Geoff Regan

[Privilege, October 30th, 2018]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised on October 18, 2018, by the member for Montcalm regarding an alleged misleading statement made by the Prime Minister during question period.

I would like to thank the hon. member for Montcalm for having raised the matter.

During his intervention, the member for Montcalm argued that the Prime Minister had misled the House by providing inaccurate information when, during question period on October 17, 2018, he said that the provinces had asked the federal government for a period of eight to twelve weeks between the time the bill legalizing marijuana came into force and the substance’s actual legalization. This answer, according to the member, contradicts a motion adopted by the National Assembly of Quebec on November 16, 2017, one which the member further claimed the Prime Minister was aware of. The hon. member for Montcalm thus feels that the Prime Minister intended to mislead the House, a contempt that constitutes a breach of privilege.

The question of whether a member has intentionally misled the House is always a serious one, and the member for Montcalm reminded us of this when he enumerated the three well-established questions the Speaker must answer when deciding whether such an accusation is a valid question of privilege.

Additionally, as I stated during a ruling I made on November 20, 2017, at page 15325 of the Debates:

Members know well that in any case in which the veracity of what a member of the House has said is called into question, the Chair's role is very limited to the review of the statements made in a proceeding of Parliament. In other words, the Chair cannot comment on what transpires outside of the deliberations of the House or its committees.

As a result, apart from the Prime Minister's response during question period, the Speaker cannot be officially apprised of anything said to have transpired outside the walls of this place and on which the hon. member for Montcalm is basing his argument.

As Speaker Milliken said on January 31, 2008, at page 2435 of the Debates:

any dispute regarding the accuracy...of a minister’s response to an oral question is a matter of debate; it is not a matter for the Speaker to judge.

The proceedings in the House are a forum for differing opinions to be vigorously debated. This is the reason why I remind members to demonstrate the greatest care to ensure that the information recited to the House is clear; doing so will allow everyone to fulfill their roles as they should.

Based on the remarks made in the House on October 17, 2018, there is no clear evidence that would lead me to conclude that the criteria for a deliberately misleading statement were met. Accordingly, I do not find that there is a prima facie question of privilege.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.

[Points of Order, October 24th, 2018]

I am now prepared to rule on a point of order raised on October 23, 2018, by the hon. member for Perth—Wellington regarding Bill C-76, an act to amend the Canada Elections Act and other acts and to make certain consequential amendments.

The hon. member objects to an amendment adopted by the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, sometimes called PROC in this place, on the basis that it amends a section of the parent act not amended by the bill. He argues that the committee went beyond the mandate the House had given it and urges the Chair to strike the amendment from the bill. He notes that Speakers have exercised this power in the past to deal with inadmissible amendments adopted by a committee.

I am grateful to the hon. member for having raised this matter, as it affords me the opportunity to clear up a misconception about what is commonly referred to as the “Parent Act rule”.

As the hon. member no doubt noted, the passage he cited concerning this rule, found at page 771 of House of Commons Procedure and Practice, is contained in a section about relevance.

The Parent Act rule, the idea that an amendment should not amend an act or a section not already amended by a bill, rests on a presumption that such an amendment would not be relevant to the bill. This can be true. Often, such amendments attempt to deal with matters not referenced in the bill, and this is improper.

However, there are also occasions when an amendment is relevant to the subject matter of a bill and in keeping with its scope but can only be accomplished by modifying a section of the parent act not originally touched by the bill or even an entirely different act not originally touched by the bill. This is especially so when the amendments are consequential to other decisions taken by a committee or by the House.

In the present case, an amendment adopted by the committee creates a new section 510.001 of the Canada Elections Act. This section would empower the commissioner of Canada elections to request and obtain certain financial documents from political parties. The hon. member made no suggestion that this amendment was inadmissible. He objects, however, to a related amendment to section 498 of the act that makes it an offence to refuse to comply with the commissioner's request. Section 498, while not originally part of the bill, is the section that spells out offences relating to Part 19 of the act, which is where the new section 510.001 would be found.

I have trouble seeing how this could be considered irrelevant to the bill. Were I to accept the hon. member's argument, we would find ourselves in the strange circumstance of allowing an amendment that creates a new obligation but refusing an amendment that spells out the consequences for failing to comply with that new obligation.

