Mr. Speaker, in my speech, I will focus on the two Senate amendments that, unfortunately, the government rejected. That is the motion before us now.
I think it is very important to point out that the Senate amendments to the bill were proposed by Senator Kim Pate.
Senator Pate was appointed through the independent selection process. She has been on the job for over a year. According to the government, the purpose of the process is to appoint distinguished senators, citizens who can make a unique contribution to the Senate.
In theory, it would seem that the Senate selection committee chose Senator Pate because she is a distinguished jurist whose opinion is highly respected.
Interestingly, the amendments she proposed are very similar to the NDP's amendments, and I think they carry considerable weight. The amendments are about sexual consent. The government bill refers to circumstances under which a person cannot give consent, such as unconsciousness and other reasons.
The Senate amendments refer to a person who is unable to understand the nature, circumstances, risks and consequences of the sexual activity in question, unable to understand that they have the choice to engage in the sexual activity in question or not, or unable to affirmatively express agreement to the sexual activity in question by words or by active conduct. When it comes to the ability to consent, I think that unconsciousness clearly falls under the third point.
I think that is very important, because one of the problems that victims are currently having with sexual consent is the difficulty of proving that they did not give consent in situations that fall in somewhat of a grey area. I want to speak specifically to that.
Often, when we talk about sexual consent, we are talking about voluntary consent. The problem is that consent may be vitiated. I will give a few examples that will help members understand.
A person can freely consent to a sexual activity without understanding the risks or circumstances that are involved. The first case that I want to talk about is the Hutchinson case, which is very important in understanding what follows.
This man poked holes in the condom he was going to use with his partner so that she would get pregnant. If I remember correctly, he was worried she would leave him, and he wanted to get her pregnant so that she would stay with him. Unfortunately, the partner did get pregnant, and she ended up finding out the truth about the pierced condoms. She pressed charges against him, and the case went all the way to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court had to study this case specifically to determine whether there had been a problem. Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled that the consent had been vitiated because, in this specific case, there was a risk of bodily harm, and harm did actually result because she got pregnant. The consent had therefore been vitiated, so this constituted sexual assault.
The complainant had to take her case all the way to the Supreme Court to prove that she had been sexually assaulted. This was not a case where the justice system worked swiftly. If the concept of sexual consent had been clarified from the outset, including the ability to understand the risks of a sexual activity, it could have been immediately established that the complainant was unable to understand the risks of the sexual activity because her partner had not informed her that the condom was pierced. She was therefore unable to properly assess the risk that a pregnancy would result from the sexual activity.
Unfortunately, in this ruling, the problem is that we are really talking about the risk associated with pregnancy as major bodily harm.
However, if someone were to remove the condom without telling his partner, but she was unable to become pregnant because of sterility or menopause, the jurisprudence would not necessarily apply. That is according to experts who refer to Hutchinson to determine whether stealthing—removing a condom without the partner's knowledge—is a form of assault.
In cases involving women who can become pregnant, experts believe that the precedent set in Hutchinson may apply because there is a risk of significant bodily harm. However, in cases involving women who cannot become pregnant because of menopause or for some other reason, and if the partner does not have a sexually transmitted infection, there is no clear risk of sexual harm, and the jurisprudence may not apply.
The same is true of homosexual relationships unless the partner is, say, HIV positive. In such cases, it is possible to prove that a person was exposed to a risk of bodily harm when the partner removed the condom without the person's knowledge. In every other case, the jurisprudence does not provide grounds for proving the existence of risk, and it is not clear there would be grounds for sexual assault.
When people report cases of stealthing to the police, they are not taken seriously. The police tell them that they have not been sexually assaulted and so they are sorry but there is nothing they can do, despite the enormous stress this puts on victims.
According to victims' testimonies, this causes a lot of stress about potentially being exposed to disease. Victims may also have to take emergency contraceptives because they do not want to get pregnant. There is also the stress of waiting for the test results to come back. Stealthing can also affect relationships. Victims may have a hard time trusting others after something like this happens.
One victim recounted the following story in an article in the Journal de Montréal. She said, “After a night of drinking, I had sex with a guy I was seeing. A few days later, while doing some cleaning, I found the condom that he had supposedly used behind my bed. It was still in the torn wrapper. I realized that he had just pretended to put it on and that I had not noticed. I had to get tested for STIs.”
When we read these stories, we realize that this could be a form of assault because there was vitiated consent. When someone consents to having protected sex, it is because that person has assessed the risk and decided that she is willing to have protected sex but not unprotected sex because of the risk of disease or pregnancy. From a public health perspective, there is currently an epidemic of sexually transmitted infections, and yet there have been delays in bringing the legislation into line with the jurisprudence for these kinds of cases.
If it were clearly illegal and criminal to engage in such an activity because it vitiates consent, I think that much more immediate action could be taken. In the few cases where a victim actually has the courage to report what happened, the police would not have to tell her that what she experienced was not a sexual assault, despite the risk of bodily harm.
There is currently a problem with sexual consent as there are grey areas where consent was vitiated. Bill C-51 does not address all the issues of vitiated sexual consent. Yes, the person voluntarily consents to a sexual activity, but does so under certain conditions. If these conditions are intentionally disregarded, the consent is vitiated and this could constitute an assault. If the justice system is incapable of recognizing that fact, it is turning its back on these victims.
The Senate amendment directly addressed that case. It could have settled the issue once and for all. The judges could have relied on a new, much clearer law and such cases would not have to go all the way to the Supreme Court to be recognized as assault. I seriously believe that the government is making a mistake with its motion and that the Senate amendments, which resemble those moved by the NDP, should have been adopted.