Michel Bellehumeur

[Supply, November 25th, 1997]

Talk about the 4 per cent in Alberta.

[Supply, November 25th, 1997]

Mr. Speaker, I listened with interest to the speech by the Reform member on today's opposition motion.

I find it somewhat disconcerting that he seems to claim that, since municipalities are the level of government closest to the public, they should be the ones doing the consultations. They should be the ones reviewing the agreement—the term “agreement” is used, but it is saying a lot about a piece of paper signed in Calgary, since there is absolutely no agreement in it, only proposals made with everybody's input. Is the hon. member really saying that municipalities should be the ones consulting people on this meaningless piece of paper?

What I find even more disconcerting is the question from the Quebec MP who asked the member whether he thinks municipalities should come under federal jurisdiction. The Reform member says that everything is on the table and that this may be an opportune time to consider such an option.

I should remind the hon. member that municipalities are created by legislative assemblies—the National Assembly in Quebec's case. According to the Canadian Constitution, not our constitution, not the constitution we never accepted, but the Constitution of 1867, they come under provincial jurisdiction. It is not up to the municipalities to examine or decide whether an agreement or a piece of paper such as the Calgary declaration is good or not.

I find it strange that the Reform member, and the member who tabled the motion, are concerned about Quebec and the consultation process, given that, according to the media, the consultation in their own part of the country, in their own province, is a phoney consultation in which practically no one is interested or involved.

I would appreciate it if the hon. member could comment on my remarks.

[Access To Information Act, November 24th, 1997]

moved for leave to introduce Bill C-286, an act to amend the Access to Information Act and amending the National Archives of Canada Act as a consequence (destruction and falsification of documents and access to confidences of the Privy Council).

Mr. Speaker, it is a great pleasure for me to introduce in this House, at first reading, a bill to amend the Access to Information Act and the National Archives of Canada Act, particularly as regards the destruction and falsification of documents. The proposed amendments are very important, given what is regularly reported by the media, since they would allow us to have access to documents of the Privy Council which are currently confidential.

The Access to Information Act does not have enough teeth, as a number of people have said, including the information commissioner in his most recent report, and it does not meet current needs.

I can assure you that my proposed amendments to these two acts reflect in every way the information commissioner's concerns and expectations. I hope that all members of this House will support my initiative, so as to give more visibility, more access and more teeth to the Access to Information Act, and particularly to include penalties for those who do their utmost to prevent its application.

(Motions deemed adopted, bill read the first time and printed)

[Criminal Code, November 24th, 1997]

Madam Speaker, things are not going well for the Reform Party, because a second member has just dissociated himself from the party. Things are not going well. There are another four or five who may do the same.

That said, the bill put forward by the member for Prince George—Peace River has two parts to it. The aim of the first is to reinstate capital punishment and that of the second is to ensure the maximum prison sentence for offenders, people who have committed serious crimes. The crime is no less serious, but people under 18 years of age who have committed first degree murder, for example, would serve a life sentence.

They are amending the Criminal Code by replacing section 235 of the Criminal Code—and I think it important every word of this bill be understood—with the following:

Every one who commits first degree murder is guilty of an indictable offence and shall be sentenced a ) to death, where the person was eighteen years of age or more at the time of the commission of the offence; or b ) to imprisonment for life where the person was under the age of eighteen at the time of the commission of the offence.

As we can see, there are two elements to be amended, namely, the Criminal Code with respect to capital punishment and the Young Offenders Act.

In the case of the Criminal Code, all of us in this House know that there was a big debate on the subject in 1975-76, when Canada still had capital punishment. They wanted to amend it. There was a moral debate, with the church involved, a political and a social debate. I think there was a very important debate in 1975-76 on that. A compromise was reached, because they abolished capital punishment. The compromise was life imprisonment, with the possibility of parole after 25 years. It was perhaps not the best formula, but it was the most accurate representation of the will of the people at the time.

