Guy Caron

[Economic Action Plan 2014 Act, No. 2, October 29th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, since my time is limited and I will have to continue my speech tomorrow, I will split it into two parts. The first part will deal with the history of the government's budget bills, which are massive, mammoth omnibus bills. That is very disappointing, because all opposition parties feel that these bills are contrary to the spirit of Parliament and to the spirit of democracy that we should embody.

We do not have a problem with the tax measures, which make up the first three parts of this bill. These tax provisions implement the measures that were announced in the budget. We may or may not like these measures, but it makes sense for them to be included in a budget bill.

The other measures are the ones we have a major problem with. For example, how can they justify including changes to the electoral process in the Northwest Territories? What is that doing in a budget bill? Why would a budget bill include a measure enabling provinces to establish a mandatory residency period for refugee claimants applying for welfare? There would be no change to federal transfers one way or the other. Nothing justifies putting these measures in a budget bill.

I am outraged and offended that government members who want to be part of the government are not saying a word and are refusing to ask the government to be accountable to its citizens. The government, the executive, is made up of cabinet. The backbenchers and the rest of the Conservative caucus are not part of government.

When they stand up and say that their government did such-and-such a thing, they are failing to fulfill their duty as parliamentarians and MPs to demand accountability from their government about deeply undemocratic measures. I am not the only one saying that. Yesterday's Globe and Mail editorial perfectly summarized the unfairness and irregularity of these omnibus bills.

I truly hope that this bill gives them a chance to search their conscience regarding their own duty in terms of government accountability and transparency, which are essential to the work we need to accomplish here.

Bill C-43 is the federal government's second budget implementation bill. When we were studying the last omnibus budget implementation bill, I talked about a trend that seemed to be emerging in these omnibus bills. Indeed, I have noticed eight basic criteria that the government routinely adheres to when drafting these bills, and this trend continues in this bill.

The first criterion the government seems to adhere to concerns the huge size of the bills. This one is 460 pages long in English and in French. The bills introduced before 2009 that my colleague from Saanich—Gulf Islands was talking about were 100 pages in both languages. The Conservatives need to stop comparing by using the pretext that it is in both languages. We are comparing apples to apples.

We are therefore being asked to hastily review for adoption 460 pages and 401 clauses at the Standing Committee on Finance. This leads to many mistakes that later have to be corrected. Sometimes they are corrected in subsequent bills. In fact, this bill includes changes and corrections for mistakes that were made in previous bills. Sometimes these changes or corrections are made through the Senate.

These are mistakes that we pointed out in committee. We told them they would regret heading in this direction. I am thinking specifically about the bill that amended the process for appointing Quebec judges to the Supreme Court. We warned the government a number of times that it was heading in the wrong direction with this measure, which it tried to make retroactive in order to cover for the massive blunder it made in appointing Justice Nadon. The Conservatives did not listen.

This is the fifth budget bill that I have had the honour of studying and contributing to at the Standing Committee on Finance. We have studied more than 2,000 pages to date. We have moved hundreds of amendments, which were often constructive, but only one was adopted by the committee. Even then, the Conservative members made an amendment to the amendment.

This approach does not make sense. With such mammoth bills, which is the first criterion I mentioned, we cannot give every clause and every element of the bill the attention it requires, although that is a fundamental principle of how our government works.

The government's second criterion when drafting bills such as this one is that the bill amends at least a dozen laws. In this case, there are about 40 laws that are being created, eliminated or amended.

The third criterion consists of dealing with many subjects that have absolutely nothing to do with the budget process. This bill goes from the Judges Act to the Industrial Design Act to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, and even amends the Criminal Code and the electoral process in the Northwest Territories, as I mentioned. That has nothing to do with the budget. These measures could have been introduced separately. Some of the measures are not being challenged at all and could very easily have been passed by the House and, subsequently, perhaps even by the Senate. However, the government has decided to bring together these bills, which adds to the confusion that can arise when studying other provisions that are more directly related to the budget process.

The fourth criterion is that a Conservative omnibus bill must create new laws that once again have nothing to do with the budget process. In this case, a law is being created to establish a high Arctic research station. Why did the government not make the effort to sit down and draft a proper bill to create this station? Furthermore, this bill corrects another Conservative government decision to close a similar station located even further north in the Arctic. We suspect that the station was closed for ideological reasons and in order to deny the scientific truth. The Conservative government did not seem to like that research station's findings, many of which had to do with climate change.

