Transport Committee on Nov. 27th, 2014

[Capt Kevin Obermeyer]

We've always had very clear safety protocols and procedures. The problem for us was that it wasn't based on any international system. The TSB pointed this out to us a while back. We've been working on it and it will be in place, because it was an identified gap.

[Ed Komarnicki, Conservative, Souris—Moose Mountain, SK]

Are you saying that you're improving on your safety management protocol by raising a standard yet higher than what it was?

[Capt Kevin Obermeyer]

That is correct.

[Ed Komarnicki, Conservative, Souris—Moose Mountain, SK]

At what point do you expect that transition to be completed?

[Capt Kevin Obermeyer]

We expect at the end of 2015. Internally in the pilotage authority, our expectation is that we will be finished in December of this year. For the two pilotage groups who have been working on it for the last year or two years, we expect them to be complete by the end of 2015. That's our expectation.

[Ed Komarnicki, Conservative, Souris—Moose Mountain, SK]

I notice that you have said your jurisdiction applies to vessels 50 metres to 150 metres or larger. I heard the Transport officials say that they're hoping to get the safety management systems to vessels as small as 24 metres. Is there a significant difference between 24 metres and 50 metres? Is there a reason, that you can see, why safety management systems haven't been implemented for the smaller vessels?

Maybe Mr. Lachance can comment, too.

[Capt Kevin Obermeyer]

I don't think I can answer that one.

[Ed Komarnicki, Conservative, Souris—Moose Mountain, SK]

Mr. Lachance or Ms. Girard, go ahead, please.

[Sylvain Lachance]

There are two aspects to this. The first is that we want to bring the SMS down to 24 metres because in most cases it's a logical cut-off point in most conventions internationally. That's for the operation itself, for the vessel and so on.

The pilotage is another system that my colleague, Captain Obermeyer, has for its own operation, so it's complementary. With ours, the systems regulation we want to put in place has to do with the routine operation without a pilot or any time the vessel has an operation.

[Ed Komarnicki, Conservative, Souris—Moose Mountain, SK]

We heard some testimony—

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

Sorry, I have to cut you off there, Mr. Komarnicki.

We'll now move to Mr. Sullivan for five minutes.

[Mike Sullivan, NDP, York South—Weston, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

And thank you to the witnesses.

I want to follow up a bit on Mr. Mai's questions about risk assessments. As the transportation of dangerous goods across the country and in our waterways increases, whose responsibility is it to analyze the increase in risk and, therefore, analyze what additional resources will be necessary from both Transport Canada and the transporters of these dangerous goods, to make sure safety can be maintained?

The example given was the potential increase in tanker traffic in the St. Lawrence, but I'm also aware that the Minister has specifically asked the railways to do risk assessments for the transportation of dangerous goods through built-up urban areas. Could the department supply those risk assessments that have now, I assume, been given to the transportation department by the railways? Can it supply them to this committee?

[Nicole Girard]

We'd have to take that back under consideration. Rail safety personnel are not here today, unfortunately. I can take it back as a question for us to get back to you on.

[Mike Sullivan, NDP, York South—Weston, ON]

Thank you.

In terms of marine safety, I still want to know whose responsibility it is to conduct a risk assessment when there is a significant increase in the transportation of dangerous goods, for example on the St. Lawrence, but also along the coast of British Columbia.

[Sylvain Lachance]

You're probably aware that we commissioned the tanker safety expert panel to conduct such a study. It did table its report last year for the first phase, which had to do with transportation of oil south of 60. The second phase of the report was completed not too long ago, and it looked at the transportation of HNS, hazardous and noxious substances, in Canada, and also transportation of oil north of 60. This report was completed not long ago and is under consideration within the department right now.

[Mike Sullivan, NDP, York South—Weston, ON]

You're saying it was the responsibility of that commission to analyze the risk?

[Sylvain Lachance]

The responsibility was to examine the regime and so on, and it has tabled the report. It's being analyzed as we speak to see what recommendations it has and what can be implemented.

