François Langlois

[Supply, September 18th, 1996]

I am wondering too. The member for Ontario, who is also very vigourous and represents around 250,000 people, must feel very frustrated these days knowing that he will have to face the electorate and justify his policies and the fact that the promise to abolish the GST has not been fulfilled; he might have a hard time.

There are people roughly his age in the other place, they are there until they turn 75, without being held accountable to anyone. It is incredible. There is something wrong somewhere. We all will have to go home. In your riding of Stormont-Dundas, maybe it will not be so difficult, Mr. Speaker, but in Bellechasse it might be harder, we will see.

In any case, we will return, we will all take the plunge without any guarantee whatsoever to see what seat will be occupied. The 206 members who were replaced in this House all know what it means to have no job security.

I went to the other House earlier. What a nice sunset I saw. It was the darkness in that room that struck me the most; sometimes the darkness is in the minds. They speak about a House of sober second thought, but it looked more like a dormitory.

We will be sitting until ten this evening. Over there, they are not sitting at all. Evening debates are rare enough because the number of days are limited.

Section 31 of the British North America Act of 1867 states that a senator loses his seat do you know when? When he or she is absent from sittings during two consecutive sessions. That means a senator who was a member of the Senate in 1993, at the beginning of the 35th Parliament, and who has not yet been present in that House, still has two more years to attend at least one sitting in order to keep his seat.

If we did that here, if we were absent from this House, our constituents would quickly boot us out. We would be subject to procedures much harsher than impeachment, the newspapers would demand our resignation, would require that we either sit or quit and return our salaries. In the other place they can do that, but not here. It is time to abolish that institution.

[Supply, September 18th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, in the Upper House, the Senate, Quebec has a constitutional guarantee of 24 seats. Unlike any other province, Quebec counts 24 senate ridings.

In 1867, Quebec was divided into 24 ridings. A thing to remember, a small anomaly of which I will remind my colleague, the member for Ontario: in 1912, Quebec borders were altered by

adding to it the Ungava area. Quebec borders were changed, but the Senate map was not. All of northern Quebec is not represented in the Senate. Today we are asked if Quebec would be less represented? Probably over a third of it is not represented at the moment. I cannot see where the problem is.

As far as the problem of demographics is concerned, I have trouble putting it in context. With regard to procreation, I would be more inclined to trust the members of this House, especially my colleague from Témiscamingue, who recently had a little Félix, than the members in the other House. I fail to see the connection.

[Supply, September 18th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for St. Albert will surely have the opportunity to speak after the member for Richelieu, with whom I will share my time.

The issue of a second House in Canada is not something new; it goes back to 1774. That year, the pyramid was started from the top, in the sense that institutions were established for the British North America of the time. In 1774, only institutions approved by a legislative council were set up. Our structures were rather simple, with a governor representing the Crown and a legislative council appointed by the governor.

This was a bit of a family compact. There was little discussion when laws were passed and budgets approved. When democratic movements called for an elected house to represent the population and have a say in the government of the colony of the time, many voiced their opposition to the idea.

In the end, rather significant support from the United Empire Loyalists led to our country's having elected houses. But do you know what happened at the same time? Canada was divided in two: Upper Canada and Lower Canada, to make sure that French Canadians would never succeed in passing their laws and in imposing them on the rest of the country.

Today, as we try to get our powers back and to govern ourselves, we meet with strong objections and are told that we cannot do that. Two hundred years ago, they would not let the majority govern in this country. The pendulum has swung back.

So, in 1791, the Constitutional Act amended the Quebec Act to create the Houses of Assembly. We still did not have a responsible government. However, we had an elected House of Assembly, with an extremely restricted role to play, and the legislative council was maintained in both Upper Canada and Lower Canada. While the Constitutional Act of 1791 was in force, this legislative council, whose members were appointed by the governor, systematically opposed every decision made by the House of Assembly. The elected representatives had little success in imposing their final decisions during the period from 1791 to 1838, at which time the Special Act was passed to suspend the Constitutional Act of 1791, following the Patriots' Rebellion in 1837.