The fifth criterion is that a Conservative omnibus bill must include provisions that concentrate power in the hands of a minister. That has been the case in every omnibus bill passed, and it is also true of Bill C-43. In this case, the Aeronautics Act will give more power to cabinet. The provisions of the new Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act will also give more power to cabinet. Once again, it seems as though these bills must include provisions that give a great deal more discretionary power to cabinet ministers.

One of the last three criteria for a Conservative omnibus budget bill is that the bill needs at least one legislative amendment to restrict workers' rights. This bill has one such amendment. To qualify, the bill also needs measures to restrict the rights of unions and immigrants, and lastly it needs a law and order measure. This bill has them all. All of these criteria are met. The government has created a model that prevents us from doing the job our constituents elected us to do. Our job is to provide oversight and hold the government accountable through one of the most fundamental acts of our Parliament: approving the budget.

Once again, I do not understand how members of Parliament who are not members of cabinet but are on the Conservative side can allow this nonsense, which is condemned throughout Canada's political society. I hope that those members will think about this. I will stop there and resume my speech tomorrow.

[Economic Action Plan 2014 Act, No. 2, October 29th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, I listened carefully to my colleague's speech.

She does not seem to realize that columnists, editorial writers and even journalists—whether they lean to the left, right or centre—all seem to agree. They are opposed to omnibus bills that distort the parliamentary process when they include measures that have nothing to do with the budget. I have a simple and clear question for the member, in the hopes of getting a clear answer.

The member is bragging about a measure to eliminate pay-to-pay billing practices in the telecommunications sector that require consumers to pay to get their bills. However, consumers will still have to pay to get a bank statement.

If she is so proud of this bill, why did she not insist that her government include this measure to fully protect consumers against this practice?

[The Budget, October 29th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, since growth in the oil industry is slowing and the manufacturing sector has stalled, we would have expected the Conservatives to use the budget implementation bill to breathe some life into the job market. However, all that they decided to do was to dip into the EI fund to finance a bad plan that has already been lambasted by the Parliamentary Budget Officer. Allocating $550 million to create 800 jobs is ridiculous.

How does the minister explain his inability to create jobs, especially in the manufacturing sector, when we have given him all kinds of suggestions?

[The Environment, October 28th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, the more we question the minister about what is happening in Cacouna, the more she convinces us that she does not know what is happening in her own department.

She misjudged the noise impact of the exploratory work in Cacouna, and now we have also learned that the proponent conducted penetration testing, which no one had heard of before.

How can the minister explain the fact that nothing was known about this testing or the noise impact of the work carried out off the coast of Cacouna?

[Canada-Korea Economic Growth and Prosperity Act, October 27th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, that is a very good question. It goes to the heart of one of the concerns I raised in my speech, namely the minimal resources the government allocated to such an important agreement. It doled out all kinds of resources to negotiate strategic agreements that are much less crucial than this one. At the end of the day, since the government eventually had to act swiftly to conclude this agreement that the United States and the European Union had concluded two years earlier, the government probably had to make a few concessions to sign the agreement quickly.

The question is important because it also allows me to respond to an argument I heard an hon. member and parliamentary secretary use, specifically that an investor state dispute settlement mechanism is the cornerstone of any trade agreement. Currently, the United States and the European Union are on the verge of entering into negotiations for which such a mechanism would not be included. We insist on having such an agreement, despite the fact that it could derail the trade agreement with the European Union. Germany and Austria do not support this agreement. The United States is entering into negotiations with this issue off the table and not negotiated.

The government will eventually have to get serious and carefully reflect on the criteria and the approach currently being used for negotiating trade agreements.

[Canada-Korea Economic Growth and Prosperity Act, October 27th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, it is not only a threat to exporters. Currency manipulation can have a tremendous impact on the global economy. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, there were large waves of currency market speculation, which seriously affected many economies, particularly in Southeast Asia. Those repercussions were also global.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was a massive devaluation of the Mexican peso, in part because of currency market manipulation. It had a serious impact on Mexico itself as well as the United States, which was Mexico's largest partner.

We need to be very careful. Canada needs to be vigilant as a country but also as a partner with many other major economies. I am thinking about the G20. We need to try to minimize the impact that speculation could have on the currency market and prevent this type of economic upheaval, which greatly affects the general public, but only benefits the speculators, who generally do not have the same concerns as the general public.

[Canada-Korea Economic Growth and Prosperity Act, October 27th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, these amendments would help reassure Canadians who are concerned about compliance with the investor state dispute settlement process.

