Geoff Regan

[Privilege, June 6th, 2017]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised on May 4, 2017, by the honourable member for Montcalm concerning the effect of the proposed changes to the Standing Orders on the rights and privileges of members from unrecognized parties.

I would like to thank the hon. member for having raised the matter, as well as the hon. Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons, the member for Saanich—Gulf Islands, and the member for Joliette for their contributions.

In raising this question of privilege, the member for Montcalm alleged that the government’s proposed approach to parliamentary reform will violate the rights and privileges of members of unrecognized parties. Specifically, he argued that their freedom of speech will be violated by any discussions held in the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, as members of unrecognized parties are not entitled to be members of committees, and that the proposed increased use of time allocation in the House will likewise affect these members disproportionately. In addition, he decried the government’s expressed intent to bring into effect rule changes without a consensus, as well as the inequitable treatment of members of unrecognized parties who were notified of the government’s parliamentary reform proposal later than members from recognized parties.

In response, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons enumerated opportunities that members of unrecognized parties have to participate in committee deliberations, as well as the fact that debate time in the House is limited for all members, which in any case, is beyond the Speaker's purview to judge. He also challenged the belief that changes to the Standing Orders should be made only with the consent of all parties, citing instances of rule changes achieved without the support of opposition parties.

As the member for Montcalm rightly suggests, as Speaker, I am the custodian and defender of members’ privileges, regardless of their political affiliation. The member is looking to the Chair to ensure that there will be no abrogation or willful disregard of the rights of individual members as the House determines if and how it should change its rules.

The privilege of freedom of speech is undoubtedly the most important right accorded to members of this House. At the same time, there is an important distinction to be made between the right to freedom of speech and the right to participate in the proceedings of the House and its committees. Asked to rule on the right of members to make statements in the House pursuant to Standing Order 31, my predecessor stated on April 23, 2013, at page 15800 of Debates:

…there are inherent limits to the privilege of freedom of speech. Aside from the well-known prohibitions on unparliamentary language, the need to refer to other members by title, the rules on repetition and relevance, the sub judice constraints and other limitations designed to ensure that discourse is conducted in a civil and courteous manner, the biggest limitation of all is the availability of time.

This very same limitation, time, which is a limit for all of us in this life, is equally relevant to other proceedings, including those that may be involved in any review of the Standing Orders.

As has been well established, the Speaker has no authority to judge the adequacy of those time limits agreed upon by the House, nor decide when and if an issue has received sufficient debate; that authority rests solely with the House.

House of Commons Procedure and Practice, second edition, states, at page 648:

When asked to determine the acceptability of a motion to limit debate, the Speaker does not judge the importance of the issue in question or whether a reasonable time has been allowed for debate, but strictly addresses the acceptability of the procedure followed. Speakers have therefore ruled that a procedurally acceptable motion to limit the ability of Members to speak on a given motion before the House does not constitute prima facie a breach of parliamentary privilege.

The honourable member for Montcalm has asked whether or not the Speaker should be empowered to determine which procedure the House must use to effect parliamentary reform. The rules and practices of the House provide different approaches, procedurally speaking, to changing the Standing Orders. The Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, whose permanent mandate includes “the review of and report on the Standing Orders, procedure and practice in the House and its committees”, has frequently been the originator of Standing Orders changes. The House has also tasked special committees in the past to study the Standing Orders and report recommendations back to the House. In other cases, the House has been seized of motions to change the Standing Orders that have been sponsored either by the government or by private members.

Regardless of the means chosen, ultimately the Standing Orders can be amended only by way of a decision of the House. House of Commons Procedure and Practice, second edition, at pages 256 and 257, states:

Such a decision is arrived at either by way of consensus or by a simple majority vote on a motion moved by any Member of the House.

The Chair has been asked to determine if potential or future courses of action with respect to the review and reform of the Standing Orders will negatively impact the privileges of individual members. As the member's claims are more speculative in nature at this point, it would be premature and presumptive for the Chair to rule based on assumptions of what might transpire.

I can assure the member for Montcalm, and the whole House, that the Chair has found no evidence that the rights of members from unrecognized parties have been breached nor that they have been impeded from fulfilling their parliamentary duties. Therefore, I cannot find that a prima facie question of privilege exists in this case.

I thank members for their attention in this matter.

