Bill C-59 (Historical)

National Security Act, 2017

An Act respecting national security matters

Part 1 enacts the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, which establishes the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and sets out its composition, mandate and powers. It repeals the provisions of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act establishing the Security Intelligence Review Committee and amends that Act and other Acts in order to transfer certain powers, duties and functions to the new Agency. It also makes related and consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 1.‍1 enacts the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act to authorize the issuance of directions respecting the disclosure of and request for information that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity and the use of information that is likely to have been obtained as the result of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity.
Part 2 enacts the Intelligence Commissioner Act, which provides that the duties and functions of the Intelligence Commissioner are to review the conclusions on the basis of which certain authorizations are issued or amended, and determinations are made, under the Communications Security Establishment Act and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and to approve those authorizations, amendments and determinations if those conclusions are reasonable. This Part also abolishes the position of the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment, provides for that Commissioner to become the Intelligence Commissioner, transfers the employees of the former Commissioner to the office of the new Commissioner and makes related and consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 enacts the Communications Security Establishment Act, which establishes the Communications Security Establishment and, among other things, sets out the Establishment’s mandate as well as the regime for authorizing its activities. It also amends the National Defence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 4 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to
(a) add a preamble to that Act and provide a mechanism to enhance the accountability of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(b) add new limits on the exercise of the Service’s power to reduce threats to the security of Canada including, in particular, by setting out a list of measures that may be authorized by the Federal Court;
(c) provide a justification, subject to certain limitations, for the commission of acts or omissions that would otherwise constitute offences;
(d) exempt employees of the Service and persons acting under their direction from liability for offences related to acts committed for the sole purpose of establishing or maintaining a covert identity;
(e) create a regime for the Service to collect, retain, query and exploit datasets in the course of performing its duties and functions;
(f) make amendments to the warrant regime that are related to datasets; and
(g) implement measures for the management of datasets.
Part 5 amends the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act to, among other things,
(a) emphasize that the Act addresses only the disclosure of information and not its collection or use;
(b) clarify the definition of “activity that undermines the security of Canada”;
(c) clarify that advocacy, protest, dissent and artistic expression are not activities that undermine the security of Canada unless they are carried on in conjunction with an activity that undermines the security of Canada;
(d) provide that a disclosure of information is authorized only if the disclosure will contribute to the carrying out by the recipient institution of its national security responsibilities and will not affect any person’s privacy interest more than reasonably necessary;
(e) require that information disclosed be accompanied by information about the accuracy of the disclosed information and the reliability of the manner in which it was obtained; and
(f) require that records be prepared and kept in respect of every disclosure of information and that every year a copy of every record prepared in the preceding year be provided to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.
Part 6 amends the Secure Air Travel Act to authorize the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to collect from air carriers and operators of aviation reservation systems, for the purpose of identifying listed persons, information about any individuals who are on board or expected to be on board an aircraft for any flight prescribed by regulation, and to exempt an air carrier from providing that information, or from the application of any provision of the regulations, in certain circumstances. It amends the Act to authorize that Minister to collect personal information from individuals for the purpose of issuing a unique identifier to them to assist with pre-flight verification of their identity. It also reverses the rule in relation to a deemed decision on an application for administrative recourse. Finally, it amends the Act to provide for certain other measures related to the collection, disclosure and destruction of information.
Part 7 amends the Criminal Code to, among other things,
(a) make certain procedural modifications to the terrorist listing regime under section 83.‍05, such as providing for a staggered ministerial review of listed entities and granting the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness the authority to amend the names, including aliases, of listed entities;
(b) change the offence of advocating or promoting terrorism offences in general, in section 83.‍21, to one of counselling the commission of a terrorism offence, and make corresponding changes to the definition of terrorist propaganda;
(c) raise one of the thresholds for imposing a recognizance with conditions under section 83.‍3, and amend when that section is to be reviewed and, unless extended by Parliament, to cease to have effect;
(d) repeal sections 83.‍28 and 83.‍29 relating to an investigative hearing into a terrorism offence and repeal subsections 83.‍31(1) and (1.‍1), which require annual reports on such hearings;
(e) require the Attorney General of Canada to publish a report each year setting out the number of terrorism recognizances entered into under section 810.‍011 in the previous year; and
(f) authorize a court, in proceedings for recognizances under any of sections 83 and 810 to 810.‍2, to make orders for the protection of witnesses.
Part 8 amends the Youth Criminal Justice Act to, among other things, ensure that the protections that are afforded to young persons apply in respect of proceedings in relation to recognizance orders, including those related to terrorism, and give employees of a department or agency of the Government of Canada access to youth records, for the purpose of administering the Canadian Passport Order.
Part 9 requires that a comprehensive review of the provisions and operation of this enactment take place during the fourth year after section 168 of this enactment comes into force. If that section 168 and section 34 of Bill C-22, introduced in the 1st session of the 42nd Parliament and entitled the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, come into force within one year of each other, the reviews required by those sections are to take place at the same time and are to be undertaken by the same committee or committees.

