Foreign Affairs Committee on June 13th, 2006

[Dr. Thomas Graham]

I could give my personal judgment on that, which is worth the exact amount I'm going to charge the committee for it.

For North Korea, I think they see it as a way of survival. For Iran, I think it's a weapon of prestige.

[The Rt. Hon. Kim Campbell]

Could I just add that I think it's important to understand that if a weapon from any of these countries wound up in the hands of a terrorist, it would involve the most extraordinary retribution against that country. It would be a huge gamble. Even Afghanistan's harbouring of Osama bin Laden—it didn't involve nuclear weapons, but just harbouring him—involved massive military intervention there. It would be a huge gamble for a state to think it could provide that kind of weaponry to a terrorist group and not have it detected.

It's more a question of the theft, the accidental use, or the kind of activity that, for example, happened with A.Q. Khan in Pakistan that is really very worrisome.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Ms. Campbell.

Mr. Obhrai. And I stand corrected: Mr. Obhrai was here in 1997 and 1999 and was part of that report as well.

Mr. Obhrai.

[Deepak Obhrai, Conservative, Calgary East, AB]

Thank you. Thank you for noticing.

Of course, we had dinner yesterday and we discussed the situation in the Soviet Union. But I think the main point here is that the Middle Power Initiative is a good initiative. Everything is right. One would be foolish to say one wouldn't support the elimination of nuclear weapons, specifically when we discuss the matter you've just discussed, about terrorists getting their hands on nuclear weapons, or failed states getting nuclear weapons.

However, events are going in a different direction, specifically with the five permanent members who under the NPT have obligations that you have just mentioned, which they have failed to fulfill. This gives an impression to the other countries, as recently as France's saying it would have no hesitation in using nuclear weapons, in reference to terrorist attacks.

China just said that in light of the nuclear agreement and cooperation between the U.S. and India, China would start cooperating with Pakistan to do the same, so suddenly you have this other side of the executive committee nucleus coming out.

This agreement between India and the U.S. is quite interesting, really, if you go down into it deeper. I understand your saying the Americans want the Indians to come into the other agreements, such as the non-proliferation treaty. Nonetheless, it is a challenge out there that the direction.... I honestly believe the direction the U.S.A. has taken in reference to India was that of its own self-interest and had nothing to do with elimination. It was all self-interest, and now you are saying these things are happening.

Taking all these new developments that are taking place, which are totally going in a different direction from what we are discussing here today, what do you think? Do we really need to focus on this, or do we really need to take them into account and ask how can we make the world safer, taking these new developments into account?

[Jonathan Granoff]

The perception of the direction, of course, depends on where you sit. For example, the United States did put forward the proposition that we need a fissile material cut-off treaty. The rest of the world needs to say it agrees with that, this is the right direction, and we need to make it verifiable. That way, we'll be able to help safeguard ourselves from terrorists getting this material.

The steps that will make us safer and the steps that will corrode the regime happen to be very close to each other right now. In other words, a treaty between the United States and Russia that's not verifiable I say undermines the legitimacy of international law. But a treaty that is verifiable will strengthen it. So this issue of verification, which is an issue in which Canada has some expertise and has a record of advocacy, is extremely important.

If the agreement with India were coupled with a fissile material cut-off, coupled with a comprehensive test ban treaty, coupled with India agreeing to abide by the article VI commitments of the NPT, thus roping India into the process of the historical movement toward downgrading nuclear weapons and eliminating them, then it's a positive step. On the other hand, if those elements are not there, it cuts to the core of the regime. So we are at a turning point.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations said a few weeks ago that we are at a crisis point right now in which one route is going to strengthen multilateral cooperative security based on the rule of law and another route is going to unravel this regime. We are at a point now in which decisions that are made are going to affect our future in irreversible ways. That's what we're asking everybody to do, focus on strengthening those norms that can make us safer.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Granoff.

We want to get to Mr. Patry. You only have a couple of minutes.

[Bernard Patry, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Thank you.

The 1995 review conference was a good one. In the year 2000 there was a useful consensus. In 2005 there was total failure. What's going to happen in five years from now, four years, in the year 2010, nobody knows about that. God knows.