[Budget Implementation Act, 2017, No. 1, June 5th, 2017]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised by the hon. member for Repentigny concerning an amendment presented in committee to Bill C-44, an act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 22, 2017, and other measures.

The member raises two key points in this question of privilege: the first relates to the admissibility of the amendment she presented in committee, which she has resubmitted at report stage; the second issue she raised has to do with her status as a member from a non-represented caucus in committee proceedings. In so doing she is asking the Chair to select her report stage motion, Motion No. 87, for consideration during the report stage debate of Bill C-44.

The member argues that the chair of the Standing Committee on Finance wrongly ruled that her committee amendment was inadmissible because it required a royal recommendation. The member stated that her amendment altered the qualifying weeks needed to claim maternity leave benefits for newly or suddenly unemployed mothers of newborns. She maintained that it did not represent a new or extended charge against the consolidated revenue fund, which would require a royal recommendation. The member simultaneously argued that the employment insurance fund was separate, and that, therefore, additional payments from the EI fund could not be seen as a new charge against the CRF.

On that specific point, I would like to direct the House's attention to a ruling by Speaker Milliken on November 10, 2006, at page 5027 of the Debates. He said:

Although contributions to the employment insurance program are indeed made by employers and employees, appropriations for the program are taken from the consolidated revenue fund and any increase in such spending would require a royal recommendation.

Accordingly, I cannot agree with the member’s view that a royal recommendation is not required. The ruling by the chair of the Standing Committee on Finance was procedurally sound and appropriate. Without a royal recommendation forthcoming for Motion No. 87, I cannot acquiesce in her request that the motion be considered during the report stage of Bill C-44. The Assistant Deputy Speaker indicated on June 2, 2017, that the motion would not be selected as it required a royal recommendation, and I see no reason to go back on that finding.

The member also argued that, because of her status as a member of a non-represented caucus, she did not have the ability to appeal the decision of the chair with respect to the admissibility of the amendment she presented in committee, as permanent members of the committee could.

The member is correct in her assertion that she is not able to participate in precisely the same way as permanent committee members, specifically in this case because committees’ practice is clear that only permanent members can appeal the ruling of a chair. That is not to say, however, that the member for Repentigny has been excluded in all ways from participating in the proceedings on this bill.

My predecessor, in a ruling on a similar question of privilege on June 6, 2013, at pages 17795 to 17798 of the Debates stated:

Turning to the issue of the rights of independent members, the Chair can only observe that the decision of the finance committee permitted them to do something they could not do before: namely, to have their amendments considered in the committee and, indeed, to be granted, pursuant to Standing Order 119, an opportunity to speak in committee. This is something that was not open to them before. In that sense, they succeeded in obtaining a form of participation in committee proceedings, as imperfect as it may have been in their eyes.

In the matter currently before us today, the member may not have been able to participate exactly as other members, but the process did afford her the ability to participate. In fact, she has had the opportunity at report stage to present her case as to why her amendment should have been admissible and the Chair has delivered its findings on that matter. Based on the substance of the member’s complaint, I cannot conclude that she has been impeded in the performance of her duties nor can I find, accordingly, that the Standing Orders or practices of the House have been breached.

I would like to thank all hon. members for their attention on this matter.

It is my duty, pursuant to Standing Order 38, to inform the House that the questions to be raised tonight at the time of adjournment are as follows: the hon. member for Vancouver East, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship; the hon. member for Brandon—Souris, Taxation; and the hon. member for Montcalm, Air Transportation.

[Privilege, May 29th, 2017]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised on May 10, 2017, by the hon. member for Victoria concerning the government’s advertisement of job opportunities at the proposed Canada infrastructure bank.

I would like to thank the member for Victoria for having raised this matter, as well as the Parliamentary Secretary to the Government House Leader , the member for Perth—Wellington, and the member for South Surrey—White Rock for their interventions.

In presenting his case, the member for Victoria explained that the government had publicly launched the selection process for various positions at the proposed new Canada infrastructure bank before the bill creating the bank and its governance structure, Bill C-44, an act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 22, 2017 and other measures, had been passed by Parliament and received royal assent. In fact, he noted that the bill had passed only second reading in the House. Arguing that all new activities and the appropriation of associated funds require the authorization of Parliament before being acted upon, he considered the actions taken by the government to recruit for these positions to be a contempt of the House and a grave attack against the authority of Parliament.