With respect to NAFTA, some American investors filed lawsuits against Canada as a result of environmental regulations or legislation. Canada lost some of the lawsuits, but more importantly, ended up withdrawing the regulations or legislation to avoid the whole process.

As a result, the Canadian government and the provincial, territorial and municipal governments hesitate to enact legislation or make regulations for the common good, since they are afraid that they will be the target of a lawsuit because of the investor state dispute settlement process.

One of the two proposed amendments to reassure the Canadian public had to do with environmental regulations or legislation, but the Conservative government is clearly not interested in trying to alleviate the public's legitimate and serious concerns.

[Canada-Korea Economic Growth and Prosperity Act, October 27th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, this relevant question cannot be repeated enough to counter the misinformation that many government members want to spread about us.

The first criterion pertains to the level of democracy and respect for human rights, environmental rights and working conditions. These provisions are essential.

I found it interesting that a parliamentary secretary indicated that this criterion was part of the free trade negotiations with South Korea. However, why was it not included in the negotiations with Honduras, where human rights are clearly not respected? The situation in that country is far more urgent than that in South Korea, which is an excellent global citizen.

The first criterion should be essential when considering a free trade agreement, and it should even be a principle under which we include provisions that would allow the partner country to raise its standards in order to meet the conditions established by the future agreement. Right now, we are not using that tool even though we should be able to do so.

As for the two other conditions, it goes without saying that we should prioritize negotiating an agreement if the country is a strategically and economically important partner to Canada. At the end of the day, if these first two criteria are met, we look at the effect the agreement will have on the Canadian economy. Then we can decide whether we support this trade agreement.

[Canada-Korea Economic Growth and Prosperity Act, October 27th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise in the House to speak to Bill C-41, which will implement the free trade agreement between Canada and the Republic of Korea. I am very pleased because, honestly, our position makes me smile and laugh. As deputy international trade critic, I am pleased to confirm what our senior international trade critic said, and that is that we are going to support this bill to implement the trade agreement at third reading.

This makes me smile because, unlike what our opponents, the government members, like to say, we are not a party that is against international trade. We are not anti-trade, quite the contrary. If members want to ask me questions about that, they should also speak to the member with whom I have been communicating over the past two, three or four years on economic issues. They will see that as an economist, I am in favour of the principles of trade agreements and that the value of each trade agreement that we sign or negotiate must be assessed based on the content and details of that agreement.

Furthermore, I think that we cannot repeat often enough the basis on which the NDP, the official opposition, assesses these trade agreements. We have three criteria. The first pertains to the notions of democracy, respect for human rights, and respect for environmental rights and working conditions. When we signed NAFTA, or even the initial agreement between Canada and the United States, there was an entire section regarding environmental issues and respecting environmental rights and working conditions. However, only side agreements were signed, and they were not as restrictive. We then saw that very few complaints were lodged about NAFTA. Complaints were made regarding working and environmental conditions, but they did not end in a court decision. The process clearly has no teeth.

What we on this side of the House want is for the negotiation of trade agreements to be used as leverage with the country we are negotiating with in order to raise that country's environmental and democratic standards, as well as its standards related to human rights and working conditions.

We think this first condition is essential, which is why we repeatedly said that we opposed the agreement with Honduras, because the agreement did nothing to raise these standards.

The second condition is the economic and strategic value of the agreement in question. There is no denying that South Korea is a significant trade partner. South Korea is Canada's seventh-largest trade partner and its third-largest in Asia. The standard of living, or more specifically, the per capita income in Korea, if we evaluate it based on purchasing power, is about 75% of that of Canada, and that is rather significant. From a strategic standpoint, therefore, no one can deny the importance of South Korea.

More specifically in terms of agri-food, and because the region I am honoured to represent relies on agri-food for 12% of its economy, it is important to point out that South Korea is our fifth-largest partner in this area. In terms of current global exports, South Korea is as important as Germany or France as a trading partner. Exports are currently worth over $3 billion.

In fact, this brings several questions to mind. As I said at second reading, an internal memo from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade raised the problem that the government was squandering too many resources on issues that had less strategic value and that the resources were not available to negotiate and eventually conclude as agreement as important as the one with South Korea.

