Mr. Speaker, point one is that Bill C-22 would give police and CSIS clear, court-authorized tools aligned with Supreme Court decisions such as Spencer and Bykovets. Two key tools worth highlighting in those decisions were, first, confirmation of service, or a simple yes-or-no confirmation of which service provider holds a specific identifier. This does not reveal personal information and does not replace judicial authorization. Second is subscriber information production orders. These allow police, with a judge's approval, to obtain basic identifying information, nothing more, so investigations can actually proceed.
The bill would also clarify the ability to accept voluntarily provided information, such as tips or victim reports. It would codify exigent circumstances so police could act quickly in genuine emergencies. It would also create smarter tools for international co-operation, reflecting that data does not stop at borders.
Point two is technical capability. It would not be new powers as only technical capabilities would be expanded. Bill C-22 would ensure that electronic service providers have the technical ability to comply with existing warrants and court orders. That is critical. The bill would create no new surveillance powers, which is very important, as this was crafted to ensure that it would not be giving police access to something that would jeopardize people's constitutional rights. It would not allow warrantless access, nor mass surveillance, direct access or back doors. Access to content, browsing history or social media activity would not allowed with Bill C-22.
Every disclosure would require lawful authorization. Providers themselves would supply the information. If a cybersecurity concern arises, judicial review for this would be built in to Bill C-22. There would also the strong oversight and accountability I mentioned. Bill C-22 would embed judicial oversight, intelligence commissioner approval for ministerial orders and public annual reporting. A mandatory parliamentary review after three years would be essential to see if the goals of Bill C-22 are being achieved or if changes are needed in one way or the other.
This is how responsible legislation is done. The privacy and the charter I mentioned earlier are extremely important. In Bill C-22, privacy and public safety would not be opposing values. They would be mutually reinforcing. Bill C-22 would narrow definitions of subscriber information and explicitly exclude content. It would limit data retention to metadata for a maximum of one year, respond directly to Supreme Court jurisprudence and add more transparency than exists today.
This bill would not lower constitutional standards, as I mentioned earlier. It would clarify them so police, providers and courts all operate with certainty and consistency. If we do nothing, we leave investigations in a grey zone, where they are today, and where accountability is weaker and not stronger.
Some have suggested that this bill would go too far. Others claim it would not go far enough. This tells me this legislation is carefully balanced. To be clear, Bill C-22 would not authorize access to emails, content or web browsing history. It would not create secret surveillance powers. It would respond to real operational gaps identified by police, child protection experts and national security professionals.
I am thankful for the opportunity to speak on Bill C-22. It is an important bill that is endorsed by police chiefs, frontline officers and child protection organizations. We have been very clear: Digital evidence is essential, and today it is far too often out of reach to help accomplish the goals we have today.