John Godfrey

[Supply, May 29th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, I have to re-emphasize that the focus is not on Norad control. I do not have a problem with Norad control for the improved surveillance of North America. What I have a problem with is the idea that as long as we are part of Norad control we will allow any system to develop when we have just clearly said that we will not endorse a system which involves the weaponization of space. The whole point of an interceptor based in space is to knock down other satellites, and that is the weaponization of space.

The issue is not the control but rather what kind of a system will the United States put up there. It does not make it any better that we have a hand in a system we have denounced as the weaponization of space. It just means that we are writing a blank cheque and saying that wherever this leads to, any system the United States comes up with we will be there for it. We cannot accept that.

[Supply, May 29th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, it is with pleasure that I rise to take part in this debate. I will be sharing my time with the member for York North.

As I read the motion that is before us, I find much that I like, particularly when it comes to Norad, and I will be speaking about that. Unfortunately, the motion contains a huge and fatal flaw. It is one word. The word is any, which means that I must oppose this motion. First, let me begin with the part I like:

That this House affirm its strong support for NORAD as a viable defence organization to counter threats to North America, including the threat of ballistic missile attack;--

I like that part because I was in Colorado Springs last week for three days to visit Norad headquarters and saw the amazing complex in Cheyenne Mountain. I came back hugely impressed by the skill, talent and dedication of the Canadian men and women of the armed forces who serve in the joint Norad command. I support Norad and those people.

After my discussions with them, I am of the view that Norad has an increasingly important role to play in the defence of North America after September 11, 2001. In the first place, as we discovered, the aerospace defence of North America is no longer about the perimeter, about armed bombers coming from some other continent, or from inter-ballistic missiles only. The defence of the continent is now about hijacked civilian airliners and the fact that Norad is speaking with our own Canadian civil aviation authority, Nav Canada, and with the American FAA, to ensure the internal defence of North America is an important strong and vital step. Of course, it is logical because we share this airspace with the United States.

Second, there is a very important activity going on right now in Norad called the binational planning group, which is looking at a variety of other threats to the security of North America based on our new understanding of the way in which international terrorists operate. That binational planning group is asking itself whether there are things we can do together which are not simply about aerospace, but are about land based threats because we share a common land base with the United States separated only by a frontier. There is also the issue of sea based threats because ships may move in and out of Canadian or American water, and they may constitute a serious threat to the security of North America.

I give the example of some kind of tramp steamer off the coast of the eastern seaboard within 100 kilometres of a major American city that has a fairly low tech cruise missile. Currently, the whole question of it being a ship means that it is under a maritime operation and surveillance, but the moment a cruise missile leaves that freighter and heads toward North America it becomes a Norad task. The only problem is that with about a seven minute period of time to react there is no way we can counteract a cruise missile under the current divided structure between maritime surveillance and air surveillance. Therefore, we may see ourselves, quite apart from national missile defence, with these clear and present dangers, with a Norad which deals with air, land and sea so that we can have an integrated and more pre-emptive approach to the defence of the continent. I think that is an important and useful direction for Norad to evolve.

The problem is, of course, what happens when we get to national missile defence? Where does that fit in to our catalogue of risks to the continent? Let me begin by speaking of the ways in which I agree with the Minister of National Defence in his statement this morning.

Though I have much to criticize in the whole concept of national missile defence in terms of the geopolitical questions it raises, I agree with the minister that it is important that Canadians take charge of the defence of their own space in North America and that they share in a sensible way that duty with the United States; hence the importance of Norad.

I agree with him about the importance of improving our ability to detect incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles from whatever source, whether that is from Russia, China, North Korea, or any other rogue state.

I agree with the minister on the importance of insisting, in our discussions with the Americans, that we will not participate in any scheme which involves the weaponization of space. In saying so, of course, the minister was reiterating what the Minister of Foreign Affairs had said in the House before that.

Finally, it is possible and appropriate that we should proceed with discussions with the Americans on that basis, understanding the limitations of the discussions and the possibility that we may not come to agreement. That is where I agree with the Minister of National Defence.

I, however, disagree with this particular motion. I indicated at the beginning of my speech that my disagreement focuses on one word, that we would support giving Norad responsibility for the command of any system developed to defend North America against ballistic missiles, any system. Unfortunately, this is a blank cheque motion. It says in effect, as long as a new weapons system is under Norad control it does not matter whether it involves the weaponization of space or not. It opens the barn door. It opens a huge possibility and therefore, I cannot support it.