I think the government needs to seriously address this issue at some point, because putting these resources into an agreement with Honduras when our trade with that country is worth a little over $40 million and neglecting the negotiations for an agreement with a trade partner worth over $3 billion in exports is highly problematic in terms of the government's ability to effectively negotiate trade agreements. Thus, there can be no question about the economic and strategic value of the agreement.

This brings us to the third criterion we used to analyze the agreement: the actual terms. Obviously, the Standing Committee on International Trade did its job. I know that a number of members of the House also assessed the consequences of the agreement for our ridings and the economies of our regions. As with any trade agreement, certain sectors will benefit in the short and medium terms, while others will face economic challenges once this agreement is implemented.

I am going to talk about the advantages and disadvantages. As far as advantages are concerned, the beef industry will benefit rather quickly from the phasing out of the 40% tariffs imposed on that sector. Some members of the House have already mentioned that. The United States also opted to have this tariff phased out when it signed the agreement in 2012.

Our share of the beef market in South Korea has decreased tremendously because of our diminished competitiveness compared to the United States. Tariffs on the U.S. are currently 32% and are decreasing by 2.7% a year, while tariffs on our products are 40%. This is a real red flag. These market shares we are losing for our beef sector have to be recovered quickly.

In 2002, our beef exports to South Korea totalled $50 million. After the South Korean embargo was lifted in 2012 and the South Korean market was finally reopened, beef exports totalled $10 million. The following year, in 2013, these exports dropped to $7.5 million. The difference in tariffs has had a huge impact, and that is why we must use the agreement with South Korea to minimize and eventually compensate for and eliminate the competitive difference between Canadian and American exports.

The European Union and the United States signed agreements with South Korea in 2012 while our own negotiations lagged, mainly for lack of resources. This resulted in a 70% drop in our share of the agri-food market. However, it is an important sector of our trade with South Korea. It was quite irresponsible not to put enough resources into concluding an agreement with South Korea more quickly. It took 10 years to negotiate.

I was talking about the elimination of 40% tariffs on the beef industry. Tariffs of 18% on beef offal will eventually be eliminated. For pork, these tariffs can reach 25%, depending on the product. These tariffs will gradually decrease to allow our farmers to open up a market. This decrease will be welcomed in the pork industry in particular, since there is currently uncertainty in that sector as a result of our trade with Russia, which was a big consumer and importer of Canadian pork.

A number of areas stand to win, as pointed out by most of the people who came to the Standing Committee on International Trade. The aerospace sector the forestry sector, which is an important industry to my region and riding, stand to gain a lot. Furthermore, tariffs for various forestry products, which vary from 8% to 13%, will eventually be eliminated. Tariffs for other sectors, such as mining, transportation, fish and seafood, which could go as high as 50%, will also gradually be eliminated. Some sectors stand to benefit a lot. Furthermore, nearly 87% of all the tariff lines that imposed tariffs on our exports to South Korea will eventually be eliminated.

One of the reasons why we are supporting this agreement is that it is 100% reciprocal. Once again—and earlier I heard a speech that mentioned this—we need to consider South Korea's tariffs on Canadian products. They were much higher than Canada's tariffs on South Korean products. This will give our exporters access to a market that did not use to be as open to Canadians as the Canadian market was to South Koreans.

Obviously, if at some point we are unhappy with something in the agreement, if there are disputes about the effects of the agreement, there is always a way to renegotiate or revoke it. This, however, would take six months. Everything can be renegotiated.

We also raised concerns about the investor state dispute settlement mechanism, and I will come back to that. It is very important to have that six-month time period. It cannot be so long that it ties the hands of future governments—that is a fundamental principle of democracy—as is the case, for example, with the Canada-China foreign investment protection agreement, which is binding for 31 years.

In all of the trade agreements that we have signed in the past, that fundamental principle allowed us to renegotiate or open up the agreement to include or withdraw certain clauses, obviously with our partner's consent, over a six-month period or with six months' notice.

This new investor state dispute settlement mechanism contains more progressive transparency measures than previous incarnations. These measures are welcome. When it comes to the lack of transparency in the process, this is one element that really worries those who want to ensure that the recourse measures to ensure compliance with trade agreements are democratic and open.

The disadvantages have been talked about in committee and by the media. There are a number of risks related to the challenges facing the automobile and steel industries. A representative of Unifor, the main union representing auto workers, expressed his concerns about these agreements. This might come as a surprise, but the Canadian Council of Chief Executives had the same concerns. I should point out that we import around $3 billion worth of South Korean cars but export just $15 million worth of Canadian or Canadian-American cars.