You have to understand that people, that a society, that a country can change. Maybe not the Reform Party, but everyone else. Today we do not think exactly the same way we did 25, 30 or 40 years ago. I think it is normal in a free and democratic society to deal with this, especially since with the help of experts and the people involved, we can review much more objectively the whole situation, which is rather unpleasant, I must admit. There is nothing pleasant about first degree murder. When we read the newspapers, there is nothing pleasant there neither, but I believe that in a society like ours, we had to get to the bottom of this. That is what we did during those years and we arrived at a rather satisfactory formula.

However, we improved it over the years. Recently, I think we solved still other problems by amending the Criminal Code so an individual can be declared a dangerous offender and denied the possibility of parole. Perhaps there will be further improvements over the years, but it surely will not be by going to extremes, as the Reform member wants to do this morning with Bill C-212, and by imposing capital punishment for first degree murder.

I would like to read to you some of the objectives we have here. Why did we go from capital punishment to the system we have today? France and other European countries had the same social debate we had here and finally adopted legislation resembling Canada's.

The judge should base his sentence on the objective and subjective seriousness of the offense so that the sentence is fair and in line with the offense and the offender. He should think about the objectives to be achieved by imposing a sentence. The sentence should be a deterrent for the accused and set an example for the people in the community, the region and even, in some cases, the province. But the sentence should also consider the actual or potential rehabilitation of the offender. The objectives that the judge has to consider are the following: the protection of society, retribution, deterrence, example, and the social rehabilitation of the offender and his protection against other sanctions. Considering all this, I believe that the present system strikes a balance and, as I was saying earlier, further improvements can always be made.

Another reason to oppose this bill—and I am saying this on a personal basis today, but also, knowing rather well my colleagues from the Bloc Quebecois, I believe there are a number of them that agree with me—is the possibility of an error in the judicial system. This is an extremely important reason and I think that even though our judicial system has proven itself, it is not infallible. No one in this House is infallible either. No judge is infallible, and I think there may be cases where individuals are found guilty who are not really guilty.

In Canada, we have seen people spend 5, 10 or 15 years in jail who were later found to have been unfairly convicted and who were released after their files were reopened and a new investigation was conducted.

I know that with the progress made in the medical field and in other fields, we can make the judicial system better or try to reduce the risk of mistakes being made, and I am referring here to deoxyribonucleic acid analysis, better known as DNA analysis. Such analyses may be used to link a given individual to a murder based on evidence found on the scene of the crime.

But even the best techniques will not prevent mistakes from being made and individuals from being convicted of murder in the first degree. If this House passed the hon. member's bill, these people would be executed, when it may be found ten years down the road that they were not guilty of the crimes they were accused of.

Also, before taking a stand on this bill, I did what I had done before taking a stand on the bill introduced by my Reform colleague during the 35th Parliament: I read what had been written about it and checked what the experts had said. Criminal lawyers are not unanimous, but the vast majority of them, including Gisèle Côté-Harper, Antoine Manganas and Jean Turgeon, say that capital punishment does not have a deterrent effect in the case of first degree murder.

To conclude, as far as young offenders are concerned, the proposed amendment to the Young Offenders Act would completely upset the balance of this legislation. For these additional reasons, I am opposed to the hon. member's bill.

[Criminal Code, November 24th, 1997]

Madam Speaker, the hon. member from the West may be ashamed of his party. Indeed, this is a private member's bill. Some of us are capable of making that distinction.

That said, during the 35th Parliament another hon. member from the Reform Party tabled a bill proposing a referendum on the death penalty. It will be recalled that there was a debate in this House. Outside of the Reform members, hon. members voted without exception against that bill. I would remind the hon. member that the bill in question was C-261. The Reform MPs were in favour of the bill, while all the rest of the House was against it.

Today—

[Criminal Code, November 24th, 1997]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to speak on this bill put forward by the Reform Party.

There is nothing surprising about this bill, considering that the Reform Party had tabled a bill during the 35th Parliament—

[Customs Act, November 18th, 1997]

Mr. Speaker, some days are busier than others. Today, I was in a building on Wellington Street to attend a sitting of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, but I insisted on rushing back here to speak on Bill C-18, an Act to amend the Customs Act and the Criminal Code.

These are extremely important amendments. This bill, which was tabled by the Minister of National Revenue, affects several facets of law. There is one entire section that deals with the changes and enhanced powers the government wishes to give customs officers.