[Jim Eglinski, Yellowhead, CPC]

I have two questions, and they're kind of related.

Under Bill C-59, you've been given the authority to lead the cyber centre, and you talk about the other government agencies: Public Safety, Shared Services, the RCMP, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the military.

Being a former policeman and having been involved in major crimes in larger communities, I know there are always conflicts, perhaps the bullheadness of one department over another department.

You've had some time since Bill C-59 came out, and we have been discussing it in the House and around. Are your agencies getting together already and working together? Do you see that this will be a fairly easy transition and a joint effort, or do you feel that there may be some stumbling blocks and pressure back and forth maybe because you've been given the lead?

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

The other piece I want to ask about is the vulnerabilities equities process that exists within the NSA in the U.S. On the same topic of transparency, I'm wondering about this. More and more, especially with the existence of the centre, I'm assuming that there's going to be more work done to identify these vulnerabilities.

In Bill C-59, a lot of the pieces involve working with the private sector to identify the vulnerabilities and to, in some cases, even study them to a certain extent. I don't want to rehash the debate that we've had quite extensively at this committee, but is there a specific protocol that exists here, in the same way that the NSA has developed one, in order to disclose to the public and parliamentarians, etc., the existence of vulnerabilities in software and such?

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

We heard from the Bill C-59 conversations that it's like a hockey analogy, in that it depends on the coach. They say that a good defence is a strong offence. I'm intrigued by how we always defer or default to a defensive posture when actually that defensive posture may be an offensive posture.

[Scott Jones]

I think the key thing is that defensive cyber-operations are proposed in Bill C-59. It's a tool we can use to respond against any malicious cyber-activity.

There are a number of elements. The first one is the permission to undertake that activity. It's up to the Minister of National Defence, with consultation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to ensure that if there are any foreign relations aspects, they are taken into account.

But this wouldn't be the first measure, if you were taking a defensive action. You would want to increase your network defences. You would want to try to increase your resiliency against the activity. This type of activity is something that, if there were no other option, you would turn to as things escalated.

There are a number of other things we would look to do. If the activity were originating from a foreign actor, we would engage our international CCIRC community. The Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre has relationships around the world with national computer emergency response teams to respond. We could ask them for help. We would certainly look for law enforcement, if that were a better option.

[Scott Jones, Deputy Chief, Information Technology Security, Communications Security Establishment]

Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.

My name is Scott Jones. It's a pleasure to be back again. I'm the deputy chief of IT security at the Communications Security Establishment and the head-designate of the soon-to-be established Canadian centre for cybersecurity.

I am joined today by Rajiv Gupta, the director of standards architecture and risk mitigation. Thank you for inviting us to discuss this very important topic.

The Communications Security Establishment is the lead technical and operational agency for cyber security in the Government of Canada. We are mandated to protect information and information infrastructures of importance to the Government of Canada.

This expertise in protecting and providing information is over 70 years in the making. The protection of government communications has been a part of CSE's mission since it was first established in 1946 as the Communications Branch of the National Research Council.

It goes without saying that the world of 1946 was much different from the world of today. What has not changed, however, is the need for innovative and skilled leadership to meet the challenges of an evolving world.

Canada's new national cybersecurity strategy, announced in June of 2018, recognizes this and sets out Canada's vision for security and prosperity in the digital age. Among the new measures in this strategy is the creation of the Canadian centre for cybersecurity, to be housed at the Communications Security Establishment.

Combined with the investments made in budget 2018, these efforts will enable us to remain resilient against cyber-threats and to continue to protect the safety and security of Canadians—and there's a great deal worth protecting.

Recent innovations in technology have created incredible opportunities for economic growth in Canada. The benefits of an increasingly digital society are many and should not be understated.

The Internet has brought enormous benefits to the lives of Canadians. Many federal government services are online. Budget 2018's investments in strengthening digital services demonstrate that the government is embracing new and innovative technology.