My question is, how can international communities address the fact that countries mis-signed the NPT as a means of developing civilian nuclear expertise and can simply withdraw from the treaty on nuclear weapons? That's my question now.

I have a second question going back to the fissile material cut-off treaty. Obviously, you mentioned this. It's one of your four priorities that you gave us. You say:

Emphasize the need to start negotiations on a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty and contribute Canadian expertise on verification.

We heard all about this.

My question concerning this is the following. You also stated:

To take advantage of the opening discussed below, middle power countries should explore creative ways to overcome the stalemate.

What do you mean? Could you explain about the creative ways, because we seem to be in something of a deadlock for the moment.

[Douglas Roche]

Thank you, Mr. Patry. I'll try to answer the elements of your questions briefly.

First of all, you mentioned 2010, the next review conference of the NPT. The Middle Powers Initiative takes the view that the NPT cannot withstand two failed conferences in a row. It failed in 2005. What are we doing about it? What are the creative initiatives, as you have mentioned?

For our part, we have started an article VI forum of 25 states that are like-minded; they're non-nuclear and like-minded. They want to move ahead on the agenda that we have been describing here. We are providing a forum for them. We met at the United Nations last October, then we went to The Hague in the Netherlands in March, for two days. Now, with the support of the Government of Canada, we are coming here at the end of September.

I want to state parenthetically to Mr. Wilfert--I owe you the answer about the parliamentarians--that every member of this committee will receive an invitation to attend the article VI forum on September 28 and 29. It will be opened the evening before by Hans Blix, the author of this outstanding report.

Finally, on the breakout from the treaty, we want to ensure that the loophole in the NPT is closed. That loophole is that states can, through the NPT, use their access to nuclear technology and then can use it to make a bomb. We want that stopped. The only way to get cooperation of states who have an inalienable right to access nuclear energy and the only way to close the loophole is to have the major powers show that they are also living up to their commitments. The only way the NPT can survive is if there's a balanced implementation of the responsibilities for disarmament as well as non-proliferation.

[The Rt. Hon. Kim Campbell]

I would just add that my colleague Mr. Graham was speaking today about the fact that there are also new technologies for nuclear power that are non-proliferative. That may be something we need to try to bring into a regime as well to protect it, because the point you make is a very good one.

[Dr. Thomas Graham]

That's right, Mr. Chairman. There's a new type of nuclear fuel available that you can't make weapons from. Down the road there are going to be new types of power reactors that are similarly non-proliferative. So technology is advancing in a positive way.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you so much for coming here. I think all committee members would agree that an hour is just not long enough for this type of topic, so we also appreciated the opportunity to get together a little bit last night.

We would welcome you back, and we look forward to September. Thank you for coming.

I should also mention that Tom Hockin, former Minister of Trade, just walked in. Welcome to our committee.

We will suspend and reconvene in a few minutes, so don't do a lot of visiting or running around.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

I call this meeting back to order.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are studying Canada's role in complex international intervention that involves multiple foreign policy instruments focusing on Canada's efforts in Haiti.

We're pleased to have with us today, from the Parliamentary Centre, Robert Miller, executive director; and Joseph Kira, program director, Canada.

Welcome to our foreign affairs and international development committee. We would appreciate hearing testimony from you for about 10 to 15 minutes. Then we will go to questions and answers.

The time is yours. Welcome.

[Robert Miller, Executive Director, Parliamentary Centre]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We are pleased to have this opportunity to testify before the Committee. For me, it is a special pleasure because for the better part of ten years I served as an advisor to the Committee, in the days when it was known as the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

Our presentation today will consist of two parts. I will begin by presenting some of the lessons learned by the international community in conducting what the committee has called complex interventions, and principles for strengthening Parliament, specifically our mandate or mission, in so-called failed and fragile states. My colleague, Joseph Kira, will then describe our experience to date in laying the groundwork for a parliamentary strengthening program in Haiti. I'll then briefly conclude by stressing the importance of Canadian parliamentary engagement in complex interventions, specifically in Haiti.

Let me begin by saying that the centre welcomes the study being undertaken by the committee, with particular reference to Haiti. Situations like Haiti are especially complex in three distinct ways that are important for policy-makers.