The Union Act of 1840 maintained the legislative council and an elected House, of course, but the legislative council could oppose, under any circumstances, all the decisions made by the elected representatives of the population. For 16 years, the members of this legislative council would be appointed by the governor and could do everything they pleased to oppose the decisions of the elected representatives.

In 1858, a timid but still significant reform was initiated, with the election of the members of the legislative council, although vested rights were maintained. Those who had been appointed before the 1856 act, which provided for the election of the legislative council members, were able to keep their seats, but had to sit next to members who were elected on a rotational basis.

It must have been strange to have an elected member and a member appointed for life sitting side by side in the same House. It is as if my colleague, the hon. member for Shefford, was there for life and I had to go back to the voters every four years, I would not be too amused.

Change had begun, and with it government instability and the decision of the elite, not the public, to change the form of government. These were the people known as the Fathers of Confederation, the grand term used to describe those who decided that there would be a federal government in Canada's future. There was never any desire to consult the public about this.

A great Liberal, Antoine-Aimé Dorion, proposed in the House of Assembly in Parliament, here in Ottawa, that a referendum be held on the change in Canada's constitutional status in 1867. This highly democratic proposal to let the public decide on the future status of Canada was defeated. The changes proposed by a small elite were adopted. In Quebec, numerous county and municipal councils opposed the constitutional change, sensing the trap into which we were heading. By letting go of our equal representation in the Parliament of the United Canada, that is, from an institutional point of view, we were saddled with a lame duck. At the beginning we had a third of the seats in the Senate and the House of Commons, but today we no longer even guaranteed a quarter of the seats.

In the next election, Quebec will have only 75 members out of 301, which is below the critical threshold of 25 per cent representation which has always been one of Quebec's traditional demands.

Perhaps I may, oh irony of ironies, quote Senator Jean-Claude Rivest, who represents the district of Stadacona. Speaking before the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, he said that 25 per cent was the minimum, was the critical mass Quebec needed in the House of Commons. This 25 per cent will be lost in the next election.

In 1867, they talked about what they would do with these institutions. When I say: "they", I am referring to the Fathers of Confederation. There were other constitutions in the past. There

was the Constitution of Great Britain and there was a tendency to refer to the Constitution of Great Britain, the United Kingdom.

The first preamble to the British North America Act, 1867, forms the basis of all provisions dealing with the Senate in our institutions. I will read it to you:

Whereas the provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have expressed their desire to be federally united into one dominion under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a Constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom.

A constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom provides for two Houses of Parliament. In the United Kingdom, as in this country, there is a House of Commons, but also an upper House, the House of Lords. We wanted to establish one as well. I am not an agriculture critic but we have our own little lords.

So we established another House, the Senate. This House has the same powers the House of Lords had at the time: the power to fully obstruct decisions of the House of Commons. This was in 1867, when the House of Lords systematically opposed all bills that would give back to Ireland its institutions, which had been suspended for many years.

In any case, one would have to be totally lacking in political vision to be oblivious to the fact that someday, the other House, the Canadian Senate, which was not elected and was not accountable to any one would obstruct major legislation. We saw it happen during this Parliament.

Earlier, the hon. member for Kamouraska-Rivière-du-Loup referred to the bill concerning Pearson Airport. The bill was defeated in the Senate. An important bill on electoral boundaries readjustment, Bill C-69, on which the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs worked for weeks on end, was never passed and died on the Order Paper in the Senate.

There is something odd about an unelected house coming to tell us how to get ourselves elected.

We cannot, of course, as Bloc members and sovereignists, subscribe to the Reform proposals, which will perhaps be useful to a Canada in which Quebec is not represented, but we certainly cannot subscribe to a Senate which would be elected, effective and equal. If there were any equality, it would have to be between the two nations, the two founding peoples, not one between provinces. And what would an elected Senate mean? It would mean another House with popular legitimacy which would act as a buffer between the provincial and federal governments. If there is one thing we do not need right now, it is that.