But of course, Canadians can only reap the benefits of online commerce when they can conduct their online activities with confidence and trust. These risks should not dissuade us from adopting new technologies, but they should be acknowledged and mitigated.

Unfortunately, we have all seen how cyber-compromises can result in significant financial loss, the loss of intellectual property and reputational damage to a company, an individual, or a government. For example, recent cases involving ransomware demonstrate the increasing threat of cybercrime and the effects of a cyber-compromise.

Today's cyber-threat actors have a variety of motivations and capabilities. They include state actors, hacktivists, criminals and terrorists capable of a broad range of disruption, from denial of service attacks to the exposure of personal information.

CSE plays an important role in stopping threat actors from achieving their goals. Our expertise helps identify, prepare for, and defend against the most severe and persistent threats to Canada's systems and networks.

There are three keys to success: partnerships, appropriate authorities and talent.

Let's begin with partnerships.

Cyber security is everyone's business. Our relationships with industry are critical to defending Canada and Canadians from cyber threats.

Equally important are our relationships with other government departments, including Public Safety Canada, Shared Services Canada, the RCMP and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

Beyond the government and the private sector, CSE's partnerships also extend to academia and leading-edge research groups.

The Canadian centre for cybersecurity will greatly improve our ability to work with industry, other government departments, other government partners and academia. The cyber centre will consolidate the key cybersecurity operational units of the Government of Canada under a single roof. In doing so, the cyber centre will establish a unified source of expert advice, guidance, services and support on cybersecurity operational matters, providing Canadians with a clear and trusted place to turn for cybersecurity advice.

An important part of this is ensuring continuity in the functions of the Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre—also known as CCIRC—at Public Safety, once it becomes part of the cyber centre. Specifically, a crucial element of CCIRC's work is the notification of victims in the event of a cyber-compromise. This is an important role and one that will need to continue under the cyber centre.

Second, I would like to talk about CSE's authorities.

As you all know from debates on Bill C-59, under the proposed legislation, CSE would retain its current cyber security and information assurance mandate and would be given a new authority to defend important networks outside the Government of Canada.

The proposed Communications Security Establishment Act would also explicitly allow CSE to share cyber threat information with owners of systems outside the Government of Canada, so they can better protect their networks and information. For example, CSE could more extensively share information about specific cyber threats with the owners of critical infrastructure such as communications companies or the banking sector.

Finally, the CSE act would give CSE the ability to take action online to defend important Canadian networks and proactively deter cyber-threats before they reach important Canadian systems. These new authorities will better protect Canadians' most sensitive information and important cyber-networks from compromise and strengthen Canada's cyber-defences.

Third, and most key for me, is people. Among the new measures introduced as part of the national cybersecurity strategy is funding to develop Canadian cyber-talent. We are fortunate at CSE to have incredibly bright and talented Canadians working to address these tough cyber-challenges. However, to continue the success, we need to build on this talent and harness the tremendous brain power in the cyber field that exists here in Canada.

With strong partnerships, appropriate authorities and skilled people, CSE is working to address cyber threats facing Canada. However, cyber security is everyone's responsibility, and it will take all of our expertise and innovation to remain resilient.

Thank you for your invitation. We look forward to answering your questions.

Public Safety

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Mr. Speaker, we understand the frustration of families with no-fly kids. By definition, no children are on Canada's secure air travel list. However, worrisome adults with similar names are, and that creates the false positives.

When the system was first implemented, the previous government should have recognized this problem and provided unique identification numbers for automatic redress. However, it did not. The Conservative design failed. We now have $81 million to fix it. First and foremost, we need the legal authority to do so. That is in Bill C-59 and Bill C-21. Both bills need to be passed as quickly as possible.

[Ian Wright, Director, Financial Crimes Governance and Operations, Department of Finance]

Bill C-59 was SCISA, the ability to share information. You obviously have to talk to Public Safety or the lead for that piece of legislation, but our understanding is that the changes didn't limit it. I think it pulled one agency off, but it certainly did not impact FINTRAC or our ability to use SCISA to exchange information.

On the question on sanctions, that's more public information anyway. It's a listing that will come out through due process, and we'd have to talk to our Global Affairs colleagues, but I don't think it would be a SCISA type of national security threat issue.

[Dan Albas, Conservative, Central Okanagan—Similkameen—Nicola, BC]

Mr. O'Toole raised the point that with Bill C-59 there are more hurdles now for departments to be able to share information. Does that work against the ability to have a consolidated list?