The parent act rule was never intended to be applied blindly as a substitute for proper judgment as to the relevance of an amendment. Clearly, amendments that arise as a direct consequence of other admissible amendments should be considered relevant to the bill, even if they are made to a section of the parent act otherwise unamended.

The hon. member noted that our procedural authorities do not reference any exceptions, leading him to conclude that none are possible. He well knows, however, that practice and precedent are also binding. As is stated at page 274 of House of Commons Procedure and Practice:

Where there are no express rules or orders, the House turns to its own jurisprudence, as interpreted by the Speaker, who examines the Journals and the Debates of the House to determine which rulings of past Speakers and which practices and precedents should be applied.

There are multiple examples of amendments of this nature having been accepted in the past. In 2003, Bill C-250, an act to amend the Criminal Code (hate propaganda), contained a single clause amending section 318 of the Code to change the definition of “identifiable group”. At the beginning of the report stage, on June 6, 2003, the Chair accepted amendments to sections 319 and 320 of the Criminal Code, which also dealt with hate propaganda.

On May 5, 2014, when the Procedure and House Affairs Committee presented its report on Bill C-23, an act to amend the Canada Elections Act and other acts and to make consequential amendments to certain acts, the report contained an amendment to section 345 of the act, which was not originally amended by the bill, but sought to clarify what did not constitute an election expense under section 376, which the bill did amend.

Just last year, in a report tabled on October 5, 2017, the health committee amended Bill C-45, an act respecting cannabis and to amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the Criminal Code and other acts, by modifying section 7 of the Non-smokers' Health Act, originally untouched by the bill. This change arose out of an earlier amendment to the definition of “workplace” in the same act.

These are just a few examples where exceptions were made to the parent act rule because the amendments were clearly relevant to the bill. Given that the present amendment is of a similar nature, I have no difficulty concluding that it too should be found in order.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.

[Privilege, October 23rd, 2018]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised on October 5, 2018, by the hon. member for Repentigny concerning the number of questions allotted to independent members during oral questions. I would like to thank the hon. member for having raised the matter.

In speaking to her question of privilege, the member for Repentigny argued that, when the number of independent members recently increased from 14 to 15, they were entitled to have an additional question per week during question period. Without it, she claims, there is an unacceptable inequity between independent members and members from recognized parties.

While some may see this issue as simply mathematical, the hon. member for Repentigny raises a question that goes directly to the matter of how our parliamentary institutions are structured. As honourable members are aware, our modern parliamentary system has been developed largely around the existence of recognized political parties. The procedures and practices that guide much of our deliberations revolve around these recognized parties and are, in a lot of ways, the result of negotiations agreed to by them.

For example, recognized political parties have certain benefits in our proceedings that are not necessarily shared, or not to the same extent, with unrecognized parties and independent members. This is the case with respect to such matters as the order of participation in debate, the granting of opposition days, committee membership and, of course, the conduct of question period. Undeniably, these distinctions guide the speaker in exercising his duties.

Furthermore, the Parliament of Canada Act and the bylaws of the Board of Internal Economy make a clear distinction between recognized and unrecognized political parties giving them different funding.

These distinctions have not been static. They have evolved over time through changes in tradition and usage, including the rules and practices adopted by the House itself. Many of these changes are founded on the principle of supporting the fair and active participation of each member in the work of the House.

Speaker Fraser addressed the role of the Speaker in this regard, when he stated, on September 24, 1990, at page 13216 of the Debates:

I have some discretion in dealing with the rights of every person in this House who is in a minority position. I think we have a great tradition of protecting the rights of minorities, and I can assure the honourable member that the rights of minorities will be protected by the Speaker in a way that is fair and equitable for all other members.

Safeguarding the fair and equitable rights of the minority is no less a concern for the Speaker during question period. The Speaker's interpretation of the rules, principles and practices put in place by the House itself must balance the rights and interests of both the majority and minority. This is why successive Speakers have progressively opened up the floor to independent members during question period even though the allotment of the different speaking slots under this rubric in our daily agenda has historically been determined through extensive discussions among the recognized political parties.

For instance, not so long ago, the practice was that, when time permitted, and only when time permitted, the Chair would allow an independent member to ask questions during question period. The member for Repentigny rightfully acknowledged that, in more recent years, Speakers have endeavoured to call on independent members to ask questions that roughly matched their proportion in the House.

