Michel Bellehumeur

[Criminal Code, November 7th, 1997]

Madam Speaker, I will take 30 seconds since I want this bill to pass today. However, I want to add my voice to these three motions: Motions Nos. 2, 4 and 6.

I would say first off that I oppose these motions and I will tell you why briefly. As we know, an arrest warrant, a warrant to enter a dwelling house or other similar warrants already contravenes the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It is somewhat similar, in fact, to what happened in the arrest in the Feeney case.

I believe the amendment proposed by the hon. member broadening the scope of arrest or entry warrants to apply to dwelling houses contravenes the charter. It is too broad and too vague. I think we are leaving ourselves open once again to criticism, and certainly to having these amendments to Bill C-16, or more specifically, clause 529.6, rejected by the courts as in the Feeney case. This is our only reason for opposing these three motions.

[Criminal Code, November 7th, 1997]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to speak to this extremely important bill. Like the members who spoke before me, I think I will say a few words on the procedure imposed on the Committee on Justice and Human Rights.

I know that it is following a decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Feeney case that the government was required so to speak to amend the provisions if it wanted to correct the situation. The ruling was made on May 22, 1997, in the middle of the electoral campaign. However, as I openly said in committee—and there is no reason to hide this—officials wisely held consultations across Canada and Quebec.

My concern in all this is that there were no consultations before the political side of this issue was addressed, that it was only on Friday of last week that Bill C-16, which is in fact very important, was tabled in this House, which has been sitting for eight weeks. It may not be the fault of the Liberal members, but it is surely the fault of the federal government's cumbersome bureaucracy and procedures if we have to accelerate the review process as we are doing.

However, after consulting with people who have an interest in seeing this bill improve the Criminal Code, I believe that this bill is generally acceptable. We do not support it without reservations, but considering the time we have to review it, I believe that as a first step, it is something we can live with.

I will deal with the amendments in each group. I will speak very briefly on the first group, which includes Motion No. 1. I think that the wording of Section 529.5 in Bill C-16 reflects in fact what is found in other provisions, other laws. I don't think we should amend this section as proposed by the member of the Conservative Party. I think that the wording in the section on telewarrants meets requirements that have already been established in this area.

I want to read it to you because I think it clearly indicates that such warrants may only be issued in exceptional circumstances.

The rule is that the peace officer must appear personally before the judge to make an application for a warrant, but it can happen in exceptional circumstances that it would be impracticable, to use the words in the section, or impossible for the police officer to appear before a judge. It can also be an emergency situation—and there is a section that deals with these—, and the police officer cannot appear before a judge.

The section, which is very clear, says the following:

If a peace officer believes that it would be impracticable in the circumstances to appear personally before a judge or justice to make an application for a warrant under Section 529.1 or an authorization under Section 529 or 529.4, the warrant or authorization may be issued on an information submitted by telephone or other means of telecommunication and, for that purpose, Section 487.1 applies, with any modifications that the circumstances require, to the warrant or authorization.

I think that the wording reflects the purpose of this section, and to keep our laws in general as simple as possible, I believe that we should not amend this section because it is similar to all other sections dealing with telewarrants. That is why we will oppose Motion No. 1 as presented.

[Criminal Code, November 6th, 1997]

Madam Speaker, I was saying that there are four items of misinformation and I will name them right off. Then I will give them the right information.

The case of the pedophile. The case of the person who is on probation and ordered to stay out of bars, and ends up drinking in a bar. The individual who is impaired and is arrested by a police officer, who can do nothing because the person is on parole. That is another such case. The thief who cannot be arrested even if caught in the act. These are all inaccuracies.

As far as the pedophile is concerned, if there are conditions attached to his parole and he is found by a playground, it is false to say that the police can do nothing. The police officer will use what I have here, the Criminal Code. Maybe I should give them a copy, as they seem not to have one.

It indicates very clearly—under section 497—that a police officer, in fact, any person may arrest another person if he has reasonable grounds to believe that—

Provision is made in the Criminal Code for pedophiles and for a person in a bar too. On top of that, the Corrections and Conditional Release Act contains a mechanism respecting individuals released under certain conditions or on statutory release, who fail to meet the conditions. There are revocation mechanisms, the police can go and get them and so on.

