An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts

This bill was last introduced in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session, which ended in September 2019.

Sponsor

Dominic LeBlanc  Liberal

Status

This bill has received Royal Assent and is now law.

Summary

This is from the published bill. The Library of Parliament often publishes better independent summaries.

This enactment establishes the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and sets out its composition and mandate. In addition, it establishes the Committee’s Secretariat, the role of which is to assist the Committee in fulfilling its mandate. It also makes consequential amendments to certain Acts.

Elsewhere

All sorts of information on this bill is available at LEGISinfo, an excellent resource from the Library of Parliament. You can also read the full text of the bill.

Votes

April 4, 2017 Passed That the Bill be now read a third time and do pass.
April 4, 2017 Failed That the motion be amended by deleting all the words after the word “That” and substituting the following: “Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, be not now read a third time but be referred back to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security for the purpose of reconsidering Clauses 8, 14, and 16 with a view to assessing whether the investigatory powers and limits defined in these clauses allow for sufficiently robust oversight of ongoing intelligence and national security activities”.
March 20, 2017 Passed That Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, {as amended}, be concurred in at report stage [with a further amendment/with further amendments] .
March 20, 2017 Passed 16 (1) The appropriate Minister for a department may refuse to provide information to which the Committee would, but for this section, otherwise be entitled to have access and that is under the control of that department, but only if he or she is of the opinion that (a) the information constitutes special operational information, as defined in subsection 8(1) of the Security of Information Act; and (b) provision of the information would be injurious to national security. (2) If the appropriate Minister refuses to provide information under subsection (1), he or she must inform the Committee of his or her decision and the reasons for the decision. (3) If the appropriate Minister makes the decision in respect of any of the following information, he or she must provide the decision and reasons to, (a) in the case of information under the control of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police; (b) in the case of information under the control of the Communications Security Establishment, the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment; and (c) in the case of information under the control of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Security Intelligence Review Committee.
March 20, 2017 Passed 14 The Committee is not entitled to have access to any of the following information: (a) a confidence of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada, as defined in subsection 39(2) of the Canada Evidence Act; (b) information the disclosure of which is described in subsection 11(1) of the Witness Protection Program Act; (c) the identity of a person who was, is or is intended to be, has been approached to be, or has offered or agreed to be, a confidential source of information, intelligence or assistance to the Government of Canada, or the government of a province or of any state allied with Canada, or information from which the person’s identity could be inferred; (d) information relating directly to an ongoing investigation carried out by a law enforcement agency that may lead to a prosecution.
March 20, 2017 Passed to sections 14 and 16, the Committee is entitled to have access to ed by litigation privilege or by solicitor-client privilege or the professional
March 20, 2017 Failed That Motion No. 3 be amended by deleting paragraph (a).
March 20, 2017 Passed and up to ten other members, each of whom must be a (2) The Committee is to consist of not more than three members who are members of the Senate and not more than eight members who are members of the House of Commons. Not more than five Committee members who
March 20, 2017 Passed That, in relation to Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, not more than one further sitting day shall be allotted to the consideration at report stage of the Bill and one sitting day shall be allotted to the consideration at third reading stage of the said Bill; and That, 15 minutes before the expiry of the time provided for Government Orders on the day allotted to the consideration at report stage and on the day allotted to the consideration at third reading stage of the said Bill, any proceedings before the House shall be interrupted, if required for the purpose of this Order, and in turn every question necessary for the disposal of the stage of the Bill then under consideration shall be put forthwith and successively without further debate or amendment.
Oct. 4, 2016 Passed That the Bill be now read a second time and referred to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

October 17th, 2016 / 2:40 p.m.
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NDP

Matthew Dubé NDP Beloeil—Chambly, QC

I appreciate that. Like I said, I'll get off Bill C-22. There's a lot more to be said, but we'll have that opportunity when we study the bill.

You talked about the wider array of departments when it comes to the green paper and the review that needs to happen of the national security framework. There's a very specific story that comes to mind that's come out in the last couple of week of information sharing under Bill C-51 with consular affairs, for example, and the risk that runs of creating another situation like we saw with Maher Arar.