This is a major concern for the union and the automobile industry. We had a 6.1% tariff on South Korean cars, but there was an 8% tariff on cars we exported to South Korea. The tariff was higher. That is not the only reason for the big difference, and people have pointed that out, but we still have to pay close attention to the auto sector and the impact of this agreement on it. As I said, the Canadian Council of Chief Executives has recognized this particular challenge. In committee, it suggested that we should develop a special strategy for the auto sector vis-à-vis the Korean market for automakers. Here is what it said:

...that Canadian auto and auto parts manufacturers are positioned for success. Such a strategy could examine exports, two-way foreign direct investment, and non-tariff barriers as well as cooperation with other major auto and auto parts exporting nations that have free trade agreements with Korea, to ensure an open market for foreign products.

This specific problem for the auto industry was raised by the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, among others, and must be taken seriously. In fact, this was included in one of the amendments that we tried to propose. We proposed it at the Standing Committee on International Trade and it was rejected by the government members on the committee. We proposed five amendments and they were all rejected.

There is a lot of talk about the investor state dispute settlement mechanism, but that is not the only thing we proposed. The government could have accepted entirely reasonable aspects, such as sending a Canadian mission to South Korea to oversee the implementation of the agreement and report on the progress of that implementation. In fact, I asked the member for Huron—Bruce about that. This mission should report regularly, every year, until it is no longer necessary to do so.

The government members rejected this idea. Again, to reassure those who might be concerned about this, we proposed an amendment whereby no environmental law could be repealed or amended in order to increase investment. These are laws for the common good. These are the environmental protections the public called for and we recommended, not to put up an obstruction or a non-tariff barrier, but truly for the common good. The government refused.

The measures we proposed sought to respond to the concerns we on this side of the House are hearing. The last amendment we proposed responded precisely to the request by Unifor and the Canadian Council of Chief Executives; it was aimed at developing a strategy to help the auto industry and the steel industry meet the challenges that the implementation of this trade agreement will present.

In closing, I would like to speak to this issue of the investor state dispute settlement mechanism. I heard the parliamentary secretary say that this was the cornerstone of every trade agreement that has been and will be negotiated by Canada.

There is no international consensus. Many countries are asking questions about the validity, usefulness and relevance of this mechanism. The first time it was proposed in the context of trade negotiations was for NAFTA, in response to concerns that Canadian and American investors had regarding the strength and soundness of the Mexican legal system, in particular. That is where the idea of an external mechanism came from. No one said that this had to be done behind closed doors, but that is what happened. No one was supposed to say that the Canadian or American legal system had not been used. However, this agreement goes beyond Canadian and American legal powers. The fact remains that it was originally in response to the perceived lack of soundness of one of our trade partners, namely, Mexico in this case.

This issue can also come up in the negotiation of trade agreements that we, as a party, if we formed the government, might negotiate less aggressively than this government is doing. I am thinking of countries like Honduras and Panama and other countries we do business with that not only have serious problems when it comes to human rights, environmental rights and working conditions, but also have legal systems of dubious soundness and impartiality.

Is that the case with South Korea? I do not think so. Is that the case with the European Union? I do not think so. Should we automatically include an investor state dispute resolution mechanism in situations where our trading partners have respected, impartial systems that can serve as tribunals in the event of any investor complaints regarding what is perceived as an impediment to investments or profitability, which would ultimately be a non-tariff barrier?

This mechanism remains controversial and will continue to be debated. I categorically reject the government's contention that this is the cornerstone of the agreement. On the contrary, in the months and years to come, we will see more and more countries raising concerns and asking questions about the relevance of automatically having such mechanisms in every agreement. As I mentioned, the new president of the European Commission and countries such as Austria and Germany are beginning to publicly air their concerns.

Nevertheless, we support Bill C-41 at third reading stage. We support the principle of the agreement with South Korea, which may not be the agreement we would have negotiated but, for the time being, satisfies the three criteria we use to assess the relevance and desirability of a trade agreement. We will gladly vote for this bill.

[Canada-Korea Economic Growth and Prosperity Act, October 27th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from Huron—Bruce.

Of course, this is a new agreement designed to foster good trade relations with South Korea.

Given that this is very important and that there were some problems, particularly in terms of non-tariff barriers, would the member support a decision by the House or the Standing Committee on International Trade to create a regular mission to monitor progress on the implementation of the free trade agreement between Canada and South Korea to ensure that the implementation is proceeding properly?