The hon. member for Brome-Missisquoi has just said that a constitutional amendment is needed to abolish the Senate. Of course we need a constitutional amendment; it is the 7-50 rule which applies: 7 provinces representing 50 per cent of the Canadian population. Let the other provinces reach agreement among themselves to abolish the Senate and we will probably be rid of it.

I would like to close with an acknowledgment that, of course, there are some good people sitting in the other House. It is not my intention to discredit those who are there, but rather to state that, in 1996, the existence of a House of this nature is no longer justified. The best way to see it abolished quickly is to hit it where it hurts the most, in the pocket book, by choking off its operating funds, and then there is a good chance that it will fall on its own sword.

[Supply, September 18th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, after listening to the comments made by my colleague from Fraser Valley East, I have a question for him regarding his party's platform with regard to the Senate, since what we are hearing on this issue is less and less clear: Does the platform of the Reform Party of Canada still include an elected, equal and effective Senate where each province would have the same number of senators chosen by the people?

In this respect, I would like to know, in view of the great disparity of population between provinces, and I will raise this again when I deal with the substance of the motion, how would electing senators make them more effective? In my opinion, the more equal the Senate becomes, and if it is totally equal as the Reform Party has been suggesting so far-total equality among the ten provinces-the more likely it will be for its effectiveness to be zilch. The Senate will be able to block a piece of legislation for 20 or 30 days, that is all; as far as money bills, supply bills, and allotment of public moneys are concerned, we would still be in the same situation.

Is the triple E Senate a concept which is still defendable in view of the analysis conducted by our colleagues from the Reform Party?

[Prisons And Reformatories Act, September 17th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure to take my turn to speak to Bill C-53 before the House today. Since the position of the official opposition was clearly established by my colleague and friend, the hon. member for Manicouagan, I will merely elaborate on some of the elements he touched on just now, and I also intend to add to this some figures which the hon. member for Windsor-St. Claire was so kind as to pass on to me earlier, after quoting them in her own speech.

Clause 7 of the bill refers to the conditions for conducting temporary absence programs, as they are commonly referred to.

We should not forget that, when a court of law imposes a prison sentence, the primary purpose of the prison sentence is to protect society, while the second is to mete out punishment. We must not forget that. The rehabilitation aspect comes third, when we are certain that society is protected and that an individual is punished for an offence of which he has been found guilty or to which he has confessed. Subsequently comes the time for clemency and rehabilitation. The first two elements should not be overlooked: the protection of society and the punitive aspect. I think that clause 7 should put more emphasis on one of the principles of sentencing, according to which society has both the right and even the duty to protect itself.

That being said, I think that legislating rules for the guidance of authorities in charge of temporary absences is an improvement. At least there will be guidelines far more specific than what exists at the present time with respect to temporary absences.

Second, the bill specifies the grounds for revocation of the temporary absence. Here again, this is certainly an improvement which we will have an opportunity to examine in committee, but clause 7 of the bill enumerates the conditions under which the temporary absence may be revoked.

Of course, when we give people the power to grant temporary absences or revoke them, we cannot expect them to be faultless in their judgment of who should or should not be given a temporary absence. A temporary absence should be granted, of course, everyone or almost everyone will agree, when these people, for their own rehabilitation, when they are no longer a risk to society, when they can make a contribution to society to rectify mistakes that happened during their lives, can benefit from it.

It is to be hoped the boards that will have to decide whether or not to grant parole or a temporary absence will use their judgement. Let us not kid ourselves. Ours is not an ideal world and there will always be errors. Errors that are often infrequent and not the general rule should not blind us to the primary purpose of this bill, which deals specifically with rehabilitation and also relieving pressure on the prison system.

My colleague, the hon. member for Windsor-St. Clair, spoke earlier about a rate of incarceration in Canada of 130 persons for 100,000 population, while the rate in western countries, excluding the United States, can vary, for example, from 51 per 100,000 in the Netherlands to 81 per 100,000 in Germany, much higher rates.

It seems that, despite a decrease in crime in Canada, there is a rather strong trend for the courts to hand down firm prison sentences that are much more exemplary and to do so more often, particularly in cases of domestic violence.