[Erin O'Toole]

Let's leave aside FINTRAC, because one of the things security experts say is that siloing of information often leads to money laundering or terror financing. We see information sharing in the global community and, potentially from this hearing, financial information sharing between institutions, but we don't seem to trust the agencies of our own government.

Is there some reason you removed that ability in Bill C-59?

[Erin O'Toole]

We've heard that our partners, the other countries that were at the French “No Money for Terror” conference, are enhancing their information sharing among government departments. Bill C-59, which passed this week, detracts from relevant information sharing. Why are we going in an opposite direction to our allies and partners in the G20?

[Erin O'Toole]

It was a joint statement. I might be overstating it.

The reason I ask is that the first element coming out of that conference was a priority, and I'll read it to you:

(1) Further reinforcing the domestic legal and operational frameworks to collect, analyse and share information by national authorities

This week Bill C-59 passed and actually took away that information-sharing ability for relevant national security information with changes to the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, so we don't seem to be meeting the lofty goals of the conference in terms of terror financing.

National Security Act, 2017

[The Speaker, Geoff Regan]

I declare these elements carried.

The House has agreed to the entirety of Bill C-59, an act respecting national security matters at the third reading stage.

(Bill read the third time and passed)

[The Speaker, Geoff Regan]

Pursuant to order made Tuesday, May 29, the House will now proceed to the taking of the deferred recorded division at third reading of Bill C-59.

Pursuant to Standing Order 69.1, the first question is on parts 1 to 5 of the bill, as well as the title, the preamble, part 9 regarding the legislative review, and clauses 169 to 172 dealing with coming into force provisions.

The House resumed from June 18 consideration of the motion that Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters, be read the third time and passed.

[Erin O'Toole, Conservative, Durham, ON]

Madam Speaker, it is a real pleasure for me to rise and speak to an important bill and issues related to public safety and security in general.

I would like to begin my remarks with a positive word of thanks for those men and women who are charged with keeping our communities safe, certainly the front-line police officers and first responders, but a lot of the people in the intelligence networks from CSIS, to CSE, to think tanks that analyze these things, to engaged citizens who are constantly advocating on issues related to public safety and security. These are probably some of the most important debates we have in this chamber because we are charged with making sure we have a safe community and finding the right balance between the remarkable freedoms we enjoy in a democracy like ours and the responsibility to ensure that there is safety for Canadians. We thank those who are charged with doing that both in uniform and behind the scenes and sometimes under the cloak of secrecy. All Canadians respect that work.

I am going to talk about Bill C-59 from a few vantage points, some of the things that I thought were positive, but I am also going to express three areas of very serious concern I have with this legislation. In many ways, Bill C-59 is a huge step back. It is taking away tools that were responsibly provided to law enforcement agencies to be used in accordance with court supervision. In a lot of the rhetoric we hear on this, that part has been forgotten.

I am going to review some of it from my legal analysis of it, but I want to start by reminding the House, particularly because my friend from Winnipeg, the parliamentary secretary to the government House leader is here, that here we are debating yet another omnibus bill from the Liberal Party, something that was anathema to my friend when he was in opposition. Omnibus bills of this nature that cobbled together a range of things were an assault on democracy, in his words then, but here we are in late night sittings with time already allocated debating yet another Liberal omnibus bill. The irony in all of this is certainly not lost on me or many Canadians who used to see how the Liberals would howl with outrage whenever this happened.

Bill C-59 came out of some positive intentions. My friend from Victoria, the NDP's lead on the parliamentary security oversight committee of parliamentarians is here. I want to thank him for the work that we did together recommending some changes to the minister ahead of what became Bill C-59. The NDP member and I as the public safety critic for the Conservative Party sent two letters to the minister providing some general advice and an indication of our willingness to work with the government on establishing the committee of parliamentarians for security and intelligence oversight.

My friend from Victoria ably serves on that committee now and as a lawyer who has previously practised in the area of national security and finding the right balance between liberty and security, he is a perfect member for that committee as are my friends from the caucus serving alongside the Liberal members. That is very important work done by that committee and I wish them well in their work. We indicated pre Bill C-59 that we would be supportive of that effort.

In those letters we also indicated the need for a super-SIRC type of agency to help oversee some of the supervision of agencies like CSIS and CSE. We were advocating for an approach like that alongside a number of academics, such as Professor Forcese and others. We were happy to see an approach brought in that area as well.

It is important to show that on certain issues of national safety and security where we can drive consensus, we can say we will work with the government, because some of these issues should be beyond partisanship. I want to thank my NDP colleague for working alongside me on that. It took us some time to get the minister to even respond, so despite the sunny ways rhetoric, often we felt that some of our suggestions were falling on deaf ears.