In response, the parliamentary secretary to the government House leader agreed that the Canada infrastructure bank being proposed by Bill C-44 could not be established nor any associated funds spent until such time as the bill has been passed by Parliament. However, he added that the member for Victoria was making an assumption that the government was seeking to proceed prematurely, when, in fact, the government was simply proceeding with planning for the potential establishment of the bank. As proof of this, he cited the news release posted on Infrastructure Canada’s website which stated that the selection processes in question were subject to parliamentary approval.

As the charge being made by the member for Victoria is one of contempt, it is important to understand what constitutes contempt and, in doing so, what distinguishes contempt from privilege. House of Commons Procedure and Practice, second edition, at page 82, defines contempt as:

…other affronts against the dignity and authority of Parliament which may not fall within one of the specifically defined privileges.

It continues, and I quote:

Thus, the House also claims the right to punish, as a contempt, any action which, though not a breach of a specific privilege, tends to obstruct or impede the House in the performance of its functions; obstructs or impedes any Member or officer of the House in the discharge of their duties; or is an offence against the authority or dignity of the House, such as disobedience of its legitimate commands or libels upon itself, its Members, or its officers.

I might add, as many of my predecessors have, that it is possible to categorize the privileges of both the House and the individual privileges of members which are limited, whereas contempt cannot be catalogued and defined categorically.

It is within that framework that the Chair must now determine if, in advertising prospective positions at the proposed Canada infrastructure bank in advance of Parliament having authorized its creation and funding, the government committed an offence against the authority or dignity of the House. Did it, to quote the member for Victoria, discount “the need of this House to pass legislation before it rolls out appointments for this institution.”? It is a serious question, one complicated, in some sense, by the need for the Chair to carefully measure precedents against the inability to either enumerate or categorize cases of contempt.

The Chair therefore examined thoroughly the evidence presented, including the news release on Infrastructure Canada's website, as well as the proposed selection processes in question on the Privy Council Office's website. In particular, as Speaker, I was looking for any suggestion that parliamentary approval was being publicized as either unnecessary or irrelevant, or in fact already obtained. Otherwise put, I was looking for any indication of an offence against or disrespect of the authority or dignity of the House and its members.

Madam Speaker Sauvé specified on October 17, 1980, at page 3781 of the Debates, that in order for advertisements to constitute contempt of the House, “there would have to be some evidence that they represent a publication of false, perverted, partial or injurious reports of the proceedings of the House of Commons or misrepresentations of members.”

The Chair’s review also looked for such evidence. In doing so, the Chair found that, in the news release on the Infrastructure Canada website, the words “subject to parliamentary approval” were clearly there, as the parliamentary secretary to the government House leader had indicated. In addition, the Chair notes that there is no reference to a starting date of employment. Thus, there were not any specific details found indicating that any position at the Canada infrastructure bank would be filled in advance of the enactment of the enabling legislation.

The Chair must also take into consideration the assertion of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons that the advertisement was but a preparatory measure for a proposed initiative, in addition to his clear acknowledgement of the role of Parliament. In keeping with established practice, the Chair must take the member at his word.

However, as noted by the member for South Surrey—White Rock, the relevant job postings found on the appointments-nominations.gc.ca website maintained by the Privy Council Office lacked any reference to parliamentary approval. On this point, the Chair notes, with some disquiet, that this was changed after this matter was raised in the House. The advertised positions are now listed as “anticipatory”, and a disclaimer has been added in each case. It reads, “An appointment to the position will only be made once the legislation to create the Canada Infrastructure Bank has been approved by Parliament and receives Royal Assent.”

The member for Victoria has noted that Bill C-44 has passed second reading only: this leaves the House and its members still able to determine its outcome. As Speaker Fraser indicated in his ruling of October 10, 1989, at pages 4459 and 4460 of the Debates in a case with some similarity to the present one:

In order for an obstruction to take place, there would have had to be some action which prevented the House or Members from attending to their duties, or which cast such serious reflections on a Member that he or she was not able to fulfill his or her responsibilities.

The Chair has carefully considered that ruling, which had to do with a misrepresentation of Parliament’s role in government communications respecting the proposed goods and services tax in newspaper advertisements, because of its relevance to the current circumstance. It is interesting to note that in it, Speaker Fraser, in reference to the clarity of advertisements, reminded the public service that the role of Parliament needs to be acknowledged and respected.