The worst I heard concerns being under the influence. When an individual is on parole or statutory release and drives under the influence of alcohol, the arresting police cannot take him to the police station even if he refuses to take the breathalyser test.

Did the Reform Party recount anything more inexact or grosser this evening? I do not think so. Under the Criminal Code, under all the provisions pertaining to driving under the influence, anyone refusing to take a breathalyser test is committing an offence and can be taken to the station and charged with refusing to obey police.

Is it usual to twist the facts in such a way for political purposes? I think it is for political purposes.

The final example is theft, and breaking and entering. It is very true that the police may arrest an individual, as may anyone under section 494, whether or not he is a police officer, who notices an individual in the act of committing an offence arrest that individual, and particulary if he is a police officer. I think that there is a misunderstanding, or that they are deliberating distorting the meaning of these sections.

That having been said, I do not want to repeat what the parliamentary secretary to the Solicitor General said regarding the mechanism envisaged. It can perhaps be improved.

As I said at the outset, there is undoubtedly room for improvement, but this is not the kind of improvement needed. The more I listen to the Reform Party members, the more I can see where they are headed. In the end, what they want is a justice system that is a bit like a robot, that is programmed to apply the right sections. The judges would be replaced by a computer. All the evidence would be fed into the computer and out would come the answer, an inhuman answer that does not take into account every relevant fact and serves but one specific goal: scoring political points.

I may be a sovereignist, a nationalist, a Quebec nationalist, still I can recognize that some things work in this system. I think that, all in all, as flawed and imperfect as it may be, these things we should work at improving over time, our justice system is an excellent system.

I do not think that amendments like the one proposed in Bill C-211 before us this evening will do much to improve on the current system. On the contrary, I think it would confuse the courts, complicate things to achieve what the Criminal Code and the relevant legislation already provide for.

For all these reasons, the Bloc Quebecois will vote against private member's Bill C-211.

[Criminal Code, November 6th, 1997]

Madam Speaker, would you please ask that bunch of Reform members to keep quiet.

[Criminal Code, November 6th, 1997]

Madam Speaker, when there is talk of parole, probation orders and so on, I believe that there is misunderstanding among the public and I believe that the Reform Party also has a poor understanding, or perhaps it suits them not to understand, because it is such a juicy topic. They can drag out specific cases, and really talk altogether off topic.

The bill we have before us is a type of bill that does not reflect reality. I am not saying there are no problems in the parole system or in application of the Criminal Code. On the contrary, I believe there are shortcomings. I believe there is room for improvement in the Criminal Code and in the Corrections and Conditional Release Act. I do not believe, however, that Bill C-211 is what is going to solve the problem.

What is important here? Whether it is the Criminal Code and its provisions relating to probation orders, or the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, the criterion is protecting society. At this time, do the courts, the law enforcement bodies in Quebec and Canada have the proper tools to do their job properly? My answer must be yes.

Are the police officers, the correctional system, the courts, making the proper use of those tools, applying them in the way they were meant to be used? Maybe, maybe not. That depends on the circumstances.

I sincerely believe that, with sections 494, 495, 496 and 497 of the Criminal Code, a broad range of cases are covered, as the Reform Party said just now.

I cannot sit by while they distort the facts. I am a member of an opposition party, but an opposition party that is fair. I try to do my job as honestly as possible, to be as realistic as possible, and I cannot, even though I am in the opposition, sit still and listen to nonsense spouted in the House. I will give you four examples that I heard during the Reform Party's discourse.

The first, and this is a favourite topic of the Reformers, was what they had to say about pedophiles. They say that a pedophile on conditional release who is near a playground will jump on the first victim he sees. I know it does not suit you to hear the facts. I know there is an immense gulf separating us, but I would ask you as politely as possible to at least listen to what Quebec has to say.

That having been said, with the provisions of the Criminal Code—

[Criminal Code, November 5th, 1997]

Mr. Speaker, it is sad to see a bill like this one being used to try to misrepresent the facts, because of a lack of understanding, exaggeration or what not. The problem is not as bad as it seems or as the member from the Reform Party made it out to be.