This is not a new bill, however. It is numbered C-18, but it was tabled in exactly the same form during the 35th Parliament as C-89. It will be remembered that it was tabled by the government of the day on the eve of the calling of the federal election, on March 13, 1997.

During the first mandate, a number of groups came to the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights as well as to the government calling specifically for the government to change certain provisions of the Customs Act in order to enhance some powers. A number of groups have long pointed out the need for customs officers to be able to enforce criminal law at Canadian entry points. In a country like Canada, especially, which has such a long border with a lot of entry points, offences have occurred over the years, and customs officers lacked the tools necessary to deal with them.

What provision does the Customs Act make at the moment? We are told that customs officers have powers, but they are enforcement powers as established under part VI of the Customs Act. These powers apply to surveillance duties and to the control of merchandise imported into or exported from Canada. They include the power to search a person in order to find proof of an offence and to inspect, detain or seize merchandise.

Currently customs officers' powers apply primarily to merchandise entering or leaving Canada. They do not involve the application of provisions of the Criminal Code. The expression “peace officer” in the Criminal Code includes customs officers, but only in the context of offences set out in the Customs Act. For example, section 163(1) of the Criminal Code stipulates that it may apply with respect to offences set out under sections 153 or 159 of the act, which are false statements and smuggling.

Under these circumstances, customs officers are invested with the powers granted peace officers under sections 462.3 and 462.32 to 462.5 of the Criminal Code. In short, at the moment, customs officers are considered peace officers under the Criminal Code only in the case of offences set out in the Customs Act.

The bill is proposing to amend the Customs Act to set out new offences that come under the powers of customs officers. They really want to use the bill to give the customs officers greater opportunity to intervene when they witness certain offences.

Let us be clear about the changes. At present, customs officers are only allowed to act when an offence under the Customs Act has been committed. Since they do not have jurisdiction over Criminal Code offences or impaired driving offences—we will come back to that later, because there are specific provisions on this—they cannot act in those instances. There has been in the past striking examples of cases where blatant irregularities took place at Canadian ports of entry and departure because customs officers did not have the power to act.

Bill C-18 proper contains four clauses. These are small technicalities, but I think they are worth mentioning anyway. Clause 1, which makes substantive changes to the Customs Act, is the bill's main provision, while clauses 2 and 3 amend two sections of the Criminal Code; these amendments, although minor, are nevertheless far-reaching in terms of the customs officers' jurisdiction. Finally, clause 4 is the usual provision dealing with the coming into force of the bill.

I will take the extra time at my disposal to look at a number of very important provisions. Clause 1 of the bill would add part VI.1 to the Customs Act. This new part is entitled “Enforcement of Criminal Offences Other than Offences under this Act”. As indicated in the title, legislation other than the Customs Act is involved, hence the importance of the powers conferred upon customs officers.

Section 163.4 would be added, stipulating that the minister may issue a certificate of designation to customs officers for the purposes of new part VI.1. In this respect, according to documents from Revenue Canada, these new powers would only be granted to customs officers at ports of entry to Canada who are not students. This is reassuring, since it is an important power. It will only be given to customs officers on duty at Canadian ports of entry. The certificates of designation will be issued by the minister. As will be seen later, we have some concerns. While we support the bill as a whole, as we did during the 35th Parliament, we do have concerns regarding the certificates of designation.

The next important provision is paragraph 163.5(1), which gives a designated officer the powers and obligations of a peace officer under sections 495 to 497 of the Criminal Code. These are very important sections. As you know, section 495 gives a peace officer the right to arrest without a warrant a person who has committed an indictable offence or is about to commit such an offence. Section 495 also provides that this power can only be exercised under exceptional circumstances, that is when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that public interest requires such an intervention.

Under section 497, a peace officer who makes an arrest without a warrant must release the person arrested as soon as practicable, unless he has reasonable grounds to believe—this is another well-known legal concept—that it is necessary in the public interest to detain that person.

It is to be noted that these new powers can only be exercised in a customs office. So, while additional powers are given to customs officers, the bill restricts their use and relies on well-known legal concepts. These concepts are also recognized in case law and, over the years, they have been interpreted under a number of acts, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Quebec charter. The expression “reasonable grounds to believe” has indeed been interpreted.

