Bill C-76 (Historical)

Elections Modernization Act

An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and other Acts and to make certain consequential amendments

This enactment amends the Canada Elections Act to establish spending limits for third parties and political parties during a defined period before the election period of a general election held on a day fixed under that Act. It also establishes measures to increase transparency regarding the participation of third parties in the electoral process. Among other things that it does in this regard, the enactment
(a) adds reporting requirements for third parties engaging in partisan activities, partisan advertising, and election surveys to the reporting requirements for third parties engaging in election advertising;
(b) creates an obligation for third parties to open a separate bank account for expenses related to the matters referred to in paragraph (a); and
(c) creates an obligation for political parties and third parties to identify themselves in partisan advertising during the defined period before the election period.
The enactment also amends the Act to implement measures to reduce barriers to participation and increase accessibility. Among other things that it does in this regard, the enactment
(a) establishes a Register of Future Electors in which Canadian citizens 14 to 17 years of age may consent to be included;
(b) broadens the application of accommodation measures to all persons with a disability, irrespective of its nature;
(c) creates a financial incentive for registered parties and candidates to take steps to accommodate persons with a disability during an election period;
(d) amends some of the rules regarding the treatment of candidates’ expenses, including the rules related to childcare expenses, expenses related to the care of a person with a disability and litigation expenses;
(e) amends the rules regarding the treatment of nomination contestants’ and leadership contestants’ litigation expenses and personal expenses;
(f) allows Canadian Forces electors access to several methods of voting, while also adopting measures to ensure the integrity of the vote;
(g) removes limitations on public education and information activities conducted by the Chief Electoral Officer;
(h) removes two limitations on voting by non-resident electors: the requirement that they have been residing outside Canada for less than five consecutive years and the requirement that they intend to return to Canada to resume residence in the future; and
(i) extends voting hours on advance polling days.
The enactment also amends the Act to modernize voting services, facilitate enforcement and improve various aspects of the administration of elections and of political financing. Among other things that it does in this regard, the enactment
(a) removes the assignment of specific responsibilities set out in the Act to specific election officers by creating a generic category of election officer to whom all those responsibilities may be assigned;
(b) limits election periods to a maximum of 50 days;
(c) removes administrative barriers in order to facilitate the hiring of election officers;
(d) authorizes the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to provide the Chief Electoral Officer with information about permanent residents and foreign nationals for the purpose of updating the Register of Electors;
(e) removes the prohibition on the Chief Electoral Officer authorizing the notice of confirmation of registration (commonly known as a “voter information card”) as identification;
(f) replaces, in the context of voter identification, the option of attestation for residence with an option of vouching for identity and residence;
(g) removes the requirement for electors’ signatures during advance polls, changes procedures for the closing of advance polls and allows for counting ballots from advance polls one hour before the regular polls close;
(h) replaces the right or obligation to take an oath with a right or obligation to make a solemn declaration, and streamlines the various declarations that electors may have the right or obligation to make under specific circumstances;
(i) relocates the Commissioner of Canada Elections to within the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, and provides that the Commissioner is to be appointed by the Chief Electoral Officer, after consultation with the Director of Public Prosecutions, for a non-renewable term of 10 years;
(j) provides the Commissioner of Canada Elections with the authority to impose administrative monetary penalties for contraventions of provisions of Parts 16, 17 and 18 of the Act and certain other provisions of the Act;
(k) provides the Commissioner of Canada Elections with the authority to lay charges;
(l) provides the Commissioner of Canada Elections with the power to apply for a court order requiring testimony or a written return;
(m) clarifies offences relating to
(i) the publishing of false statements,
(ii) participation by non-Canadians in elections, including inducing electors to vote or refrain from voting, and
(iii) impersonation; and
(n) implements a number of measures to harmonize and streamline political financing monitoring and reporting.
The enactment also amends the Act to provide for certain requirements with regard to the protection of personal information for registered parties, eligible parties and political parties that are applying to become registered parties, including the obligation for the party to adopt a policy for the protection of personal information and to publish it on its Internet site.
The enactment also amends the Parliament of Canada Act to prevent the calling of a by-election when a vacancy in the House of Commons occurs within nine months before the day fixed for a general election under the Canada Elections Act.
It also amends the Public Service Employment Act to clarify that the maximum period of employment of casual workers in the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer — 165 working days in one calendar year — applies to those who are appointed by the Commissioner of Canada Elections.
Finally, the enactment contains transitional provisions, makes consequential amendments to other Acts and repeals the Special Voting Rules.