In fact, recent successive speakers have made significant efforts to find a delicate balance in the allotment of questions between the recognized political parties and the independent members. This has been brought to a new and unprecedented level in the present Parliament. Never have independent members been recognized as much during question period.

The impact of this has been significant; the time now spent on question period has increased so that it rarely ends within the fixed time prescribed by the Standing Orders. As Speaker, I believe that adding another question, as the hon. member for Repentigny suggests, would simply aggravate the pressure on the limited number of hours at the disposal of all members.

In a ruling delivered on April 23, 2013, at page 15800 of the Debates, my predecessor had the opportunity to speak of the notion of equity when referring to the rights of members. He said:

Hence, while many members in this instance have spoken of the right to speak, the member for Langley acknowledged this inherent limitation and spoke more precisely of the equal right to speak. It is this qualifier of rights—equity—that carries great significance, and to which the Chair must play close attention.

The principle of equity applies to the allotment of questions to independent members for question period. Given the 45-minute limit of question period, it is of the utmost importance that it be managed in a way that is fair and equitable to the rights of all members.

I would be remiss if I looked at this matter only through the lens of just one group of members’ and their right to speak. Instead, I must manage all proceedings, including question period, effectively for the benefit of all members. It is the view of the Chair that the current allotment of 14 questions per week for independent members maintains an appropriate balance with respect to the management of time, the rights of independent members, and the longstanding practices of this House.

The Chair notes that recently, some of the time slots made available to independent members have not been used. I would therefore encourage independent members to consult table officers, who remain available to assist in any way necessary, with a view to ensuring that these opportunities are optimized for the benefit of all.

As the Chair cannot find evidence that the rights of independent members have been breached, or that they have been unduly impeded in fulfilling their parliamentary duties, there is no prima facie question of privilege in this case.

As a final note, the complaint raised through this question of privilege challenges the management and control of House business which is itself protected by privilege. In recent years, the distinction between questions of privilege and points of order have become somewhat blurred. This matter is more properly a point of order.

Nevertheless, the Chair realizes how important this question is for many of us. As the Speaker often looks to the House for guidance and direction, particularly for changes in how business is conducted in this place, I welcome any direction on this matter the House wishes to offer, perhaps through negotiations between the parties and independent members or by way of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.

I thank all honourable members for their attention in this matter.

[Points of Order, October 22nd, 2018]

I am now prepared to rule on the point of order raised on October 3, 2018, by the hon. member for Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound regarding unparliamentary language. I would like to thank the member for Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound for having raised this serious matter, as well as the Leader of the Opposition, the Prime Minister, and the members for Milton, Portage—Lisgar, Grande Prairie—Mackenzie, and Barrie—Innisfil, for their comments.

The member for Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound expressed his concern about the response from the Prime Minister after the member for Milton raised a point of order regarding his use of the English expression “ambulance chaser”, an alleged unparliamentary term.

The member for Portage—Lisgar added that allegations which question a member’s integrity, honesty or character are not in order. Furthermore, she argued that comments allegedly made by the Prime Minister in an exchange with the member for Grande Prairie—Mackenzie effectively questioned my impartiality and integrity as your Speaker.

Let me address the second issue first. The issue of the independence of the Chair is pivotal to not only our proceedings but also to our parliamentary system. Therefore, I thoroughly reviewed the audio, video and interventions relevant to this allegation. Although I was unable to confirm the allegations, I want the House to know with absolute certainty that, as Speaker, I am the guardian of the rights and privileges of all members. That is to say, I am not the servant of any one part of the House nor of any one member. Rather, as your Speaker, I remain the servant only of the entire House, much as Speaker William Lenthall described on January 4, 1642. All members can be assured that I am guided by this core principle, which he helped to establish, by the way, every day, come what may.

As for the first question raised, it continues to be the responsibility of the Chair to ensure that the language used by members in the House falls within the parameters of what is considered to be parliamentary language. In fulfilling this responsibility, the Chair is guided by practice and precedent. As the House of Commons Procedure and Practice, third edition, says at page 624, and I quote:

Expressions which are considered unparliamentary when applied to an individual member have not always been considered so when applied ‘in a generic sense’ or to a party.

