. member that we have a number of ships and other assets in the region in the Afghanistan area already.

I am saying that we are by no means suggesting any military commitment at this moment, as I said in my speech, but the hon. member can rest assured that if the government were to decide to take action a significant contribution would be available.

[An hon. member]

Like what?

[John McCallum, Liberal, Markham, ON]

I am not going to get into exactly what that contribution would be because it is, so far, hypothetical, but the member can rest assured that the people at National Defence headquarters are always working on contingency plans and possible contributions to possible situations depending on what the government should require.

Also, I have been fully briefed on the British document.

[Antoine Dubé, Bloc, Lévis-Et-Chutes-De-La-Chaudière, QC]

Mr. Speaker, personally, I am delighted that a debate is being held here this evening on this important issue, which is of concern to many people. At the same time, I note that the Minister of Foreign Affairs shared his time with the Minister of National Defence. This puts me in mind of the dove, the weapon and the sword. In his speech, the Minister of National Defence seems to be saying that our sword will be mighty, that it is ready, and so forth.

I have a question for him about this kind of verbal offensive. We know that Canada does not even have a ship with which to transport its equipment and men. It is leasing equipment from other countries and private ships for this purpose.

Finally, since the minister appears to be moving towards an offensive, can he assure the House that he will raise the debate here, and that it will be the subject of a parliamentary vote before troops are authorized to be sent to Iraq?

[John McCallum, Liberal, Markham, ON]

Mr. Speaker, with respect to the second part of the question, I cannot give the member this assurance, because it is not up to the Minister of National Defence to take such a decision.

I can, however, tell the member that we have not contradicted one another. We said that diplomacy was the first choice. But, in the event of UN authorization, we have the capacity, if the government so decides, to send troops. It is simple.

[Stephen Harper, Canadian Alliance, Leader of the Opposition]

Mr. Speaker, I welcome the opportunity to debate the issue of Iraq and weapons of mass destruction. I will lay out to the government the advice of Her Majesty's loyal opposition.

I want to get to the immediate question. The question is whether Canada would support a multilateral allied action to neutralize the capacity of Iraq to manufacture and deploy weapons of mass destruction should, and I repeat should, Saddam Hussein fail to comply with new or existing resolutions of the United Nations.

When asked that question yesterday, the foreign minister said that the government “would judge that when it comes”. For three reasons, those being international law, the threat of weapons of mass destruction and the integrity of Canadian foreign policy, the government's approach is inadequate.

Let me be very clear here. The Canadian Alliance position is that it does not want to encourage or urge war. We hope that war may be avoided. Our position states the following: The time has come for Canada to pledge support to the developing coalition of nations, including Britain, Australia and the United States, determined to send a clear signal to Saddam Hussein that failure to comply with an unconditional program of inspection, as spelled out in either new or existing UN resolutions, would justify action to ensure the safety of millions of people in the region from Iraq's suspected weapons of mass destruction.

The time has come for Canada to join this growing coalition, including Great Britain, Australia and the United States, that is determined to make Saddam Hussein understand that any refusal to comply with an unconditional inspection program, as prescribed in new or existing UN resolutions, would justify action aimed at ensuring the safety of millions of people in the region and protecting them against any weapons of mass destruction that Iraq may have in its possession.

Let me recap where matters stand and the events of today.

Last weekend Britain and the United States submitted to the permanent five members of the Security Council of the United Nations a draft resolution. In that resolution Iraq would have seven days to accept without conditions a rigorous program of inspection. Upon acceptance Iraq would have 23 days to open all sites, including Saddam Hussein's eight palaces, to full inspection. Last week the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, said that the UN cannot return to the past cat and mouse game of Iraqi resistance to inspection. By all accounts, all members of the Security Council hold that view, though some may differ on issues of timing.

Hans Blix, the chief UN weapons inspector, entered into negotiations with an Iraqi delegation on the modalities of an inspection program. Those very negotiations themselves did not bode well for future compliance. If Iraq were sincere, then the terms of the UN inspection should not have been an issue.