I'm just wondering, because you mentioned the foreign policy implications, if perhaps you could elaborate on that and some of the concerns there are even within Bill C-51 that the legal dispositions that exist here at home aren't the same as what happens abroad when information sharing happens.

October 17th, 2016 / 2:35 p.m.
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NDP

Matthew Dubé NDP Beloeil—Chambly, QC

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Farson, thanks for being here. I have a few questions. I don't want to get lost in the weeds on Bill C-22 because we will, as was mentioned, have the chance to study it at committee. Since it was brought up, there are a few points. There are some things we brought up as amendments that should be seen, and I perhaps wouldn't mind hearing your thoughts on those.

For example, there is election of the chair, which is something the British model does that the current legislation doesn't provide for. There's the question of oversight versus review. I'd also like to hear from you about it, because you did mention briefly the issue of SIRC when it comes to the fact that it's a review and not actual oversight. It's a very important distinction that doesn't come up often enough. The other thing is that the executive's discretionary power over what the committee actually gets to see has been a huge concern we have as well. I'd just start off on those three points and hear your thoughts on them.

October 17th, 2016 / 2:30 p.m.
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Conservative

Larry Miller Conservative Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON

Sure, and I agree with you on that oversight.

You mentioned that C-22 should be amended. This is something that some of us have brought up before. It's been mentioned, as you did again, that C-22 is modelled after the British model. The one thing that hasn't come out is that the British model was amended, big time, in 2013.

October 17th, 2016 / 2:20 p.m.
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Liberal

Marco Mendicino Liberal Eglinton—Lawrence, ON

If I understand you correctly, you're saying that the committee created by Bill C-22, which is not a committee that would report to Parliament but instead the Prime Minister, should in fact report to the House. Would that be your recommendation?

October 17th, 2016 / 2:20 p.m.
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Prof. Stuart Farson

Yes, indeed. Bill C-22 was in fact where I was going next.

This would establish a committee of parliamentarians. Recently a former director of CSIS said that we should pass it and think about amending it later. I happen to disagree with that. I think we need to really address it and get it right, right now.

October 17th, 2016 / 2:20 p.m.
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Liberal

Marco Mendicino Liberal Eglinton—Lawrence, ON

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Professor Farson, thank you for your testimony.

Let's begin where you left off. I got the sense that you had more to say about the subject of oversight. What I took down from your closing remarks was that, first, there was a need for a rationale, an explanation, as to why the oversight mechanism was necessary, but there was also a need to ensure that the oversight was robust and effective.

As you've seen, the government has recently tabled Bill C-22. That legislation will be studied by this committee. Perhaps you can take a moment to expand your thoughts on that piece of legislation.

Salaries ActGovernment Orders

October 7th, 2016 / 10:35 a.m.
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Conservative

Candice Bergen Conservative Portage—Lisgar, MB

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to rise today to speak to Bill C-24, An Act to amend the Salaries Act and to make a consequential amendment to the Financial Administration Act.

I want to talk briefly about what it looks like the bill would do, and then a little longer about what it would actually do, and its implications.

As my hon. colleague across the way said, the bill attempts to make all cabinet ministers equal. It would also allow the creation of three new cabinet posts, without actually naming what those cabinet posts would be. It then eliminates all of the ministers for the regional economic development agencies. Those are the three main things that the bill proposes to do, as well as some housekeeping issues tied to the financial implications of doing that.

I will talk a little about those three things, some of which are more important than others. I will start with the issue of making all ministers equivalent.

Some would argue that there was a fairly good system set up under previous governments, including our previous Conservative government. In that system, there were ministers of state who had smaller portfolios without the same scope, and perhaps not the same impact on the country or the same status as other ministers' portfolios. For example, the minister of sport, although running a very good ministry, was considered and styled as minister of state, because that minister probably did not have the same impact on the country as, let us say, the minister of defence.

I was a minister of state, so I can tell everyone in the House directly about my experience. I was a minister of state for social development. When I sat at the cabinet table with the minister for foreign affairs, the minister of health, and the minister of finance, I had completely equal status with them in terms of what I said. I had equal time to speak to the Prime Minister. My opinions had equal weight, and it was a great experience.