We know that there is social pressure, and a good thing too, for zero tolerance of domestic violence. Therefore, our judges, who are sensitive to public opinion, are generally much more severe. And this reflects an evolution in society that I commend. Here, as with alcohol and drug use, it is zero tolerance that we should be aiming for.

In committee, of course we will try to pin down the scope of clause 7.2, which states that it is the lieutenant governor of the province who designates who is competent to authorize temporary absences in each of the provinces.

My colleague, the hon. member for Vaudreuil, has just mentioned that we have a new lieutenant governor in Quebec. Although appointed by the federal government, and theoretically by the Governor General, the lieutenant governor is in fact named on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. And although the lieutenant governor acts, also theoretically, on the recommendation of the provincial cabinet, he is not legally obliged to do so.

An old case from 1938, in a referral to the Supreme Court, on "-power of disallowance and reservation", clearly established that constitutional conventions which may deprive the Crown of the exercise of some rights do not hold when these rights, reserved for the Crown, are effectively exercised despite those constitutional conventions.

We just had such a debate in Quebec on whether, in a example A or B, the representative of the Crown could not prevent the people or the National Assembly, which represents the people, from exercising its democratic right. I hope that it will not happen.

If we added the words "in council" after lieutenant governor in clause 7.2 and therefore used the expression "lieutenant governor in council", we would simply mean that a Cabinet decision signed by the lieutenant governor would be necessary in order to designate the persons responsible for authorizing temporary absences. This would be compatible with the provincial jurisdiction.

This is what the member for Vaudreuil was referring to when he talked about the overlap which existed in criminal law in Canada-an overlap which is not so clear cut as one would think. In sections 91, 29 and 92(14) of the Canadian Constitution, the British North America Act of 1867, renamed the Constitution Act, 1867, as if it had never been called anything else, the BNA Act of 1867 gives the federal Parliament the power to determine sentencing and to establish a criminal code, and of course related laws, and gives the provincial authority the responsibility of administering justice.

But what administration of justice? Civil matters clearly are the responsibility of the province. This has not been disputed to date although according to some, an area of civil law falls under federal jurisdiction at this stage of the evolution of the law. However, things have not yet gone very far at this level.

As to areas of criminal law, is the provincial administration constitutionalized pursuant to subsection 92(14) or is it delegated to the provincial attorneys-general under the Criminal Code, and something that the federal Parliament may revoke at any time?

I was simply trying to point out to the fact that, after 126 or 127 years, after so much change, interpretation and discussion, we are still in a grey area, in a no man's land. We are still wondering about the distribution of jurisdictions among the different levels of government.

Bill C-53 is a step forward or perhaps sideways, but certainly not backwards in improving the balance that, as long as we belong to this system, we must constantly be trying to reach in the sharing of powers between federal and provincial jurisdictions. The enacting of Bill C-53 will mean better coordination.

With the flexibility afforded by this bill, we should be able to keep in custody those who really deserve to remain in prison, who are a danger to society and themselves and who have not earned a temporary absence or permission to go out. They must be earned, they are not automatic.

There is one last thing, with which my colleague from Manicouagan dealt very eloquently, I will probably be less eloquent. My colleague is quite familiar with the system, not for having served time, but for having worked in the penal system. When he talked about the change in the reporting period from 15 to 60 days, he touched upon a critical point we will have to look into. My mind is not made up at this time, but I have reservations.

If a parolee, who now has to report every two weeks, finds himself in a situation where he only has to report every 60 days instead of 15, an added 45 days, a reporting period four time as long, is there not a danger of losing control over this individual, or at least the correctional officials' ability to follow up? I believe this is a real danger.

If it is found that the individual is in breach of the terms of his parole, will it not be too late after 60 days to bring him back on track? Should his parole not be simply revoked? I think that a follow-up period of two weeks, even though it seems at first to be a rather cumbersome administrative measure, might be preferable to extending the reporting period to 60 days without any prior study. I presume that the committee will look into this issue with an open mind.

