Evidence of meeting #10 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 39th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was weapons.
4:05 p.m.
Chairman, Middle Powers Initiative
I shall answer in English if you do not mind.
4:05 p.m.
Chairman, Middle Powers Initiative
We have confidence that Atomic Energy of Canada Limited is maintaining the strictest standards with respect to CANDU reactors.
The Middle Powers Initiative does not take a position on the efficacy of nuclear power. Rather, we recognize that the non-proliferation treaty guarantees access to nuclear power by states. We thus feel that the International Atomic Energy Agency and its inspection facilities need to be strengthened and more strongly supported financially than is now the case.
But with respect to CANDU reactors, we do not have a position on that.
4:05 p.m.
Conservative
4:05 p.m.
Conservative
Peter Van Loan Conservative York—Simcoe, ON
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Canada has obviously depended strongly on the international architecture of nuclear arms control to protect and safeguard our own security; I think everybody takes that as a given. In case there's any doubt, the four priorities you laid out to us in your report are consistent with this government's practice and policies.
I will say this: I'm concerned with suggestions that proliferation is in some way justified by the fact that the nuclear powers have not yet fully disarmed. To fuel that kind of discussion is almost to give an excuse and justification for proliferation activities. I think one has to be very careful about encouraging that, suggesting that, and justifying that, because it really plays into the hands of proliferation.
If that were the case, the reality we have seen is that the most troubling proliferation activities actually happened as we've had the greatest amount of disarmament happen among the permanent nuclear powers. That aside, we also see that the worst proliferation problems have happened outside of the non-proliferation treaty countries--those who have withdrawn, with the possible exception, of course, of Iran, which is in there but is being defiant.
In terms of those countries that are outside and in which we've seen proliferation occur, in your report I'm not sure I see the answer for those biggest troubles. Even if we proceeded on all the paths you lay out there, I'm not sure we're going to address the concerns about that kind of proliferation in those countries. I'm wondering if anybody has something to offer on that front.
4:10 p.m.
President, Global Security Institute, Middle Powers Initiative
Which countries are you talking about?
4:10 p.m.
Conservative
Peter Van Loan Conservative York—Simcoe, ON
Well, all the countries that we've seen participate in proliferation--Korea, for example, which withdrew, and others who were never in.
4:10 p.m.
President, Global Security Institute, Middle Powers Initiative
Let's take Korea. Had the suggestions with respect to the withdrawal provisions been in effect, that would have addressed Korea. We've learned from that. I think some of the suggestions—
4:10 p.m.
Conservative
Peter Van Loan Conservative York—Simcoe, ON
Then there were others who were never parties. Is that correct?
4:10 p.m.
President, Global Security Institute, Middle Powers Initiative
In addition to North Korea, which dropped out, three countries have not joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: India, Pakistan, and Israel.
India for many years challenged the nuclear non-proliferation regime by saying that they would only join if they saw bona fides that you were going to move towards disarmament. They said they were one-sixth of the world's population, and as long as nuclear weapons were a currency of power, they wouldn't renounce them until they knew that there was going to be universal progress.
4:10 p.m.
Conservative
Peter Van Loan Conservative York—Simcoe, ON
That's exactly the justification I talked about. The reality is that we're seeing a great movement towards disarmament in the past decade.
4:10 p.m.
President, Global Security Institute, Middle Powers Initiative
There has been huge quantitative movement, but there hasn't been the consistent unequivocal commitment to getting there. I agree with you fully that proliferation is bad in all respects.
Dr. Blix described it very well. He said that nuclear weapons are very bad in the hands of irresponsible states, but nuclear weapons themselves are bad in anybody's hands, and a state that could be responsible this year may in the future not necessarily be responsible.
We're not by any means justifying proliferation by the failure of the nuclear-weapons states to move rapidly. We're only saying that to strengthen the non-proliferation regime means to fulfill the threat-reduction steps that will also reduce the threat and give more security to the nuclear-weapons states. The same process of reducing the threat will also strengthen the non-proliferation regime and move us in the right direction, so these are not really opposed concepts.
4:10 p.m.
Chairman, Middle Powers Initiative
Mr. Van Loan, the situation is like this: the 27,000 nuclear weapons in the world constitute a volcano. These other states like North Korea and Iran are flashpoints off that volcano. The volcano could erupt at any time, and that's what we're being warned about.
Naturally we want to stop any country whatsoever from obtaining nuclear weapons--period--but it is unrealistic to think that other states in the world, as we proceed through the 21st century, will not wish to acquire nuclear weapons as instruments as power if the nuclear-weapons states themselves do not follow their legal obligations in the non-proliferation treaty. That's what this issue is really all about.