First of all, they demand a wide range of interventions, including security, development, and diplomacy. We're all familiar with that. Secondly, they are highly unpredictable situations because of multiple forms of insecurity and political instability. They're unpredictable especially for the people of the country, but for those who work in the country as well, it introduces a note of risk and insecurity to what in other circumstances are normal operations. Finally, they entail unusually high risks for the intervening countries, Canada included.

The Parliamentary Centre, just to situate our presentation, was established in 1968 to assist the Parliament of Canada in fields of policy related to international relations. As I mentioned, for almost a decade I served as an adviser to this committee.

In the early 1990s we began to undertake parliamentary strengthening programs internationally. Today we are carrying out such programs in Asia, Africa, eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas. In the course of doing this work, we found ourselves in numerous countries that have experienced internal conflict and suffered prolonged political instability. Examples include Cambodia, Ethiopia, Lebanon, and Serbia. Recently our work, much of which has been supported by the Canadian International Development Agency, has taken us to Sudan, and now to Haiti.

Before we turn specifically to the Haiti case, let me say something about the broader international context in which this work takes place. The members of this committee are all too familiar with the failures of international engagement in failed and fragile states. What is less well known is that out of that immensely painful experience have come some lessons learned about how to conduct such interventions. The challenge remains to apply those lessons more effectively and consistently.

For the next few minutes I'd like to draw your attention to two documents that we have submitted to the committee. The first is an OECD document summarizing principles for good international engagement in fragile states, known as the “Learning and Advisory Process on Difficult Partnerships”. I cite this because Canada has been an active and even leading participant in developing these proposals, and has prepared a detailed case study on Haiti.

I want to briefly comment on a few points in that document. The first of these is the emphasis on context.

One of the lessons learned from a generation of work in these situations is that attempting to apply the same rules and experience to all situations is self-destructive. It's particularly important in the area in which we work to recognize different constraints of capacity and political will. Much of the attention of the international community is paid to building capacity, but too little attention is paid to strengthening political will. Obviously, a project that focuses on Parliament will be preoccupied with that.

The second point I want to emphasize is the centrality of state-building as an objective in these interventions. To paraphrase from the document, state-building rests on three pillars: the capacity of state structures to perform core functions, basic functions of providing infrastructure, education, and health care services to their citizens; the legitimacy and the accountability of those state structures; and the ability to provide an enabling environment for strong economic performance. Of these pillars of state reconstruction, the requirement for legitimacy and accountability demands more attention than it commonly receives.

The third point that I would emphasize from these principles is the importance of coherence between donor government agencies--that is to say, taking Canada as an example, between the various parts of the Canadian government. Close links on the ground between the political security, economic, and social spheres require policy coherence within the administration of each international actor. Our comment here is that this principle must be extended to both governmental and non-governmental actors, such as the Parliamentary Centre, because many of the programs of reconstruction and engagement in these states are actually delivered not by the government, but by non-governmental actors.

The fourth broad principle of intervention in these states that I will emphasize is to act fast but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance. Assistance to fragile states needs to be capable of flexibility at short notice. Capacity development in core institutions will normally require an engagement of at least ten years. Our comment is that donor decision-making processes are often still too slow to meet the needs of complex interventions, and project timeframes are still too short.

With those broad principles in mind, let me just briefly say something about guidelines as they apply to working with parliaments in crisis prevention and recovery situations. There are three points that I would highlight.

First of all, following conflict, elections should never be viewed as an exit strategy for external actors. Elections are part of a process for furthering democratic governance and may be rendered meaningless if support for democratic institutions such as parliaments is inadequate or ill-conceived. Our comment here is that although the situation has improved somewhat, the international community still focuses disproportionate amounts of attention and resources on elections, compared with building the capacity of other democratic institutions such as parliaments.

Secondly, after conflict, parliamentary institutions often remain weak in relationship to the executive, armed groups, and other non-state actors. Building effective democratic governance requires correcting this imbalance. External actors have a role to play assisting in the timely strengthening of parliaments.

I would mention that when the international community created its framework agreement for Haiti, initially no attention at all was put on the reconstruction of the parliament or the critical role of parliament in achieving some of the broad objectives of the strategy. It was Canada that came forward and said this is something that's being neglected and something that we ourselves as a country will support.