What does the Criminal Code provide in this respect right now? Section 322 of the Criminal Code deals with theft per se. Let us call a spade a spade. Let us call things by their rightful name. To take a vehicle with intent to use it—when there is, in legal terms, actus reus and mens rea, that is to say acting wilfully with criminal intent—it is just that, theft.

The other thing the lawmakers saw fit to add to the Criminal Code under the heading of offences resembling theft is subsection 335 (1), which the hon. member from the Reform Party would like us to amend.

What does this subsection say?

335.(1) Every one who, without the consent of the owner, takes a motor vehicle or vessel with intent to drive, use, navigate or operate it or cause it to be driven, used, navigated or operated is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

This is another offence which, while not being as serious as theft, is also punishable. This is the case where a young person, or an adult for that matter, decides to use an automobile or another vehicle without the owner's consent, but does not have a criminal intent, has no intent to defraud, there is no fraudulent intention, and the lawmakers leave it up to the crown to decide whether to prosecute under section 322 of the Criminal Code or under subsection 335 (1).

I think that, in a free and democratic society as ours in Canada and Quebec, it is healthy to let those who enforce the law use their head in laying charges to try to see what would be most appropriate in each case.

As the government member said earlier, the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada, in 1973, however, not in 1972, handed down a clear ruling in Lafrance v. Regina to the effect that the offence as worded in section 335 (1) is not a lesser offence than ordinary theft. They created two separate offences, each with its own characteristics. The two are distinct and the crown may decide on the charge according to the circumstances of the case. This interpretation by the courts seems to show the effectiveness of the standard set by the present wording.

The amendments or speeches by Reform members I have heard sometimes seem to indicate an interest in seeing everything covered in the Criminal Code. Each situation would have its own section in the Criminal Code. The goal would be to limit the judge's discretion as much as possible. I have the impression that the Reform Party wants to see the courts turned into legal robots, heartless machines operating on the basis of sections, statistics, sometimes even stereotypes. It looks like they want to remove any possibility of discretion, of a decision based on a particular case.

In the field of justice, I learned very early on that nothing is black and white. In this field, as in many others, some things must be analyzed, and I think that judges in the existing system—if everyone does not agree with me on this, we have a big problem—have the training and the skill to analyze and judge the offence before them, which the crown has decided to prosecute under either section 322 or section 335 (1).

But the Reform member's bill goes further still. It calls for a stiffer sentence. Once again, the intention is to prevent judges from exercising their discretion, from using stiff fines to make a distinction between cases. It is true that sometimes this will be the result of a joyride, but other charges will be laid against the wrongdoer, the adolescent or young man who uses a car without the owner's consent, because damaging another person's property is also an offence. And it is the crown prosecutors who look at the facts presented to them by the police and decide which sections they will rely on in court.

There is also a major shortcoming in Bill C-209, and you will agree with me that it is another reason to reject this bill. It undermines the Young Offenders Act.

I know that when it comes to the Young Offenders Act, there is a tremendous gulf separating the Bloc Quebecois and the Reform Party. I think we will never succeed in sharing the same views on this matter.

This is what I concluded when we studied the Young Offenders Act last year. With Bill C-209, an attempt is made to quietly uproot powers in the Young Offenders Act, namely a part of that act relating to the application of section 335(1) of the Criminal Code. There is an attempt to increase the penalties for this offence.

Let it be clear, I do not want to minimize that. I think that presently the Criminal Code includes all the necessary tools for the administration of justice, provided of course that the courts apply it properly. I have every reason to believe that today the courts are applying properly sections 322 and 335(1) of the Criminal Code.

There is another reason why we should reject this bill—this will my last point—and it concerns parental responsibility. In fact, I remember when I was 15 or 16, I was attracted to cars. Are not all young people at that age attracted to cars? I am not saying that I stole cars, I am not saying that I used cars without my parents' consent, but I was nevertheless attracted to cars, especially in a county like Berthier—Montcalm. Berthierville is in that county, and with the Villeneuves, it is natural down there to be attracted to cars.

