François Langlois

[Financial Administration Act, June 19th, 1996]

Madam Speaker, I thank the hon. member for Kingston and the Islands for brilliantly defending his Bill C-270 before the Sub-committee on Private Members' Business so that it was declared a votable item.

My analysis of the bill, which contains only one clause, was made easier by the member's kindness in sending me an article he published in the Canadian Parliamentary Review in the summer of 1990 on supply bills and the Governor General's special warrants.

The article is quite detailed and refers to the particular situation the hon. member for Kingston and the Islands described earlier.

I will not linger over the 1988 and 1989 precedents, which I read. Rather, I will try to situate this debate in terms of the cardinal principles of the parliamentary system.

The debate on the sole clause in Bill C-270 means basically going back over the whole of British parliamentary history. In my opinion, we have to go as far back as 1215 to discover the rules governing us today. The issue being raised today was raised in other terms in the baronial rebellion of 1215, which led to the signing of the Magna Carta.

What were the barons after? The possibility of being judged by their peers and the power to control spending by the crown. The year was 1215. Nearly a thousand years later, we are faced with the same problem, the intensity is different and the context is different, but the same thread runs through it.

King John, nicknamed John Lackland, was not without land for no reason: he had sold it for his war effort. The barons did not want to finance him any more; hence his name. Most of his French possessions had been sold and he found himself in a position where his name went into the history books.

King John conceded the Magna Carta in 1215. It was the forerunner of our parliaments and gave the barons the right to control spending. It did not last very long. When the king's situation improved somewhat, he tried once again to impose his priorities. In 1256, new rebellions broke out, and the Provisions of Oxford essentially renewed the Magna Carta's control over spending by the crown and the individual freedoms of the nobility-to be sure. At the time, little if any attention was paid to the ordinary folk, who were in a state of considerable servitude. We have come a long way.

Then what happened? Of course the crown gave the barons and then Parliament the right to control public spending, except no sessions of Parliament were planned. If it had no spending to approve, Parliament was not required to meet. This gave rise, over the centuries, to some strange situations where Parliament did not convene for 20 or 30 years at a stretch. Pressure was again brought to bear, and the people's elected representatives again demanded that Parliament be required to convene at least once a year. That was four or five hundred years ago.

The Constitution Act, 1867 flows directly from these, I was almost going to say medieval, struggles to have Parliament's sittings enshrined in law. Today, section 20 of our Constitution states that Parliament must sit at least once a year, and, since 1982, this obligation has been extended to the provincial legislatures.

Need I point out that another section of our Constitution, section 53, which is based on what was happening in Great Britain at the time, also deals with these questions? When we say that any bill involving financial expenditure or allocation of public money must originate in this House, we are recognizing clearly the control and decision making power of elected representatives over the management of public finances.

Naturally, the government sets its budgetary priorities. This is one of the primary responsibilities in its budgetary policy statement. But in our system of Parliamentary democracy, the government cannot remain in power without the support of members for its budgetary policy statement. One may or may not be in agreement with policies, but one rule that is a well established part of our constitutional conventions, although it is not written down in any text of law, requires that in financial matters, the government must always have the confidence of the House. Over the years, ministerial responsibility has become more relaxed, but certainly not to the extent of not applying when it comes to spending public money.

Of course, as the hon. member for Kingston and the Islands has mentioned, the provisions which make it possible to govern by special warrant of the governor general are set down in law as being measures that must be applied in case of emergency, when there is a requirement to act rapidly and Parliament is unavailable. The best example of Parliament's unavailability, if I may put it that way, Madam Speaker, is when the House has been dissolved. The government cannot summon a Parliament that no longer exists once a writ of election has been issued. It must wait until Parliament has been reconvened, on the date set out in the writ of election.

Outside of these periods, are there any exceptional situations in which government use of Governor General's warrants would be applicable, knowing full well that the government can indeed recall Parliament, even during recess? This is what we shall see in committee, what we must examine in committee. At the second reading stage, we must stick to the principles themselves which underlie this bill, and these are extremely valid ones. When we have heard the witnesses, we will probably be able to re-examine whether the hon. member's bill is too restrictive or not.

