François Langlois

[Witness Protection Program Act, June 11th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, for essentially the same reasons, I believe the Senate has passed a very useful amendment, substituting the word "evidence" for the word "opinion", a vague term leaving the commissioner unlimited discretion.

When the commissioner terminates protective services under the Witness Protection Program Act, he must base his opinion on material facts that can ultimately be reviewed by the courts. In a country that believes in the rule of law, this is a notable improvement that deserves support.

I would particularly like to thank my friend, the hon. member for Berthier-Montcalm, for all the attention and consideration he gave this issue.

[Quebec Referendum Act, June 11th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, Quebec's directeur général des élections has laid formal charges against certain private corporations and members of the Liberal Party of Canada, for offences against the Quebec Referendum Act on the occasion of the mammoth no rally last October 27. In English Canada, some Liberal MPs are expressing the opinion that freedom of expression is in jeopardy because of the charges laid by the DGE.

I would remind the House that the Quebec legislation does not prevent freedom of expression. On the contrary, in fact. The present debate again raises the question of the justification of limiting third party expenditures during the time leading up to elections, and their impact on the outcome on voting day.

How would English Canada react to a Quebec citizen's spending like there was no tomorrow in order to influence the results of a provincial election? Must it be pointed out that even the Canada Elections Act limits election expenses? This attack by English Canada against a Quebec law is just one more illustration of its double standard.

[Criminal Code, June 4th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, for the sake of consistency, I shall take it from the top. I am pleased to speak on Bill C-274 put forward by the hon. member for Mississauga East. If I may, I would like to start by setting the record straight because the hon. member, acting in all good faith I am sure, has questioned the procedure currently used by the sub-committee on private members' business.

Along with the hon. members for Mississauga West, Edmonton North and Okanagan-Shuswap, I sit on this committee, which, for obvious reasons, meets in camera to hold proceedings and only under these circumstances. That is because the House has seen fit for the committee responsible for looking into private members' business to be sheltered from outside pressure. What better way to elude pressure than to sit in camera, where we can discuss freely and frankly, without having people watching over our shoulders as we draw our conclusions.

Without compromising the secrecy of in camera meetings, I was able to assure the hon. member that no vote was taken on his bill in our committee. In fact, the sub-committee on private members' business very seldom takes votes. We usually report to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs after reaching a consensus. I would say that, in 95 per cent of cases, we unanimously agree on the bills referred to us.

That is why I was taken aback, to some extent, by the remarks made by the hon. member for Mississauga East, as reported in the Hill Times . This is probably due to a lack of knowledge of the system, a system which has shown that we can have good bills and good motions in this House, provided there is an appropriate process and it is complied with.

This being said, even though the bill before us is not a votable item, it raises important issues including, of course, the whole matter of cumulative sentences. Under our system, when a judge

imposes sentences for various offences, he has a duty to state whether these sentences are cumulative or concurrent.

According to our tradition, a judge usually imposes a sentence for the most serious offence and includes in it the other sentences for lesser offences. So, generally speaking, sentences are concurrent.

The fact is that, under our criminal laws, including the Criminal code, judges already have the power to impose consecutive sentences when they deem appropriate to do so. It might be a good idea, during a debate on a motion to this effect, to look at the issue of sentencing. Do we want judges to make greater use of their power to impose consecutive sentences? Perhaps.

Perhaps the judiciary itself could deal with the fact that, in some cases, the imposition of consecutive sentences is justified. However, imposing consecutive sentences does not settle all the situations better than if it was ordered by legislation.

Inevitably, we will find ourselves in a situation where the compulsory imposition of consecutive sentences would become inappropriate. What can a judge do if he has no discretion? He will have to impose sentences that will prove to be an excessive burden for the individual who has been found guilty or has admitted his guilt.

The hon. member for Mississauga East also mentioned some people, notorious criminals, who were sentenced to one life sentence only. Contrary to the U.S. system, we do not have in our system convicted people sentenced to 200 or 300 years of imprisonment. Generally, one life sentence is enough.

In the case in question, as in the Bernardo case, since a charge was laid, the judge had no other choice but to pass sentence. It is up to the crown to follow up on the other charges or to lay new charges on additional offenses to try to get additional sentences for the criminal. But fortunately enough, according to a tradition we have here, in our country, an individual cannot be convicted before he or she has been tried.