Third and lastly, legitimately elected parliaments provide a forum for the concerns of diverse actors, as people around this table know, including women and minority groups, forums where those groups can air and incorporate their concerns in processes of dialogue, reconstruction, and conflict resolution.

As a comment, special attention should be paid in parliamentary strengthening programs to broadening and deepening the participation of the poor and the marginalized. Obviously that's especially critical in a country like Haiti, where the poor represent the majority, but it cannot be taken for granted that representative institutions will necessarily be especially attentive to these groups.

With that broad introduction, what I'd like to do now is turn the presentation over to my colleague, who will say something specifically about Haiti.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

All right, and we want to leave lots of time for questions, if that's possible. We do have votes at 5:30, and the bells will start to ring. So bear that in mind.

Go ahead, Mr. Kira.

[Joseph Kira, Program Director, Canada, Parliamentary Centre]

I would also like to take a moment to thank the Committee for inviting us to appear before you.

A key aspect of our work in Haiti is to dwell on the lessons we have learned from some 100 projects in dozens of countries. One of those lessons is that our cooperation and our expertise must be offered with respect to the history, culture and politics of the country in which we are working. And if there is a country where this is key, it is Haiti.

As noted recently by the new Prime Minister of the Republic of Haiti, the country has been in an endless period of transition for 20 years. We sincerely hope that the coalition government that has been called to lead Haiti--composed of ministers from half a dozen political parties--will be able to get Haiti out of this cycle. The job will not be easy. As noted by economist Jeffrey Sachs in a recent report, the new Haitian government and legislature have inherited such serious economic and social problems that this could quickly undermine the government's authority and compromise its ability to govern.

The new government is currently in a honeymoon period. How long this will last? No one can say. However, one fact remains: the Haitian people have elected a minority parliament, with everything that that involves, such as political uncertainty and unpredictability.

While waiting a second round of voting for 13 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and three in the Senate, there are currently 18 political parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies and eight in the Senate. The Espwa party, with the greatest number of elected members in each of the two Houses, elected 19 deputies and 11 senators, but these figures could change slightly following the second round of voting for the remaining seats. The numbers speak for themselves: balancing the expectations and agendas of so many political parties in a single legislature will not be an easy task, both for parliamentary leadership and the Executive, particularly in a political and cultural environment traditionally seen as volatile and contentious.

During the Duvalier dictatorship, the Haitian Parliament had the reputation of a rubber-stamping legislature. Then, the resulting successive political crises and social and political instability that the crises generated directly involved Haitian parliamentarians and thus, did not allow the parliamentary institutions to evolve and assume their normal constitutional roles. What the Haitian population saw was a depressing spectacle in which the parliamentary actors and institutions were either the victims of or were themselves caught up in the endless political wranglings that have usually ended with the dissolution of the legislature.

The parliamentary institutions need stability, time and space, meaning no coup d'État, nor insurrection or serious crisis with the Executive, so to allow them to grow and demonstrate to Haitians that they can assume their constitutional roles in terms of representativeness, oversight and legislation. However, Haitians must not only understand those roles, but must also be able to better discern how the work done by parliamentarians affects their daily lives, starting with the ratification of the choice of a prime minister, support for his government and the budgetary process.

I would like to mention some elements and priorities of the Parliamentary Centre's project in Haiti. There are many needs and challenges at the institutional level. First, there is the infrastructure: the buildings housing the Parliament of the Republic of Haiti are in poor condition and so cramped that not all parliamentarians can have their own offices. Then there is the alarming need for equipments and technical expertise, in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. It is clear, as part of the first stage of assistance to the Parliament, that emphasis will be put on immediate, urgent needs, as identified with our Haitian partner.

Whether it be employees assigned to transcribe and write the debates of commissions and plenary sessions of the two Houses or those assigned to archive services, the drafting of bills or security, the competence of the staff should be subject to a special assessment and an intensive training program to strengthen the professionalism of all services in both Chambers of Parliament.

The other challenge that has traditionally faced international cooperation in Haiti is the will of key players, whether in Parliament, the Executive or the political parties, to work together to make the necessary changes to the way Parliament functions and is managed.

For instance, we know that human resource recruitment and management of the parliamentary staff is traditionally based on politics. We were told that there is no merit-based parliamentary public service staffing system as we know it in Canada. Promoting practices that are not based on merit obviously has an effect on the quality of professionals and senior officers recruited by the secretariats of Parliament.