I have one last question. I am not stating my position on the breach of parole, on the non respect of the parole terms, I am just

wondering. Right now, under Bill C-53, a law enforcement officer cannot arrest an individual who is clearly in breach of his parole.

Therefore, if a policeman sees me in a bar in the middle of the night, while I am out on parole under the condition that I stay in my house from 8 p.m. to 8 a.m., the only thing he can do is write a report saying that I violated the conditions set for my parole but he cannot arrest me.

Would it not be appropriate to change the policemen's powers in some instances? A private member's bill has been submitted to that effect. I do not know where it stands on the Order Paper, but we should also think about acting quickly in that case because the sooner we act, the less deviations from the rules there will be. This is one aspect of the 60-day rule I do not like; it will be very difficult to follow the individuals during those two months when they are at large. We are all aware of the problems created by budget cuts at all levels.

If we reduce personnel, we also reduce the supervision. The person in need of help will receive less and less and he or she will probably want to test the limits of those conditions set for the temporary absence or the day pass.

I submit that these points should be considered in committee. We will insist that they be. Since the parliamentary secretary was courteous enough to stay in the House to hear the official opposition's statements, I am sure he took note of our comments and he will transmit those comments so that everyone will know what issues are of concern to us.

At the second reading, we will of course support Bill C-53.

[Criminal Code, September 16th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, let us first get things straight. Over the summer, it was rumoured on the Liberal side that Bill C-45 had been killed by the official opposition, by the Bloc Quebecois, that we were against this bill, that we were on the side of those who rely a little too much on rehabilitation. There were all sorts of rumours going round.

The position we took in second reading was very clear. We supported the bill while pointing out that, after 20 years of operation, the time had come to review section 745 of the Criminal Code, under which a person sentenced to life imprisonment for murder can request that a jury be summoned and his or her case reviewed after serving only 15 years.

This section that came into force 20 years ago last July deserved to be reviewed but not in all of one day and a half, as it were, with time allocation being imposed on Bill C-45, the committee working almost round the clock to report to the House in a rush and the bill finally never being considered because time ran out.

One of the main concerns we had in the official opposition, in the Bloc Quebecois, was to determine where the interest of the victims lay in this whole issue. The hon. member for Crowfoot raised this point time and time again in committee. We too trust the jury, of course, as an institution, to make a decision under section 745 in relation to the exceptional release of lifers. We trust the jury, provided it has all the facts. One factor that was missing in our opinion was the notion that the victims, their families, other individuals and even the community at large may have sustained a loss because of the murder.

Whether it is made by psychologists or sociologists, there is always a delineation made. That is the main reason why we gave our support to this bill in second reading. We can either use the steamroller or have a logical and enlightening discussion right across Canada on the implementation of section 745 of the Criminal Code. The value of this section in certain circumstances has been demonstrated, and it has been shown that, when a person is sentenced to life in prison but is released after 15 years or more, the rate of relapse is practically non existent. Indeed, the value of this section has long been demonstrated.

Today, the government wants to change it, quickly and without any study. Three major amendments are being proposed: first, the jury which currently makes its decision or recommendation based on a two-third majority would, with this bill, have to make unanimous decisions.

The idea is to give these jurors the same role as the members of a jury rendering a verdict at a trial. In a trial, the jury's decision must

be made beyond any reasonable doubt. It makes perfect sense that the 12 citizens forming a jury have to render a unanimous guilty or not guilty verdict. However, the jury referred to in section 745 is not at all the type of jury that we have known for centuries in the British criminal law system. One has the right to be judged by one's peers and to see them render a verdict.

The jury that exists since 1976, twenty years is a short period in history, is a special jury which does not have to render a verdict but to give its opinion. Should an inmate sentenced to life in prison for murder-the act also mentions high treason, but since Louis Riel I do not think we have had the audacity to condemn anyone on that ground-be eligible for release after 15 years, in exceptional cases? This jury does not even make the decision. It authorizes or not the inmate to submit a request to the National Parole Board, which will hold hearings. And here we say that, of course, the victims should have a right to be heard.