That said, the fact was that the minister of state portfolio I had was different. It was important, but it was different from that of the minister of defence, for example. Some would argue that that distinction is important to recognize. However, the Liberals have said that they want to make all ministerial portfolios equal. They have proposed doing that because, let us fact it, they have gotten themselves into a bit of a state. They have a bit of a problem because they put a number of people in as ministers of state and were criticized for it, and now they want to fix it all.

I am not going to spend a lot of time on this. I think it is a shell game. Frankly, I would have been immensely insulted and refused to be one of these ministers whom the government has used as tokens and told, “Sorry, we put you in the wrong position, but don't worry, we're going to pay you as much as every other minister, but you actually won't have that responsibility, you won't have a deputy minister, and you won't have the same scope. But don't worry your pretty little head about it, because we're going to pay you the same amount”.

This is the shell game that we see the Liberals do time and time again. They did it on Bill C-22, when they introduced that bill to create oversight over CSIS. It is a shell game. We see it in their consultations with the provinces. It is a shell game. It is window dressing.

This part of the bill is all window dressing. It is an insult to the ministers who are now ministers of state but will soon be full cabinet ministers, and frankly, it is an insult to Canadians, but it is not a surprise.

I am going to leave that part. There are other things I want to talk about that are more important in their impact on our country.

The second part of the bill that I am concerned about is these three blank ministerial positions that would be created, but which no one knows what they would be for. The bill was introduced about a week-and-a-half ago, and so I have had a little time to look at it. When I was reading the bill, I thought that maybe they have a couple of friends in high places that they need ministerial portfolios for.

Maybe it is for Gerald Butts? Maybe the Liberals need a minister for moving expenses. Maybe they need a minister for increasing taxes, but then I realized that every one of their ministers are ministers for increasing taxes. Maybe they need a minister for photography. Obviously I am being facetious, but the point is that we do not know what these ministerial spots would be for and, frankly the answer that the parliamentary secretary gave me was not sufficient. In fact, he answered his own question.

The Prime Minister right now has not even used the full scope of the ministers he has available. There is no reason that these three empty spots have to be created, and one has to wonder what game is going on. What is the plan? We do not have an answer for that. We do not know what these posts are for.

The third reason, and frankly the most important one, that we cannot support the bill is that it would eliminate all of the ministers for the regional economic development agencies.

Let me explain what this would do. It would not eliminate the regional economic development agencies themselves. I want to read them off for the record. There are currently six regional economic development agencies, and under our government and previous governments, there were ministers from each of those regions who oversaw these economic development agencies.

For example, we still have Western Economic Diversification Canada. Under our government, we had an individual from western Canada in charge of that portfolio, who understood and represented the region, and could get feedback from people from western Canada. Right now, under this legislation, that minister would be gone.

As for the Economic Development Agency of Canada for the region of Quebec, there was always a minister from Quebec who oversaw that regional agency. When there are so many Liberal members of Parliament from Quebec, what an insult it is that not one of them could now be named to this portfolio. I am from Manitoba. I cannot tell people in Quebec what would benefit them, what they need for economic development, but what an insult it is to those in Quebec to say it will not have its own regional minister for Quebec.

As for the federal economic development initiative for northern Ontario, or FedNor, being from Manitoba, I understand northern Ontario. I am sorry, but some members are from Toronto and some of the members across the way are from northern Ontario. Northern Ontario is a little bit like Manitoba in some ways. We have a lot in common. It is not like Toronto at all, or Mississauga.

Then there is the Federal Economic Development Agency for Southern Ontario. Okay, we have one from Toronto, which makes sense.

As for Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency, my colleague from Yukon just said that we should quickly get this bill through. Does he realize that without having a minister from the north watching over it and being accountable and listening to people from his region, he is being hamstrung in the job he needs to do? Instead, it is a minister from Toronto.

Then we have the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agencies, ACOA. Here we go again with Atlantic Canada. There are 32 competent members of Parliament from Atlantic Canada. Could one of them not have been named as the minister overseeing ACOA? Instead the government has centralized power in one member of Parliament, one individual MP, and that is the Minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development from Mississauga.

We are seeing regional interests and accountability for these agencies being ignored. There is a lot of money going through these agencies. There was a reason there needed to be a minister to oversee each one of these agencies. There is a reason there is a minister looking over the money that is flowing through and where it is going. Now there is one minister who also has Innovation as his responsibility. He is in a pretty good portfolio, but he is in charge of each one of these economic development agencies.

