Mr. Speaker, institutional reform, if not done wisely, might create more bad than good. It is a well-known tenet of political science that tomorrow's political difficulties are often the result of today's ill-conceived institutional reforms.
I will show that this is exactly what will happen if the House makes the mistake of supporting the motion moved today by the hon. member for Toronto—Danforth on behalf of the NDP caucus. This motion urges the Government of Canada, in consultation with the provinces and territories, to take immediate steps towards abolishing the Senate of Canada.
Let us list all the problems that implementing this motion would cause. First, we would have to open the Constitution. In these times of economic uncertainty, where the governments in our federation have to work together to protect Canadians' jobs, the NDP is asking them to put a great deal of their energy into constitutional negotiations.
Second, the NDP must tell us whether it really believes that all the governments in our federation are willing to open the Constitution to deal solely with the issue of the Senate. If the NDP thinks that is true, then I suggest they go talk to the current Government of Quebec.
As Professor Benoît Pelletier, from the University of Ottawa, said to Hill Times on February 18, 2013:
I don't see the abolition of the Senate to be something that would get the approval of all the necessary provinces that would have to give their approval. I'm sure that different provinces, including Quebec, would like other subjects to be discussed at the same table. We would eventually get something as large, as wide, and as substantial as the Meech Lake Accord or even the Charlottetown agreement.
The NDP may want a new round of mega-constitutional negotiations, but Canadians put constitutional talks at the bottom of their current priorities, and rightly so.
Third, has the NDP taken into account the fact that the constitutional rule to abolish the Senate almost certainly requires the unanimous consent of the provinces? Most experts think that, if the 7-50 rule—seven provinces representing at least 50% of the population—is needed to change the nature of the Senate, then the consent of the House and the unanimity of the provinces is needed to abolish the Senate, and this would likely be confirmed by the Supreme Court.
In the February 18 edition of The Hill Times, Bruce Ryder, a professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, reminded us of this when he said that the support of 10 provinces was needed. In any case, I would like to remind all hon. members of something that has not yet been mentioned: the Parliament of Canada has passed regional veto legislation. The regional veto act would therefore have to be abolished so that none of the provinces would have the opportunity to veto changes to the Senate or its abolishment.
Fourth, since the NDP keeps saying that it wants to impose a costly referendum on Canadians on this issue, has the party considered what question should be asked and what majority would be required? A question that gives Canadians only one alternative—to abolish the Senate or not—would not do justice to the variety of opinions Canadians have about the Senate.
As for the majority required for abolition, is the NDP thinking of a simple majority at the national level? That will not do because the provincial governments and legislative assemblies that would have voted to keep the Senate would feel, with reason, that their constitutional duty is to have the wishes of their voters prevail.
So we are talking about a simple majority within each province. The probability of attaining such a majority 10 times from coast to coast is so low that you have to wonder why public funds should be spent on such a referendum.
Therefore, we see that abolishing the Senate would represent a major change to the federation, requiring the unanimous support of the provinces under the rules for amending the Constitution. This is very unlikely to happen. As a matter of fact, only three provinces have indicated they are currently in favour of abolishing the Senate.
I think the best conclusion we may reach on this ill-advised motion is the one given by Peter Russell, Professor Emeritus at the University of Toronto. He was quoted in Hill Times on February 18, 2013. Dr. Russell said:
They [the NDP] really haven't done much homework on the pros and cons of bicameralism. I don't know if they honestly know how to spell the word.
Professor Russell said this. Indeed, if we followed the NDP's plan, Canada would become the only large federation in the world to have a single federal chamber. If we were to lose our upper chamber, then we would also lose the useful role it plays in our political system, which benefits Canadians, particularly the regions and minorities.
This is precisely the role that the Fathers of Confederation set out for the Senate, the role of sober second thought. Since senators are not elected, they play their role with moderation and almost always give the elected chamber, the House of Commons, the last word.