I will recall to mind a precedent in 1985-86, when using Governor General's warrants led to a rather odd situation, namely having to borrow money to use the funds authorized by the Governor General's warrant, but since the time allowed to function under Governor General's warrant is very limited, the lending rate reflected this and we had to pay a higher rate of interest. It would have been far simpler to recall the House and get the supply voted.

My concern, which will be addressed in committee, is that adoption of this clause must put us into a situation like the one that prevails in the U.S. There, virtually every year, or every year there is a legislative or presidential election, sometimes both, there is a road block between the White House and the Congress. This means

that, overnight, government employees start to wonder if they will be paid, if social services can be provided and, in many areas, whether such essential services as the administration of justice, police services, airport services can be provided.

These will be some of the questions we will need to address in committee, but in principle I am pleased to support Bill C-270.

[Canada Elections Act, June 18th, 1996]

Madam Speaker, after hearing the hon. member for Don Valley North, I feel like saying, as they do in criminal proceedings: I rest my case. But I will still say what I have to say.

That a bill like this one can be introduced is not a major step forward for democracy. Let us calmly sum it up for those who would like to know what it is about. This bill would allow registration of a political party in Canada only if this party nominates candidates in at least half the ridings of seven Canadian provinces representing 50 per cent of the population.

This is not a minimum, but a mountain. Especially since the hon. member knows full well that the Bloc Quebecois, the official opposition, only nominates candidates in Quebec. As a result, there is no way we could comply with the provisions of this bill. As everyone knows, the Bloc Quebecois' goal is to promote Quebec sovereignty, a mandate given to us by the people of Quebec. It would be surprising, to say the least, if there were a Bloc Quebecois candidate in the riding of Beauséjour or Madawaska-Victoria. Your constituents would have trouble understanding this, Madam Speaker.

We have no extraterritorial ambitions, as the Helms-Burton law does, and although we have many friends outside Quebec, in particular in the francophone and Acadian communities, we display no imperialistic tendencies.

If this bill were passed-and I thank the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs for not making this a votable motion, which more or less settles the fate of this bill-we would be condemned to remain forever in opposition and, most of all, to the status of a group of independent members. That is to say, only the election expenses of candidates who receive 15 per cent of the vote in their ridings would be reimbursed, so our party would not be

entitled to a 22.5 per cent refund of its expenses at the national level. This would be a major setback.

The Reform Party would also be in a precarious position, as it first burst onto the scene with the election of the hon. member for Beaver River to this House. All regional based parties would not have been so lucky.

We can say one of the good things about Canadian democracy is that it allows regional parties to emerge, parties like the Bloc Quebecois or any regional party that may emerge to promote the interests of one region or another of Canada.

Just the same, the chance of promoting regional interests that comes with a political system must be recognized. It existed in the days of the CCF, the New Democratic Party at the federal level, and of the Progressive Conservative Party. It has always existed.

I do not think that just because an election gave the results it gave, the 35th Parliament has wiped off the political map a former national party-we are not going to change the law to prevent them from trying their luck again. The democratic rules by which the vast majority of members of this House abide must be respected.

I think that the more we value democracy, the more important we feel it is that the rights of our minorities be respected. Because if all democracy stands for is the rights of the majority, the majority always wins in the end anyway. When a vote is taken by a show of hands, the majority wins. The guarantees given to the minority are rights that we must respect because the minority is always at a disadvantage. That is why we have charters protecting the rights of minorities, charters that we generally respect.

This is a bill calling for a form of intolerance, a bill designed to make quick political hay, that completely misses the mark. I think that the hon. member who introduced this bill will not score very many points with this bill. For these reasons, I obviously cannot support this bill. I did not have to tell you since we will not be voting on the bill. But in the unlikely event a vote were taken, I would vote no. I will also gladly refuse consent if unanimous consent is sought to put this bill to a vote.

[Public Service Staff Relations Act, June 18th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, in his speech on the first group of motions, the parliamentary secretary said that they were only minor changes on which the opposition needs not ask so many questions.