Members are aware, however, that in the end Speaker Fraser did not arrive at a finding of prima facie contempt. The honourable member for Perth—Wellington may be right: had he been confronted again with such a case, Speaker Fraser may have ruled differently as he indicated he would. We will never know, as Speaker Fraser was not again seized of a matter of that kind.

Thus today I must assess the facts of this case on their own merits. In applying the strict procedural confines of contempt, the Chair must conclude that the question raised does not constitute a prima facie contempt of the House, and thus there is no prima facie case of privilege as there is no evidence to suggest that the House was obstructed in its legislative authority nor that members were obstructed in the fulfillment of their parliamentary duties.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.

[Points of Order, May 29th, 2017]

I am now prepared to rule on the point of order raised on May 17, 2017, by the hon. member for Victoria concerning the consultations conducted in the nomination process for the next Commissioner of Official Languages.

I would like to thank the member for Victoria for having raised this matter, as well as the House leader of the official opposition and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons for their interventions.

In raising the matter, the member for Victoria explained that when appointing a Commissioner of Official Languages, two statutory requirements must be satisfied. Both he and the House leader of the official opposition cited section 49 of the Official Languages Act, which stipulates that “The Governor in Council shall, by commission under the Great Seal, appoint a Commissioner of Official Languages for Canada after consultation with the leader of every recognized party in the Senate and House of Commons and approval of the appointment by resolution of the Senate and House of Commons.”

Having acknowledged that the leader of the New Democratic Party did in fact receive a letter announcing the nomination and inviting a reply, the member argued that, nonetheless, Canadian courts have made it clear that the term “consultation”, when provided for in a statute, connotes more than mere notification. Having received no offer of further discussion from the government after the letter, he argued that this statutory precondition requiring consultation had not been met.

For his part, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons contended that the requirement for consultation had indeed been met when the Prime Minister sent the letter on May 8, 2017, to the leaders of both recognized parties in the House, informing them of the nomination and requesting their views on the appointment. Confirming that both leaders had replied, he argued that the government was required only to consult, not abide by the recommendations of the opposition leaders.

Essentially, the Chair is being asked to judge if the actions taken by the government satisfy the requirement for consultation pursuant to the Official Languages Act. To do so would require the Chair to determine what constitutes “consultations” pursuant to that act. Past rulings set the parameters of the role of the Chair vis-à-vis consultations as they pertain to proceedings in the House. For instance, when asked to rule on the consultations required for the use of time allocation pursuant to Standing Order 78(3), Deputy Speaker Comartin explained on March 6, 2014, at page 3598 of the Debates that:

The nature of the consultation, the quality of the consultation, and the quantity of the consultation is not something that the Chair will involve himself in. That has been the tradition of this House for many years. What the Chair would have to do, in effect, is conduct an extensive investigative inquiry into the nature of the consultation. That is not our role, nor do the rules require it.

My predecessor added on June 12, 2014, at page 6717 of the Debates:

Therefore, it remains a steadfast practice that it is not the role of the Speaker to determine whether consultations have taken place or not.

The fact that, in this instance, the requirement for consultation is embedded in statute, rather than a rule of the House, does little to change the role of the Speaker in this respect. In fact, it adds an additional element in terms of the role of the Speaker: that of interpreting laws. On that front, there is a rich body of jurisprudence to confirm that the Speaker cannot adjudicate on the legality of matters, which, of course, would include whether or not specific provisions of a statute, such as the need for consultations, have been respected.

Faced with a situation regarding the statutory requirement for consultations on appointments made pursuant to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, Speaker Fraser stated on December 7, 1989, at page 6586 of the Debates:

It is rather a question of law, and consequently I cannot offer my opinion as to the merits of the case…. The Chair is not in a position to decide upon questions of law. This is a matter best left to the courts.

Therefore, in this matter, the Chair cannot pass judgment as to the adequacy of the consultations, nor the fulfillment of the legal requirements. Instead, the role of the Chair is strictly limited to determining procedural admissibility of the motion for the nomination of the official languages commissioner, which was put on notice on May 17.

As Speaker, I am satisfied that the procedural requirements have been met. The motion is in order and the process prescribed in Standing Order 111.1 can follow its course.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.

