Mr. Chairman, members, and guests, thank you for the opportunity to speak on the economic implications of Bill C-377.
My name is Dave Sawyer. I'm an Ottawa-based economist working on issues of climate policy.
I am here neither to support nor to contend Bill C-377, but rather to discuss the economic implications of the bill.
What are the economic implications of the bill? Well, not surprisingly, it depends. More specifically, it depends on how it's designed and implemented, but since the bill is not specific on this point, and since you have asked me to come here and comment on the possible implications, I basically need to identify a policy package from which to provide some judgments or some information for you. I'll do that now.
The key elements of a policy package that I use and that I think are required to assess any sort of deep GHG reductions like this—i.e., good principles to basically design effective policy for GHG mitigation—include the main points that follow.
First, not surprisingly, to attain substantial reductions in 2020 while minimizing costs, we need economy-wide carbon pricing. This means, as others have said, cap and trade, a carbon tax, or some combination of the two. Recognizing, however, that cap and trade is the dominant policy for large final emitters and that cap and trade is difficult to implement for smaller emitters like you and me—our houses and our cars—the preferred and maybe most expedient approach is to have a revenue-neutral carbon tax for the remaining emissions. While I recognize a carbon tax does not resonate politically, the alternatives have higher costs, and frankly, Canadians may dislike income taxes even more than they dislike carbon taxes.
Second, an effective policy package would provide subsidies to low-emitting technologies such as carbon capture storage and renewables—renewable electricity or renewable transportation fuel. Targeted regulations for buildings, transportation, and other difficult-to-get-at emissions would also be required.
Third, there would be significant financial flows with carbon pricing, and we must decide how these are distributed, or at least I must think about these in my assessment for providing information to you. Some revenue from cap and trade is transferred among industry through trading markets, but some could also accrue to the public through auctioning, because there is value in allocating permits free—significant value, in fact, as the European system is demonstrating. A carbon tax shift could then have income taxes on households reduced or targeted to address adverse competitiveness impacts in disproportionately impacted industries, so there are income effects that carbon revenue can be used to mitigate.
For now, let us look at domestic action only, but later on I will revisit this.
I will also focus on 2020, because if we don't hit the 2020 targets laid out in Bill C-377—or Turning the Corner, for that matter—we'll not likely be able to achieve longer-term targets by mid-century, at least not without significant economic dislocations. Again, the round table talked about this quite a bit, but technology lock-in is the issue where you have high-emitting technology rolling forward if you don't address it early on.
So with this policy package in place—I gave you a vision of a policy package—I now need to specify what the economy and the emissions will look like in 2020. With an economy growing at about 2% annually between now and then, Canada's GDP will grow from current levels of about $1.3 trillion to $1.7 trillion to $1.8 trillion. Again, a somewhat uncertain number, but the economy is growing at some sort of rate around 2% or 2.5%. This growth will then increase emissions by roughly 15% from current levels, from about 750 megatonnes currently to something around 850 to 900 megatonnes. These are publicly available estimates from Natural Resources Canada. This means that to hit the Bill C-377 targets of minus 25% below 1990, forecasted emissions will have to drop by about 50% in 2020—drop by 50% in 2020.
This compares to a 34% decrease under Turning the Corner. So we basically can bracket the types of reductions that we as a nation are contemplating in 2020: 34% to 50% below business as usual.
So now to get on to the interesting bits. To assess the economic implications of this stylized policy package, I employed two models that are routinely used to assess mitigation targets. CIMS is an integrated energy and emissions model of the Canadian economy, and it's widely used by governments, industry, and NGOs alike. Complementing CIMS is a model called C-GEEM, which is a macroeconomic model suited to questions of macroeconomic impact in public finance.
What do the models have to say about the costs of these different targets? Essentially, applying an economy-wide carbon price, having subsidies for renewables, having targeted regulations and some smart tax shifting, the models imply carbon prices in the order of about $100 per tonne in 2020 for the Turning the Corner targets and about $200 a tonne for Bill C-377. They are somewhat uncertain numbers, but they give you an idea, a rough range.
Now the question is, what do these numbers mean? The economic impact of these carbon prices on GDP, on growth, could then range between about 0.6% of 2020 GDP for Turning the Corner and 1.2% for Bill C-377. We're looking at basically reductions in future GDP less than the forecast growth rate. So we're not talking about wrecking the economy, although there are some underlying assumptions here about early action, getting moving, and stringent policy. You must also recognize that there is a significant level of uncertainty in these numbers, as there is in all modelling, but this gives you a flavour for what you're looking at.
These conclusions assume efficient policies, and indeed the models can show that a lower target with poorly designed policy could be more expensive than a higher target with efficient carbon pricing. We could go on and on about these numbers, but simply, maybe the more important point is that policy design matters much more than the targets themselves.
So the policy package I have outlined will raise prices, with increases of about 25% in electricity, 15% in petroleum products, and about 10% in natural gas. Again, this is the order of magnitude and the numbers for you to get your head around, what this means, what's the “so what”.
The impact on oil production is not so clear, given the variable of carbon capture and storage. If carbon capture and storage is widely available, the cost impacts on that sector will be much lower. If it's not available, then there are larger, larger hits. Again, poor policy design would change these price impacts entirely.
This national picture masks some sectoral and regional variations. While I can't comment on the regional variation, I can say something about the sectoral impacts. While national GDP impacts seem relatively small, sector output for the energy-intensive sectors will fall, especially in sectors like petroleum refining and coal. The extent of this drop is dependent on what is happening in the rest of the world. If Canada acts more or less in concert with the OECD, the trade impacts will likely not be as large, with drops in exports but also in imports, because prices will be rising for foreign goods.
Still, competitiveness impacts will be real and significant for some segments of the economy, so the smooth macroeconomic picture nationally is not borne out at the sector level. This is not to say, however, that we don't or shouldn't seek reductions from these sectors—you have asked for some specific targets, so you need reductions from all sectors—but rather that we should design complementary policies to address disproportionate income effects; that is, we separate a carbon signal from an income effect.
As for the notion that manufacturing will move to China, I would submit that other factors are also influencing this business decision and probably need some closer scrutiny.
I'd now like to visit the importance of obtaining low-cost reductions internationally. At domestic reductions above 20% below 2020 BAUs—the two targets I mentioned are greater than that—domestic mitigation costs rise exponentially. This means that at the targets contemplated, costs are rising much faster than reductions, so to minimize economic impacts, a strategy to access low-cost international abatement opportunities is probably a good thing, assuming they're real and verifiable.
I'd like to conclude with a short discussion of the cost of inaction, shifting basically from discussion about costs to discussion of what we get, discussion of the benefits. In thinking about designing effective climate policy, at least from an economist's narrow efficiency lens, the economist would prefer cost-effective reductions at a level where the costs and benefits are balanced, but information on the scope and scale of the possible benefits of action is too uncertain to lead to recommending targets that balance costs and benefits, so we're not in a great place.
As a result, our national climate debate continues to be informed by only a conceptual understanding of the benefits of abatement or adaptation, while we have a very acute understanding of the costs. Because of this asymmetry in information, it is likely that we will continue to be locked into a cycle of questioning the appropriateness of action on targets, regardless of their stringency. Indeed, without a balanced view of what we get for what we spend, we will continue to argue about targets, discuss policy options, reveal the associated costs, and ultimately question affordability. I call this “Globe and Mail economics”. This focus on costs and affordability is one-sided and will ultimately lead to poor national outcomes.
Oh, yes—in conclusion, a little more focus on action and a little less on targets would be nice.
Thank you.