Regions are being ignored, accountability is being ignored, as we see the very worrisome trend of regional ministers being taken away in practice already, before this legislation. Under previous Liberal governments and under our previous government, there was always a regional minister in each province.

For example, in Manitoba we had a couple of very good regional ministers, one being the former member of Parliament and minister, Vic Toews, now Justice Vic Toews. He served as our regional minister for a number of years. We saw regional ministers in B.C., Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Quebec.

However, now that these ministerial positions have been eliminated, there is no one in the provinces for the provincial governments to go to when they are having a problem and need a regional minister to connect his or her cabinet with in Ottawa to bring their issues forward. The municipalities have no one to talk to.

In Manitoba, we are hearing it over and over again. Municipalities are asking us who the regional minister for Manitoba is. They wonder if it is the Minister of Natural Resources, because he says one thing and the Minister of Labour says something different. In Quebec, there is no regional minister. That is what I am hearing from my colleagues in Quebec. Municipalities and provinces do not know who to go to. What is happening is a massive sucking noise of the centralization of power.

Last Monday, we saw the provincial ministers for environment meet with the federal minister. However, it is pretty scary when the federal government has the ability to say to the provinces “If you don't get in line with us on CPP, on the carbon tax, on health care, we're cutting off your infrastructure funding, and you don't have a regional minister who is going to say anything, because there is none”. There is one guy from Toronto and a guy from Edmonton who are going to be making the decisions, and that is it.

This is scary, because it is going to be the Prime Minister and his cronies who are making these decisions. However, it really should not be a surprise when we look at what the government has done in ignoring the regions, whether ignoring the normal convention of appointing judges from Atlantic Canada to the Supreme Court of Canada, whether ignoring the provinces when it comes to imposing a carbon tax, or whether ignoring jobs that are needed in Alberta and New Brunswick by not standing up for energy east. There is a huge lack of respect by the federal government toward the regions and their need to be represented.

As far as imposing a carbon tax on the provinces is concerned, we have just seen it happen. Some provinces have said they do not want a carbon tax, and some have said they want to fight climate change, but they do not want the federal government telling them how to do it, because the federal government does not always understand what is happening in northern and rural Manitoba, for example.

I think Brad Wall, the Premier of Saskatchewan, said it very well:

I cannot believe that while the country's environment ministers were meeting on a so-called collaborative climate change plan, the prime minister stood in the House of Commons and announced a carbon tax unilaterally...The level of disrespect shown by the prime minister and his government today is stunning.

I think the bill before us is showing that same disrespect. It is showing disrespect to the people who are supposed to be full ministers, but who will not now have their own deputy ministers, and they will not have the same scope and responsibility. For example, the Minister of Science is not equivalent to the Minister of National Defence. She will not have the same budget. She will not have the same staff. She will not have the same authority. What utter disrespect and window dressing toward that woman.

Then we are seeing disrespect for the regions to the effect that, “Atlantic Canada, Quebec, western Canada, we know you're suffering from job losses, but you don't need your own minister of economic diversification, you don't need your own minister to see economy flourish. We'll just put it in the hands of Toronto and the Prime Minister and you'll be fine”.

Finally, directly to the Canadian people, the Prime Minister just wants to be able to appoint as many ministers as he wants carte blanche. He wants three blank spots. I have never heard of that happening before.

If a prime minister wants to put more cabinet ministers in place, he makes the decision, he gets—

October 6th, 2016 / 4:30 p.m.
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Liberal

The Chair Liberal Rob Oliphant

Committee, I know you'll be very pleased that we're going to get right to questioning. The opening statement was done by the minister, and we now have witnesses here.

Mr. Brown from the department is still here. He is now joined by Ms. Beauregard.

Monsieur Coulombe, from CSIS, welcome again.

Mr. Paulson, it's nice to see you back.

Thank you for taking the time to join us.