The evidence on which this jury bases its decision is not judged on the same criteria as the evidence presented during a trial. It is an opinion issued by a jury. It is normal that there may be dissension and disagreement. The two thirds rule established in 1976 appeared to us to be a wise rule allowing uniform application of the law throughout Canada in criminal matters.

It is obvious that, if the bill were to be passed as it reads today, section 745 of the Criminal Code would be applied differently according to the province in which inmates resided. It is obvious that juries empanelled in Quebec under section 745 of the Criminal Code are generally more liberal, more socially open to such an application, while in other provinces it will take just one person to block parole.

One of the basic principles for our having one criminal code for the entire country is that there must be uniform application of the rules of law. In practice, we will not have uniform application of the rules of law throughout Canada.

The government is presenting us with a bill, Bill C-45, that is nothing but double talk. On the one hand, in those parts of Canada where it suits its purposes to do so, it will be able to say that it has, to all intents and purposes, made it impossible for someone serving a life sentence to be released on parole. And in other more liberal parts of Canada, the government will say that it has not abolished section 745, even though the House of Commons passed Bill-226 presented by our colleague, the hon. member for York South-Weston, which repealed section 745.

The background discussion has taken place. Should the section remain or not? It is a good question, a clear question with a clear answer. I am in complete disagreement with the points of view expressed by my colleague, but at least he asked the right question: Should it, or should it not, remain in the Criminal Code?

For us in the official opposition, a life sentence is a life sentence. This means that a person released while serving his prison sentence is nevertheless released conditionally and may be returned to custody if he violates the conditions of his release.

However, we should not make the false hopes raised by section 745 disappear altogether, and I say this because other aspects of Bill C-45 will make the application of section 745 of the Criminal Code even more haphazard. From now on, it will be necessary to obtain the judicial approval of a provincial superior or supreme court for the inmate to be eligible to file his application. Why was this done? Why was this done so quickly during the last few hours of the session? Because a serial killer in Canada became eligible to apply for parole this summer.

Some people made it appear as though this criminal would automatically be released. The only right he obtained this summer was the right to file his application with the provincial chief justice. A jury will be called and asked to decide, probably with a two-thirds majority, whether he should be released or not. That is a good way to test the system. Will the jury, in this case, allow a serial killer to be released? Will a jury cognizant of the facts allow this to be done, and if it did, second question, will the National Parole Board which appears before our committees be comfortable with justifying that release? Personally, I am confident this will not happen, even if Bill C-45 is not passed.

I am far more concerned about a government that acts in haste when dealing with the Criminal Code and unthinkingly alters the rights and freedoms of each citizen, although the judicial area is the very area where prudence is of the essence, because often the secondary or side effects may be more serious than expected.

That is why we suggest that the unanimity rule proposed by the government in Bill C-45 should be changed to three quarters, in other words, nine jury members out of 12 must be in favour of the inmate's release as opposed to the present two thirds rule, and this for the purely technical reason that maintaining the status quo was already voted down in committee and it was therefore impossible to reintroduce it at this stage, at the report stage.

For these reasons we intend to vote for the motion to establish the three quarters rule for jury decisions when section 745 is being applied.

[Criminal Code, September 16th, 1996]

moved:

Motion No. 5

That Bill C-45, in Clause 2, be amended by replacing lines 28 to 43, on page 13, and lines 1 to 5, on page 14, with the following:

"(3) The jury hearing an application under subsection (1) may determine that the applicant's number of years of imprisonment without eligibility for parole ought to be reduced. The determination to reduce the number of years must be by a vote of not less than three quarters of the members of the jury.

"(4) The applicant's number of years of imprisonment without eligibility for parole is not reduced if a ) the jury hearing an application under subsection (1) determines that the number of years ought not to be reduced; b ) the jury hearing an application under subsection (1) concludes that it cannot determine by a vote of not less than three quarters of the members of the jury that the number of years ought to be reduced; or c ) the presiding judge, after the jury has deliberated for a reasonable period, concludes that the jury is unable to determine by a vote of not less than three quarters of the members of the jury that the number of years ought to be reduced.''

