Geoff Regan

[Privilege, April 4th, 2019]

Order, please. I am now ready to rule on the question of privilege raised on March 18, 2019, by the hon. member for New Westminster—Burnaby, regarding allegedly misleading statements by the Minister of Justice and Attorney General and his parliamentary secretary.

In his intervention, the member for New Westminster—Burnaby accused the Minister of Justice and Attorney General and his parliamentary secretary of deliberately misleading the House by repeatedly denying accusations of political interference by the Prime Minister's Office in the work of the former minister of justice and attorney general.

As proof, the member cited certain answers provided by the minister during question period on February 7 and by the parliamentary secretary on February 8, where it was argued that at no point was either the current or former justice minister pressured or directed by the Prime Minister or anyone in the Prime Minister's Office to make a decision on this or any other matter.

These answers, he contended, are contradictory to the testimonies given before the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights on February 27 by the former minister of justice and attorney general, the member for Vancouver Granville, and on March 6 by Gerald Butts, as well as a statement made to the media by the Prime Minister on March 7.

He concluded that:

All parties involved, specifically the former attorney general, the current Attorney General, the Prime Minister's former principal secretary and, especially, the Prime Minister himself admit that there was pressure placed on the hon. member for Vancouver Granville in her former role.

While he acknowledged that accusations of misleading the House are usually found to be disagreements as to the facts, he argued that the two versions of events presented amount to a breach of the privileges of the House.

As I mentioned in my ruling on January 29, 2019, which can be found at page 25018 of Debates:

The charge of misleading the House is always regarded by the Chair as a most serious one for it touches not only on the technical aspects of the charge but also the integrity of the member.

This, in large part, explains the rigorous burden of proof required to reach the conclusion of a member misleading the House. House of Commons Procedure and Practice, third edition, at page 85, describes this proof as threefold, stating:

...one, it must be proven that the statement was misleading; two, it must be established that the Member making the statement knew at the time that the statement was incorrect; and three, that in making the statement, the Member intended to mislead the House.

When questions of privilege are raised which involve a charge of a member having deliberately misled the House, essentially the Speaker is being asked to pass judgment on statements made; in this particular case, it is the answers of the Minister of Justice and Attorney General and his parliamentary secretary to oral questions.

Members, of course, are well versed in the limited authority of the Chair in this respect. The Speaker is not responsible for the quality or content of replies to questions.

However, as has been suggested, it is also true that exceptional circumstances could exist whereby, with proper evidence, a determination could be made that certain statements made to the House breached its privileges.

After thorough study, the Chair cannot find that the statements in question were misleading, made with the knowledge that they were incorrect and made with the intent of misleading the House. Accordingly, the Chair is unable to conclude that this matter constitutes a prima facie case of privilege.

I want to thank all hon. members for their attention.

[Points of Order, April 1st, 2019]

I am now ready to rule on the point of order raised on February 28, 2019, by the hon. member for Calgary Nose Hill concerning events that occurred at meetings of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration on February 25 and 27, 2019.

I want to thank the hon. member for Calgary Nose Hill for having raised the matter and the member for Don Valley West for his comments.

In her intervention, the member for Calgary Nose Hill explained the circumstances that gave rise to her point of order. That is, on February 25, the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration was debating a motion when the chair of the committee suspended the meeting to allow members to vote in the House, indicating at the time that the meeting would resume after the vote. However, as the member stated, when they returned, they “waited [for] some time for the quorum to be met, which never occurred.” The chair then left the room without either resuming or adjourning the meeting. Consequently, in response to a point of order raised at their next meeting, the chair confirmed that the meeting had indeed been adjourned. Upon appeal, that decision was upheld.

Contending that the adjournment was a unilateral and prohibited decision of the committee chair, the member for Calgary Nose Hill made it clear that the premise of her objections was twofold. That is, committees do not have any authority to act beyond the powers granted to them by the House and, specifically, they cannot circumvent, even indirectly, Standing Order 116(2).

To answer these objections, and in fact determine the authority of the Speaker in this matter, a comprehensive understanding of not only the words found in Standing Order 116(2) but also of its scope and applicability is important, particularly since this is the first instance in which this Standing Order has been invoked.

Standing Order 116(2) states:

(a) Unless a time limit has been adopted by the committee or by the House, the Chair of a standing, special or legislative committee may not bring a debate to an end while there are members present who still wish to participate. A decision of the Chair in this regard may not be subject to an appeal to the committee.