Today in Vienna, Blix and the Iraqi delegation reached an agreement on the inspection modalities. The agreement nonetheless does not yet adequately deal with the access of UN inspectors to the eight presidential sites. These sites are not quaint towers. They contain approximately 1,500 buildings covering some 32 square kilometres. More importantly, the inspection modalities agreement does not take the British-U.S. 30 day access resolution out of the Security Council. If anything the inspection agreement makes passage of the resolution ever more pressing, and I gather that Mr. Powell has indicated that he will pursue that.

Whether or not the Security Council passes a new resolution, a clear and unmistakable message must be sent to Saddam Hussein that his failure to comply completely with not only the UN weapons inspection, but also with the removal of any and all weapons of mass destruction and their components constitutes legitimate ground for direct action to remove the threat of those weapons. A resolution from the Security Council may come this week. It may come just before the UN inspectors return to Baghdad, now scheduled for October 15.

Let me present the reasons why Canada should make clear its own position, and clear immediately, in order to continue building the pressure to reduce the Iraqi threat of weapons of mass destruction.

First, there is justification in international law. In 1991 the Gulf War in which Canada participated as a full coalition partner did not end in an armistice. It ended in a ceasefire agreement in which Iraq agreed to a series of UN resolutions requiring the unconditional and unrestricted inspection of any and all Iraqi sites. The Gulf War itself made clear the necessity and urgency of such inspections. The conflict exposed for the first time the full extent of Saddam's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs. Shortly after Iraq agreed to the conditions of the ceasefire agreement it began to block the UN inspectors and place sites off-limits. The work of the inspectors continued despite the realization that Iraq intended to violate not only the spirit of the ceasefire agreement, but also the letter of the UN inspection resolutions.

By 1997 UN inspectors had declared they could not work effectively and by late 1998 the UN team withdrew. In 1999 a new UN resolution demanded their re-entry. Nothing happened. In July 2002 Kofi Annan concluded that Saddam Hussein had no intention of complying with its ceasefire commitments and ended negotiations.

As matters stand now, Iraq has defied 14 UN resolutions over 11 years. That fact alone would provide sufficient justification to consider the 1991 ceasefire agreement as no longer in force. The leaders of the Gulf War coalition could therefore be justified in resuming their original action. Britain and the United States chose instead, and chose correctly and wisely in my view, to seek new domestic consensus and to return to the UN one more time to secure an unambiguous resolution on an unconditional and unrestricted program of inspection. Even in the event a new resolution is not forthcoming, justification for action exists both in terms of the original ceasefire and subsequent UN resolutions.

Second, there is justification by the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Some individuals question whether Saddam Hussein does possess weapons of mass destruction sufficient to justify an action to remove the threat of their deployment in a hostile Iraqi action. Let me say first that no doubt exists that Saddam Hussein operates programs to produce weapons of mass destruction.

The relevant question is: in the four years since UN weapons inspectors left Iraq in 1998 how much further has Saddam Hussein progressed in securing these weapons?

One week ago British Prime Minister Tony Blair laid out before the British House of Commons the contents of a special dossier prepared by his country's joint intelligence committee. That dossier laid out in great detail the efforts of Saddam Hussein to acquire new weapons of mass destruction and to conceal existing ones unaccounted for at the end of the Gulf War.

The weapons program of Saddam fall into the following categories: chemical, biological, nuclear and delivery missile systems. I will not review all the evidence in the JIC dossier. The material is in the public domain. I will as an example, however, review the evidence on Iraq's progress toward constructing a nuclear bomb and securing the capacity to deliver one or more such bombs.

I choose to highlight Iraq's nuclear threat because our own intelligence service, CSIS, released in February a report providing strong evidence both of Iraq's intent to construct a nuclear device and its success. It reported that:

During the inspections of the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) after the 1991 Gulf War, it was discovered that Iraq had been engaged since the early 1980s in a broad-based and massive, multi-billion dollar program to acquire nuclear weapons, in violation of its pledges under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The UN inspectors learned that the Iraqis had replaced their original bomb design with one small enough to fit on a Scud-type missile. We now know that Iraq may still possess Scud missiles as nine of them still remain unaccounted for since the Gulf War. Additional information has come from a top Iraqi nuclear scientist who defected in 1994. The inspectors determined that Iraq's bomb design will work. The Iraqis have mastered the key technique of creating an implosive shock wave which squeezes a bomb's nuclear material enough to trigger a chain reaction.