The additional powers given to customs officers come with certain obligations. In the final part of my speech, I will comment on the obligations that will apply to customs officers as a result of these amendments.

Bill C-18, an act to amend the Customs Act and the Criminal Code, contains an extremely important provision. I must say that I am very happy to see that the lawmakers have included a provision to amend the Criminal Code accordingly through the Customs Act. This provision can be found in proposed paragraph 163.5(2). It would give designated customs officers—the same officers just designated by the minister—the powers and obligations of a peace officer under sections 254 and 256 of the Criminal Code.

What are sections 254 and 256 of the Criminal Code? As everyone knows, I am sure, these are the sections having to do with impaired driving. Customs officers will have powers similar to those of peace officers, at border points for entering or leaving Canada—it all depends on the direction of travel. They will have the same powers as peace officers to apply sections 254 and 256.

These provisions are for the taking of breath or blood samples in cases of impaired driving. Thus, where a peace officer believes on reasonable and probable grounds—again, the same principle of law recognized by lawyers—that a person is committing or has committed the offence of driving while impaired as described in section 253, that officer may, under the provisions of another section, section 254(3), require that person to provide him with a sample of the person's breath or, in certain circumstances, blood.

In the past, when a person who was driving into or out of Canada had alcohol on his breath, the customs officer to whom that person made his declaration could do absolutely nothing about it.

Mr. Speaker, as an Ontario MP, you are well aware that the biggest port of entry between the USA and Canada is Windsor. This was an extremely big problem in that region of Ontario, because many people who worked across the border, or who crossed to the States or to Canada for a night out, were at the wheel of a vehicle and had had one too many. When they went through customs, the customs officer could do nothing.

With this amendment, in the form of subsection 163.5(2), customs officers will have additional powers and will be able to require individuals to provide a breath sample. Their actions will have legal consequences, eventually.

Proposed subsection 163.5 (3) provides that a designated officer who arrests a person in the exercise of the powers conferred under subsection (1) may detain the person until the person can be placed in the custody of a police officer or peace officer.

I find this reassuring, that customs officers' powers are being enhanced within very definite limits. These are very clearly delineated powers. The customs officers' powers do not replace those of the police officers of a province, nor those of the RCMP in provinces served by the RCMP.

Section 163.5(4) would limit the new powers of the designated officers by stipulating that they could not use any power conferred on them for the enforcement of the act for the sole purpose of looking for evidence of a criminal offence under the Criminal Code or any other act of Parliament. The purpose of this is to prevent customs officers from searching for evidence of other criminal activities.

With this clause too, the lawmaker has imposed certain limits on customs officers, that is, a customs officer witnessing an offence will be empowered when this bill is passed to investigate and gather evidence of what he has seen. If he has reasonable grounds to believe that an individual is, for example, moving stolen goods from Canada to the United States, he has, under the legislation and if there are reasonable grounds to believe the goods are in the trunk of a car, the power to examine the items in order to gather evidence to hand over to the police with jurisdiction where the customs officer made the seizure or conducted his investigation.

So, as we can see, there are limits, which are extremely important. Substantial additional powers, essentially the powers of peace officers, cannot be given to customs officers without limits being set, without very precise limits to ensure that everything occurs according to the intent of the bill.

As I have said on a number of topics, we will support the bill. However, we have some questions. As I said earlier, we have already examined the bill in the previous Parliament under another number and another title. This one is exactly the same as the one that was introduced in March 1997. I will raise certain points, which, at the time, gave me cause for considerable thought and also convinced me of the merits of such amendments.

In 1995, a study revealed that, in 17 months, there were over 4,000 instances where criminal law could have been applied in one way or another at 160 ports of entry either on the highways or at airports. According to Revenue Canada officials, the majority of these are suspected instances of impaired driving. In these 4,000 cases, no action was taken because customs officers did not have the jurisdiction to act.