(b) A violation of paragraph (a) of this section may be brought to the attention of the Speaker by any Member and the Speaker shall have the power to rule on the matter. If, in the opinion of the Speaker, such a violation has occurred, the Speaker may order that all subsequent proceedings in relation to the said violation be nullified.

While the language of this rule is unambiguous, the Chair must, as always, understand and consider carefully the meaning, and even intention, behind the words. In other words, what was the purpose of adding this standing order to our rules or what new expectations or parameters does it bring? Essentially, it seems to the Chair that this new rule is intended to safeguard debate in committee from a procedural hijacking, so to speak, that would permanently end debate on a motion.

Before its introduction, members could have, for example, forced a debate on a debatable motion by moving the previous question, which is not procedurally permissible in committee, thus requiring committee chairs to rule it out of order. A challenge of such a ruling could have resulted in its being overturned, thereby forcing the chair to put an end to debate and depriving members of the opportunity to further deliberate on a question.

At the very core of this new provision, then, stands the desire to allow committee members to participate fully in their deliberations without being unduly stopped from debating matters until their natural conclusion. Defence of this mattered to the extent that it was, in fact, fortified with a recourse, and a new authority for the Speaker, in the event of a clear violation.

However, this is not to be interpreted as being applicable in all instances of debate ending in committee. For instance, on occasions when a committee adjourns before deliberations are concluded or agrees to a motion to adjourn debate on a question, a permanent end to the debate is not triggered in the matter outlined in Standing Order 116(2); rather, debate on the matter is still permissible and may come back before the committee at a future date to be determined by either the chair or the committee.

To answer whether the matter now before the House is one which Standing Order 116(2) was intended to address, as Speaker, I have scrutinized the evidence and minutes of the February 25 and 27 meetings of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration.

It is my view that the manner in which the meeting of February 25 was adjourned was procedurally sound as it was due to a lack of quorum, a fact avowed by the member for Calgary Nose Hill. This is a pivotal factor since the debate on the motion did not end permanently in consequence. In fact, the motion being debated at the time by the committee remains unresolved and may be taken up again at a later date. Accordingly, Standing Order 116(2) does not apply in these circumstances and, as Speaker, I am unable to intervene as provided for in this new standing order.

The remaining question then is whether the committee's proceedings strayed outside the powers granted to it by the House, the sole body able to grant them. The fact that committees are generally the masters of their proceedings is in no way diminished by Standing Order 116(2). Consequently, barring a report from a committee, the Speaker will not usually intervene in committee matters. From the evidence presented in this instance, the Chair is unable to conclude that the circumstances are exceptional enough to warrant an intervention, without the House having been seized of the matter by way of a report from the committee, as is the usual practice.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.

[The Budget, March 19th, 2019]

Order, please. I want to remind members of Standing Order 83(2), which provides:

An Order of the Day for the consideration of a Ways and Means motion or motions shall be designated at the request of a Minister rising in his or her place in the House. When such an Order is designated for a Budget presentation, the Minister shall specify the date and time thereof and the Order shall be deemed to be an Order of the House to sit beyond the ordinary hour of daily adjournment, if required. At the specified time, the Speaker shall interrupt any proceedings then before the House and such proceedings shall be deemed adjourned; and the House shall proceed forthwith to the consideration of the Ways and Means motion for the Budget presentation.

At 5 p.m. on April 27, 1989, Speaker Fraser was in the process of hearing arguments on a question of privilege raised concerning an alleged budget leak. He interrupted the arguments, which he agreed to give a further hearing to at a later time, in order to permit the budget presentation. At that time, the Speaker stated, in Debates on April 27, 1989, at page 1060:

The difficulty the Speaker is in, in this present situation, is that while fully understanding the position of the Official Opposition and the New Democratic Party and fully understanding the reason for it, the fact of the matter is that we now have a House Order, which was passed by the House. I can see no way that I can unilaterally change that.

He continued, after indicating his intention to hear further argument:

However, while I do not know what may eventually happen on the privilege issue, I do know what the House has done with the special House Order. I must advise Hon. Members that I am bound by it. Therefore, it is my duty to recognize the Hon. Minister of Finance.

The hon. member for Skeena—Bulkley Valley is rising on a brief point of order.

[Points of Order, February 21st, 2019]

I am now prepared to rule on the point of order raised yesterday by the hon. opposition House leader concerning the participation of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada in the votes on the opposition motion on political interference allegations.

I would like to thank the honourable opposition House leader for having raised the matter, as well as the members for Timmins—James Bay and Saanich—Gulf Islands for their comments.