As the expression used by the Prime Minister in response to a question from the member for Milton was not aimed directly at her but rather had a broader scope, technically speaking, the language used fell within our accepted practice. That being said, I want to remind members of their responsibility to be vigilant in their choice of words, given their potential effect.

My predecessor encouraged members to be mindful of this when he stated, in a ruling on October 30, 2013, at page 593 of the Debates:

Previous Speakers have tried to draw some lines around certain phrases.... My advice to all members on all sides is that when Speakers attempt to draw those lines, members should try to stay clear of them and not try to tiptoe up to them and see how far you can lean over.

As your Speaker, I know we can do better through a continued collaboration and cooperation from all members.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.

[Privilege, October 16th, 2018]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised on October 2, 2018, by the hon. member for Montcalm regarding the government's alleged disregard of a motion adopted by the House.

I would like to thank the member for Montcalm for having raised the matter, as well as the deputy government whip and the member for Cowichan—Malahat—Langford for their observations.

During his intervention, the member for Montcalm argued that the government disregarded a motion adopted unanimously by the House on September 26, 2017, that stated:

That the House reiterate its desire to fully preserve supply management during the NAFTA renegotiations.

The member feels that the concessions made with respect to access to the Canadian dairy products market in the new trade agreement between the United States, Mexico and Canada constitute a clear disregard of the will of the House and, thus, are a grave offence to the authority of the House and constitute contempt of Parliament.

In response, the deputy government whip stated that the matter raised was more a question of debate on the facts; therefore, it could not constitute a question of privilege.

For his part, the member for Cowichan—Malahat—Langford contended that the terms of the motion adopted on September 26, 2017, are fundamentally different in English and in French in the House of Commons' records which should be taken into account when examining the question at hand.

The House regularly adopts motions, by unanimous consent or by a simple majority, intended to allow members to express themselves on all sorts of matters. Depending on their intent, these motions take the form of a resolution or an order. Resolutions, such as the motion adopted on September 26, 2017, are intended, regardless of their precise wording, to be expressions of opinion and do not order or require that measures be taken by the government. House of Commons Procedure and Practice, third edition, states on pages 536 and 537:

A resolution of the House of Commons is a declaration of opinion or purpose; it does not require that any action be taken, nor is it binding. The House has frequently brought forth resolutions in order to show support for an action or outlook.

Such motions can not bind the government or prevent it from pursuing a particular course of action.

In response to a charge that the then prime minister was in contempt of Parliament for disregarding a motion to concur in a committee report that had been adopted by the House, Speaker Milliken stated in a ruling on May 3, 2005, which can be found at page 5548 of Debates:

While the government can be guided by recommendations of a standing committee...the Speaker cannot compel the government to abide by the committee's recommendation nor by the House's decision on these matters.

Consequently, I cannot conclude that the matter raised constitutes a prima facie contempt of the House, and, thus, it is not a question of privilege.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.

[Privilege, June 19th, 2018]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised on May 29, 2018 by the hon. member for Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner concerning documents published on the website of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in relation to Bill C-71, an act to amend certain acts and regulations in relation to firearms.

I would like to thank the member for Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner for having raised the matter, as well as the parliamentary secretary to the government House leader for his comments.

In presenting his case, the member for Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner contended that information on the RCMP website led readers to believe that Bill C-71 had already been enacted by acknowledging neither the parliamentary process nor the fact that the bill remains subject to parliamentary approval. He added that the presumptuous language used, including such phrases as “will be impacted”, “will become prohibited”, and “is affected”, is proof of contempt of Parliament.

The member returned to the House the next day to explain that the website in question had been updated that day to include a disclaimer about Bill C-71 in fact being a proposed law. He viewed this as an admission of fault.

For his part, the parliamentary secretary to the government House leader explained that the matter raised was simply one of debate as there was clearly no presumption of anything in the information respecting Bill C-71 on the RCMP website.

As the charge being made by the member for Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner is one of contempt, the Chair must determine if the information provided on the RCMP website does in fact anticipate a decision of Parliament. If it does, this would offend the authority of the House.

Having reviewed in detail the relevant information on the website, before the disclaimer was added, I found instances where some provisions of the bill were in fact framed as legislative proposals, using such phrases as “proposed legislation” and “is expected to be”. Despite these statements, the vast majority of the information was presented as though the provisions will definitively be coming into effect or are already the law of the land. Nowhere did I find any indication the bill was still in committee and was not yet enacted law.