Even if the current parliamentary leadership wanted to do so, it must be admitted that these practices, well established in the political and administrative ways of public institutions, will not be easy to change, particularly in the context of a minority Parliament.

The Parliamentary Centre's approach consists of working collaboratively and in partnership withe the Haitian partner, who, according to all indications, plans to assume ownership and leadership of efforts to develop and strengthen their parliamentary and legislative capacities. The Parliamentary Centre's project must, as I indicated earlier in my presentation, quickly demonstrate its ability, insofar as possible, to meet the immediate, urgent needs of its Haitian partner. I say insofar as possible because, as the executing agency, there are certain limitations that must be respected, and we must give account to the Canadian International Development Agency.

In keeping with what we heard and learned during the three missions that we conducted in Haiti, a key element of our intervention will be the training of administrative staff at the Parliament and the parliamentarians themselves, emphasizing the work to be carried out by parliamentary commissions.

Also, given the traditionally difficult relationship between the Executive and Parliament, we feel we can offer a contribution in this area: for example, with the work by parliamentary commissions or the tabling of reports by the Executive in Parliament.

Another element of our intervention consists of offering our cooperation to Haitian parliamentary leaders in their efforts to ensure that parliamentary institutions are open to the public, in order to give Parliament the credibility and recognition that it so needs.

Finally, it must be noted that, despite a lack of means and its difficulties, Haiti remains a very proud nation, particularly of its military history. The current circumstances should not make us forget the Haitian political leaders' deep attachment to their national sovereignty and the institutions that embody their sovereignty, such as Parliament. The Parliamentary Centre is fully aware of this fact and will ensure that its efforts to accompany and support the Haitian Parliament is in step with the priorities identified in cooperation with the Haitian parliamentary authorities.

[Robert Miller]

Mr. Chair, thank you very much.

In the interests of time, we'd be happy to take questions now. In the course of the discussion we'll have the opportunity to make our point about the importance of close collaboration with the Canadian Parliament. Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you.

I also want to thank you for a very comprehensive report, your very comprehensive document. I know that it's already going to be a help.

We're going to go to questions.

Mr. Patry, go ahead, please.

[Bernard Patry, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask a question very quickly to give my colleague the chance to ask one himself.

Thank you very much.

I wish to congratulate the members of the Parliamentary Centre for their work. I think that they are showing a lot of professionalism. I am the Chair of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Francophonie. This organization is holding orientation seminars for parliamentarians of other countries not in conflict, but recovering from conflict.

Mr. Miller, you talked about UNDP a little bit in your report. And you say, “After conflict, parliamentary institutions often remain weak in relation to the executive”.

Mr. Kira said that: “Given the traditionally difficult relationship between the Executive and Parliament [...]” We all know that there are 18 political parties in the Haitian Parliament at the present time. In spite of that, the two Houses have accepted the appointment of the Prime Minister Jacques Édouard Alexis and after that the two chairs of the two Houses were elected rather rapidly, which had not occurred since a very long time.

Parliamentarians can help each other and this Committee could do its share. However, in Haiti, the members of the Executive are appointed by the Prime Minister and must report to Parliament. The Executive and Parliament two really distinct entities.

How will you ensure that the Executive will really do its work and help parliamentarians to do theirs? Even if we are helping the Haitian Parliament, if the Executive, that is to say Cabinet ministers do not do their work, there won't be any improvement.

Brent, do you want to ask a question?

[Brent St. Denis, Liberal, Algoma—Manitoulin—Kapuskasing, ON]

Thank you to my colleague.

Thank you for being here.

I had a wonderful experience with the Parliamentary Centre when I was with a small Canadian delegation observing the first Duma elections in 1996 in Russia under the leadership of Peter Dobell. I'm not certain if he's still involved with the centre, but he had done a wonderful job. The centre was providing great support to the emerging Parliament in Russia. In fact, Canadian staff were resident in the Duma, if I'm not mistaken.

Which of the experiences elsewhere in the world most closely resemble the challenge of Haiti in terms of bringing the corporate knowledge and corporate memory of the centre to the task?

