With respect to the recently published document Building Resilience against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy (“the Strategy”) and the testimony on June 2, 2012, of the Minister of Public Safety and two of his officials before the Public Safety Committee on the Strategy: (a) what was the process by which the Strategy was planned and generated, from date of conception (i.e. when it was decided to produce a strategy document) to the date of release, including (i) which unit, branch or agency within the Department of Public Safety took the lead, and what other units, branches or agencies of the Department were closely involved, (ii) were other departments consulted and, if so, which units, branches or agencies within those departments were involved; (b) did the planning process for the Strategy include conducting ‘lessons learned’ or similar reviews or studies of counter-terrorism policy and operations since September 11, 2001, including with respect to intelligence policy and operations in Afghanistan, and/or were reviews or studies that were done outside the Strategy’s own planning process drawn upon in formulating the Strategy, including with respect to Afghanistan; (c) with respect to studies and reviews mentioned in (b), (i) what are their names or titles, (ii) on which dates were they conducted, (ii) what were the authoring governmental units, branches or agencies responsible for the said studies and reviews; (d) have there been reviews or studies of lessons learned from the Afghanistan experience that will be used for future counter-terrorism policy, notably with respect to how counter-terrorist intelligence interacts with military operations and imperatives; (e) did the reviews and studies referred to in (d) include a review or a study of the lessons learned with respect to the interaction of CSIS operatives who were in theatre with Defence Intelligence, Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) and other intelligence operatives who were also working in theatre; (f) has the Security and Intelligence Review Committee conducted reviews and studies on the role of CSIS in Afghanistan including, but not limited to, reviews and studies relevant to CSIS relations to the National Directorate of Security concerning transfer and interrogation of detainees; (g) what was the nature, timing and process of each review or study identified in (f), and what are the details regarding the relevant documents or summaries; (h) has the government conducted a review to identify what can be learned concerning what the Strategy identifies as the challenge of “increasing interaction with non-traditional partners” (p. 17) as a result of the interactions of CSIS, Defence Intelligence and CSEC with Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS), and, if so, what are the lessons learned or conclusions of any such review; (i) with regard to the recommendations in the recent Concluding Observations of the UN Committee against Torture, will the government implement any aspects of Justice O’Connor’s Arar Inquiry report with respect to oversight of intelligence agencies, including RCMP intelligence, in addition to measures already taken, and (i) if so, which aspects, (ii) if not, why not; (j) given that on page 9 of the Strategy “environmentalism” is listed as one advocacy area that can generate “extremism” leading to terrorism, has the government concluded that any environmental group currently present in Canada is “extremist” in this sense; (k) does the mandate of the integrated national security enforcement team include the protection of the Canadian oil and gas industry and its employees from environmental “extremism” that turns into terrorism, as described in the Strategy; (l) in its planning process for the Strategy, did the government study how Bill C-304, An Act to amend the Canadian Human Rights Act (protecting freedom), and specifically its clause to repeal section 13 of the Canada Human Rights Act, could affect the Strategy’s goal of establishing “stronger laws against ... hate propaganda” (p. 32), and, if so, what were the government’s conclusions; (m) is Bill C-30, An Act to enact the Investigating and Preventing Criminal Electronic Communications Act and to amend the Criminal Code and other Acts, an important part of Canada’s counter-terrorism strategy, and, if so, why was it not included in the Strategy; (n) is Bill C-31, An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Balanced Refugee Reform Act, the Marine Transportation Security Act and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Act, an important part of Canada’s counter-terrorism strategy, and, if so, why was it not included in the Strategy; (o) will further legislation be put forward to implement the Strategy and, if so, on what matters and with what purposes; (p) with respect to the the Strategy’s statement concerning the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the importance that the group is “not allowed to rebuild in Canada in order to engage in terrorist activities,” (p.8) , (i) why does the Strategy refer to conduct that predated the end of the civil war in 2009 (i.e. the 2008 conduct of an LTTE fundraiser, for which he was convicted after the war in 2010) to illustrate the concern about the LTTE rebuilding, (ii) does the government possess information that suggests that the LTTE is in the process of rebuilding in Canada for purpose of terrorist activities; and (q) has Canada ever accepted communications intelligence from one of the traditional “Five Eyes” allies mentioned in Minister Toews’ testimony from June 5, 2012, where that intelligence consisted of communications that took place between persons both or all of whom were within Canada at the time the communications occurred?