Further to this, I reviewed the material to try to determine if the assertions being made could be related to existing regulations or statutory provisions. I can confirm that, although some elements of the information are rooted in existing statutory or regulatory provisions, many more would be new measures that would come into force only with the enactment of Bill C-71.

The member for Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner did acknowledge that some of the language is conditional but, even then, the Chair shares the member's concern that the website information suggests that the only approval required is that of the government.

Parliament's authority in scrutinizing and adopting legislative proposals remains unquestionable and should not be taken for granted. The Chair is troubled by the careless manner in which the RCMP chose to ignore this vital fact and, for more than three weeks, allowed citizens and retailers to draw improper conclusions as to their obligations under the law. Changing the website after the fact does little to alleviate these concerns. Parliamentarians and citizens should be able to trust that officials responsible for disseminating information related to legislation are paying attention to what is happening in Parliament and are providing a clear and accurate history of the bills in question.

The work of members as legislators is fundamental and any hint or suggestion of this parliamentary role and authority being bypassed or usurped is not acceptable. The government and the public service also have important roles when it comes to legislation, but these are entirely distinct from those of members as legislators. In fact, part of their responsibility is to state loud and clear that legislation comes from Parliament and nowhere else.

As the member for Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner reminded us, some 30 years ago, Speaker Fraser had cause to state on October 10, 1989, at page 4461 of the Debates in ruling on a similar matter:

This is a case which, in my opinion, should never recur. I expect the Department of Finance and other departments to study this ruling carefully and remind everyone within the Public Service that we are a parliamentary democracy, not a so-called executive democracy, nor a so-called administrative democracy.

Again, on November 6, 1997, at page 1618 of the Debates, Speaker Parent was equally clear about the respect owed to the authority of the House, stating:

This dismissive view of the legislative process, repeated often enough, makes a mockery of our parliamentary conventions and practices.

As Speaker, I cannot turn a blind eye to an approach by a government agency that overlooks the role of Parliament. To do otherwise would make us compliant in denigrating the authority and dignity of Parliament.

Accordingly, the Chair finds this to be a prima facie matter of contempt of the House. I invite the member for Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner to move the appropriate motion.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.

[Points of Order, June 11th, 2018]

I am now prepared to rule on the points of order raised on May 29, 2018 and May 30, 2018 by the hon. member for Elmwood—Transcona regarding vote 40 under Treasury Board Secretariat in the main estimates 2018-19, also known as the budget implementation vote.

On May 29, I ruled on an earlier point of order of his regarding the same vote. In that ruling, I indicated that speakers have generally been reluctant to rule that an item in the estimates was out of order except in clear cases where the supply item had a legislative dimension and was not pure supply.

The hon. member, in his intervention of May 29, argued that the funds sought under vote 40 do not appear to be for a purpose under Treasury Board's legal mandate, as defined in the Financial Administration Act. Instead, it is a central fund from which Treasury Board will allocate money to other departments and agencies for them to carry out their mandates. He felt this circumvented the usual practices for supply. He also contended that this vote cannot reasonably be compared to other central funds under Treasury Board, which are all either consistent with its legal mandate or otherwise justifiable.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Government House Leader responded to this point by arguing that the hon. member's reading of the Treasury Board's mandate was too narrow. In his view, there was no question that these matters fall within the legal mandate of the Treasury Board. He also cited my earlier ruling indicating there is ample precedent for monies to be granted to a central fund.

On May 30, the hon. member for Elmwood—Transcona argued that some of the specific initiatives in vote 40 lack proper legislative authority. In particular, he noted that initiatives relating to employment insurance and cybersecurity seem dependent on measures contained in Bill C-74, Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No. 1. As this bill is not yet law, he felt it was not proper for the government to seek appropriations for its implementation.

Finally, given that vote 40 will fund a variety of initiatives in various departments and agencies, the member felt it problematic that the vote had been referred to a single committee, the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates. In his view, it would be more appropriate for the initiatives in vote 40 to have been studied by the committees directly responsible for those departments and agencies.