The dossier also revealed that Iraq tried to buy the special equipment including 60,000 specialized aluminum tubes necessary to process natural uranium into weapons grade uranium. The dossier identified all of these procurement attempts as having occurred since 1998, since the end of UN inspections.

Today Iraq may possess a nuclear bomb and the ability to launch it at targets in an arc ranging from Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Some respond that this information does not constitute proof. To that I reply, not only does the risk exist but Saddam Hussein's possession of a launchable nuclear bomb is also a risk that is a fairly quantifiable one.

In time the odds will only increase that he will possess one. The question we must now consider is: what is the risk Saddam Hussein may launch a nuclear attack should he decide to project his power over the Middle East, feel threatened by other countries or attempt to gain support by launching an attack against Israel or another country?

In 1991 he repeatedly launched Scud missiles against Israel. Let us make no mistake. The prospect of mass death does not deter Saddam Hussein. Members will recall his use of mustard gas on the Kurdish village of Halabja in 1998. It was the largest chemical attack in history in which 5,000 people died and another 10,000 people were injured.

I will recap to make clear the argument. For two decades Saddam Hussein has pursued weapons of mass destruction. The Gulf War only slowed his effort, it did not change his intent. New evidence suggests he has made advances toward acquiring hideous weapons since the departure of UN inspectors in 1998. He has used weapons of mass destruction before. Should he fail to fully comply with either new or existing UN declarations he poses a significant risk to millions of innocent people in the region.

The UN failed in Rwanda to respond to evidence of an impending massacre. Should the UN fail again, the very credibility of the organization is at stake. All indications are clear the UN will uphold its resolutions. In any event, a coalition of countries have indicated that the threat posed by such weapons could lead to action aimed at removing that threat. Canada, a country where soldiers did try valiantly to avert the Rwandan massacre, cannot sit idly by in the face of such a threat.

Canada has simply to tell Saddam Hussein that responsible nations including this country will hold him accountable should he fail to disclose and dismantle his programs to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

Let me move thirdly to justification in Canadian foreign policy. Canadians rightfully and sensibly do not seek war for war's sake. Canadians do not want to see war waged on the basis of propaganda. Canadians do want to see Canada's national security interests and long held values in international diplomacy upheld. The position taken by the Canadian Alliance reflects all three of these conditions.

I note in passing that yesterday the British Labour Party at its conference in Blackpool passed a resolution similar to the position the Canadian Alliance has proposed here tonight.

Any action following Saddam Hussein's failure to allow honest inspections if and when the UN inspection team returns to Iraq must be consistent with international law and should, but not necessarily must, follow from a new UN resolution.

The limits of UN declarations are not the limits of Canadian foreign policy or our security needs. While Canada has always strived to work with the United Nations and other multilateral bodies we have also pursued independent policies with our allies. A case in point is our commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Our NATO commitments have never been subjected to review let alone conditioned by our commitments to the UN. More specifically, we share with the United States a broader commitment to continental and international security. Our commitment to the United Nations should complement our long standing commitment to international security.

The United Nations itself now faces a challenge not unlike Canada's own of committing to a cautious yet responsible approach to the real and emerging threats to global security. Canadians want to uphold the credibility of the United Nations, but the most pressing challenge to the credibility of the United Nations remains Saddam Hussein's continued defiance of the UN resolutions requiring him to disclose and dispose of his programs to acquire chemical, biological and particularly nuclear weapons.

Canada can most assist the United Nations by standing with countries willing to defend the credibility of that body by removing the threat of Saddam Hussein's weapons. Now is not the time to dither but to send a clear signal to Saddam Hussein.