[Privilege, May 18th, 2017]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised on April 4, 2017, by the honourable member for Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman concerning allegedly misleading statements made by the Minister of National Defence.

I would like to thank the member for Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman for having raised this matter, as well as the Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons for his contribution.

In presenting his case, the member for Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman explained that the answer to written Question No. 600, tabled in the House on January 30, 2017, and signed by the Minister of National Defence, stated that all members of the Canadian Armed Forces deployed in Operation Impact in Kuwait and Iraq were granted tax relief benefits by the previous government. In later submissions, on May 3 and 16, 2017, the member added that a press release issued by the minister on April 19, 2017, a briefing note prepared for the minister obtained through an access to information request, and a ministerial order issued by the President of the Treasury Board on April 17, 2017, further supported this assertion.

The member argued that the minister misled the House when, in answers to oral questions on March 8 and 21, 2017, he stated that members of the Canadian Armed Forces were sent by the previous government to Iraq and Kuwait without the tax-free allowance at the time of their deployment.

The member for Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman alleged that these two seemingly contradictory versions of events were misleading the House and therefore constituted a prima facie question of privilege since, as he stated, “Only one of these statements can be true.” In one of his submissions, the member presented evidence to support his contention that, and I quote:

...the Minister of National Defence has misled, fabricated, and embellished other issues on numerous occasions in addition to my original question of privilege.

For his part, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons explained that, as the tax relief in question was applied retroactively, the minister had in fact provided the very same information when responding to Order Paper Question No. 600 and to oral questions asked in the House. Thus, he characterized the matter as a dispute as to facts and not a question of privilege

Members have a right to request and obtain trustworthy information in order to carry out their parliamentary duties. This reliance on access to accurate information is the cornerstone of their ability to hold the government to account. As a result, the Chair has often been called upon to rule on the quality, completeness, and internal coherence of information provided in responses to questions, whether oral or written.

As members will know, the exchange of information in this place is constantly subject to varying and, yes, contradictory views and perceptions. This, of course, heightens the risk that, inadvertently, a member making a statement may be mistaken, or, in turn, that a member listening may misunderstand what another has stated.

This, in large part, is why strong, even indisputable evidence is needed for the Chair to reach the very serious conclusion that the House has been deliberately misled and that therefore a prima facie question of privilege exists.

To aid in this arduous task, the Chair is guided by three clear and well-established conditions, which my predecessor outlined in his ruling of April 29, 2015, when he stated at page 13197 of Debates:

…first, the statement needs to be misleading. Second, the member making the statement has to know that the statement was incorrect when it was made. Finally, it needs to be proven that the member intended to mislead the House by making the statement.

These criteria are meant to protect members as they freely express views that can be at odds with the views of other members.

Without evidence meeting these conditions, when faced with this type of allegation, the Chair has consistently concluded that the House has not, in fact, been deliberately misled, but rather that the matter can only be viewed as a disagreement on the interpretation of facts.

Thus, while the member for Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman may be in disagreement with the statements made by the Minister of National Defence, there was no evidence presented that would suggest that the three necessary conditions existed in this case or that the Chair has cause, exceptionally, to overlook the long-standing practice of taking members at their word when the accuracy of their statements is called into question.

As stated at page 145 of House of Commons Procedure and Practice, second edition:

If the question of privilege involves a disagreement between two (or more) Members as to facts, the Speaker typically rules that such a dispute does not prevent Members from fulfilling their parliamentary functions nor does such a disagreement breach the collective privileges of the House.

As such, the Chair concludes that no prima facie case of privilege exists in this case.

I thank hon. members for their attention.

[Private Members' Business, May 9th, 2017]

The Chair would like to take a moment to provide some information to the House regarding the management of private members' business.

As members know, after the order of precedence is replenished, the Chair reviews the new items so as to alert the House to bills which at first glance appear to infringe on the financial prerogative of the crown. This allows members the opportunity to intervene in a timely fashion to present their views about the need for those bills to be accompanied by a royal recommendation.

Accordingly, following the April 10, 2017 replenishment of the order of precedence with 15 new items, I wish to inform the House that there are two bills that give the Chair some concern as to the spending provisions they contemplate. They are Bill C-315, an act to amend the Parks Canada Agency Act (Conservation of National Historic Sites Account), standing in the name of the member for Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, and Bill C-343, an act to establish the Office of the Federal Ombudsman for Victims of Criminal Acts and to amend certain acts, standing in the name of the member for Beauport—Côte-de-Beaupré—Île d'Orléans—Charlevoix.