I am going to commit the rest of my speech tonight to the three areas that I believe are risks for Canadians to consider with Bill C-59. I am going to use some real-world examples in the exploration of this, because we are not talking in abstract terms. There are real cases and real impacts on families that we should consider in our debate.

The first area I want to raise in reference to the fact that when Bill C-59 was introduced, it was one day after a Canadian was convicted in a Quebec court in a case involving travelling abroad from Canada to join and work with a terrorist organization. Mr. Ismael Habib was sentenced the day before the government tabled this omnibus security legislation, and I think there is a certain irony in that. In his judgment, Justice Délisle said, “Did Ismael Habib intend to participate in or knowingly contribute to a terrorist activity? The entirety of the evidence demonstrates the answer is yes.” There is such an irony in the fact that the day before this debate there was a conviction for someone who was leaving Canada to train and participate with a terrorist organization.

Only a short time before Mr. Habib left Canada to do this, the previous government criminalized that activity. Why? Really, there was no need to have in the Criminal Code a charge for leaving Canada to train or participate in a terrorist organization, but this was a reaction to a troubling and growing trend involving radicalized people and the ability for people to go and engage in conflicts far from home. Mr. Habib's case was the first of its kind, and the charge he was convicted of by a Quebec court was for an offence that just a few years before did not exist. This is why Parliament must be seized with real and tangible threats to public safety and security. Unfortunately, a lot of the elements of Bill C-59 are going to make it hard for law enforcement to do that, to catch the next Mr. Habib before he leaves, while he is gone, or before he returns and brings that risk back home.

The first area that I have serious concerns with in the bill relates to preventative arrest. This was a controversial but necessary part of Bill C-51 from the last Parliament. Essentially it moved a legal threshold from making it “necessary” to prevent a criminal activity or a terrorist act instead of “likely” to prevent. By changing the threshold to “necessary”, as we see in this bill, the government would make it much harder for law enforcement agencies to move in on suspects that they know present a risk yet do not feel they have enough proof to show that it is necessary to prevent an attack. I think most Canadians would think that the standard should be “likely”, which is on balance of probabilities. If we are to err on the reality of a threat that there is violence to be perpetrated or potential violence by someone, then err on the side of protection. We still have to have the evidentiary burden, but it is not too hard.

It is interesting who supported the preventative arrest portions of Bill C-51 in the last Parliament. The Prime Minister did as the MP for Papineau. I loved Bill C-51 in so many ways, because it showed the hypocrisy of the Liberal Party at its best. The Liberals were constantly critical of Bill C-51, but they voted for it. Now they are in a position that they actually have to change elements of it, and they are changing some elements that the Prime Minister praised when he was in opposition, and they had this muddled position. My friends in the NDP have referred to this muddled position before, because now they think their Liberal friends are abandoning the previous ground they stood on.

What did the Prime Minister, then the leader of the third party and MP for Papineau, say about preventative arrest in the House of Commons on February 18, 2015? He said:

I believe that Bill C-51, the government's anti-terrorism act, takes some proper steps in that direction. We welcome the measures in Bill C-51 that build on the powers of preventative arrest, make better use of no-fly lists, and allow for more coordinated information sharing by government departments and agencies.

What is ironic is that he is undoing all of those elements in Bill C-59, from information sharing to changing the standard for preventative arrest to a threshold that is unreasonably too high, in fact recklessly too high, and law enforcement agencies have told the minister and the Prime Minister this.

The Prime Minister, when he was MP for Papineau, thought these important powers were necessary but now he does not. Perhaps society is safer today. I would suggest we are not. We just have to be vigilant, vigilant but balanced. That is probably why in opposition he supported these measures and now is rolling them back.

Nothing illustrates the case and the need for this more than the case of Patrice Vincent. He was a Canadian Armed Forces soldier who was killed because of the uniform he wore. He was killed by a radicalized young man named Martin Couture-Rouleau. That radicalized young man was known to law enforcement before he took the life of one of our armed forces members. Law enforcement officers were not sure whether they could move in a preventative arrest public safety manner.