[Criminal Code, September 16th, 1996]

moved:

Motion No. 3

That Bill C-45, in Clause 2, be amended by replacing lines 11 to 31, on page 9, with the following:

"(3) The jury hearing an application under subsection (1) may determine that the applicant's number of years of imprisonment without eligibility for parole ought to be reduced. The determination to reduce the number of years must be by a vote of not less than three quarters of the members of the jury.

"(4) The applicant's number of years of imprisonment without eligibility for parole is not reduced if a ) the jury hearing an application under subsection (1) determines that the number of years ought not to be reduced; b ) the jury hearing an application under subsection (1) concludes that it cannot determine by a vote of not less than three quarters of the members of the jury that the number of years ought to be reduced; or c ) the presiding judge, after the jury has deliberated for a reasonable period, concludes that the jury is unable to determine by a vote of not less than three quarters of the members of the jury that the number of years ought to be reduced.''

[Criminal Code, September 16th, 1996]

moved:

Motion No. 1

That Bill C-45, in Clause 1, be amended by replacing lines 28 to 43, on page 4, and lines 1 to 5, on page 5, with the following:

"(3) The jury hearing an application under subsection (1) may determine that the applicant's number of years of imprisonment without eligibility for parole ought to be reduced. The determination to reduce the number of years must be by a vote of not less than three quarters of the members of the jury.

"(4) The applicant's number of years of imprisonment without eligibility for parole is not reduced if a ) the jury hearing an application under subsection (1) determines that the number of years ought not to be reduced; b ) the jury hearing an application under subsection (1) concludes that it cannot determine by a vote of not less than three quarters of the members of the jury that the number of years ought to be reduced; or c ) the presiding judge, after the jury has deliberated for a reasonable period, concludes that the jury is unable to determine by a vote of not less than three quarters of the members of the jury that the number of years ought to be reduced.''

[The Senate, June 20th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise today to speak to the motion of my colleague, the member for Kamouraska-Rivière-du-Loup.

History has shown us that, from the very beginning of the Canadian federation, the need for the Senate has been constantly questioned. At the time of union, as I was mentioning the other day, the Fathers of Confederation could not agree on whether it should be elected or appointed, because, since 1856, they had had an elected legislative council.

Therefore, the united Canada which came into being in 1840 was more advanced than the institutions we know today. We took a step backward in 1867, with an appointed Senate with responsibility for protecting the regions, minorities, and, although this was not spelled out, the general public against the abuses and excesses that might be committed from time to time by the House of Commons.

It was perhaps justifiable in 1867 to think that the House of Commons might, in the heat of the moment, take measures requiring some control by the Senate. This is no longer true today, with the advent of universal suffrage. We must remember that women in Canada did not have the vote until 1919-20. Limitations on the right to vote were abolished and any Canadian citizen aged 18 and over is now entitled to vote.

Accordingly, the reasons set out in 1867 for having another House no longer obtain. Almost all Canadians are agreed that the Senate is no longer necessary, and that it should be reformed or abolished, but almost everyone agrees that that will not happen.

I was listening to the speech by the member for Calgary Centre a little earlier, in which he gave a perspective of the Senate of Canada quite different from mine. Personally, as an elected representative from Quebec, I am not interested in having a stronger Senate, an elected Senate, in Ottawa. What would be the result? This Senate, of course, would acquire legitimacy in the eyes of the public. If the 24 senators from Quebec were elected by the public, it would strengthen the central institution. It would be one more House to reinforce the power of the federal government, to the detriment of provincial governments, and it would take up a position somewhere between the provincial first ministers and the Prime Minister of Canada. It would be just one more obstacle, not to the Reform party but to distribution, to the proper operation of the system.

Some time ago we reached the conclusion that the Senate was not reformable, since everybody wants reform but nobody wants the same reform. The Reform members want one that is elected, equal and effective, suggesting six to ten senators per province, regardless of population, in a Senate that would have the same powers as the House of Commons and be elected by universal suffrage.