Is it your sense that in the public service of Haiti and among the elected parliamentarians and senators of Haiti there is an open welcome to the centre to participate fully in the passing on of knowledge on what appear to be mundane but important things, such as the Hansard, managing committees, and the very important nuts and bolts of operating a parliament?

I'm very interested to hear how you see that unfolding.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. St. Denis.

We'll go to Mr. Miller and then Mr. Kira.

[Robert Miller]

Let me very quickly comment on Mr. Patry's comment and question.

Executive parliamentary relations can fail in two opposite and equal ways, either by the parliament becoming utterly subservient to the executive, which we see in some countries, or the opposite: it simply becomes warfare between the parliament and the executive, which has been the pattern at times in Haiti, followed by a shutdown of parliament, and so on.

Essentially, what is available to us in doing the kind of work we do--and we have found this quite effective in a number of countries--is to work with parliamentary committees like this one, and in everything the committee does, use the opportunity to start building lines of communication and relationships between parliament and the officials in the government. Whether and to what extent we can serve to promote dialogue at the highest levels between the government and parliament is uncertain. We've had that opportunity in one or two cases, but until we're on the ground, have established a relationship, and have begun to build trust, it's very difficult to do. But we build that as an element into our programs.

To your question on our previous experience and its relevance to Haiti, quite honestly, there is nothing comparable to the situation in which we find ourselves in Haiti. I would say, probably, that the closest comparison is to when we began working with the parliament of Cambodia in the early 1990s. They shared the same problem of human-resource devastation, in a sense, that Joseph and our colleagues found in the parliament when they went to Haiti. Many Cambodians had been killed or had left the country and were slowly coming back. Even there, there was more of a physical infrastructure and so on in place by the time we began working.

I would say that we're involved here in a unique, new experience for the Parliamentary Centre, and we're approaching it with real humility and caution, because we recognize that fact.

As to your second question, all indications so far are that the Haitians welcome Canadian assistance and appreciate particularly that Canada has chosen the parliament, among other institutions, to concentrate support on. We're expecting a similar welcome from the presidents of the chamber of deputies and the senate next week when we visit the country.

[Joseph Kira]

I would just like to complete the answer to your question, Sir.

The President and the Prime Minister have agreed to create a new position of Minister responsible to the Prime Minister for relations with parliamentarians. It sets the tone. It is a matter of political will. The government itself is made up of people from half a dozen different political parties. The new Minister responsible to the Prime Minister for relations with parliamentarians with whom we met several times, Mr. Jasmin, has been a parliamentarian himself during a period when Parliament and the Executive were at each other's throat. It is believed that it will promote better relations than in the past.

[Diane Bourgeois, Bloc, Terrebonne—Blainville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good afternoon, gentlemen.

In the last weeks, several witnesses told us about the climate of corruption and impunity that prevails in Haiti. I suppose that you will probably have to deal, even in a parliamentary institution, with that climate of corruption and impunity.

How do you expect to overcome that difficulty? First of all, have you thought about it?

[Robert Miller]

The short answer is, with great care and caution. This is an area in which, unfortunately, we have had a lot of previous experience. As you've said, the parliament is no exception to corruption in the public institutions in these countries. What we attempt to do, and what we see as part of the value of the work of the Parliamentary Centre, is to set an example for the way in which we conduct our own business. We will establish an office on the ground that will be run by Haitians—this is our practice elsewhere in the world—and they will be joined with the administrative and financial systems of the Parliamentary Centre.

We see that part of what we leave behind is, in a very small way, an example of how institutions have to be administered if they're going to become effective. You're quite right that this is one of the most serious problems in the governance of Haiti, acknowledged as such by President Préval.

In addition to the way we conduct our own affairs, the Parliamentary Centre has for the last ten years been working on the building of interparliamentary networks on anti-corruption. We serve as the secretariat for an international organization launched by this Parliament called GOPAC, chaired by John Williams. We have a regional network in Africa called APNAC, which does similar work. We see the possibility of building links between those networks and the parliamentarians of Haiti. It's a very difficult problem.

[Diane Bourgeois, Bloc, Terrebonne—Blainville, QC]

What can we do as parliamentarians? You have mentioned several little steps. Could we go further ourselves as Canadian parliamentarians? Can we help? Besides participating in a bilateral committee or a Canada-Haiti committee, what could we do?