Mr. Speaker, thank you for this opportunity to speak to Bill C-299.
As a member of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, I have worked on this bill with my 11 other colleagues to look at its strengths and weaknesses.
I must say that I understand where the hon. member for Kootenay—Columbia is coming from. I am sensitive to that and I absolutely do not doubt his desire to improve things.
Unfortunately, the bill before us may not have the scope or produce the results that my colleague is looking for. I think that is a shame.
I will provide two sound reasons why we strongly oppose the passage of this bill.
When we look at case law and the sentences handed down in court, we see that the sentences far exceed the five-year minimum proposed in this bill. The minimum sentence of five years has no practical purpose. It is almost impossible to find a case where the sentence was less than five years.
When we go back a number of years, we can see that generally, sentences imposed in similar cases ranged between 12 years and 14 years. That is what one of our witnesses, retired Supreme Court Justice John C. Major, told us during the work of the committee. In addition to confirming that he did not find a sentence that was less than 10 years for this type of crime no matter how far back he looked, the honourable justice questioned the purpose of including a minimum sentence in the legislation.
I must say that this concept, this option, lends itself to discussion. I am perfectly open to that. It is not a problem at all to think it may be useful to contemplate mandatory minimum sentences for certain categories of crime. Unfortunately, hon. members opposite do so too systematically, without any basis. They do not rely on experience, or on research that support the fact that it is good to have mandatory minimum sentences for certain categories of crime.
I can even mention the R. v. Mills case, in 1998, in which a court of appeal judge decided, after reviewing the accused's conviction, to reduce from 13 years to 11 years the sentence that had been imposed and which was significantly longer than the five years proposed in Bill C-299.
Therefore, the concern raised by the member for Kootenay—Columbia is totally unjustified.
The second reason is the deterrent effect invoked in many bills amending—or dare I say “altering”—the Criminal Code. Unfortunately, this deterrent effect has never been clearly shown in our work.
Of course, I am not referring to belief, which is one thing. I must admit that some witnesses firmly believed in the deterrent value of a mandatory minimum sentence in the act. Our work in committee also clearly showed it, and this was even supported by Michel Surprenant, who was representing the Murdered or Missing Persons' Families Association.
Mr. Surprenant talked about the most despicable, the most shocking aspect of a child abduction, namely the sexual assault. He said that sexual predators ignored logic and were primarily, if not exclusively, guided by their instinct.
This raises a question. If we follow Mr. Surprenant's reasoning, no sexual predator will take into account this kind of clause, even if it is included in the Criminal Code, since he will never have it in mind. Rather, he will be guided by his instinct.
I think this is somewhat simplistic. During our work, we often received confirmation from experts that the typical criminal, regardless of the category of crime, does not act thinking he may get caught in the act. He always thinks he can commit a crime with impunity, without ever being caught. Therefore, since criminals believe they can get away it, why include this type of clause as a deterrent?
I would like to add to that the fact that in the course of our work, some of my colleagues unfortunately demonstrated a degree of confusion when they attempted to support arguments of this kind. For example, my colleague from Delta—Richmond-East cast doubt on the value of studies conducted in the United States on minimum sentences of up to 20 years. When she questioned our witness, Michael Spratt, he clearly stated that no studies in the United States had been able to demonstrate that a 20-year minimum sentence had a deterrent impact. How then could a five-year minimum sentence have such an impact? Unfortunately, this did not convince my colleague. I therefore leave her to her own reasoning, and to her conscience, because I do not want to give people a false sense of security.
Confusion reigned for my colleague from Brampton West as well, who in speaking of deterrence confused it with the restraint represented by incarceration. During the appearance of one of our witnesses, the member for Brampton West interrupted frequently to say that incarceration was deterrence when it is nothing of the kind. Those who are incarcerated cannot do harm, but prior to incarceration, the threat thereof is not a deterrent.
From my standpoint, it is rather unfortunate to see this bill go forward, when a rather serious study is known to have shown that it might give people a false sense of security.
I call upon my colleagues in this House to consider this unintended impact and the possibly very harmful effects it might have, and to reject Bill C-299. The problem is not the Criminal Code, but rather the mechanisms used to implement it within society.