If Ontario crown attorneys think it would be appropriate to prosecute an individual already convicted for first degree murder, it is up to them to decide what to do. The accounts we have heard are in fact very unsettling. That a person who has committed such crimes as those reported in the media-and I am thinking in particular of the Bernardo trial-can be released after serving only 15 years in prison, pursuant to section 745 of the Criminal Code, is quite disgusting.

The same thing goes for all the cases mentioned by the hon. member. It would be easy to jump to a general conclusion, but that is something we should not do before carrying out a more detailed study.

This bill also raises the issue of the victim's rights. I must say that the hon. member did a better job of getting my attention on that issue, because it is true that our system tends to forget about the victims. Their voice is not heard at sentencing hearings. When the parole board makes a decision, their statements are hardly, if at all, taken into consideration. These people are just left out of the process.

Attorneys are generally overburdened, and when a Crown attorney is put in charge of a case, he must do his work as quickly as possible, and he does not get all the resources he needs. Obviously, it is important that justice be done, but not always expeditiously. These are two points I wanted to deal with, the rights of the victims, consecutive sentencing and the right of society to protect itself.

Just because I do not approve of all the provisions in Bill C-274 does not mean I do not recognize that the society has a right to protect itself. It is a fundamental right for Canadians to see people who pose a threat to society forced to reflect in isolation on what they did. If this is not enough, they will be given longer sentences and they will not be eligible for parole.

When we heard from members of the Parole Board, I realized that there has been a very big improvement lately in the way the board deals with releases.

There is still much to be done but progress was made. Obviously, we do not now have cases as worrisome as some we had a few years ago. The watchfulness of parliamentarians surely has something to do with it as it is our duty to point out, on occasion, flaws in the system.

Bill C-274, which is before us today, warrants more reflection than a gut reaction. All the issues raised by the hon. member for Mississauga East are emotional, and give rise to such gut reactions. If we were to let our emotions colour our judgment, we would always pass stricter sentences and forget about the guidelines that insure a good administration of justice.

Since this is not a votable bill, I do not have to indicate whether I will vote for or against it, but the issues raised by the hon. member certainly give us food for thought.

[Criminal Code, June 4th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak on Bill C-274 put forward by the hon. member for Mississauga East.

[Justice, May 30th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, in the circumstances, does the minister have any objections to releasing the report of the inquiry into this matter?

[Justice, May 30th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Minister of Justice.

In a ministerial statement yesterday, the Minister of Justice commented on a serious case of undue interference by an assistant deputy attorney general with the chief justice of the federal court. Faced with such a flagrant case of interference in the judicial process, the minister announced that an inquiry would be held.

Can the minister assert from his seat that he was not aware in any way of the representations made to the chief justice of the federal court by his assistant deputy attorney general?

[Supply, May 28th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my hon. friend from Vancouver Quadra for his question. In my opinion, the Senate's attitude, especially in relation to Bill C-69, the Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act, is usually a prerogative of the people's elected representatives. By not only considering but unduly delaying consideration of this bill so that it died on the Order Paper between the two sessions of this Parliament, the Senate has hijacked the powers of this House and shown contempt for this House as well as for traditions that have been clearly established for decades.

This is a literal interpretation of the Constitution Act, 1867, which is totally unacceptable. I think this must be the last action taken by the Senate, especially on an issue so central to the privileges of this House as the readjustment of electoral boundaries.

[Supply, May 28th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak on the motion put forward by my hon. colleague for Comox-Alberni. The motion before us today, which calls for control-I will not say greater control, just control-to be exercised over how public money is spent at the Senate, is a timely topic.

In fact, the Senate of Canada, as we have known it since 1867 and whose functions have changed very little since, but I will come back to this later, has already become something of an anachronism in a democratic society such as ours. For all intents and purposes, there is no longer any institution similar to the Canadian Senate in the western world. The House of Lords has seen its powers drastically reduced by the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949; today, all it has left is protocolar powers, as it only has a suspensive veto.