In 1991 the current Prime Minister when he was Leader of the Opposition dithered. He dithered as Iraq first conquered, then terrorized Kuwait. On the night before Desert Storm began the Prime Minister said in this House:

If faced with an act of war, we say on this side of the House that it is premature and that our troops should not be involved in a war at this moment and our troops should be called back if there is a war, unless we decide to be in a war. But we have to have the time--

The official opposition, the Liberal Party, at that time did not take a decisive stand in 1991, but Canada did. It should do no less if necessary in the current situation. If Canada were to remain undecided on the fundamental question now before the international community, it would appear uncertain and hollow in its commitment to international security.

I am delivering today the clear advice to the government that the then Leader of the Opposition failed to provide in 1991. That advice consists of three statements. Should Saddam Hussein not agree or fulfil an agreement to unconditional and unrestricted access to UN weapon inspectors, Canada should stand with its allies in spelling out clearly to Saddam failure to comply will bring consequences. Should the UN Security Council issue a declaration to demand Iraqi compliance and should Iraq fail to meet those conditions, Canada should stand with its allies in telling Saddam once again failure to comply will bring consequences. Should some UN Security Council members falter in re-emphasizing their own past declarations, Canada should stand with its allies in ensuring that Saddam understands once again failure to comply will bring consequences.

Our position is clear. We do not want to see war in Iraq, but we do want Saddam Hussein stripped of weapons of mass destruction consistent with resolutions of the United Nations.

The government undermines Canada's reputation with its allies and does nothing to uphold the credibility of the United Nations by not joining in sending a clear message to Hussein that failure to comply will bring consequences. Recent events even of today require that Canada send that message now.

It is a great shame of course that while Canada may eventually help to send that message to Saddam Hussein, Canada's forces lack the basic capacities to contribute to any meaningful solution in a significant way.

That failure to ensure that Canadian Forces can uphold Canada's commitment to continental security and to our foreign commitments is a topic for another discussion.

[Aileen Carroll, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs]

Mr. Speaker, I have listened well to the hon. Leader of the Opposition and he makes several very valid points.

However, in his insistence that the reputation of Canada and the objectives of our foreign policy should be to ensure international security, I have some reservations that he would, if certain steps were not taken in the manner in which he would have them taken, move in a direction that would undermine that very vital institution, the United Nations, that exists to enable us to have international security under which he says we should work.

I would add that if we do move in a manner outside of the United Nations, I think he should have some concern for the precedent he would be recommending for other international settings.

[Stephen Harper, Canadian Alliance, Calgary Southwest, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I repeat once again that our position is that current United Nations resolutions provide sufficient international justification for action.

In any case, I think the hon. member misunderstands the equation here. The credibility of the United Nations is at stake if the United Nations Security Council members, and, in particular, our allies, do not achieve the objective that is sought here, which is the complete removal of Saddam Hussein's nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and all capacity to pursue those programs in the future.

There can be nothing short of that achievement. If we do not achieve that then the credibility of the United Nations will be permanently damaged, as was the League of Nations in a previous incarnation when it failed to take the necessary steps to back the necessary action to ensure international security.

The question here is not whether Canada or our allies would endanger the credibility of the United Nations. The fact is that action will be required on some front, we hope well short of war, to ensure that United Nations resolutions are fulfilled if the credibility of that organization is to be sustained.

[Bill Casey, Progressive Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

Mr. Speaker, I listened with great interest to the hon. member's comments. It sounded like he was challenging the government to participate in military action with or without clarity from the United Nations in further resolutions.

I was surprised that he did not spend equal time in challenging the government to use diplomatic and political measures to try to resolve these differences. However, seeing as the Alliance is always asking and demanding accountability and predicting cost, has the Leader of the Opposition predicted what the costs would be in dollars and, even worse, in lives if Canada were to enter into military conflict in Iraq?

[Stephen Harper, Canadian Alliance, Calgary Southwest, AB]

Mr. Speaker, obviously, with or without war, we are talking about extremely high and almost incalculable risks and cost. None of us should be fooled by that.