Can it be said that parents are negligent if one day a child sees a car with its keys, and, without thinking, gets in the car, takes a ride and brings it back to the parking lot where he took it. On a whim, the young person used a car. Does this make that child a criminal?

I know that the members of the Reform Party would want that child to be called a criminal, but I tell you that is not the case. That child, on a whim, used a vehicle. In such a situation, the crown attorney can at his discretion decide to refer to theft under section 322 or to an infraction resembling theft, use without consent, under section 335(1) of the Criminal Code.

I know that it upsets Reform members when they are told such truths, but that is what is found today in the Criminal Code. I do not think the Criminal Code is the greatest thing since sliced bread, and there are things in it that should be changed. If we really want to change it, let us review it completely, rather than trying to do patchwork, as the Reform Party is doing with Bill C-209.

[Parenting Arrangements, November 5th, 1997]

Madam Speaker, I wish take the opportunity to set a matter straight for the member. We sat together on the ethics code committee. We did not succeed in agreeing there more than on the justice committee.

He made a particular comment that I agree with 100%. He said that very often we should ask ourselves which jurisdiction could more properly deal with the matter. He said that we should always give the responsibility to those who are closest to the people. I do not think there is a matter more appropriate than this one, on that score.

Which jurisdiction, the province or the federal government, can more properly apply the law on divorce or separation? I believe that the answer is obvious, it is the provinces.

There is already a lot of social legislation to assist families. I think this is like a puzzle and there is a piece of this puzzle that is missing and without which Quebec and the other provinces cannot have full jurisdiction, and that piece is divorce legislation, which would complete the whole area of family law.

But my question is the following: Is the Reform member familiar with the Quebec example in the area of family law, including separation? Also, is the Reform Party member familiar with how we have decided to proceed in Quebec since September 1, 1997 in the area of family mediation, which is offered to everyone free of charge, which accelerates the process for separation and divorce, and which deals with the issues of custody, child support, joint accounts, assets and other things? Is the member familiar with the Quebec example and does he recognize that it goes well beyond what the federal government can provide by asking a committee to review this issue?

[Parenting Arrangements, November 5th, 1997]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to ask a question to the Reform Party member, with whom I sat on several occasions, during the 35th Parliament, on the Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs. Unfortunately, we had rather different views on many matters. But that was part of the debate, and each one presented his arguments.

As for the motion we have before us, I have a question similar to the one I asked to other members in this House, but I would like to know his opinion as a Reform member. Does he believe that in the interest of greater harmony, of better enforcement of family law, this whole issue of rights relating to custody, support, visits, and other rights concerning separation or divorce, would be better dealt with if it were the province that had complete jurisdiction in this area?

[Parenting Arrangements, November 5th, 1997]

Mr. Speaker, either the member misunderstood the question by the Bloc Quebecois member for Drummond or I misunderstood her answer.

I shall be brief. One thing is clear: the whole area of separation is under provincial jurisdiction. Members on both sides will agree that separation is under provincial jurisdiction. Divorce, however, under the Canadian Constitution, is a federal jurisdiction.

Is the hon. member in favour of having a joint committee consider the issues of custody, visitation rights and parenting following separation or divorce? Had the government across the way stuck to the deal it made with the other place last year to consider the issue of what happens after a divorce, I would understand, but can the hon. member, who is a member from Quebec, accept that, under the guise of a nice little joint committee and the pretence of protecting the rights of children, they jump in, with both feet, and interfere with the rights of Quebec—because I am a member from Quebec—and discuss separation and divorce as a single issue, mixing everything up as they do on a regular basis? Can she tolerate that?

That was my question.

[Parenting Arrangements, November 5th, 1997]

Mr. Speaker, I did not quite understand the hon. member's approach. She cited the rights of children and they indeed have the right to visit their parents and to have a relationship with them. I support that 100%. Even the UN supports these rights.

Is the hon. member saying that a province such as Quebec could not legislate the rights its children are entitled to? Is she, in her centralist and federalist way, saying that provinces like Quebec cannot provide for children the rights they are entitled to?