We are in a situation where, in all matters except constitutional matters, the Canadian Senate has powers identical to those of the House of Commons. Several books has been written about the rights and privileges of the Canadian Senate, and the powers in question are enormous. The only difference between the Senate and the House of Commons, aside from the 180-day constitutional suspensive veto acquired in 1982, is the fact that money bills cannot originate from the Senate, but they still have to be approved by the upper House, which has the same powers as this House, at least in theory, in terms of legislation.

The members of the other place are appointed and therefore are not accountable. On the other hand, every five years, if not more frequently, all of us members of the House of Commons must account to our voters for our management of public funds and our individual budgets. People can ask us: "What did you do with the money you collected in taxes?" While they have, in law, the same powers as us as far as managing public funds and passing legislation are concerned, the members of the other place are not accountable.

There is a serious anomaly here, and our party has always been opposed to this way of doing things. A motion that will be a votable item will even be debated in this House, on Monday. I am referring to the motion of the hon. member for Kamouraska-Rivière-du-Loup, asking this House to support the principle of abolishing the Senate in its present form.

For the sake of history, let me quote a text prepared by the late Jean-Charles Bonenfant, a librarian for the Quebec legislature and an emeritus professor at Laval University's faculty of law, where I had the pleasure of being one of his students during a few years. This was written in the sixties, but his opinion about the Senate never changed much throughout his career. It is a well known fact that Mr. Bonenfant turned down several offers to sit in the Canadian Senate, because of what he thought of that august place.

I will read excerpts from an article published by professor Jean-Charles Bonenfant from Laval University. He wrote the following, and I basically agree with his views: "Rightly or wrongly, the Canadian Senate is the legislative body that seems to have the worst reputation in the whole world".

In 1942, journalist Grattan O'Leary wrote that the position of senator was not a job and that the Senate was not a place where one was supposed to work. Mr. O'Leary became a senator in 1962.

In 1961, Jean-Luc Pepin, who became the member of Parliament for Drummond and a cabinet member, passed a number of judgments on the Senate. He described it as "a political hospice, a sepulchre, the pound of flesh demanded by the parties, the most exclusive retirement club in the world, the fifth wheel of govern-

ment, the hollow echo of an optimistic past, the only sure weakness in the Constitution Act, 1867, a divorce mill, a tourist attraction, and the list goes on".

Finally, Marcel Faribault and Robert Fowler, imagining a new Constitution with a revamped Senate, in their book Dix pour un , wrote: ``Whether you judge it by its achievements or its reputation, the Canadian Senate has not been a particularly auspicious institution''. That is putting it mildly.

And yet, in a federation such as ours, the Upper House could have played a very important role. Representation in the Lower House is usually determined on the basis of population. Representation in the Upper House attempts to create a certain equality between the constituent parties.

This is why each of the fifty states in the United States, regardless of its size or population, has two senators representing it in the Senate.

In Australia, each of the six states sends 10 senators to the Senate, and in Switzerland the 46 members of the Council of States are divided equally among the 23 cantons.

The Canadian Senate has never played the true role of an Upper House in a federation type country. From the beginning, its composition has been along regional rather than provincial lines. In 1867, membership was 72: 24 for Ontario, 24 for Quebec, 24 for the maritimes, that is Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, which, when Prince Edward Island joined, had to give up 4 seats.

As new provinces appeared, the Senate added new members, finally settling, in 1915, at four divisions of 24 members. Quebec and Ontario remained unchanged; the maritimes division had 10 senators for New Brunswick, 10 for Nova Scotia, and 4 for Prince Edward Island; and the western division had 6 senators for each of the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia.

These 96 senators were joined, in 1949, by the six senators from Newfoundland, and later by 2 senators for the territories, raising the maximum to 104.

Under the administration that was in place during the 33rd and 34th Parliaments, a Conservative administration, we saw the hitherto unused clauses of the Constitution allowing the number of senators to be raised to a maximum of 110 or 112 put into application in order to push through the GST legislation.

Senators are appointed by the Governor General, and thus to all intents and purposes by the government, the Prime Minister even if he controls his government properly. Although a few examples of appointments outside political considerations can be found, we can state that one of the primary prerequisites for a senator is membership in the party in power.

The British North America Act requires certain qualities of senators, qualities in the sense of eligibility requirements. They must possess $4,000 in real and personal property, a quite exceptional amount in 1987. The Senate was therefore reserved for a quite specific category of person. Nowadays, it is quite easy to qualify. You can take your MasterCard or Visa, get a cash advance, and buy some property quite quickly, which was not the case in 1867.