The stark and moving testimony from Patrice's sister, Louise Vincent, at committee in talking about Bill C-51 should be reflected upon by members of the Liberal Party listening to this debate, because many of them were not here in the last Parliament. These are real families impacted by public safety and security. Louise Vincent said this:

According to Bill C-51, focus should be shifted from “will commit” to “could commit”, and I think that's very important. That's why the RCMP could not obtain a warrant from the attorney general, despite all the information it had gathered and all the testimony from Martin Couture-Rouleau's family. The RCMP did its job and built a case, but unfortunately, the burden of proof was not met. That's unacceptable.

It is unacceptable. What is unacceptable is the Liberals are raising the bar even higher with respect to preventative arrest. It is like the government does not trust our law enforcement agencies. This cannot be preventative arrest on a whim. There has to be an evidentiary basis for the very significant use of this tool, but that evidentiary basis should not be so high that it does not use the tool, because we have seen what can happen.

This is not an isolated case. I can recite other names, such as Aaron Driver. Those in southwestern Ontario will remember that thanks to the United States, this gentleman was caught by police on his way to commit a terror attack in southwestern Ontario. He was already under one of the old peace bonds. This similar power could be used against someone like Alexandre Bissonnette before his horrendous attack on the mosque in Quebec City. This tool could be used in the most recent case of Alek Minassian, the horrific van attack in Toronto.

Preventative arrest is a tool that should be used but with an evidentiary burden, but if the burden is too high necessary to prevent an attack, that is reckless and it shows the Prime Minister should review his notes from his time in opposition when he supported these powers. I suggest he did not have notes then and probably does not have notes now.

The second issue I would like to speak about is the deletion of charges and the replacing with a blanket offence called counselling commission of a terrorism offence.

What would that change from BillC-51? It would remove charges that could be laid for someone who was advocating or promoting a terrorism attack or activity. Promotion and advocation are the tools of radicalization. If we are not allowing charges to be laid against someone who radicalized Mr. Couture-Rouleau, do we have to only catch someone who counsels him to go out and run down Patrice Vincent? Should we be charging the people who radicalized him, who promoted ISIS or a radical terrorist ideology, and then advocated for violence? That should be the case. That actually conforms with our legal test for hate speech, when individuals are advocating or promoting and indirectly radicalizing.

Therefore, the government members talk about the government's counter-radicalization strategy, and there is no strategy. They have tried to claim the Montreal centre, which was set up independently of the government, as its own. The government would not tour parliamentarians through it when I was public safety critic, but it tours visiting guests from the UN and other places. That was an initiative started in Montreal. It has nothing to do with the Liberals' strategy. I have seen nothing out of the government on counter-radicalization, and I would like to.

The same should be said with respect to peace bonds, another tool that law enforcement agencies need. These have been asked for by law enforcement officials that we trust with their mandate. They are peace officers, yet the government is showing it does not trust them because it is taking away tools. The peace bond standard is now in a similar fashion to the preventative arrest standard. Agencies have to prove that it is necessary to prevent violent activity or terrorism, as opposed to the Bill C-51 standard of “likely to prevent”. A protection order, better known as “a peace bond”, is a tool, like preventative arrest, that can set some constraints or limitations on the freedom of a Canadian because that person has demonstrated that he or she is a potential threat. To say the individuals have to be a certain threat, which a “necessary” standard promotes, is reckless and misguided.

I wish the MP for Papineau would remember what he said a few years ago about the reduction of the high burden on law enforcement in preventative arrest situations. Sadly, there are going to be more Aaron Drivers out there. I always use the case of Aaron Driver, because sometimes members of specific groups, some Muslim Canadians, have been unfairly targeted in discussions about radicalization. This is a threat that exists and not just in one community. Aaron Driver's father was in the Canadian Armed Forces, a career member of the military. Their son was radicalized by people who advocated and promoted radical ideology and violence. With this bill, we would remove the ability to charge those people who helped to radicalize Aaron Driver. However, this is a risk that exists.

Let us not overstate the risk. There is not a bogeyman around every corner, but as parliamentarians we need to be serious when we try to balance properly the freedom and liberties we all enjoy, and that people fought and died for, with the responsibility upon us as parliamentarians to give law enforcement agencies the tools they need to do the job. They do not want a situation where they are catching Aaron Driver in a car that is about to drive away. We have to find the right balance. The movement of standards to “necessary” to prevent the commission of a terrorism offence shows that the Liberals do not trust our law enforcement officers with the ability to collect evidence and lay charges, or provide a peace bond, when they think someone is “likely” to be a threat to public safety and security.

I started by saying that there were elements I was happy to see in Bill C-59, but I truly hope Canadians see that certain measures in this would take away tools that law enforcement agencies have responsibly asked for, and this would not make our communities any safer.