I will deal with this last point first. When the estimates are tabled, they are automatically referred to committee in accordance with Standing Order 81(4). As is the case with documents tabled under Standing Order 32, it is the government that determines to which committee each vote will be referred. While this used to be done by motion, the Standing Orders were amended in 2001 to make the referral automatic. The minister now provides the Table with the list of committees to which separate votes are sent for study. In the case of vote 40, it was referred to the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates, a committee with a fairly wide-ranging mandate on matters relating to estimates. In its study of vote 40, the committee is free to invite whomever it feels appropriate. I do not believe there is any role for the Speaker to become involved in the matching of votes and committees.

On the matter of the legal authority for the spending, House of Commons Procedure and Practice, third edition, at page 873, indicates:

The Chair has maintained that estimates with a direct and specific legislative intent (those clearly intended to amend existing legislation) should come to the House by way of an amending bill.

My predecessors have addressed this issue in a number of different rulings. Speaker Jerome, in a ruling found on page 607 of the Journals of March 22, 1977, explained:

...the government receives from Parliament the authority to act through the passage of legislation and receives the money to finance such authorized action through the passage by Parliament of an appropriation act. A supply item in my opinion ought not, therefore, to be used to obtain authority which is the proper subject of legislation.

Nothing in the wording of vote 40, as I read it, seeks to amend existing legislation. The hon. member acknowledged as much in his intervention. He questioned whether the Treasury Board has the legal authority to spend for the purposes of the initiatives contained in vote 40. It is clear, however, from the vote wording that the funds are to be granted to the Treasury Board so that it can transfer them to other departments and agencies. As the hon. member himself concedes, the vote wording specifically says that expenditures of the funds must be for purposes “within the legal mandates of the departments or other organizations for which they are made.”

The hon. member's objection, really, is a matter about which department is seeking the funds. He does not feel it appropriate that Treasury Board requests money for a central fund on behalf of other departments or agencies. As I stated in my ruling on May 29, 2018, there is ample precedent for central funds. The hon. member for Elmwood—Transcona cited many of these in his intervention. While he argues that vote 40 is of a different nature than other central funds, I am not convinced that Treasury Board lacks the legal authority to manage it. As the hon. parliamentary secretary argued, this would require a rather narrow reading of the Financial Administration Act. I do not believe the vote can be ruled out of order on that basis.

Again, as I indicated in my earlier ruling, it is up to the government to determine the form its request for funds will take. It is for members to decide, in studying and voting on the estimates, whether or not the money should be granted. In the case of vote 40, some members may wish that the request had been in a different form. In the end, they are left to make a decision on the request as the government has presented it. The Chair's role is limited to determining if the request for funds is in a form that does not require any separate legislative authorization and if it respects the limits of the supply process.

This brings me to the final point raised by the hon. member for Elmwood—Transcona. He argued that certain initiatives do not appear to have existing legislative authority, but instead appear to be dependent on legislation currently before Parliament or yet to be introduced. Speaker Sauvé, in a ruling found at page 10546 of the Debates of June 12, 1981, indicated, “the Appropriation Act should only seek authority to spend the money for a program that has been previously authorized by a statute” and that, by seeking funds for programs where the legislation had not yet been introduced, the government was putting the cart before the horse.

On March 21, 1983, she addressed a similar matter. Vote 10c under Industry, Trade and Commerce in that year’s supplementary estimates provided for payments under the Small Business Investment Grant Act, which was still before the House in the form of Bill C-136. In ruling the vote out of order, she stated at page 23968 of the Debates:

Vote 10c clearly anticipates legislation and, in that sense, seeks to establish a new program in the absence of other legislative authority and seeks the funds to put it into operation.

The matter to be established, then, is whether existing legislative authority is lacking for the initiatives identified by the hon. member for Elmwood—Transcona. Absent this authority, it would be premature for the government to be seeking funds. Previous Speakers have noted that it is not always easy to identify the legislative authority for particular initiatives in the estimates. Unfortunately, the parliamentary secretary, in his response, did not directly address this point. This information would have been helpful for the Chair in determining whether such authority is lacking.