We always thought the opposite, and the government's approach had been to say that they were in fact only technical changes. The bill was referred to the committee on government operations when it should at least have been sent to the justice committee or the human resources development committee, considering the radical and major changes it brings to the overall working conditions of RCMP officers and to their relations with their superiors.

This not an innocuous bill. We were told that it deals only with the payment of the bilingualism bonus to RCMP officers, but then one has to see on what legal grounds the decision was based. That is one of the biggest flaws in the reasoning of the parliamentary secretary.

A few moments ago I said that the Gingras decision was a trial decision of the Federal Court, but, in fact, it was an appeal decision of that court. The Appeal Division of the Federal Court ordered the payment of the bilingualism bonus to RCMP officers only because it could rely on a legal analysis saying that those officers have the same status as public servants. But if the officers are part of the public service, that means that they are covered by all applicable rules that stem from Treasury Board decisions and legislation applicable to the public service, including the bilingualism bonus policy.

The Appeal Division of the Federal Court did not decide on its own that they were entitled to the bonus, it had to make a legal analysis of the situation. So, the whole question should not be downplayed.

In clause 4, and this is quite revealing, there is a derogation or interpretive clause that has a clearly retroactive effect. The clause reads as follows:

(1) For greater certainty, the Canada Labour Code does not apply to members, and members are not part of the Public Service within the meaning of the Public Service Staff Relations Act , nor part of the public service within the meaning of section 11 of the Financial Administration Act .

The purpose of Bill C-30 is quite obvious. If the government wished to keep this position, all it had to do was go before the Supreme Court and plead its case. In this country, we do not legislate retroactively except in very rare cases and for good reason. It is a way of legislating, referred to as nunc pro tunc in latin, by which the government is trying to ensure retroactively that if the officers were to go back to court and if Bill C-30 perchance were passed, they would be told that the law has been changed and that their rights can no longer be recognized.

Canadian courts do not need clause 4 in Bill C-30. It is up to them to determine what the state of the law is pursuant to the general provisions applying to every citizen. One clause, clause 4, is written only for RCMP officers. This clause does not apply to everybody. It applies only to one class of citizens. The government takes their measurements, the size of their coat, pants, shoes, and hat if they need one, and says that these people, RCMP officers, are not covered by the Canada Labour Code.

As my colleague for Kamouraska-Rivière-du-Loup mentioned a few moments ago, as did my colleague for Mercier, labour relations are a serious problem in the RCMP. There is an unhealthy climate, and a constitutional state such as ours cannot tolerate that labour relations be subject to the pleasure by the prince, in this case the commissioner of the RCMP, who dictates working conditions and refuses to share his supervisory powers with the country's regulatory agencies. We believe there should be a system, which could be unique to the RCMP, that would give members of this force the right to free collective bargaining.

Such free collective bargaining does not exist. Of course, there are divisional representatives who do their best but, as I was saying in my remarks on the first group of motions, the climate is such that the basic trust that should normally exist between management and employees is just not there. There will be a need for an outside agency to come it and help settle the disputes and legitimate grievances that may arise.

The myth that the RCMP exists outside our society must be destroyed. RCMP members are first-class citizens who have the right, like everybody else, to have their grievances heard by courts that are not prejudiced against them. When you look at the existing

grievance adjudication process, the adjudicators can only make recommendations. They cannot make binding decisions.

I mentioned earlier the case of Staff Sergeant Gaétan Delisle, mayor of Saint-Blaise, who was reprimanded and who basically received a notice of discharge because he was a candidate in an election. That shows how serious the problem is. No other police force in Canada could have done this. Members of the RCMP are no different from members of the Sûreté du Québec, members of the OPP and members of most municipal police forces. Their right to free collective bargaining must be recognized.

The Gingras decision does not say explicitly that members of the RCMP can be unionized under Part I of the Canada Labour Code, but it opens the door. So let us allow the legal debate to take its course. Given that RCMP officers are considered members of the public service, does Part I of the Canada Labour Code apply to them? If so, they can be unionized under the Code. If, after this is done, it becomes apparent that it is not the appropriate regime for their collective bargaining framework, there will still be time to legislate a different framework, which could resemble what has been done in the case of the Sûreté du Québec.