In Quebec, theoretically, the senators represent 24 senatorial divisions. These correspond to the 24 divisions of the legislative council elected between 1856 and 1867. The territorial divisions act gives the divisions represented by senators. It is worth pointing out that, according to my personal research, not one Quebec senator has a division office.

One might wonder what is the point of dividing Quebec up into senatorial divisions if the people serviced, if I may use that expression, cannot track down their senators.

Moreover, if you carry out a survey of no scientific value whatsoever, asking passers-by to name their senator, it is rare to find anybody who can do so. This is far different from the situation with their MP. Whether they like the person representing them in the House of Commons or not, they are generally able to identify that person and to say: "So and so is my representative in the House of Commons and I will vote (or not vote) for him or her in the next election". Generally, members of the House of Commons are recognized, while the members of the other House do not enjoy the same high profile. This does not mean that there are not some fine people there. It is not my aim to judge the members of the other House, but rather the institution, which, as I said earlier, is completely outmoded.

We must remember that, until 1965, senators were appointed for life, and a number admirably benefited from the privilege. There was the Hon. David Wark, from Fredericton, for example, who was appointed in 1867, at the time of Confederation, and died in 1905 at the age of 102. The Hon. Georges Dessaules of Saint-Hyacinthe died in 1907 at the age of 103.

Under Bill C-98 introduced on April 27, 1965 by Prime Minister Pearson, which was passed by both Houses, a senator appointed after the bill became law would remain in the position until he reached the age of 75.

I have always wondered whether the Governor General could reappoint someone to the Senate, who had retired at the mandatory retirement age of 75, once they turned 76, since the 1965 legislation contains no such prohibition. Perhaps we might see people like Senator Wark or Senator Dessaules come back to sit in the Senate if such an interpretation were possible. A senator can always resign,

of course, and risks losing his seat in the Senate if he no longer fulfils the requisites of his appointment.

As with what happens in an elite club, the Constitution provides that the decision rests with the Senate in the case of a vacancy in the Senate or on the matter of a senator's ability to sit there.

This is sort of the way it was in the United Kingdom in the 1940s. At that time, the House of Lords had the power to judge any of its members accused of a crime. That practice continues today here, even though it was abolished nearly 50 years ago in the United Kingdom.

Yesterday, my hon. colleague from Vancouver Quadra made a brilliant speech before the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs on the powers of upper houses in British type parliaments. My hon. colleagues should refer to the proceedings of this committee.

I can therefore say that the Senate is an upper chamber similar to the British House of Lords, on which the Fathers of Confederation modeled the Senate to some extent when they established it. But contrary to popular belief, its powers are not as limited as those of the British Upper Chamber following the Asquith Bill of 1911. This first Parliament Act to be passed was complemented by the 1949 Labour bill. These two bills considerably reduced the powers of the House of Lords, which is now left with only a suspensive veto.

On the other hand, the Canadian Senate has all the powers of the House of Commons except, as I mentioned earlier, that it cannot introduce a bill providing for a tax or an expenditure.

In 1918, the subject of Senate powers was thoroughly examined by two great Canadian legal scholars: Aimé Geoffrion and Eugène Lafleur. They submitted a conclusive and momentous opinion in writing supporting the Senate's omnipotence, which the Lower House, the House of Commons, still does not recognize, particularly as regards financial matters.

Note that, since 1982, the powers of the Senate regarding constitutional amendments were slightly curtailed, as this House now has only an 180-day suspensive veto, as I indicated earlier.

It is strange, to say the least, for a House where appointed members sit until they turn 75 not to have any public accounting procedure and to hide behind its privileges and some pretty outdated traditions to justify itself.

I think that, in requesting that representatives of the Senate appear before the Standing Committee of Government Operations to review annual expenditures of approximately $40 million, the committee was acting not only in good faith, but also in response to the public's wish to know how their money is being spent. To try to see how the money is spent is, of course, a first step.

In every riding I travelled to, but I will focus on my own riding, the majority of people do not see the use of an upper house like the one we have at present. It should be either abolished or reformed. In the present circumstances, as desirable as it may be to everybody, a reform is clearly not possible.