After the member for Vancouver Granville explained why she had voluntarily abstained from voting because of personal interest, the opposition House leader asked whether the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada should also have abstained. In her opinion, they too have personal interests in the matter. She asked for guidance from the Chair.

The right of all members to vote is fundamental. This cannot be overstated. It is through voting that members participate in making the decisions of this House. As Speaker, I am entrusted with protecting this right that belongs to all members.

Yesterday’s vote was a typical and normal vote and, as usual, every member was free to vote or to abstain. On occasion, the Chair has been asked to reconcile this right with alleged conflicts of interest. At all times, however, the answer has been the same. When ruling on a similar matter back on November 30, 2017, I stated, at page 15799 of the Debates:

It is not the role of the Chair to determine if a conflict of interest exists, but instead, to ensure that the rights and privileges of members of this House are always safeguarded. By extension, as Speaker, I cannot unilaterally deprive a member of the right to vote any more than I can unilaterally order that a vote be redone.

The role of the Speaker in addressing the right of a member to vote is limited. These limitations are procedural in nature and involve ensuring that a member heard the question in order to vote.

As to the matter of an alleged conflict of interest, the House has adopted rules under the Conflict of Interest Code concerning these potential situations. Bosc and Gagnon explain at page 576:

No member is entitled to take part in debate or to vote on any question in which he or she has a private interest (formerly referred to as a “direct pecuniary interest”), and any vote subsequently determined to have been cast in these circumstances would be disallowed.

The House not only adopted the Conflict of Interest Code for itself but has also granted the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner the sole authority to interpret and apply this code, including the power to conduct investigations.

Specifically, section 13 of this code stipulates that, “A Member shall not participate in debate on or vote on a question in which he or she has a private interest.”

All questions relating to compliance with the Conflict of Interest Code and the Conflict of Interest Act must be directed towards that office.

It is the Ethics Commissioner to whom members must turn when they believe that there has been a contravention of the code, including when it involves a member’s participation in a vote.

Accordingly, the votes taken yesterday stand.

I thank all hon. members for their attention in this matter.

[Privilege, February 21st, 2019]

I am now ready to rule on the question of privilege raised on February 8, 2019, by the hon. member for Mirabel regarding the reply to an oral question the previous day.

As members will recall, further to a point of order raised by the member for La Pointe-de-l'Île at the end of oral questions on February 7, 2019, I explained clearly the circumstances surrounding my decision to allow the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship to answer his question, one which had been directed to the chair of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights.

Nonetheless, the member for Mirabel raised the matter again, stating that, as committees of the House are not servants of the government, the parliamentary secretary breached the House's privileges.

The member also asked that the member for La Pointe-de-l'Île be granted a supplementary question.

Without revisiting my original decision—since all members know that the Speaker's decisions are not subject to appeal—the precedents supporting my decision to recognize the parliamentary secretary are well established. In a situation similar to the one before us, Speaker Milliken, in a ruling on February 8, 2008, said at page 2836 of the Debates of the House of Commons:

I do not think the question is whether anyone else is allowed to answer or not. The question for the Speaker of the House is to take a look at those who are standing to answer and choose who is going to answer.

In the case before us, since the chair of the committee did not rise immediately, I called upon the only person who was standing at that point to answer the question, which is the prerogative of the Chair.

In another ruling on November 2, 2011, which can be found at pages 2861 and 2862 of Debates, my predecessor stated:

Simply put, it is not for the Speaker to judge who possesses which information and, thus, who might be able to provide the information being sought....

Nothing in this incident should be interpreted to mean that members should not continue to direct their questions to those who are properly accountable for answering them. It is also entirely reasonable to expect that those to whom questions are directed, in this case the chair or vice-chair of a standing committee, would automatically be recognized by the Chair to respond, provided they are, of course, rising.

Accordingly, the Chair does not find this to be a prima facie question of privilege.

I thank all honourable members for their attention.

[Privilege, February 19th, 2019]

Mr. Speaker, I am now ready to rule on the issue raised on February 6, 2019, by the member for Hull—Aylmer regarding an incident of racial profiling that recently occurred within the parliamentary precinct.

The Chair is grateful to the honourable member for bringing this incident to the attention of the House. I also appreciate the comments made by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Canadian Heritage and Multiculturalism.

While the hon. member for Hull—Aylmer raised this matter as a question of privilege and it deals with a serious event, it is not properly a question of privilege. It did not involve a member of Parliament or engage a proceeding of either this House or any committee. Nonetheless, the member has given me an opportunity to make a statement to the House and to report on the investigation that has taken place with respect to the incident.