The same study shows that an amendment to the Customs Act similar to the one contained in Bill C-89—at the time, we were considering Bill C-89, tabled on March 13, 1997—would fill the gap between the time when customs officers observe a Criminal Code offence and the time when the police can respond. It was clear from the statistics and from past experience that there was indeed a loophole allowing law-breakers to get off scot-free. This bill bridges the gap to correct this shortcoming and ensure that offenders are prosecuted.

Given the foregoing, we must recognize that the Criminal Code could be much more effectively enforced at our borders if our customs officers were given the appropriate tools.

However, while public safety may demand that we support the bill before us, some aspects will definitely have to be looked into at the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights. There are concerns regarding this bill. Some answers were found in departmental documents, others through informal discussions I have had with government members, but there are still questions that remain unanswered. These questions will be raised at the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights on which I sit as a representative of the Bloc Quebecois.

I will mention four points. The first one is the need to properly train the designated officers. As I explained at the beginning of my speech, in some situations and under specific circumstances, customs officers will have basically the same powers as peace officers do, and these powers are very important ones.

It must be realized that in fact the bill proposes a significant broadening of the customs officers' responsibilities. Sections 495 to 497 of the Criminal Code are not easy to apply. They require a high level of judgment on the part of the peace officer, since the consequences are very significant. Take, for example, the expression “reasonable grounds to believe”, which I pointed out earlier. This concept is not difficult to understand. It is a legal concept lawyers are used to work with, judges are used to interpret and officers are trained on. However, I am not sure that customs officers do get that kind of training.

The expression “reasonable grounds to believe” used in these sections is extremely important, as we saw in Storrey v Regina, in 1990, where the supreme court stated that, in order to arrest a person without a warrant, a police officer must have reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the person has committed an indictable offence. This subjective belief on the part of the police officer must also be justifiable from an objective point of view. In order to properly interpret the clues that will influence his subjective belief, a peace officer must have received adequate training. We also have to determine whether or not customs officers should be armed to implement these new provisions. Here again, if it is felt that the implementation of Bill C-18 would require customs officers to be armed, then public safety will also require that customs officers have the necessary certificates authorizing them to handle firearms.

So, yes, there are additional powers, and, yes, we are in agreement. However, if the job is to be well done, if we want to prevent myriad interpretations and court challenges, designated customs officers will need appropriate training. They will perhaps need a basic knowledge of the legal concept of reasonable and probable grounds in order to be able to apply the legal principle. And if these officers—because this question has not yet been resolved—are armed, as are officers of the peace, then they will also have to have the necessary certificates authorizing them to handle these firearms.

My second question concerns the need to cooperate with provincial authorities. The bill would bridge the gap that existed between a customs officer's observation of an offence and police intervention. For this gap to be satisfactorily bridged, it must be possible to count on the cooperation of provincial public security services. It must be remembered—and it is good to remember this from time to time—that the administration of justice comes under provincial jurisdiction and that enforcement of the Criminal Code is thus a provincial responsibility. Although the new provisions would be implemented strictly in the context of federal customs responsibilities, consultations with the provinces would be appropriate.

If we want the amendments to Bill C-18 to be useful, if we want to avoid, once again, at this stage, the problems caused by overlap and unfairness at the enforcement level or to avoid jurisdictional squabbles, it is really essential at this time that the federal government, perhaps through the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights—we will surely be hearing witnesses from the police forces—sit down at the same table and find an approach to ensure mutual co-operation.

Another issue I am concerned with is costs. There must surely be costs related to these changes, for example merely in terms of equipping all customs facilities with cells. People cannot simply be arrested and placed at a table somewhere in the corner of some ordinary office. If customs officers have the same powers as peace officers and police officers, and if they are going to arrest individuals who could be dangerous, their safety requires that there be proper facilities, cells like those in any police station. We are told that there are about 80 border points. What are the costs for these 80 stations? This is another question that remains unanswered at this time.

My fourth point concerns infringements of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As we know, when additional powers are granted to customs officers to allow arrests without a warrant, it is possible that there will be violations to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. We must never forget that individuals have rights, including protection against arbitrary detention. So we have to ensure that customs officers, when there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offence or other act has been committed, are adequately informed about the rights they might violate if they are not careful.