Additionally, on an exceptional basis, I would like to raise concerns regarding Bill S-205, an act to amend the Canada Border Services Agency Act (Inspector General of the Canada Border Services Agency) and to make consequential amendments to other acts, and Bill S-229, an act respecting underground infrastructure safety. Both bills have been sent to the House of Commons for consideration. The Chair expects that in due course they will be given first reading in the House, as is usually the case with bills sent to the House by the other place.

As members know, certain constitutional and procedural principles inform the Chair with respect to bills containing spending provisions that would require a royal recommendation, which are also known as “money bills”.

A fundamental requirement for bills of this nature is that they must originate in the House of Commons. Standing Order 80(1) embodies this important principle, stating:

All aids and supplies granted to the Sovereign by the Parliament of Canada are the sole gift of the House of Commons, and all bills for granting such aids and supplies ought to begin with the House, as it is the undoubted right of the House to direct, limit, and appoint in all such bills, the ends, purposes, considerations, conditions, limitations and qualifications of such grants, which are not alterable by the Senate.

This stipulation explicitly prohibits “money bills” from originating in the Senate. In the past, if a bill requiring a royal recommendation was passed by the Senate and sent to the House, the Chair has seen fit to interrupt all further consideration of the bill.

The Chair has specific concerns about the unusual manner in which Bill S-205 and Bill S-229 are structured. Essentially, they appear to contain spending provisions that would require a royal recommendation, but they both conclude with coming into force provisions that suggest otherwise.

Receiving such bills from the Senate is exceptional and rare. Indeed it may well be the first time the House is seized with such legislative measures. Parenthetically, Bill C-343, which I referenced earlier, contains a similar provision.

If, following an anticipated first reading of Bill S-205 and Bill S-229, the Chair determines that the bills are contrary to our usual rules and practices regarding money bills, I would be obligated to disallow them to be further considered in the House. Specifically, it would be incumbent on me to order them removed from the Order Paper and any consideration of them ended. This is distinct from the process for bills first introduced in the House that require a royal recommendation, which are allowed to continue to the end of third reading before the Chair interrupts their consideration. Such would be the case for Bill C-315 and Bill C-343, should the Chair conclude that they do indeed require a royal recommendation.

In view of these considerations, I would encourage hon. members who would like to make arguments regarding the concerns about these bills that I have raised today, or any of the other bills now on the order of precedence, to do so at the earliest opportunity.

I thank hon. members for their attention.

[Points of Order, May 8th, 2017]

I am now prepared to rule on the admissibility of the amendment moved on Friday, May 5, 2017 by the hon. member for Carleton to the motion respecting the Senate amendments to Bill C-4, an act to amend the Canada Labour Code, the Parliamentary Employment and Staff Relations Act, the Public Service Labour Relations Act and the Income Tax Act.

At the time, the Chair took the matter under advisement and committed to return to the House as quickly as possible with a ruling. Thereafter, the House leader of the official opposition, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons, and the member for Oxford made interventions on the matter, and I thank them for having done so.

The main motion would see the House disagree to the amendments made by the Senate to Bill C-4. The amendment is intended to do the opposite. Specifically, it aims to see the House agree to the Senate amendments.

No precedent of such an amendment could be found; thus, it is up to the Chair to rule on its admissibility.

Amendments are an integral part of the process of debate but are subject to certain limitations. Page 533 of the second edition of House of Commons Procedure and Practice states: “An amendment must be relevant to the motion it seeks to amend.”

In this case, it is clear that the proposed amendment is indeed relevant to the main motion. However, House of Commons Procedure and Practice also states, on the same page, that an “amendment is out of order procedurally, if...it is completely contrary to the main motion and would produce the same result as the defeat of the main motion”.

I notice that the House leader of the official opposition has argued that the effect of adopting the amendment at hand in this case is different.

That being said, since there are no clear precedents allowing the Chair to accept the amendment, I would refer members to what is written at page 792 of House of Commons Procedure and Practice, and I quote:

The motion for the consideration of Senate amendments is itself open to amendment and subamendment during debate. Members opposed to Senate amendments may move reasoned amendments to them.