[Mike Sullivan, NDP, York South—Weston, ON]

With regard to transportation of dangerous goods in tankers, did I correctly hear you say that the TDG regime does not apply to tankers?

[Nicole Girard]

There is a combined responsibility with marine safety security. The TDG regulations work on the surface. Looking at the implementation, that means, if we're dealing with high-risk dangerous goods, for example, the requirement of ERAPs on the ground—bringing the containers from the ground to the vessel or if they're going to be brought back onto a dock. The TDG regulations will also apply when we're transporting from point a to point b within Canadian waters, and there is a mixture of authorities with the international marine code. When a vessel is coming in from outside the country or going through Canada and leaving the country, then there'll be a combined authority between the domestic regulations and the international, including reporting requirements when we're dealing with accidental releases.

[Mike Sullivan, NDP, York South—Weston, ON]

So somebody knows, then. You're saying that if the transportation of dangerous goods regime does not apply, something else does that is equivalent.

[Nicole Girard]

Yes, between our two directorates we have a memorandum of agreement to clarify where each other's authority kicks in, so that our inspectors and our oversight program are well complemented.

[Mike Sullivan, NDP, York South—Weston, ON]

My next question is for Mr. Hutchinson. In the Simushir event, as I understand it, the good winds prevented a disaster, not the actions of the coast guard, because the coast guard vessel, the Gordon Reid, though it valiantly tried to tow that ship, snapped or parted—the nautical term—all of its tow lines. What is the coast guard doing to make sure that this kind of thing doesn't happen in the future?

[Jeffery Hutchinson]

I'm going to ask my colleague Mr. Pelletier to also weigh in on this because of this operational background. The Simushir event put into motion a lot of different response activities, and I think that's important to note.

First, that event actually started as a search and rescue event because the lives onboard the vessel were at risk, and we executed a search and rescue operation. We were on standby, ready to execute as needed in that circumstance, and as you may know, the master was eventually extracted from the vessel.

In terms of the environmental side, the repairs on the ship couldn't be effected in the original timeframe—we had originally been told that it would take three and a half hours to effect the repairs on the ship and get it under way. Even before that, actually, we had started to look at what would be required from an environmental side. We started to execute the joint plan that we have with the U.S. When it comes to marine incidents, as you are likely aware, there's a lot of international cooperation, and Canada has partnerships with other countries. Given the location of the event, the U.S. was on standby both on the SAR side, the search and rescue side, and on the environmental side. For example, we started to work with the province, the first nation, and the industry to make sure that the right resources were being brought to bear on the situation.

On the tow situation itself, it should be noted that the Canadian Coast Guard might be thought of as a tow of last resort. It's not one of our principal activities. In this case we started to work immediately with industry to identify what capacity was available and to deploy that capacity. Nevertheless, we also dispatched our own vessels, and the Gordon Reid arrived first and then the Sir Wilfrid Laurier after that. It's not an uncommon event for a tow line to part. I realize that in other circumstances that's just not part of our thinking, but in vessel circumstances, particularly given the sea state at the time, that in and of itself didn't cause us undue concern. We redoubled our efforts to re-engage the vessel by towing and eventually, as you know, we were able to create enough stability in the situation that the Barbara Foss arrived and executed the principal tow.

The parting of the lines didn't cause us undue concern. We undertake an after-action review in every circumstance of that nature. Certainly we'll be looking at that to ask ourselves if there was anything unusual. In fact, we think it was the good work of the Gordon Reid that created stability in that situation. The Gordon Reid and the Sir Wilfrid Laurier actually stood by for a period of hours because there was enough stability and the direction and movement of the wind and waves weren't pushing the ship to shore, as you alluded to.

There was a combination of factors, there's no question. Actions were taken immediately, and eventually those actions addressed the situation.

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

Okay, we're way out of time but if Mr. Pelletier wants to add a comment, I'll allow it.

[Mario Pelletier]

I think the answer was very comprehensive. The Reid actually brought the vessel far enough from shore, and as Jeff said, they stood by so if we had needed to put another line on the ship to take her away from shore, we'd have been able to do that as well.