The weaponization of space is a great deal closer than people have given it credit. Last week President Bush released a confidential national security presidential directive which had been signed in 2002 in which the national missile defence was described. It said:

We are pursuing an evolutionary approach to the development and deployment of missile defenses to improve our defenses over time. The United States will not have a final, fixed missile defense architecture. Rather, we will deploy an initial set of capabilities that will evolve to meet the changing threat and to take advantage of technological developments. The composition of missile defenses, to include the number and location of systems deployed, will change over time.

Then the President listed some of the things that were being looked at and ends with:

Enhanced sensor capabilities; anddevelopment and testing of space-based defenses.

Space based defences is the weaponization of space. How likely is this? Let me turn to the hearing of the senate armed services committee in Washington held on March 18, 2003, and an exchange between Senator Bill Nelson and Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, Director, Missile Defense Agency.

Sen. Nelson: All right, General Kadish, your budget documents show that you are going down parallel paths to acquire the ground-based boost phase and a space-based phase.

Gen. Kadish: It is our intent, as far as at least my internal discussions, that that test bed that we would space-base would serve two functions. One is to demonstrate intercepts from interceptors that would be on orbit, so we'd actually do an intercept, and to work out all the difficulties involved with having a constellation of that size potentially on orbit.

Then there is more discussion and Senator Bill Nelson asks:

Well, let me--let me ask a policy question to the secretary over there. That would be the first time that we would be weaponizing space, and there has been a policy up to this point that we are not going to weaponize space. Tell me about your thinking with regard to that change of that policy.

General Kadish does not answer that question. It is answered by Pete Aldridge who says:

Now, once you've accomplished that, then you look at various ways to do boost phase, and we are looking at airborne lasers, we are looking at ground-based interceptors, and we are looking at space-based.

And then he says whether they do any of these things depends on whether there is any money or not. We might say if they do not have any money they will not go there.

I happen to have the Missile Defense Agency 2004-05 fiscal year biennial budget estimates. Under space based tests, the Missile Defense Agency will begin developing a space based kinetic energy interceptor test bed in fiscal year 2004, one year from now. Initial on-orbit tests will commence in block 2008 with three to five satellites. The test best capability will be expanded in two year blocks.

The money will be in next year's budget, fiscal year 2004. Money set aside for these interceptors is initially $14 million, and for fiscal year 2005, $119 million with the first satellite launch in 2008 and the first flight test in 2009.

Here is the problem. Weaponization of space is real. We are moving in that direction. It would be naive to think that when we are having these discussions that might not end up being the killer, the end of the discussion, because that is where the United States is going.

[Supply, May 15th, 2003]

No, Mr. Speaker. No more than I felt we should have been at the table as the inevitable attack on Iraq moved forward. If it is inevitable, that does not mean that we have to join in because if it is inevitable, it may be that there is no table. A table implies two people negotiating and that something fundamental will change.

Everyone seems to agree that it is inevitable. The Americans will do it and they will do it their way. The first phase is already set. It starts in 2004 with missiles in California and Alaska. Nothing we can say or do will change that fact.

The only thing that our participation in this process will do is to undermine our position as independent negotiators in the world with another point of view about the importance of disarmament, fighting proliferation, and being able to make our judgments when we participate with the Americans, as we should on issues like smart borders and doing our bit in Afghanistan.

While exercising sovereign judgment, we cannot, as a sovereign state, come to that decision without having better quality answers to the questions I was beginning to put forward.

[Supply, May 15th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, this is exactly why we are having this debate today.

We have to ask the right questions, demand the right answers, and then come up with negotiating position with the Americans and so on, if we want to talk, to ask questions to the Americans. But the beginning of wisdom is asking the right questions. I think that this is what this debate, this conversation, is all about.

[Supply, May 15th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, I will be sharing my time with my friend, the hon. member for Brossard—La Prairie.

To begin, I want to say how delighted I am that we are having the debate. This is Parliament at its best. This is what we are supposed to in here.

I also would like to thank the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Defence for their willingness, not only to participate in this debate but to extend that courtesy in private meetings with members of Parliament and to take the time to consider this important step at which we are looking.

Finally, I would like to thank the Prime Minister himself for encouraging the debate both within caucus and in Parliament, for urging us to take the time necessary so we can satisfy ourselves about some questions.