While the member has proposed an amendment that is not in keeping with the procedural criteria outlined earlier, other types of amendments could be envisioned that would be more in keeping with precedents and practice. Accordingly, I find the amendment to be out of order. Debate will therefore continue on the main motion.

I thank the hon. members for their attention.

[April 12th, 2017]

Malala, Prime Minister, Madame Grégoire Trudeau, Madam Chief Justice, Mr. Speaker of the Senate, my friend and classmate, Excellencies, hon. senators, members of the House of Commons, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen.

Malala, it is my pleasure and privilege to thank you on behalf of your fellow Canadians for the very inspiring words you shared today.

You have been defending the right to education, especially for girls, since age 11. It is clear that your passion for this cause has only deepened over the years.

I know that you yourself have given credit for this determination to your father, Ziauddin Yousafzai, and your mother, Toor Pekai Yousafzai, both of whom nurtured your love of learning and encouraged you to pursue your dreams. As a father, I know it cannot have been easy for them to set aside a parent’s natural desire to protect their child from the dangers that are all around, and to let her follow her heart. Therefore, I would like to thank your parents, Malala, for their courage and their generosity in sharing their only daughter with the world.

For many years now, you have been on a mission to promote education and peace, and you manage to strike a balance between your advocacy work and your studies.

In recognition of your remarkable work in promoting and defending educational rights, you have received a number of national and international honours, including, I must say, an honorary degree from the University of King's College in my city of Halifax, Nova Scotia.

You are at the dawn of a new chapter in your life, set to begin your university career. I am sure that it will be as remarkable and unique as you are.

Even as you fought for the right to learn, you have fought for the same right for others. As you have spoken up for children, you have taught them to speak up for themselves and to demand what is theirs. In other words, you may still be a student, Malala, but you have also become a teacher. If you look up at the galleries of this chamber, you will see hundreds of your students.

Mahatma Gandhi said that real education consists in drawing the best out of ourselves. This you have already accomplished. As you pursue your academic dreams, whatever they may be, I have no doubt that you will continue to make the world a better place.

Thank you.

[Applause]

[National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, April 12th, 2017]

I wish to inform the House of an administrative error that occurred with regard to Bill C-22, an act to establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain acts.

Members may recall that the House studied a number of motions at report stage. On March 20, 2017, the House adopted some of those motions and rejected others. One of the rejected motions was Motion No. 7, moved by the hon. member for Victoria, which was intended to delete clause 31 of the bill.

The House concurred in the bill, as amended, at report stage with further amendments and eventually adopted the bill at third reading on April 4, 2017.

As is the usual practice following passage at third reading, House officials prepared a parchment version of the bill and transmitted this parchment to the Senate. Due to an administrative error, the version of the bill that was transmitted to the other place was prepared as if Motion No. 7 had been adopted and clause 31 had been deleted, with the renumbering of another clause in the bill as a result. Unfortunately, the mistake was not detected before the bill was sent to the other place.

I wish to reassure the House that this error was strictly administrative in nature and occurred after third reading was given to Bill C-22. The proceedings that took place in this House and the decisions made by the House with respect to Bill C-22 remain entirely valid. The records of the House relating to this bill are complete and accurate.

However, the documents relating to Bill C-22 that were sent to the other place were not an accurate reflection of the House’s decisions.

Speaker Milliken addressed a similar situation in a ruling given on November 22, 2001, found on page 7455 of Debates. My predecessor also dealt with a similar situation in a statement made on September 15, 2014, found on page 7239 of Debates. Guided by these precedents, similar steps have been undertaken in this case.

First, once this discrepancy was detected, House officials immediately communicated with their counterparts in the Senate to set about resolving it. Next, I have instructed the Acting Clerk and his officials to take the necessary steps to rectify this error and to ensure that the other place has a corrected copy of Bill C-22 that reflects the proceedings that occurred in this House. Thus, a revised version of the bill will be transmitted to the other place through the usual administrative procedures of Parliament. Finally, I have asked that the “as passed at third reading” version of the bill be reprinted.

The Senate will, of course, make its own determination about how it proceeds with Bill C-22 in light of this situation. I wish to reassure members that steps have been taken to ensure that similar errors, rare though they may be, do not reoccur.

I thank hon. members for their attention.