We must enforce the legal base of the non-proliferation treaty in insisting--which the International Court of Justice has done--that the nuclear-weapons states enter into comprehensive negotiations leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Nobody's saying this can be done overnight--it's technically impossible--but not to start down that road and show the good faith--which is the word used at article VI--is to signal to the world that nuclear weapons are indeed going to be important for political power.
4:10 p.m.
Conservative
Peter Van Loan Conservative York—Simcoe, ON
I think anybody could look at it and say that we've had significant reductions, and that represents some good faith and it is positive. I don't want to dwell on that aspect of it; I really want to dwell on what do you do to those folks outside of the regime. I don't really think Pakistan and India look at each other and say that Russia or the United States is a threat. I'm not sure that Israel thinks that China is the threat. I think there are other reasons why countries see nuclear weapons as a source of power. If they're outside the regime, what can be done to bring them to heel? That's the original question I had for you. I didn't see an answer here. Is there an answer to that?
4:15 p.m.
Ambassador and Chairman, Bipartisan Security Group, Middle Powers Initiative
The existence of these three unregulated nuclear arsenals outside the NPT has been a problem for many years. Now we have a fourth, North Korea. To do something about this should be the very highest item on the agenda. The agreement that the United States has negotiated with India, at least in part, is motivated by that effort.
I personally have significant problems with the agreement in its current form, but I do support the objective of the agreement, to try to bring India into the international non-proliferation system.
Pakistan and Israel are very tough cases, but I have written an article about how this could be accomplished. It appeared in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 2004. We don't have time to go into it now, but I believe there are diplomatic solutions that could bring these countries at least into a relationship with the non-proliferation regime. They're not going to give up their arsenals overnight. We could bring them into a relationship with the regime and have them regulated in some way, have some limits on them.
If you're really interested, I'll send you a copy of the article.
4:15 p.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson
Yes, Mr. Graham, perhaps you wouldn't mind sending the committee a copy of that report.
4:15 p.m.
Ambassador and Chairman, Bipartisan Security Group, Middle Powers Initiative
I'll do that.
4:15 p.m.
NDP
Wayne Marston NDP Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON
I want to thank the committee for coming here today. It's a reminder and a hope, combined, for those of us who lived through the missile crisis over forty years ago, and not sleeping those nights for the number of days that was occurring and all the images that conjures back up for us.
What I'm concerned about is this. We're dealing with North Korea and Iran, and people there have a great fear. Are these weapons political weapons for them, instruments of power, as you indicated? Or is there an assessment anywhere on their possible support for non-government actors to get out there to deliver something to North America? This is the common person's fear that's out there today.
4:15 p.m.
Ambassador and Chairman, Bipartisan Security Group, Middle Powers Initiative
The common person's fear is that there are non-state actors out there who may deliver nuclear devices onto the North American continent. I think that's a very real concern. It's one that's worried me for years. There are so many ways it could happen. Former President Clinton used to say the easiest way to do it would be to put a nuclear weapon inside a baie of marijuana and it would get right in. It could come in pieces and be assembled here.
The first line of defence is intelligence. We should not skimp the money that we put into intelligence. That is absolutely the first line. The second line is we have to work as closely as possible with other countries to interdict any such attempts and to know what's going on out there and try to stop it from happening. Having said all that, if we don't strengthen the non-proliferation treaty and make it a worldwide instrument, if we don't get rid of the fissile material in Russia, if we don't do something about the incredibly dangerous situation in Pakistan, if we don't do something about failed and failing states worldwide, eventually it will happen.
4:15 p.m.
Chairman, Middle Powers Initiative
Mr. Marston, your question is extremely important. In 2000, at the NPT review of that year, the states parties grappled with the question of terrorists' use of nuclear weapons. They came to this conclusion, and they wrote it into their document, and all 188 states parties signed on to the following sentence: “...the only absolute guarantee against the use of a nuclear weapon is the elimination of nuclear weapons”. And that's the point we want to stress with the Canadian government that is today rightly concerned about questions of security. Among the Canadian government's concerns about security should be terrorist acquisition and use of nuclear weapons.
4:20 p.m.
Ambassador and Chairman, Bipartisan Security Group, Middle Powers Initiative
I agree with what Senator Roche just said. For the committee's information, there are many people in the United States, former very senior government officials in the Reagan and first Bush administrations, who share that view. There has been a series of meetings and attempts to see if a critical mass could be brought together to actually take serious steps in the direction of elimination. I would recommend to you, and I'll send this to the committee too, an op-ed article by Ambassador Max Kampelman, who was President Reagan's nuclear arms negotiator, generally to this effect.
4:20 p.m.
Conservative
4:20 p.m.
NDP
Wayne Marston NDP Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON
Really, the heart of my question was whether there has been an assessment of those particular states, North Korea and Iran, as to whether these are power weapons for them only or whether there's a maliciousness there to support non-governmental forces or the terrorists.