The vast majority of RCMP officers are not claiming the right to strike. We could therefore consider a binding arbitration, or final offer, mechanism, as was often mentioned. In this sense, I support the motion to delete clause 4. The motion presented by my colleague, the hon. member for Calgary Northeast, is nonetheless a lesser evil, in the sense that if we had to include the right of police officers to unionize by leaving clause 47.6 in Bill C-30, the recognition that Part II of the Canada Labour Code, as it relates to health and safety at work, applies, would at least be a consolation prize.

I am therefore in favour of the motion by my colleague, the member for Calgary Northeast, but only for these reasons. I believe that the deletion of clause 47.6 basically resolves the entire issue and that the right to collective bargaining under the Canada Labour Code is the same everywhere in Canada.

[Public Service Staff Relations Act, June 18th, 1996]

moved:

Motion No. 4

That Bill C-30 be amended by deleting Clause 4.

[Public Service Staff Relations Act, June 18th, 1996]

He just left? Thank you. He probably met his whip on the way out who told him to keep quiet. I would like to thank the member from Glengarry-Prescott-Russell who, for once, succeeded in bringing the hon. member from Kingston and the Islands back in line.

I can now go on. The government tabled Bill C-58 after deciding not to appeal the Gingras decision. What Bill C-58 basically tells us is that RCMP members are not part of the public service, they are not governed by the provisions on public servants or by the working conditions established by Treasury Board. This is getting close to the separate employer status that some have always wanted to give to the RCMP.

There is a much broader problem, a staff relations problem that has been around for a while and which the study of Bill C-58 made apparent. There is a gap between command staff and officers of the RCMP. The study of Bill C-58 clearly demonstrated that working conditions are not too good.

Some RCMP members wanted to appear before the committee on government operations to talk about Bill C-58 because it was directly affecting them. They were told not to wear their uniform and that they would have to appear in their own personal name, outside regular hours of work. This job atmosphere is pretty weird in an organization where everybody is supposed to have the same goals.

Bill C-58 also touches upon another aspect of working conditions of RCMP members, that is to say their unionization. Some members are unionized. At present, RCMP civilian employees are unionized. The March 1994 Gingras judicial decision definitely opens the door to the possible application of Part I and, of course, Part II of the Canada Labour Code to RCMP officers.

Fearing that its RCMP police officers could unionize, the government introduced Bill C-58 to exclude them from the ordinary rules of law applicable to all other Canadian workers subject to the Canada Labour Code's general rules.

When the minister and RCMP officers appeared before the government operations committee, they were hard put to answer the following question: "For which reasons are you opposed to unionization, to free negociation of working conditions between RCMP police officers and the government, their employer?"

All they could say was that since RCMP officers had to look after the safety of ambassadors and members of the consular corps, they could not be compared to other Canadian police officers who dit not have to perform such duties. However witnesses have shown during committee hearings on Bill C-58 that Sûreté du Québec police officers, Ontario Provincial Police officers, in their respective province, have to look after the safety of consular corps members located in Toronto, Montreal or Quebec City.

Now, all things considered, they are not any different. We realize the distinct status the RCMP command staff is so fond of is like a sacred cow.

A case is still outstanding before the Quebec Court of appeal. I am talking about the Delisle case against the Attorney General of Canada. Staff sergeant Gaétan Delisle, who is now mayor of Saint-Blaise-sur-Richelieu, claims that the freedom of association provided for in the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms includes the right to unionization.

The government simply wants to ignore court rulings and legislate retroactively to deny some rights. This approach is not appropriate. Let us wait and see what the court rulings on the right to unionization will be as well as the rulings of the federal commissions responsible for implementing the Canada Labour

Code before deciding if, according to them, RCMP police officers can be unionized, and if so, which system should be applied to them.