Here again, we will have to be especially careful in terms of the education and training provided to the customs officers chosen by the minister. In the charter alone, we find sections 8, 9, 10 and 11, which are extremely important, and customs officers will have to enforce this legislation properly to avoid any legal challenge under the charter.

[Distinct Society, November 7th, 1997]

Mr. Speaker, it is unfortunate to see such misunderstanding of Quebec and a constant, and thinly veiled, attack on the Quebec people by English Canada.

A reading of motion M-26, which we have before us at this time, leads us to that conclusion. All Quebeckers reading it and listening to the debate would reach the same conclusion.

This is an extremely important subject for us in Quebec and I would need far more than ten minutes to explain our point of view concerning it. I will, however, make an attempt to explain it to you, and to convince the hon. members of this Parliament, solely on historical grounds, briefly of course. Solely on historical grounds, I trust that they will understand that provincial equality, as seen by the hon. Reform member, and even by the government members, does not in any way correspond to the historical demands of the Quebec people.

Speaking of history, I believe we cannot help but conclude that the creation of Canada was based on a historic misunderstanding. In 1867, when Lower Canada and Upper Canada decided to unite, it was common knowledge that francophones were a minority everywhere in North America with the exception of Lower Canada. The people of Lower Canada had agreed to a federal system knowing that this would at least give them the power and democratic control of a member state within the federation.

As for Upper Canada, what it wanted was a very strong Canada, a unitary regime. The signing did take place, however. The Fathers of Confederation did sign an agreement, believing one thing, but the facts prove that they reached a devious agreement to get around the system they had used to sell Lower Canada on signing. Since 1867, therefore, quietly but inexorably, areas under Quebec's jurisdiction have been nibbled away at, along with those of the other provinces. Quebec, however, is most vocal in its demands. The area of jurisdiction found under section 92 of the Canadian Constitution is being nibbled away at.

Little by little, in an indirect by nevertheless real way, through Supreme Court judgments—and the list is long—the federal government is taking powers away from Quebec.

The most recent example, hot off the press so to speak, is Bill C-14 on water management. If there is one area that comes under Quebec jurisdiction this is it. If there is one thing that is dear to the hearts of Quebeckers it is water. The federal government in its wisdom figured it should interfere in that area in the name of peace, order and good government or using the rule of federal precedence.

As far as the Constitution is concerned, the Quiet Revolution stirred Quebec to go from passively defending vested powers to actively claiming new powers. This is nothing new. Since the 1960s, successive Quebec premiers have constantly been asking that Quebec be given more powers. Why? Because they found it necessary for the political, social, economic and cultural development of Quebec society.

However, capitalizing on the failure of the 1980 referendum, a Prime Minister named Pierre Elliott Trudeau, together with nine English speaking provinces, repatriated the Constitution and imposed it on Quebec. It should be noted that the Constitution of 1982 was never ratified by Quebec. It was never approved by any of the Quebec premiers. Since 1982, we have had premiers in Quebec who were federalists and even Liberals. As a big brother, or small brother perhaps, of the Liberal government across the way, Robert Bourassa himself refused to sign this Constitution.

In 1982, for the first time since 1867, the Constitution was amended without Quebec's consent. That was the end of an old dream of Quebeckers, who had viewed the federation as a pact between two founding nations, which could therefore only be changed with their mutual consent.

What Motion M-26 shows is that the concept of distinct society has lost a lot of ground in a very short time. A previous speaker mentioned the Meech Lake and Charlottetown agreements and the Calgary declaration. Closer scrutiny invariably reveals that every time there is an agreement in English Canada, Quebec ends up not with more but with fewer powers.

In the Meech Lake Accord, the Bourassa government, a federalist government I might add, set out the five conditions to be met before Quebec could approve the Constitution Act of 1982. What were the five conditions?

First, recognizing Quebec as a distinct society, which would be meaningful and would be used by the courts as an interpretation formula to grant more powers when considering Quebec's traditional demands.

Second, guaranteeing a more prominent role regarding immigration.

Third, allowing Quebec to participate in the appointment of supreme court justices.