I think everybody in the House shares a common view about the war on terrorism. Our repugnance, our horror at what happened in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 has demanded and evoked from Canadians an appropriate response, a response to fight terrorism wherever it is, a response to defend our continent with the United States against terrorist attacks and a response which has seen our participation in Afghanistan, which has served as a launching pad, a staging ground, for terrorism. That commitment to Afghanistan will continue this coming summer as we try our best to ensure that Afghanistan does not slip back into a state in which it would be once again a failed stated and, hence, a potential home for terrorists. I think we are all on the same page on the war on terrorism.

The problem is there is a bit of a dispute, I suppose, among our friends, the Americans, as to what constitutes a clear and present danger.

We can see, as recently as this week's news, that is the horrific bombings in Saudi Arabia, that the enemy has not disappeared. We have no evidence of the deaths of Osama bin Laden or Mullah Omar. We have a lot of evidence that the network continues and it will need all our attention. That is where we need to concentrate our resources immediately. That is why, in his state of the union speech in January 2002, I think Canadians were genuinely puzzled that the President seemed to be taking his eye off the ball against the war on terrorism and moving it onto some other subject, which is called the axis of evil. At that point we were puzzled.

We now see that is part of a larger doctrine, which is known variously as the project for the new American century, or the Bush doctrine, or the national security strategy of the United States of America, as announced last September. We now have some sense of what was animating Mr. Bush when he made the shift in his state of the union speech, and we have seen the Bush doctrine in action in the war in Iraq.

One of the questions we have to ask ourselves is, how does this new context work? That is to say the context of the Bush doctrine, a doctrine which supposes unilateralism, military superiority in every sphere without any other country challenging, a doctrine which encourages unilateral interventions and pre-emptions of attack to occur, as was the case in Iraq, a new doctrine in which the context of national missile defence has to be seen.

One of the arguments put forward in order to ask questions is that we need to have a dialogue, or talks or conversations with the United States and that this is something different from negotiations. If one were to look back over 40 years of defence talks with the United States, one would find that inevitably they led to negotiations. There is a continuum, there is no point at which this suddenly ceases to be a conversation and becomes a negotiation. We have to see this as a continuum and we have to admit it.

There are those who argue quite persuasively, and I put the Minister of Foreign Affairs in that category, that we cannot ask the questions unless we have the conversations, and I accept that. Conversations have taken place with other officials and will continue to take place, but conversations at the level of ministers are important. However those conversations leading to potential negotiations have to have two qualities.

One is we have to be able to ask questions and get satisfactory answers. The second is based on what we learn. We need a negotiating position which sets out some preconditions. Just as the Minister of Foreign Affairs today has indicated, as I hear him and I hear him loud and clear, a deal breaker would be that national missile defence would contain an element of the weaponizing of space. At that point Canada would not participate.

It is in that spirit that I would like to raise 25 questions, if I can get them out, that would form part of that conversation and which would in turn lead to the negotiating position which would have some preconditions. Let me group them.

One would be about rogue states, the rogue state doctrine. What is the rogue state doctrine which is affecting us so much? This is the definition from the American Cato Institute:

The rogue state doctrine is predicated on the claim that those states act irrationally, and therefore cannot be deterred with America's offensive nuclear arsenal. Armed with ballistic missiles, they may strike the U.S. at any time. Therefore, the argument goes, the U.S. must deploy an [national missile defence system]...

One, does Canada accept or reject the rogue state doctrine, as laid out in that argument, and the assumption that rogue states are irrational and, thus, undeterrable by conventional means, if one can describe nuclear retaliation as such?

I would only ask members to consider the problem with the rogue state doctrine because any land based missile always has a return to sender address and any rogue state attacking the United States could expect swift, massive and total retaliation. Is this the way of the dictators of the sort we have seen, whether it is Saddam Hussein or Kim Jong-il, or do they actually seem to enjoy the perks and pleasures of power, the palaces and the special trains. I will not go into the other inappropriate perks and pleasures power, but do we think they have behaved that irrationally or do they actually enjoy being dictators? That is a big question.

Two, if Canada accepts the rogue state doctrine, is this not an argument for the United States and others to expend more energy on disarmament and non-proliferation? How do we intend, if we join the national missile defence, to have some equal energy put into non-proliferation? How do we ensure that this stuff, the fissile material, does not fall into their hands? Will we abandon that part or will we give extra effort to that part? How do we ensure that countries which are marginal are on our side right now? We wink at them when they acquire the stuff, but we have to recognize that they may in turn become a rogue state one day and will always have the bomb.

Three, does Canada believe that national missile defence will give other states more or less incentive to develop long range missiles?