We could eventually hold an open debate on unionization conditions for police officers that would be acceptable to MPs representing Canadian citizens. Should we have a general system providing for the right to strike, a system providing for compulsory arbitration or a system providing for a final offer? These are all possible options. With a bill such as Bill C-30, let us not exclude other possible courses of action. Above all, we cannot disregard the tension seething within the ranks of the RCMP, tension which last October or November resulted in Staff Sergeant Gaétan Delisle being ordered not to run for the office of mayor of Saint-Blaise-sur-Richelieu.

We have indeed come to a pretty pass when a police force's headquarters seeks to strip one of its officers of his fundamental right to run as a candidate in a municipal, provincial or federal election. A grievance has been filed. This whole matter will be heard by the trial division of the Federal Court. However, this case, like many others, underscores the prevailing tension.

We are coming very close to restricting individual freedom of expression. In the case of the communiqué released by the member for Charlesbourg, an attempt was made to restrict the freedom of expression of a member of Parliament. This member was brought up before the procedure and House affairs committee and an attempt was made to "do a number" on him, as they say, to intimidate him and to restrict his freedom to freely and democratically voice his sovereignist convictions in an open debate. We have never hidden our true intentions.

The Gingras case, the Delisle case at the RCMP, Bill C-58, Bill C-30, the case of the member for Charlesbourg's communiqué: in all of cases, there is a common denominator, namely an attempt to restrict democratic rights, whether it be the rights of officers of the peace, those of RCMP officers or those of the member for Charlesbourg. To attempt to restrict a member's freedom to voice his opinion about a platform on which he was elected is to take matters too far. That is why we will be voting in favour of the motion at the report stage. We want to have certain provisions stricken from Bill C-30.

[Public Service Staff Relations Act, June 18th, 1996]

I will wait till my colleague from Kingston and the Islands has finished.

[Public Service Staff Relations Act, June 18th, 1996]

moved:

Motion No. 1

That Bill C-30 be amended by deleting Clause 1.

Motion No. 2

That Bill C-30 be amended by deleting Clause 2.

Motion No. 3

That Bill C-30 be amended by deleting Clause 3.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak to Bill C-30 just as I did when Bill C-58 was introduced in this House at second reading, on November 17 1974.

We all remember why the government tabled Bill C-58, which has now become Bill C-30. According to a decision of the trial division of the Federal Court of Canada, RCMP officers were basically covered by the legislation pertaining to public service, subject to working conditions established by Treasury Board and, indirectly, to the RCMP's incorporating instruments, the Financial Administration Act and the Canada Labour Code.

That lead to the following situation. First, according to the Gingras decision, the government had to give a bilingual bonus to RCMP officers. It did not appeal the decision from the trial division of the Federal Court. It rather decided to table Bill C-58, which was a kind of backdoor appeal. This is like changing the law after the decision was rendered.

[Airbus, June 14th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, in a matter where it is obvious that the government's lawyers have been ordered to use strong arm tactics on the former Prime Minister of Canada, does the present Prime Minister find it normal, in these politically charged circumstances, for the Minister of Justice to seemingly not have kept him informed of his meetings with the RCMP or of the possibility of an out of court settlement, which might cost the taxpayers of Canada several million dollars?

[Airbus, June 14th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Prime Minister.

Yesterday morning, the Prime Minister denied in a CBC interview that there had been any negotiations to settle the Airbus affair out of court. Yet, in a report presented yesterday evening, the CBC contradicted his statement.

In this matter, which is taking on more and more the appearance of settling political scores and less and less that of a properly conducted court case, why under the circumstances has the Prime Minister denied that negotiations had been held toward reaching an out of court settlement of the Airbus affair, last Tuesday in Montreal?

[Criminal Code, June 14th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, in his presentation, the minister has rewritten history as it relates to section 745 of the Criminal Code. I think that some clarifications, if not corrections, are in order.

First of all, if memory serves, the last time a death sentence was executed in Canada was in 1962, on December 6 to be more precise. After that, the government, represented by the governor general in council, systematically commuted all death sentences until 1967, when Parliament decided to abolish capital punishment for five years, a decision which was renewed for another five years at the expiry of the first five years.