The hon. member asserted that, as the budget indicated that certain initiatives would be the subject of legislation, it follows that such initiatives should not receive funding through the estimates until that legislation is passed. It is not entirely clear to the Chair, however, that these activities have been shown to lack existing legislative authority. To take, for example, the matters relating to cybersecurity, according to annex 1 of the main estimates, the funds are to be transferred to the Communications Security Establishment, CSE, which has an existing legislative mandate under the National Defence Act. While Bill C-74 does indeed provide for the transfer of certain employees from other departments to the CSE, I believe that the CSE does have a mandate under existing legislation to spend for such purposes. Were the government proposing to grant funds to an organization not yet created or for an entirely new purpose, I believe there would be a valid objection, but that does not appear to be the case in the examples enumerated by the hon. member.

I must admit that, at the outset, the matters regarding Employment Insurance caused me some concern. The main estimates themselves explain, at page I-9 and I-10:

Costs related to Employment Insurance benefits and Children’s benefits are the largest components of the items excluded from the estimates. Most Employment Insurance costs are paid directly out of the Employment Insurance Operating Account, rather than a departmental appropriation, and are therefore not specifically included in estimates.

The authority to spend funds for the purposes of paying employment insurance benefits is statutory, pursuant to the Employment Insurance Act. It is not entirely clear why this request has been included in vote 40, whether it is truly additional funds or whether the amount has been included for information purposes. Regardless, the question to determine is whether legislative authority for the request is lacking. The hon. member for Elmwood—Transcona indicated that the funds were to make permanent an existing pilot project for people working while on claim. While the provisions in Bill C-74 make this change to the Employment Insurance Act, it is clear to me that there was legislative authority under the existing act for the pilot project.

While the hon. member raised important questions, Speakers have generally ruled items in the estimates to be irregular only when they clearly lacked a legislative basis or when the items themselves sought to amend existing legislation. I do not believe that to be the case with vote 40, and therefore I rule that it is indeed in order.

I appreciate the hon. member’s vigilance in ensuring that proper practices are followed regarding the estimates. As this is the first time the House has been presented with a budget implementation vote of this nature, it is important to ensure that the limits of the supply process are respected. That said, I also want to remind the hon. member of my ruling of June 4, 2018, when I underscored the importance of being concise when presenting a point of order. Even on a matter as complex as the estimates, it should not require multiple lengthy interventions to make one’s point. I am certain all hon. members will keep this in mind in preparing their arguments.

I thank hon. members for their attention.

[Privilege, June 7th, 2018]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised by the hon. member for Carleton on May 31, 2018, concerning the alleged intimidation of a potential witness by the office of the Minister of Finance.

I would like to thank the member for raising the matter, as well as the parliamentary secretary to the government House leader for his comments.

According to the member for Carleton, the Canadian Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, CAMIC, received two phone calls from the office of the Minister of Finance, which he claimed were intended to stop them from raising their objections to Bill C-74, either by meeting with parliamentarians or by appearing before committee. He surmised that these comments, which he characterized as threatening, might be why this association did not even express an interest in appearing as a committee witness.

In addition to questioning the timeliness of this question of privilege, the parliamentary secretary framed the matter as one of debate and contended that actions of a civil servant have not historically qualified as breaches of privilege.

The issue of timeliness is one that the Chair has raised on several occasions recently since it is a requisite condition that members must heed. In this instance, it is a valid issue to be raised again. This question could have, and should have, been brought to the attention of the House much earlier. The article from The Globe and Mail, dated May 15, 2018, in which the member for Carleton is quoted, suggests that he was aware of this matter as early as May 15. Additionally, it could have been raised at any point since May 22, when the House returned from a break week. The fact that the member for Carleton gave notice of his question of privilege a full week prior to actually rising in the House to make his case also suggests that he could have done so earlier.

House of Commons Procedure and Practice, third edition, explains at page 145 what is expected of members in this respect, when it states:

The matter of privilege to be raised in the House must have recently occurred and must call for the immediate action of the House. Therefore, the member must satisfy the Speaker that he or she is bringing the matter to the attention of the House as soon as practicable after becoming aware of the situation.

In the past, Speakers have chosen not to pursue further on a matter when it is not apparent that it is being raised at the earliest practicable time.

In fact, Speaker Sauvé determined, on March 1, 1982, in a ruling found at pages 15473 and 15474 of Debates, that a question raised by a member was not a breach of privilege, as it had not been raised at the earliest opportunity. She stated:

The first problem I have with this question of privilege is that it does not appear to have been raised at the earliest opportunity....