Seventy years ago, and even at the Charlottetown conference and the Quebec conference, such a reform was discussed before the Senate was even established. Some advocated an elected Senate, based on the model of the united Canada legislative council, while others wanted an appointed house. The decision to establish the Senate in 1867 was not a unanimous one. Some wanted to reform this institution before it was even set up, which was definitely a bad start. They never could reform it. Given the constitutional yoke created by the 1982 amending formula, we can wonder whether such a reform will ever take place.

All the parties in this House have taken a stand regarding the Senate. The Prime Minister and member for Saint-Maurice clearly indicated that he is in favour of having an elected upper house. His position is clear. As for the Reform Party, it is in favour of a triple E Senate, even though some Es are disappearing. A Senate that is equal, effective-there is also another E-oh yes, a Senate that is elected, equal and effective.

Some E's are disappearing right now, including the E for equal, because we realized it did not really make sense to have the same number of senators representing a small province and a larger one such as Quebec or Ontario.

As for us, we say that, in its present form, the Senate must be abolished. If it must be brought back to life to reflect a different Canada, then it should have another structure. It is unacceptable to keep a non-elected house with such large powers. If it were an advisory body, and if we could afford it, it might be helpful, but it is no longer acceptable, in 1996, to have a house with powers equal to those of the House of Commons.

This is why the Bloc Quebecois is in favour of a single house system of government whose members are elected by the population as a whole. This is an issue that we should tackle at the earliest opportunity.

[Supply, May 16th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member is leading us to the issue of territorial integrity, which is indeed a very important issue. With the right to self-determination also comes the right of a people to live within clearly defined boundaries.

The Canadian Constitution currently guarantees our right to clearly defined boundaries. The boundaries of each province cannot be altered without the consent of the provincial legislature concerned, and not the consent of a municipality, or of the people who live on a specific part of the territory governed by this legislature. If the legislature wants to consult with the people before making a final decision, so much the better.

On the day after a yes vote, our borders will be clearly defined. If there are suggestions that people living near the Quebec border, either in New Brunswick or in Ontario, should apply to join other entities, it is not the people of Quebec who will be the troublemakers but those acting as agents provocateurs. It is therefore in no one's interest to raise these Swiss cheese theories to partition Quebec. The dispute over raw-milk cheese has been resolved, so let us quit while we are ahead.

[Canada Elections Act, May 15th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, I am a bit out of breath, having rushed here from a meeting of the national security committee, where we would have greatly appreciated the presence of the hon. member for Scarborough West. Oh well, maybe next time.

I took part in the examination of the bill known during the first session of this Parliament as C-319, and now with reprinting and Motion No. 1 it has become Bill C-243. As the hon. member for Fundy-Royal has said, this is a compromise, reached after many

efforts on all sides by all of the parties represented on the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.

I would like to commend the hon. member for Edmonton Southwest, if I may, for all the energy he has devoted to this entire process, first of all, in having managed to get his bill into the works, then in having defended it before the Sub-committee on Private Members' Business, and then in having defended it brilliantly before the procedure and House affairs committee.

My congratulations, not just to the hon. member for Edmonton Southwest, but also to the colleagues who contributed to this compromise: the hon. member for Kingston and the Islands, of course, who chaired the committee, the hon. member for Laurier-Sainte-Marie, who shared his experience with us, and the hon. member for Glengarry-Prescott-Russell, who, as usual, helped us draw up a better bill.

As has been mentioned, but I will take the liberty of repeating it, we focused on one thing: avoiding having public funds, the public purse, used to support marginal groups, which, through sometimes contorted interpretations of the law, manage to register as political parties and, by spending an amount of money, manage to recover certain amounts.

The aim was simply to eliminate the flakey. In no way did we question the political programs or options of any party. That was far from our intention. We set minimum criteria that enable parties with some popular support to develop in a democracy. It was certainly not our idea to limit access to Parliament, in practical terms, to existing parties or to parties that had existed in the past.

The criterion we chose was that a party, to obtain reimbursement from the public purse, had to have 2 per cent of national votes or 5 per cent of votes in ridings where they ran a candidate. With the elections act requiring a party to have at least 50 candidates in order to register, we felt this standard was high enough to eliminate the completely flakey organizations while allowing the development of political parties that failed to gather 30 or 35 per cent of votes in an initial election.