The hon. member did not listen carefully to my speech. I said in my speech that Canada should be party. I praised Britain and the United States for pursuing further diplomatic resolutions through the United Nations. I complimented the government for supporting those diplomatic actions.

What I am suggesting is that these steps and, frankly, the efficacy of these steps cannot end in mere diplomacy. There must be a willingness to apply real capabilities to ensure and to make sure Saddam Hussein understands that our desires and the resolutions previously adopted by the United Nations will be adopted.

I will also scold the hon. member. As I said in my remarks, the situation we have today is a continuation of the gulf war and the ceasefire situation that was left over from that war.

Brian Mulroney, the then Prime Minister and leader of his party, did not hesitate to do the right thing. He did not quibble about cost. He did not quibble about diplomacy. He did not quibble with these intermediate positions the member is now taking. The position Mr. Mulroney took in 1991 was correct. This party is prepared to pursue and fulfil the conditions of that position through today.

[John Bryden, Liberal, Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Aldershot, ON]

Mr. Speaker, let me bring just a little bit of clarity at the very beginning to this debate.

Biological warfare weapons will not be confined to the Middle East or Iraq. These are the weapons that are easily portable, easily produced and can be used anywhere by anyone.

In advocating this very strong stand on the part of Canada toward Iraq and possible unilateral action with our allies, is the member prepared to pay the cost in tens of thousands of casualties by a retaliatory biological warfare attack on a Canadian city?

[Stephen Harper, Canadian Alliance, Calgary Southwest, AB]

Mr. Speaker, doing nothing will not exempt us from the possibility of those kinds of actions in the future. It always amazes me that the Liberals fail to see these kinds of problems.

One of the reasons our party insists that we work closely with our allies on these kinds of matters, particularly the United States, is that we share, not just an economy, a continent, a history and geography with the United States, but in particular that we do share geography. An attack on the United States of a biological, chemical or nuclear nature, particularly if that nature is widespread, would be an attack on this country. We cannot, through the morally neutralist positions of the Liberal Party, exempt ourselves from potentially being hit with those kinds of attacks. Therefore I would urge the hon. member against that kind of thinking.

Obviously I would repeat that we should pursue every means possible with obviously minimal violence to achieve our objectives but we cannot rule out any measures necessary to achieve what was sought in the gulf war and what is being sought in existing United Nations resolutions.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I listened carefully to the speech made by the Leader of the Opposition, and I must say that I was struck to hear him use exactly the same arguments that were used in the United States regarding the fact the UN would lose all credibility, should Saddam Hussein be allowed to ignore the resolutions that were adopted.

I have two questions with regard to that. First, how can one can lend credence to a statement hoping that the United Nations will have credibility as an organization when late contribution payments--and I am referring here to the United States--have been accumulating for years?

Second, how could one seriously question the credibility of the UN because one country refuses to comply with 16 resolutions, when Israel has consistently refused to comply with 28 UN resolutions so far?

Can a loss of credibility also result from the United Nations not taking action and letting Israel get away with violating the decisions made by the international community?

[Stephen Harper, Canadian Alliance, Calgary Southwest, AB]

Mr. Speaker, in answer to that question, I would like to quote, if I may, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

True, there are issues with the resolutions dealing with Israel and with the money owed by the United States and other countries.

I think such comments are not useful to the much more serious debate we are having here. I also think it is important, in particular, not to make any comparison with Israel and the United States, which are our allies, our friends, but also members of the democratic family of nations. It is totally pointless to make any comparison between these countries and Irak under the regime of Mr. Hussein.

[Peter Adams, Liberal, Peterborough, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it seems to me that one of the reasons we are in this situation is the lack of development of a credible opposition in Iraq. I think the Kurds are a very special case.

Let us assume that we can settle the matter of the weapons of mass destruction in some reasonable way. What should we do next? Would the member support, for example, a removal of the sanctions so that the people of Iraq could build up their confidence and strength and develop a reasonable opposition, or does he have other suggestions as to how the sanctions could be changed in order that Saddam Hussein, following this crisis, could be challenged in his own--

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Bélair)]

The hon. Leader of the Opposition has a final word.