Liberal members, or rather the Liberal Party, stated in the red book that the Senate would merely be elected, so already there is a divergence between the two. And what do we want? Basically, we are here to promote Quebec sovereignty. We are therefore not fighting to reinforce federal institutions, but to reform this institution, theoretically, in a way which might be desirable. If indeed we were here to reform federal institutions that might be possible, but that is not what we are here for. As well, any reinforcement of federal powers will take away from the powers of the provinces, Quebec in particular.

Reform members have chosen to influence Ottawa by reforming institutions. They said: "If the provinces were properly represented in an equal, elected and efficient Senate, that would be one way for them to exercise more power". We take a different approach, knowing that we will never have a majority in this country, but that we will have a majority in our own space, which is: "Let us withdraw from the Canadian federation". It will probably be easier for Quebec to withdraw from the Canadian federation than it will be to reform the Senate.

So I have a hard time with the amendment by the member for Vegreville, who proposes to abolish the Senate in its present form. In principle, I could say yes, knowing nothing would come of it.

Earlier, the member for Vaudreuil said, getting back to the relevance of the debate, in his last two sentences, that an editorial had said the unanimity rule was required. It has not often been raised in the context of amending the Constitution to permit the abolition of the Senate.

In my opinion, section 38 of the Constitution Act, 1982, the seven and fifty rule, would normally apply with, in my opinion, the mandatory approval of Quebec, since sections 23 et sequentes of the British North America Act of 1867 contain provisions on

senators with respect to Quebec specifically. I think Quebec should be one of the parties assenting to the abolition of the Senate.

However, speeches in election campaigns and here in the House and perhaps the inability to do anything have prevented anyone from taking the initiative. Fortunately, the member for Kamouraska-Rivière-du-Loup has taken this initiative, which will at least shed some light on things, following the latest events. Yesterday, for example, the bill on the Pearson airport was defeated by a House that is not accountable to anyone for its actions. Before that, there was Bill C-69 on electoral boundaries. A bill of this elected assembly which had been developed in committee for one of the first times in the history of Canada's Parliament was defeated by the Senate. It does tend to stop you in your tracks when people who have not been elected come and tell you how to get elected. Some things just do not work.

My colleague, the member for Beauce, said the other day that, in his riding, three voters out of four favoured abolishing the Senate. In my riding, the proportion is probably slightly higher.

In 1978, I was 30 years old and did not even have $4,000 worth of belongings-had I, though, and it does not take long to accumulate if you know you are headed for the Senate, you can get a loan-but had Prime Minister Trudeau been in my riding and said to me: "My fine young man, you would be an asset to the Liberal Party of Canada, would you be interested in being a senator in Canada's Parliament?", I might have said yes at the time. I would have been here for 45 years, because the Prime Minister liked my smile or enjoyed a brief conversation. There are no selection criteria, other than pleasing the prince of the moment.

I prefer the more difficult, demanding and valid rule of going before the supreme court of the electorate every four or five years as we do. This is what makes you and me and the members of this House, wherever they sit, responsible for our actions. This is what we have in common.

It is not just because our name appears on the ballot every four or five years, but it is generally because people reach us in the riding, because we see them. The calls come in, the letters come in and we are in constant contact with our electors, who judge us. However, 98 per cent if not 99 per cent of the time our electors are unable to identify the senator representing them.

So when it comes time to vote, I will see whether I will support the motion of the member for Vegreville, that is, the amendment. As for the motion by the member for Kamouraska-Rivière-du-Loup, I will certainly support it, particularly because the hon. member is currently circulating a petition addressed to the House of Commons in most ridings in Quebec seeking the abolition of the Senate.

I would suggest that voters lucky enough to be represented by a member of the Bloc Quebecois sign this petition. Those who are not, whose member is from another party, should ask their member or another one to have it sent to them. We would be happy to send it. It will be no easy job abolishing the Senate, but we have always said that the first step in such an undertaking is particularly important.

On this point, Mr. Speaker, I wish you a fine and restful summer. You look tired; come back refreshed in the fall.