I must therefore decline to accord this matter precedence over the regular business of the House, particularly in view of the fact that it does not appear to have been raised at the earliest opportunity. This requirement is not a mere technicality, but indeed in some respects a test of the validity of the complaint.

Today the Chair can only come to the same conclusion. This matter was clearly not raised at the first opportunity; the member did not meet this requisite condition, and therefore the Chair will not comment further on it.

I thank all hon. members for their attention.

[Privilege, June 7th, 2018]

I am now prepared to rule on the question of privilege raised on May 24, 2018, by the hon. member for Langley—Aldergrove concerning proceedings at the Standing Committee on Human Resources, Skills and Social Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities.

I would like to thank the hon. member for Langley—Aldergrove for having raised this matter, as well as the hon. member for Battlefords—Lloydminster for her comments.

In raising the matter, the member for Langley—Aldergrove explained that the appearance of three ministers, who were at the committee to discuss the main estimates for the department of Employment and Social Development, was interrupted by a series of votes taking place in the House. According to the member, the chair of the committee had promised that committee members would be able to question the ministers after they returned from voting. However, after the committee meeting resumed and the ministers finished their presentations, the chair adjourned the meeting, leaving committee members unable to put any questions to the ministers. This, the member alleged, constituted a contempt of the House.

As I said when the matter was first raised, committees are masters of their own proceedings. The Speaker’s jurisdiction does not normally extend into committee matters, unless the committee sees fit to report one to the House. House of Commons Procedure and Practice, third edition, at pages 152 and 153 states:

Speakers have consistently ruled that, except in the most extreme situations, they will hear questions of privilege arising from committee proceedings only upon presentation of a report from the committee which deals directly with the matter and not as a question of privilege raised by an individual Member.

Furthermore, on March 23, 2015, my predecessor said at page 12180 of the Debates:

This is not to suggest that the Chair is left without any discretion to intervene in committee matters but, rather, it acknowledges that such intervention is exceedingly rare and justifiable only in highly exceptional procedural as opposed to political circumstances.

In my consideration of this alleged question of privilege, I assessed whether if this was indeed a highly exceptional procedural matter. Distilled down to its basic elements, it seems to me that this is a dispute as to the procedural correctness of how the meeting was conducted and, as such, is a matter that should be managed by the committee itself.

As an option, the hon. member for Langley—Aldergrove can still raise his grievance with the Standing Committee on Human Resources, Skills and Social Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities. For this reason, I cannot agree that the incident constitutes a prima facie question of privilege.

I thank members for their attention on this matter.

[Points of Order, June 6th, 2018]

I am now prepared to rule on the point of order raised earlier today by the member for Red Deer—Lacombe regarding the notice for time allocation given yesterday by the government House leader concerning Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters.

When raising the matter, the hon. member for Red Deer—Lacombe contended that nothing in the Standing Orders as written allowed a time allocation motion to cover both the report stage and third reading of a bill that had been sent to committee before second reading. To support his argument, the member referred specifically to Standing Order 78(3), which stipulates that a time allocation motion is allowed for both report stage and third reading only if the bill is sent to committee after second reading pursuant to Standing Order 76.1. Therefore, he asked the Speaker to rule the notice of time allocation motion out of order.

For guidance on this matter, I would refer members to House of Commons Procedure and Practice, third edition, at page 673, which states:

In the case of a bill referred to committee before second reading, the motion [for time allocation] can pertain to both the report stage and second reading stage as well as the third reading stage.

The member himself acknowledged that examples existed where precisely the same approach as was proposed in this time allocation motion was adopted by the House. I want to thank the hon. member for drawing the fact of these examples to my attention. Indeed, there have been at least four instances where this has occurred. I refer members to the precedents of May 6, 1996; another from November 22, 1996; one also from February 22, 2000; and, finally, one from May 28, 2015.

These precedents demonstrate that the House has seen fit to combine more than one stage in a single time allocation motion for bills that have been referred to committee prior to second reading. This forms a solid enough basis to indicate that this is now an acceptable practice with respect to time allocation motions. For this reason, I find that the government's time allocation motion is in order.

Nonetheless, I appreciate the hon. member's point. To avoid any further confusion, I would recommend that the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs review the matter, with a view to clarifying Standing Order 78(3)(a) vis-à-vis our accepted practices.

I thank the House for its attention on this matter.