[Privilege, April 11th, 2017]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised on April 7, 2017, by the hon. member for Perth—Wellington, in which he asks that the matter of privilege under debate on April 6, 2017, which was superseded by the adoption of a motion to proceed to orders of the day, be revived.

I would like to thank the member for Perth—Wellington for having raised the matter in the House, as well as the Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons, House leader of the official opposition, and the members for Beloeil—Chambly, Lanark—Frontenac—Kingston, Sarnia—Lambton, Banff—Airdrie, Calgary Signal Hill, and York—Simcoe for their contributions to the discussion on this important matter and unprecedented circumstance.

In presenting his case, the member for Perth—Wellington acknowledged that a motion to proceed to orders of the day while the House is considering a matter of privilege is procedurally in order. On this point, he and the parliamentary secretary to the government House leader agree. The Chair also agrees that the motion, as moved, was in order, and this is supported by numerous authorities.

Rather, it is on the issue of whether and how such a matter of privilege can be revived that the member for Perth—Wellington focused his argument. He pointed out that other types of proceedings, like the consideration of motions of instruction to committees or motions to concur in a committee report, can be considered again once a motion to proceed to orders of the day has been adopted. He argued that allowing such a motion to permanently end further consideration of something as important as a question of privilege would create a dangerous precedent. He asked the Chair to effectively restart the proceedings on the question of privilege by again finding a prima facie case of privilege on the matter relating to the free movement of members in the parliamentary precinct, as originally raised by the member for Milton.

The problem facing the Chair then is determining, first whether it is procedurally in order to revive a matter of privilege that has been superseded and second, in the affirmative, how that could be done in a procedurally acceptable manner.

If a motion to proceed to orders of the day is adopted when the House is considering a motion of instruction or a motion to concur in a committee report, the motion is also dropped from the Order Paper. However, members who wish to revive the matter can again give the required 48 hours' notice of the same motion and then move it in the House. As the member for Perth—Wellington correctly stated, this means that: “one is back where one began and can reinitiate the same identical proceeding in the usual fashion appropriate to that class of motion.”

These arguments are persuasive, and accordingly the Chair must conclude that it is procedurally possible to revive a matter of privilege that has been likewise superseded.

Having answered the first question in the affirmative, the next question for the Chair is determining how this ought to be done. The member for Perth—Wellington and others argue that this is properly done by raising the matter in the House and having the Speaker again give priority consideration to it.

As a consequence of the events of April 6, the Chair can see a few other ways the matter of privilege could be revived. The member for Milton, or any other member, for that matter, could seek to revive the question by way of written notice on the Notice Paper. As House of Commons Procedure and Practice, second edition, states at page 154, such a notice of motion, unless it were proposed by a minister, would be:

placed on the Order Paper under the list of Private Members' Business items outside the Order of Precedence following the 48 hours' notice period.

The matter could also be brought before the House as an opposition motion.

However, the situation in which the House finds itself is unprecedented. The Chair can find no instance of debate on a matter of privilege superseded by the adoption of a motion to proceed to orders of the day. At the same time, the Speaker has a duty to uphold the fundamental rights and privileges of the House and of its members. That is why, when questions of privilege are raised, the Speaker has to decide whether, prima facie, they ought to have immediate priority consideration.

If a superseded matter of privilege were brought forward again as the subject of an opposition day, the Chair would not likely interfere, unless the motion was found to be defective in some way.

If a superseded matter of privilege were put down for debate via the Notice Paper, it could also eventually proceed, pursuant to the procedures applicable to government or private members' business, as the case may be. However, as is stated in O'Brien and Bosc at page 154, the member in whose name the item stands has another option:

[The Member] may decide to seek priority in debate for the motion (e.g. if new information were to come to light). The Member must then seek to convince the Speaker that the matter raised in the motion should be considered a prima facie question of privilege.

This, in a sense, is a third manner in which a matter of privilege can be revived and it is, for all practical purposes, the same method that the member for Perth—Wellington is advocating.

Given the unprecedented nature of this circumstance, and given the weight of procedural jurisprudence, the Chair is inclined to conclude that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the matter of privilege superseded on April 6 to be revived in the manner proposed by the member for Perth—Wellington. Accordingly, without restating my ruling of April 6 in the matter of delayed access to the parliamentary precinct, I again find a prima facie question of privilege.

I now invite the member for Perth—Wellington to move the appropriate motion.