However, with sober second thought, senators can detect mistakes and inaccuracies, and can ask members to amend their bills in the interest of taxpayers and citizens.
Allow me to cite some recent examples of sober second thought executed by our colleagues of the other chamber. In 2006, the House accepted 55 Senate amendments to improve the Federal Accountability Act. In 2008, the Senate convinced the government not to proceed with changes to the Canadian film tax credit. It was an infamous censorship provision that would have allowed the minister to deny a film tax credit where it would be, according to the minister, contrary to a vague notion of public policy. There was a huge outcry from everywhere in Canada. Thank God we had a Liberal senator who saw the mistake and corrected it in the House.
It was in 2012, after rejecting Liberal amendments to the Safe Streets and Communities Act in the House, that the amendments were made in the Senate and then accepted in the House. Currently, the NDP bill, Bill C-290, an act to amend the Criminal Code (sports betting), is being carefully scrutinized by the Senate after a number of sports leagues and several provinces raised concerns that the House had failed to provide the necessary level of scrutiny before passing it.
As we see, the Senate has always provided useful amendments and clarifications to bills passed by the House, while rarely obstructing the general will of this chamber. In fact, between 1945 and today, I have enough fingers to count the bills passed by the House of Commons that were rejected by the Senate. The Senate performs an important checking role in the Canadian federation by providing an opportunity for sober second thought on bills passed by the House, a complementary chamber of scrutiny and amendment. This is precisely why the Senate was created by the Fathers of Confederation. It would be particularly unwise to abolish a chamber of scrutiny, since we are currently dealing with the most secretive government in Canadian history. What federal institutions need is more oversight, not less oversight.
For the Senate to properly fulfill its role as a chamber of sober second thought, the Prime Minister has to choose good senators who are exceptional because of their hard-working nature, rigour, expertise and moral strength.
Unfortunately, the Prime Minister has made some very dubious appointments. Instead of appointing highly qualified individuals, he has chosen some people whose sole qualification was as Conservative Party partisans. The Prime Minister is to be held accountable for these bad choices, not the Senate as an institution. The Prime Minister must also be held accountable for the constitutional mess that his own Senate reform would create. He wants to elect senators without changing anything else in the Constitution. Let me describe how much damage that would do to our country.
Many Canadians would like their senators elected rather than appointed, and that is understandable. It would be more democratic. However, what would happen if, as proposed by the Conservative government, we changed the way Senate seats were filled, without changing our Constitution accordingly?
If we went along with the Conservative Senate reform proposal, we would have: no dispute settlement mechanism between the Senate and the House if both were elected; continued under-representation of Alberta and British Columbia with only six senators each, when New Brunswick and Nova Scotia hold 10 senators when they have five to six times less than Alberta and British Columbia; U.S.-style, now Italian-style and Mexican-style gridlock between two elected chambers unable to solve disagreements; and bitter constitutional disputes regarding the number of senatorial seats to which each province would be entitled. Fortunately, the Supreme Court is likely to confirm that such ill-conceived Senate reform cannot be done unilaterally by an act of Parliament alone.
Therefore, first things first: will the provinces be able to reach an agreement on the distribution of senatorial seats? If they do, we can then figure out which constitutional powers we should attribute to the Senate in order to create healthy complementarities with the House rather than paralyzing duplication, after which we can agree on the process to elect senators and federally amend the Constitution accordingly.
Abolition of the Senate would represent a major change to the federation requiring the unanimous support of the provinces under the rules for amending the Constitution. This is very unlikely to happen. Furthermore, the Senate serves a useful function by improving or correcting bills that pass through the House.
As long as the provinces fail to agree on the number of senators to which each one is entitled, we must avoid the kind of constitutional chaos that an elected Senate would cause.
Instead, let us keep the Prime Minister accountable for the quality of the individuals he appoints to the upper house. Let the Senate continue playing the role conferred upon it by the Fathers of Confederation, the chamber of scrutiny and the chamber of sober second thought.