Mr. Chair, it is an honour to be part of tonight's debate. We on this side are all delighted that it is happening at this time, so soon after the international community has seen some success in its efforts to support Mali in restoring legitimacy to the authority of a government over all of its territory, and particularly in the north.
I would like to touch on two aspects of the crisis Mali is facing. First is the root of the matter, how we got here, the back story, who is a threat to Mali and through Mali, to all of us. Second is the question of the military imperative that is now being met, in part by French forces in support of Malian forces, and increasingly by African forces, which all along wanted to take the principal role and were authorized to take the principal role under last December's U.N. resolution. They are filling in behind French forces as progress continues.
On the root of the matter, it is important to go back some time to remind ourselves just where these terrorist extremists organizations that finally ended up in northern Mali came from. The story begins with a once upon a time, almost, recollection that one now needs to reach back toward in 1988.
Once upon a time there was a rabble rouser, an extremist called Osama bin Laden, who brought a group of friends together in Peshawar, Pakistan in the summer of 1988. Some hon. members here were not even born then. He decided that contributing to jihad in Afghanistan was not enough, that he was going to find an organization that would go to Kashmir, that would go anywhere in the world, that would attack not just the Soviet Union, but the United States. He called it al-Qaeda. He spent five years at that time in Pakistan.
We will recall that soon thereafter he felt the call to go back to Saudi Arabia. He was in Saudi Arabia for three years. He offered the services of al-Qaeda to the Saudi government to attack Saddam Hussein at that time. Of course, he was declined. He was actually banished from Saudi Arabia. He went on to Sudan for four years where he hatched other plots. He tried to kill President Mubarek of Egypt and eventually got the call to go back to Afghanistan, which was now under Taliban rule in 1996. There, even larger plots were hatched: Nairobi, Dar es Salaam and the USS Cole in Yemen.
I mention this story because all of these places are part of the regional equation which the interim leader of the Liberal party and all of us understand has to be taken into account when we talk about Mali, because it is part of a jigsaw puzzle. It is part of a global effort in which Canada has played a central role, to bring a non-governmental threat to heel, to empower governments to stand against the kind of threat that Mali has faced now since 2010 from al-Qaeda.
Displaced from all of these other places, al-Qaeda was on the ropes in most of these other places, even in Somalia and Yemen, and was forced to seek refuge in the wastes in some of the least hospitable areas of the world, the Sahel and the Sahara itself in northern Mali. All of us working together under a level of co-operation, with the full backing of the United Nations, which is unparalleled, certainly since the second world war, have succeeded in preventing al-Qaeda from finding a host. We have prevented it from taking over the whole state in some other part of the world, as it has tried to do in Afghanistan, as it would dearly love to do in Pakistan and as it has tried to do in other parts of the world over this 25-year-old saga.
Osama bin Laden is at the heart of the story. Obviously he has not been with us, as members will recall, since the day before we were elected to this place. Thank goodness, but that is another story. However, some of his last orders, as we now know from documents recovered in Abbottabad, were to re-establish outposts of his empire in places such as Yemen, Somalia and the Maghreb.
That is why al-Qaeda in the Maghreb is one of the big affiliates of the al-Qaeda organization and one of the few that, up until recently, did not face the kind of military pressure or security response that even Yemen and Somalia, with help from other African neighbours, have been able to offer. That is why we are talking about a threat to two-thirds of Mali. That is why we are talking about a coup in the spring of last year. It is not because al-Qaeda was threatening to take over the whole country but because of the army. Some of its most disciplined units in Mali, which had been trained in part by Canada, were unhappy that their government was not taking action and was not ordering them into battle in the north to deal with this problem.
They went too far and made what we think was the wrong political decision. They overthrew a democratically elected government. In fact, the Canadian-trained units, from the information we have, were not part of that unfortunate series of events. However, the legitimacy was sapped out of the Malian government. Its authority was further eroded and al-Qaeda took control, not alone, but with several other groups, Ansar Dine, Tuareg groups, that had tilted their way, seeing how strong they were in Timbuktu and elsewhere. The world looked on with consternation and became increasingly concerned as UNESCO World Heritage sites, Islamic treasures and mausoleums of moderate enlightened Sufi saints were destroyed by these butchers who were very happy to put people to death in summary trial but also to destroy the legacy and heritage of all humanity.
Canada's voice was raised by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and others on this side of the House. We were concerned but we were not yet able to take action because there was no consensus in the African Union, in ECOWAS or the United Nations to authorize that action. Therefore, the resolution that came forward in December was truly unprecedented. We have not seen that level of explicit authorization for combat operations, African-led but supported by the whole international community and the whole machinery of the United Nations, for many other conflicts. Certainly none of this would have happened until that resolution was passed in December.
Today, with the resolution in hand, we find that Mali faces three crises. One is a political crisis, which we hope will now be addressed with the road map and the path toward elections, and Canada applauds that. The second is a humanitarian crisis, which my colleagues, the other parliamentary secretaries, addressed and in which we have invested by building on a foundation of very generous investment and contribution over years, even decades, in good times and bad in Mali. However, the military crisis remains. There has been progress, as members on the other side have acknowledged. The largest population centres in the north are now back in government hands. The Tuareg are leaning the government's way once again as al-Qaeda pulls out of the cities and withdraws into the mountains and other difficult to reach places.
However, what will they do? Who will reach out and touch them there? What will the capacity of the Malian government be to bring them to justice? We still do not know. Much depends on investments to come and much depends on the AFISMA mission. It has a complex demanding mission, to contribute to building Malian defensive security forces and support national authorities in recovering areas in the north under the control of terrorists and extremist groups. That means combat if necessary. As well, it is to help stabilize the country and consolidate state authority, support authorities in protecting the population, contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced populations, protect personnel and the mission, and it has only be authorized for one year.
At the request of the Malian government and in accordance with the mandate of resolution 2085, France launched a military operation on January 11.
Canada joined the international community in supporting this initiative instigated by France in order to act quickly and put an end to these attacks by Islamist groups.
Let us be clear: France acted as an African power, a country that has military resources based in Africa. The only forces that France has sent into the theatre in any African countries so far were already based in Africa.
The United Kingdom, the United States, Germany and Canada have not sent troops into combat, because we did not have the necessary resources on the ground in Africa. It is a very simple explanation.
Our support to our ally, France, is very much appreciated. We have—