It is a tricky balance to strike, but it was feasible with everyone's patience and co-operation. Credit here must be given to the member for Edmonton Southwest for endlessly contributing, with constructive suggestions, to the improvement of the bill and successfully creating a consensus on the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.

Of course we have to come back to the funding of political parties by looking at other aspects of the question. This does not end the debate. An important point has been reached, however, and unanimously I assume. But, we must not stop here. One day we have to deal with the funding of political parties. In this case, we are only dealing with reimbursement. But how are parties funded?

We had proposed in a motion which was voted down by this House by only a few votes-members of both opposition parties had overwhelmingly voted in favour of it-that contributions to political party election funds at the federal level be subject to the same rules as in Quebec. Contributions to political parties registered in Quebec can only be made by individual voters and cannot exceed $3,000 per party, a reasonable limit in a free and democratic country.

This House came very close to passing such a measure and having a bill to this effect. If I remember right, motion M-150 moved by the member for Richelieu dealt with this issue. We will have to resurrect it some day because Canadians have the right to know who is funding political parties in this country.

The rule is simple: "Tell me who is funding you and I will tell you whom you are serving". The Bloc Quebecois has nothing to hide, we are entirely funded by our own members. We went way beyond the Canada Elections Act by choosing to accept contributions only from our members who could vote and by limiting contributions to $5,000. I must say that this maximum is rarely reached, contributions are often more modest.

As most Canadians know, in Quebec, we raise money for our party through all kinds of events, giving us the opportunity to have a good time while holding more in-depth political debates, and ensuring grassroot funding. By using this form of funding, the Bloc Quebecois makes sure it is its own creature.

We are only accountable to those who elected us. If a contributor were to insist too much, it would be easy to say: "Listen, I will write you a cheque-in this case it would be an Air Canada passenger coupon more than a cheque-I will write you a cheque, here is your refund". But there are no such situations.

If I had received $50,000 or $60,000 from the Royal Bank, I could perhaps write the first cheque, but as things stand, I am not sure my bank or caisse populaire would honour it. I would have a hard time paying it back.

That is the problem they have on the other side. I hope the problem has not yet reached the Reform Party, because they seem unable to define their position on this.

Our friends on the other side have a problem: they get their funds from large corporations, big business, and they are first and foremost accountable to those who provide those funds. Tell me who pays your way, I will tell you who you serve.

Of course, the president of a large corporation who contributed to an election fund to the tune of a five or six-figure amount will

probably get some private telephone numbers or cellular phone numbers that will give him access to influential people.

In our party, it is very easy, our numbers are in the phone book. All voters are welcome, whatever their political colours, blue, red, multicolored or any other colour you want. Reformers are a bit on the green side, I would say, but they are welcome too. When we are elected, we are, as yourselves, here to represent everyone. We are here to serve not only Bloc party members, but also Liberals, former Conservatives and NDP members who need our support.

In conclusion, it is with this in mind that I send this message, so we can debate the financing of political parties in the near future. This would be a major reform, one of the great reforms of Canadian parliamentary process, as it was in Quebec.

If we had to choose the most important piece of legislation in Quebec in the past 50 years, the first prize would go to the political party financing legislation, which only allows persons qualified to vote, ordinary citizens, to finance political parties, not unions, corporations or body corporates. This measure has revolutionized parliamentary customs.

And if we were to adopt it here, of course, it is more difficult to build up campaign funds with $20, $50 or $100 here and there, although tax provisions allow for a generous refund of up to 75 per cent on the first hundred dollars, which may help sometimes.

So, it is not so difficult, but we have to take the trouble to do it. Of course, it is always easier to make a phone call and receive a big cheque, but we stay in touch with the grassroots when we go from town to town in our ridings, to see our constituents and ask them for a contribution to a fund raising campaign. They are able to give us the message, to tell us what they want us to do in the House of Commons and which issues they want us to deal with first. This is a wonderful way for us to keep in mind we are accountable first and foremost to those who have given us, for a limited time, the seats we are sitting in so that we can rise from time to time and make some interventions such as this one, which is coming to an end.