It was in a debate held in this House around that time, in 1976, that was raised the matter of section 745 of the Criminal Code, which provides that, in cases of high treason-admittedly not the most common cases; we have to go a long way back in our history to find any-but essentially cases of first degree murder, that is to say planned and deliberate murders, and second degree murder, where the term of imprisonment is longer than 15 years, offenders be sentenced to life, but with a minimum sentence.

In 1976, about this time of the year, the Trudeau government introduced a bill to abolish capital punishment permanently-if anything can indeed be permanent in this world. The bill did not specify any dates and the practice was not restored by this House, even if there was a debate on the subject during the 33rd Parliament. There was no mention of section 745 at the time.

When did section 745 become an issue? When Mr. Trudeau, who was then Prime Minister, realized he did not have the majority he needed in this House to pass his bill on abolishing capital punishment. It was common knowledge at the time, and history also showed that, since the death sentence had been abolished on a temporary basis in 1967, a person sentenced to life imprisonment for murder usually was granted parole after a relatively short time, 12 years or so. Several members were quite irritated by this situation, as were their constituents.

The Prime Minister was opposed to section 745; the solicitor general, who was the member for Notre-Dame-de-Grâce, was opposed to section 745. In fact, most cabinet members were opposed to section 745, and it was not the cabinet that proposed section 745 in the original bill. Section 745, which deals with a minimum sentence of 25 years, was included when the government realized that its bill was not getting support.

The six-vote difference that enabled the government to abolish the death sentence in 1976 was only gained through back room political negotiations between the government, its own members and members of the opposition, to secure the majority required. Otherwise, the bill to abolish the death penalty would have been defeated in July 1976, instead of being passed with a majority of six votes. As we can see, the balance of power is something very important.

The comments made earlier by the minister must be put in their historical context. The minister talked about the legislative aspect of section 745. Everything was done through discussions that took place in informal settings. People negotiated among themselves: "If I give you a minimum of 25 years, will you support my bill? Will you be in your riding? Can you be away?" The result, in July 1976, was that the death penalty was abolished on the strength of six votes.

It is wrong to try to rewrite history and claim this was a government policy. The issue must be put in its proper historical context, starting back in 1969, with the major criminal law reforms. The process began with a liberal approach, by this I mean small "l" liberal, in the non partisan sense, because nowadays the Liberals have a rather different approach. Criminal law underwent a reform. For example, the provisions of the Criminal Code which, until 1969, criminalized homosexuality and the prescription of anovulatory pills, were eliminated. Strange as it may seem, the use of such medication was considered a criminal act. Needless to say these provisions did not reflect the values of the time, or those of today.

Other reforms took place in the ensuing years, including bail reform. It must be remembered that, at the time, people could be released on bail in Canada only if they had the money. If they could hand over a chunk of money to the clerk of the Superior Court, in the case of Quebec, or the Supreme Court, in the case of other provinces, they could be released on bail for major crimes. Others lacking the financial wherewithal could not be released.

The more liberal approach I was referring to a moment ago led to release on bail subject to various conditions other than strictly pecuniary ones. Furthermore, essentially the same conditions have been retained, even though certain criteria for release on bail have

been amended, because it could be seen that with bills passed in the early seventies it was becoming extremely difficult to prevent release on bail. Adjustments were made in the periods that followed.

Basically, the possibility that citizens accused of a crime today will be released on bail while awaiting trial does not hinge solely on their financial ability to post bail or have someone else do so on their behalf.

Changes have taken place. Today, the government is backtracking, quietly rewriting history. Today we are presented with Bill C-45, which is not a bill that can just be tossed in the garbage. It still deserves a slightly more careful analysis, and it certainly deserves to go to committee for clause by clause consideration and also so that witnesses can be heard. This is not a bill that can be passed in two or three days. There are criminologists, social groups, victims' representatives, the Canadian Police Association and several other groups that will wish to comment on this bill.