As you know, we are beginning a fairly large study of the national security framework. This is not a legislative study. It is a study by parliamentarians on the whole framework, which we hope will help to advise the minister as he considers both policy and legislative changes in the coming year. That is the nature of our work. We're not dealing with any legislation in particular. We will be dealing with Bill C-22, now that it has been referred to us. If Bill C-21 and Bill C-23 pass in the House, we expect they will also come to us. This is really very much at the theoretical level of what we as parliamentarians need to be advising the minister on, having listened to the agencies and Canadians.

Welcome, Ms. Khalid. We're glad to have you and Ms. Petitpas Taylor as well. Thank you for joining us.

We're going to begin this round of seven-minute questions with Ms. Damoff.

October 6th, 2016 / 4:20 p.m.
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Liberal

Nathaniel Erskine-Smith Liberal Beaches—East York, ON

Without getting into Bill C-22 and parliamentary oversight, but specific to expert review, the academic literature suggests that in addition to parliamentary oversight and review, and in addition to the three review bodies, a super-SIRC is likely necessary. Would you speak to that, specifically?

October 6th, 2016 / 4:15 p.m.
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Liberal

Ralph Goodale Liberal Regina—Wascana, SK

Bill C-22 provides to this Canadian committee of parliamentarians more authority, more scope, and more power than almost any of its counterparts in any of our allied countries. It will have more jurisdiction to provide a higher level of oversight, and the intervention of a minister or the Prime Minister is limited only to those cases where a particular review at a particular point in time would be injurious to national security. On those grounds, a minister or the Prime Minister could intervene to say, “Not this particular area at this moment in time”. They would have to give written reasons to the committee as to why they were making that judgment.

October 6th, 2016 / 4:15 p.m.
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Liberal

The Chair Liberal Rob Oliphant

We'll try to keep Bill C-22 to a minimum, and we estimate that we will be having you back on Bill C-22 in a few weeks.

I'll give you extra time because I've taken your time, but let's try to keep Bill C-22 down to a minimum.

October 6th, 2016 / 4:15 p.m.
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Liberal

Ralph Goodale Liberal Regina—Wascana, SK

Well, if you want an answer to the question, it takes a little time.

Bill C-22, which I gather we are discussing today, Mr. Chair, even though we weren't supposed to be—

October 6th, 2016 / 4:10 p.m.
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Liberal

Ralph Goodale Liberal Regina—Wascana, SK

—protections in place in the very structure of his ruling.

The point is this. With the greatest of respect to the author of that report from the Library of Parliament, I would disagree with his conclusions. I know we're not discussing Bill C-22

October 6th, 2016 / 4:10 p.m.
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Conservative

John Brassard Conservative Barrie—Innisfil, ON

Minister, thanks for being here today.

Yesterday, The Globe and Mail reported that you said recently that Bill C-22 creates a committee that “will set its own agenda and report when it sees fit.” Yet an independent report by the Library of Parliament stated:

How much the committee members would be able to access state secrets is in question because the legislation would allow cabinet ministers to block reviews of some spy programs and thwart the committee’s bids to see sensitive documents. “Bill C-22 authorizes ministers to refuse to provide information,”

We know there are seven exemptions that are in place within the legislation. We also know there was an issue back in 2010 where Speaker Milliken ruled on a question of privilege. He was quite clear in his ruling that the fact that there was sensitive information, or intelligence documents, or information relating to an ongoing investigation did not remove the obligation of the government to share those documents with the House. In fact, you said in support of that ruling, “That series of questions of privilege resulted in your ruling on April 27, when, in very eloquent terms, you indicated that Parliament did have the right to information.”

As a committee of Parliament, what has changed, Minister?

October 6th, 2016 / 4 p.m.
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Liberal

Ralph Goodale Liberal Regina—Wascana, SK

—while I'm saying that the core piece of legislation has been introduced. It's Bill C-22. There will be perhaps two or three other bills that will come later on, obviously the ones dealing with the specific commitments in the platform, but it is useful to ask Canadians what else they want to see considered. Indeed, the Privacy Commissioner's items are not included in the list of the first seven, so the consultation has already yielded results by bringing forward his perspective on that particular issue.

Other people have said that we need to deal with the deficiencies in peace bonds. That is a critical deficiency as well, and we learned in the Strathroy case that the peace bonds that were described a couple of years ago as being a kind of panacea solution aren't, and they need to be fixed.