Fourth, limiting the federal government's spending power. It is through this power that, increasingly, the federal government has been taking over powers that belong to Quebec, powers that are recognized as ours under section 92 of the Constitution. With its spending power, Ottawa is putting money in areas that are not under federal jurisdiction.

Fifth, recognizing Quebec's veto on the reform of federal institutions and the creation of new provinces.

These were the five conditions seen as a minimum by a federalist Quebec premier, Robert Bourassa.

We know what happened to the Meech Lake accord. English Canada felt Quebec was getting way too much. Following this episode and some arm-twisting, the Charlottetown accord was struck. What happened then to the notion of distinct society, which was the minimum for Quebec to join the Canadian confederation?

They tried to dilute it even further, with a sort of Canada clause in which everyone was equal, in which the principle of equality of all the provinces appeared for the first time in an accord concluded with English Canada.

What became of the Charlottetown accord? It was defeated. It was defeated in the west because it gave too much power to Quebec, and it was defeated in Quebec because it gave too little power to Quebec.

Then there was the Calgary accord. The focus shifted to unique character. Distinct society was no longer of interest. And here we saw a premier who was at least honest, the premier of Ontario, who said that unique character was meaningless because everything in Canada was unique, from Pacific salmon to the tar sands of Alberta. It was all unique.

In addition, as if that were not enough, points 2 to 6 of the Calgary declaration set out clearly the equality of the provinces.

Never will a premier of Quebec, whether it be Maurice Duplessis, Lesage, Johnson, Sauvé, Bertrand, Barrette, Bourassa, Parizeau, the last Johnson, Daniel, or the present incumbent, Lucien Bouchard, allow Quebec to be put on an equal footing with all the other provinces because we are one of the two founding peoples. This historic fact must be recognized. There must be recognition of the fact that Quebec forms a people. And in this regard they must know their history, they must look at the historic demands of Quebec and reach the conclusion that a motion such as the one before us asking the House to recognize that all the provinces are equal and that none can be recognized as distinct under the Constitution of Canada is unthinkable. No, no and no.

[Criminal Code, November 7th, 1997]

Mr. Speaker, I will be very brief. I will deal with Motions Nos. 3 and 5, and I do realize that they have been separated. You separated Motion No. 3 from Motion No. 5, with unanimous consent. There will be a separate vote on these motions.

Motions Nos. 3 and 5 are similar, but Motion No. 3 deals with the warrant for arrest. I realize that the member wants more flexibility and would like police officers to have more powers to serve a warrant for arrest. However, it should be remembered that with respect to the warrant for arrest itself, which is outlined on page 6 of the bill starting at line five, the police officers already know who the person involved is. This warrant for arrest applies to a known individual. We know his age, his address, his date of birth, his social insurance number, etc. Therefore with respect to the warrant for arrest that the member of the Conservative Party would like to broaden somewhat, I wish to say here that this is not necessary, since the police officers already have the information. So it is not necessary to give all those details. We will vote against Motion No. 3.

As for Motion No. 5, and I will speak to it now so that I will not have to rise later, on the warrant to enter a dwelling-house, we agree with this and we will vote for this amendment because in this case, this is useful and it gives police officers more powers to obtain a warrant to enter a dwelling-house without necessarily knowing the name of the individual who is there, as long as they have a description. For example, he is tall, he is dressed in a blue suit, he has brown hair, he has brown eyes, he belongs to the Bloc perhaps. In this way we have more information and we can enter a dwelling-house without necessarily having the name of the individual, his date of birth and other similar information.

Therefore, for these reasons, we will vote against Motion No. 3 but we will vote for Motion No. 5.

[Criminal Code, November 7th, 1997]

I rise on a point of order, Madam Speaker. I have two points. First, unless I heard wrong, in calling the vote you mentioned only Motion No. 2, while the vote should have been on Group No. 2, which includes three motions: Motions Nos. 2, 4 and 6. A vote was called on Motion No. 2 only. This was my first point.

Second, while I sit at the other end of the chamber, it was obvious to me that the nays were louder than the yeas. I wonder if there has not been a misunderstanding here. If so, perhaps you could consider taking the vote over, specifying this time that the vote will be on Motions Nos. 2, 4 and 6.