Once again, the government is trying to play both ends against the middle. It knows very well that this House has already spoken on Bill C-226, introduced by the member for York South-Weston. The House has adopted in principle the abrogation of section 745, and the minister cannot ignore this.

Now we find in the philosophy of this bill, if there is one, or at least in its principles, that, yes, the House did hold a free vote on abrogation of section 745 of the Criminal Code, and the Minister has obviously taken this into consideration.

However, the minister does not want to be perceived as following the same political line as his former Liberal colleague, the hon. member for York South-Weston. He is therefore attempting to present something today, by juggling words or procedures, that differs from Bill C-226.

Is there really such a great difference? Perhaps not really, because, when it comes down to it, the parole conditions under 745 are made so difficult that, in future, if the bill is adopted as is, one wonders if it would not be better to merely propose its total abrogation.

Let us recall that, under the present circumstances, a person convicted of first degree murder is sentenced to life imprisonment, without eligibility for parole until he has served a minimum of 25 years of his sentence. If convicted of second degree murder, the sentence is life imprisonment with a minimum of 10 years. If the trial judge has set the minimum at 15 years or over, the individual may make use of section 745 as it now stands.

In other words, after 15 years of imprisonment, the individual may apply to the Chief Justice of the superior court of his or her province, in certain provinces the supreme court, but at any rate judges at equivalent levels, requesting designation of a judge to hear the application. The judge merely notes the application, having no power of discretion, meaning that he or she does not hear the evidence at this point, merely noting that the 15 years have been served.

The judge must then empanel a jury to hear the application, as if it were a court of criminal assizes. The jury hears the application, with a judge presiding, and determines by a two-thirds vote that the inmate's behaviour warrants his release.

Although the two thirds criterion is there-and it is a pretty stiff one-the determination by the jury is final, unlike in a criminal proceeding where the decision of the jury is final on the facts and cannot be changed by the trial judge. Neither can it be quashed by a court of appeal or the Supreme Court. All a court of appeal or the Supreme Court can do with a finding of not guilty in a criminal case is order a new trial. It is no longer possible for a court of appeal-and I admit that this is one of the Liberals' major reforms-to substitute a verdict of guilty for a jury's verdict of not guilty.

It can, however, do the opposite. That is, it can make a finding of acquittal after a jury has reached a verdict of guilt. The jury convened under section 745 determines by a two thirds majority whether an individual may apply for parole. In the end, it is not even the jury's decision, at the moment. The jury simply determines the inmate's eligibility to go before the National Parole Board to apply to present his case and his arguments. The jury's decision is not the final one.

We might ask ourselves why, in a trial, is the jury's verdict of guilty or not guilty final when, in the case of release on parole, the jury's decision is simply a recommendation to all intents and purposes to the National Parole Board. It is not particularly fulfilling for a jury, despite what the minister said earlier.

What then would be affected in section 745 if the amendments were accepted? First, the accused, actually the inmate, appears before the chief justice, who will designate a judge, and makes application. As regards the application, Bill C-45 provides a new step requiring the application to be made to a judge, who will hear the evidence. On the basis of the evidence, he will decide whether the inmate has a real or reasonable chance of success before the jury. This is therefore the first stage.

Depending on whether he is powerful or destitute, on whether or not he has a good lawyer, on whether or not the judge is in a good or bad disposition that day, the defendant or the inmate may be treated differently. This step, which may be unnecessary, is worth reviewing. If the judge gives the inmate the right to appear before a jury, the inmate will be required to do so.

This bill gives the jury a slightly different role by changing the rules of the game. The rule that any recommendation must be made by two thirds of the jury no longer applies. The bill now says that the recommendation must be unanimous. The criteria used for granting parole are the same as those used to determine if a

defendant is guilty. All this is closely linked to the rule of evidence, according to which the crown has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt and convincing 12 citizens that the defendant in a trial is guilty. This is no longer a matter of convincing a jury that a defendant is guilty. Rather, the crown must ask a group chosen among ordinary citizens if, in their opinion, the inmate ought to be granted parole. In fact, it is no longer asking for a decision, but for an opinion.