Four, does Canada believe that national missile defence will increase or decrease the likelihood of U.S. interventions abroad, particularly in the context of the Bush doctrine which is an interventionist doctrine? That is what is different from the situation we found ourselves in with the Clinton administration when we did not sign it either.

The next set of questions has to do with Canada's continental national security.

Five, does the current and projected ballistic missile threat to Canada, as determined by Canada, justify involvement in the U.S. deployment of national missile defence?

Six, how does the current and projected ballistic missile threat to Canada compare to other risks to national security? What is the risk analysis, in our view, compared to the sorts of things that may be entering our harbours today and going forward to New York tomorrow in some container? How do we make that assessment?

Seven, based on that assessment, how does the estimated return on investment in national missile defence compare to the estimated return on investments of other homeland defence measures?

Eight, if Canada does not participate in national missile defence, how would we interact with the United States government in regard to friendly and enemy missiles over our territory?

The next set of questions have to do with Canada's missile defence, and I have a feeling I will not make it to the end.

Nine, what specific role is Canada considering playing in national missile defence? What role will the United States allow us to play under the Bush doctrine?

Ten, what is Canada bringing to the table by way of potential contribution to national missile defence negotiations?

Eleven, would Canada consider the placement of interceptor missiles or NMD-specific radar on its territory?

Twelve, what is an acceptable debris zone for Canada? And it will not be Don Valley West if I have anything to do with it. We hear talk of this Orwellian phrase “debris acceptance”. Are we allowed to reject it?

Thirteen, what are the odds that an intercepted warhead might detonate when it falls back to earth?

Fourteen, what is the risk of collateral damage to Canada from an NMD intercept?

Fifteen, how will Canada define national missile defence technology as successful, especially if we are counting on it for some purpose?

Sixteen, what are the current and potential long term financial costs of participation in NMD? We are told today that no one has asked us for any money. There is a bill before the U.S. congress called the missile defence burden sharing act from a democrat representative from Maine that asks that all who are protected should pay their share. How do we know they will not come back to us?

Seventeen, what is the range of estimates of financial benefits to Canadian companies if Canada joins NMD?

Eighteen, what is the opportunity cost of joining national missile defence? Would joining diminish Canada's capacity to take a leadership role in restoring multilateralism and promoting nuclear disarmament?

Those are but a few questions and I will post the rest on my website.

[Interparliamentary Delegations, April 29th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to Standing Order 34(1) I have the honour to present, in both official languages, the report of the Canadian delegation of the Interparliamentary Forum of the Americas to the second plenary session in Panama City, Panama, February 20 to 21, 2003.

[Peacekeeping, April 9th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, in the gallery today are two outstanding Canadians: Carolyn McCool, a public interest lawyer; and filmmaker Moira Simpson, both of Vancouver, who are here for the Ottawa premiere of a National Film Board production, entitled Kosovo: Fragile Peace , to be hosted tonight at the National Archives by the World University Service of Canada.

Carolyn McCool recently completed a Government of Canada sponsored secondment as a director of democratization in Kosovo for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and her work is featured in the film. She is one of over 140 Canadians who have been involved in a program administered by WUSC and funded by CIDA working toward lasting peace in the Balkans.

For over 60 years, WUSC has been active on campuses across Canada and communities around the world. I am delighted that through the work of the NFB, Canadians from coast to coast will see that Canadians are making a difference in peace building and strengthening democracy.

[Natural Resources, April 3rd, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, geomatics and geoscience are essential tools for providing information about a country's geography, environment and natural resources, including energy, minerals, metals and forests.

A few days ago the Minister of Natural Resources signed an agreement on geoscience with the minister of mines of India. Could the minister tell the House how this agreement will benefit both countries?

[Petitions, January 27th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, I have the honour to present a petition signed by over 1,000 people in the Edmonton area calling on Canada to acknowledge its part in making the world fit for children, according to the UN special assembly meeting, by creating a national child care strategy. I submit this with great pleasure.

[Child Care, January 27th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, in a poll released earlier today 90% of Canadians said they strongly agree with the statement “Canada should have a nationally co-ordinated child care plan”. Eighty-six per cent agree that there can be a publicly funded child care system that makes quality child care available to all Canadians. Clearly Canadians overwhelmingly recognize the importance of a national child care strategy.

It is time that governments caught up with our fellow citizens and put in place the child care architecture that would improve both our prosperity and our quality of life. It would allow parents to improve their education, upgrade their skills and enter the workforce while also improving the development outcomes of our children.

The fact is that Canada is falling behind many OECD countries in the provision of child care and preschool programs. Let us get on with catching up.