The member for Hull—Aylmer explained that he and the parliamentary secretary had been made aware that a group of Canadians, mostly young, had come to Parliament Hill on February 4, 2019, to engage with members of Parliament on, and sensitize them to, issues that black communities in Canada are facing today. Reporting that an incident of racial profiling had occurred during this initiative, known as “Black Voices on the Hill”, he asked me to investigate the matter immediately and suggest measures to ensure that Parliament is an open and welcome place for all Canadians.

As Speaker, I have responsibility, shared with the Speaker of the Senate, for the oversight of matters of security and policing for the parliamentary precinct, and the Parliamentary Protective Service has the operational responsibility for the security in the parliamentary buildings. These important responsibilities embody far more than just the physical aspects of keeping people safe when here on Parliament Hill. The racial profiling incident cannot be condoned and must be dealt with swiftly and purposefully.

A complaint was quickly raised in the House, and the Parliamentary Protective Service replied with a full and unreserved apology, stating:

We offer our apologies to the participants for the situation that they experienced. Our security personnel must always conduct themselves with professionalism and respect towards parliamentarians, employees and visitors. We need to do a better job in ensuring that this standard is maintained across our workforce. The Parliamentary Protective Service has zero tolerance for any type of discrimination. We took immediate action upon learning of this incident and launched an internal investigation into the matter. Once the investigation is completed, we will be advising the Speakers accordingly.

The apology is a welcomed first step. However, it should not be construed as either a final step or a way to erase the harsh and unacceptable reality of what happened. Instead, we are resolved to learn from it and to do better going forward.

While one transgression does not represent the actions of all, one is too many and none can be overlooked, dismissed or excused.

All who come here must know unequivocally that they will be welcomed with equality, dignity and respect. To experience anything less here on Parliament Hill, the centre of our democracy, is a failure on our part and for that I offer my sincere apologies. We can and must do better, and we will.

As Speaker, I would like to conclude by making it clear that while there is not a finding of a prima facie question of privilege, for the reasons I have mentioned, this in no way diminishes the importance or gravity of the matter raised.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.

[Resignation of Member, February 6th, 2019]

I thank all those who have spoken. If the House will indulge me, I have known the hon. member for Kings—Hants for well over the past 19 years now. I think I met him before that, but not very much. I have always appreciated his sense of humour and his friendship. When I think of his sense of humour, I even appreciated it when, on June 2 each year, he would say to me, “Happy anniversary”. You see, June 2, 1997, was the commencement of his parliamentary career and the commencement of what I like to call my involuntary sabbatical.

I have always appreciated and admired his eloquence. I have appreciated his generosity too, and today, in his eloquence, he certainly had a generous interpretation of 10 minutes.

He is the member of Parliament for my neighbouring riding. My riding is Halifax West and his is Kings—Hants, but I am actually a native of his riding, as we were both born at the Payzant Memorial Hospital in Windsor, but quite a few years apart, of course. Was I born before or after him? No, of course I was born before.

When we were both members of the Paul Martin cabinet, we, along with Anne McLellan, were all natives of Hants County, Nova Scotia, which we thought was rather remarkable. We all thought we were remarkable, of course, but not everyone else did.

I admire his courage as one of the first openly gay members of Parliament. Many have spoken of that. I guess I had better not get into the question of crossing the floor and all that, because that might involve partisanship. We have been great friends and great colleagues, and I have appreciated his service to the people of Nova Scotia and his great love for Nova Scotia.

I want to wish him, Max, Rose and Claire all the best.

[Privilege, February 4th, 2019]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised on December 11, 2018, by the hon. member for Perth—Wellington concerning the government response to written Question No. 2001. I would like to thank the member for having raised the matter, as well as the parliamentary secretary to the government House leader for his comments.

In raising this matter, the member for Perth—Wellington explained that, in response to his written Question No. 2001, the government had indicated that:

...a response could disclose personal and solicitor-client privileged information. Therefore, the Government must respectfully decline to respond.

This, he argued, amounted to the government boldly refusing to answer the question and, hence, should be considered as a deliberate defiance of the authority of the House.

For his part, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Government House Leader contended that, as it is the prerogative of a minister to refuse to answer a question that is considered a sub judice matter, this was simply a matter of debate.

As explained in House of Commons Procedure and Practice, third edition, at page 529:

As with oral questions, it is acceptable for the government, in responding to a written question, to indicate to the House that it cannot supply an answer.