Why set such a high criterion as the criterion of unanimity? There will inevitably be someone among the 12 jury members who, for his or her own reasons, will object to the inmate's applying to the National Parole Board. The two thirds criterion should, in my opinion, be maintained, and that is an amendment we will certainly put forward at the committee stage, as the jury's recommendation does not have the same weight as in criminal proceedings, in which the jury must be unanimous. The group dynamics within a jury must also be considered. A two thirds agreement represents a significant degree of consent on the part of the jury, and this standard can generally be recognized as valid in a free and democratic society.

So a criterion to determine guilt must be seen quite differently from a criterion to grant parole. On what basis must the jury decide? Not on evidence beyond all reasonable doubt, but on a preponderance of evidence. Jury members hear the evidence and determine if they sincerely believe that the applicant deserves to be granted parole given his behaviour, his record, and so on.

Demanding evidence practically beyond all reasonable doubt because every member of the jury must be convinced is much too high a criterion. Following a unanimous jury decision, the inmate could and should apply to the National Parole Board, which is the only authority with the power to grant parole.

Contrary to what has been said by some members of the Reform Party and the Liberal Party, which has several wings-that party is, in fact, losing a lot of feathers lately-we are faced with some rather difficult situations. They are trying to have it both ways.

So this militant wing of the Reform Party and the Liberal Party argues that section 745 automatically grants parole to inmates. The inmate must file an application, convince two-thirds of a jury, and then appear before the National Parole Board.

We in the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs recently heard representatives of the National Parole Board, who explained to us that, under section 745, there were practically no subsequent offences. This clause has probably achieved its purpose.

It may be worthwhile to review it. Is it too cumbersome or too complex? As the minister said, should a person convicted of more than one murder be given the same latitude as a person who has committed just one crime? I think that first offenders should be treated with all possible leniency, especially after spending 15 or 20 years in prison.

We recognize society's right to protect itself against career criminals. There are not only inalienable individual rights but also a collective right to protection for all of society. I am not in any way defending the idea that convicted repeat offenders should be set loose on society.

We can still review the current criteria used to enforce section 745, without going to extremes. We should certainly consider the age at which the inmate was convicted of a crime. If he is convicted of first-degree murder at age 20, there is not much information on his past. It may be normal to want to keep this individual in prison for 15, 20 or 25 years to see what happens. There is a problem when a 20-year-old is convicted of first-degree murder.

But there are always exceptions, as we saw in the Quebec judicial district. This 62 or 63 year old lady, if I remember correctly, had been found guilty of first degree murder. In theory, she would not become eligible for parole until the ripe old age of 88. There are always exceptional cases like that.

This is a real-life story. Should persons who have been law-abiding citizen all their lives until the age of 65 or 70 be subject to the 25 year parole ineligibility criterion? This would certainly not be very consistent with the individualization of punishment principle, calling for the particular circumstances under which an act, fundamentally reprehensible in itself, was committed to be taken into account.

For the foregoing reasons, the official opposition will support the principle of Bill C-45, especially since it is only normal to take a second look and a good hard second look at section 745 of the Criminal Code after 20 years of operation. There are very valid provisions in this bill dealing, among other things, with criminals who are utterly beyond redemption, in other words repeat offenders, those who murder more than one person. I have no trouble understanding this part of the bill.

Where the jury is concerned, I think we should stick to a two thirds majority decision and hear more expert testimony on the need for the inmate to convince the judge before the application is allowed to proceed to the jury.

There is something wrong with the way our criminal justice system is administered. People should not have to make their case first before a judge and then before a jury. This is not in keeping with the way our criminal justice system generally works. Those who go before a jury have chosen to be heard by a jury and, in such cases, the judge is master of the law, but not master of the facts. Now it would all be jumbled. The bill would have the judge

examine the facts first and then the jury do it again. If section 745 and hearing by a jury are maintained, the judge should be only concerned with the law and let the jury deal with the facts, as in any other criminal matter.

For these reasons, we will vote in favour of Bill C-45 at second reading and make sure it is examined carefully by a parliamentary committee.