Speaker Lamoureux had also addressed this in a ruling on May 5, 1971, at page 5515 of the Debates, when he stated:

It is correct, of course, to state as a general principle that a member should not be impeded in the discharge of his parliamentary duties. I suggest that this in itself does not create an obligation on the part of the government to supply any and all information sought by a member, either by way of an oral question or a written question.

Additionally, the authority accorded to the Speaker to judge responses is limited. Bosc and Gagnon, at page 529, is clear on this when it states:

There are no provisions in the rules for the Speaker to review government responses to questions.

Accordingly, I do not find that there is a prima facie question of privilege.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.

[Point of Order, January 29th, 2019]

I am now prepared to rule on the point of order raised earlier today by the hon. member for Montcalm concerning the secret ballot on the designation of Bill C-421.

I want to thank the hon. member for Montcalm for having raised this question.

During his intervention, the member asked that the result of the secret ballot on the designation of Bill C-421, an act to amend the Citizenship Act in regard to the adequate knowledge of French in Quebec, be revealed at the same time as the result of the vote itself. In his opinion, the Chair cannot simply announce whether Bill C-421 is votable, because it is essential that the number of votes for and against be announced to thwart the government's desire to muzzle members.

As the member himself remarked, I issued a ruling on the same question on November 28, 2017. At the time, it was claimed that the procedure for designating a bill did not have to be the same as the procedure for electing the Speaker. Members will recall that in response I stated, at page 15677 of the Debates:

Standing Order 92 does not provide any direction to the Chair which would cause it to depart from that now established practice.

I also invited the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs to consider the matter, if it deemed it necessary. Until such time as the House decides to provide new direction on this matter, the Chair will continue to follow the only similar practice that exists in our Standing Orders, that of the election of the Speaker.

Therefore, once the voting is completed at the end of tomorrow’s sitting, I will be provided only with and announce to the House the final outcome of the vote, and nothing more. The table officers will in no way reveal to the Chair, or anyone else, the number of ballots cast on the designation of Bill C-421.

I want to thank the hon. members for their attention.

It being 6 p.m., the House will now proceed to the consideration of private members' business as listed on today's Order Paper.

[Privilege, January 29th, 2019]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised on December 13, 2018, by the hon. member for Skeena-Bulkley Valley concerning an allegedly misleading statement made in the House by the former member for Saint-Leonard-Saint-Michel.

I want to thank the member for having raised the question, as well as the former member for Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel and the member for Grande Prairie—Mackenzie for their interventions.

In raising his question of privilege, the member for Skeena—Bulkley Valley stated that, on December 11, 2018, in response to another question of privilege, the former member for Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel had misled the House when he said he was not collecting his salary as a member of Parliament. He concluded that that statement had to have been incorrect given that, pursuant to the Parliament of Canada Act, the House of Commons administration has an obligation to pay a salary to all sitting members and that the former member for Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel was still a member when he made that statement.

Earlier today, the former member for Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel reaffirmed that he had no intention of ever “pocketing” his salary and, in fact, had donated it to a cause of his choosing. He also explained that his statement was made in French but the English translation, used by the member for Skeena—Bulkley Valley as a basis for the current question of privilege, did not accurately represent his views and led to a misinterpretation of his remarks.

I have carefully reviewed the statement made on December 11, 2018, by the former member for Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel in which he stated, indeed several times, that he was not “collecting” a salary. The words spoken at the time, or at least what one could easily understand them to mean, appeared to contradict the established facts, specifically the House of Commons administration’s legal obligation to pay a salary to all members until such time as they are no longer members of Parliament. Today’s statement clarifies what the former member intended to say.

The charge of misleading the House is always regarded by the Chair as a most serious one for it touches not only on the technical aspects of the charge but also the integrity of the member. The Chair, of course, is bound to respect the established conventions accepted by the House on such matters; this does not include assuming a role in the interpretation of what members intended to say. As Speaker Parent reminds us at page 9247 of the Debates on October 19, 2000:

What I am required to rule on is a more narrow procedural issue: whether a wilful attempt has been made to mislead the House....Only on the strongest and clearest evidence can the House or the Speaker take steps to deal with cases of attempts to mislead members.

After a careful review of the precedents and the current case before the House, the Chair cannot find that there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie question of privilege.

Before I conclude, I would once again encourage members to be more mindful of the need to choose their words carefully to help minimize any confusion, however inadvertent, that could lead to a serious misunderstanding. Of course, this is even more important when the ambiguous statement cannot be readily clarified as happened in this case. At the same time, I would urge members to be cautious in considering a charge against a fellow member.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.