[Professor Michael Pal, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, to you, the committee and the clerk for the invitation to appear today. I'm a professor down the street in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa, working in the areas of election law and constitutional law.

There are a number of items of interest in Bill C-65, given what a significant piece of legislation it is. I want to focus my comments in the time I have on the same topic as Professor Bennett, the rules around voter privacy, because I think that's an area where amendments would be of use.

Political parties, as is obviously well known to everyone around the table, use data very extensively. Traditionally, though, federal political parties have fallen in between private and public sector federal privacy legislation. There were some provisions, or are some provisions, in the Canada Elections Act around misuse of the voters list, but other than that, restrictions were relatively minimal and certainly nothing approaching what we would understand as the fair information or generally accepted privacy principles that apply through most of the private and public sector.

Recent amendments to the Canada Elections Act have been moving towards a privacy regime applicable to political parties, particularly with the Elections Modernization Act in 2018 obliging parties to have a policy. The problem with the Election Modernization Act was that it was one step forward but it did not actually impose substantive limits on the use, collection, retention and analysis of sensitive personal information of the kind that would give Canadians confidence in how their data is collected and used.

It is worthwhile going through some specific provisions of Bill C-65, some of which I think are an important step forward and some of which need, in my view, significant amendment.

Proposed section 444.2 will allow authorized parties to “collect, use, disclose, retain and dispose of personal information” as long as that is done “in accordance with the party's policy”. Again, the rule is tied to the particular policy rather than independent principles tied to other privacy values. Parties and entities acting on the party's behalf “must comply with the policy” or potentially be subject to administrative monetary penalties. Parties must now also protect personal information under their control “through [proportionate] physical, organizational and technological security safeguards”. I think that is a positive development, but more definition is likely needed as to what counts as a “proportionate” safeguard. That is spelled out more directly in the legislation.

Most significantly, parties are now prohibited from carrying on the activity of “selling personal information”; parties are prohibited from disclosing sensitive information “for the purpose of causing harm”; and parties are prohibited from “providing false or misleading information” about their collection practices. Those three measures, I think, are certainly welcome and a step forward from the 2018 amendments.

The main problem that remains, however, is that the amendments are targeted at ensuring parties and their volunteers and representatives adhere to the party's policy without actually requiring substantive limits on how the data can be collected and used, apart from those specific ones around selling or disclosing.

In conclusion, I would say that this is an important step forward. More remains to be done. The overall concern certainly is in facilitating democratic participation. It is a good thing for Canadian democracy and elections that parties collect data and use it. It helps with communication to voters, advertising and being responsive to the public, but Canadians have an increasing expectation for how sophisticated entities in Canadian society will protect their data, and there is still some way to go, even if the amendments in Bill C-65 are passed.

Thank you.

[Stéphane Perrault]

With all due respect, I do believe their concern is about the provisions in the Elections Modernization Act of 2018 and not in any amendment either in the bill or that I am proposing.

As I indicated, none of these provisions prohibit any engagement or conversation or partisan promotion by unions. However, like any other group, if they spend more than the threshold amount, they have to register, and then they can spend up to probably around $1.2 million or $1.3 million in the pre-writ period, with inflation, and probably $600,000 in the writ period—I'm rounding it up here with inflation—so they have considerable latitude to do surveys and partisan activities, but they must register.

Electoral Reform

[Paul Chiang, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Immigration]

Madam Speaker, I am honoured to rise today in the chamber to talk about the opportunities for youth engagement in our democracy, particularly voting in federal elections. I would like to thank the member for Saanich—Gulf Islands for raising the important issue of Canada's voting age.

Section 3 of the Charter of Rights and Freedom states, “Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote”, and all citizens do eventually. The Canada Elections Act qualifies this right by adding the age requirement that citizens must be 18 years old. This is consistent with the voting age for provincial and territorial elections and most jurisdictions around the world.

The federal voting age has not always been set at 18. In 1970, it was lowered from age 21, which had been the voting age since Confederation. Since then, Parliament has often reflected on the voting age. Indeed, this very Parliament debated the idea of lowering the voting age to 16 a few years ago. While Parliament did not agree to lower the voting age, our government and the Prime Minister in particular have made very significant efforts to ensure young people continue to have a voice in our parliamentary democracy.

I would like to highlight a few of the many opportunities available to youth for engaging in democratic life at all levels of government. For example, they can become an active member of political parties, and they can join or even launch social movements on issues of importance to them, as well as advocate for public policies.

Our government recognizes that youth participation in our democracy, which is not limited to voting, makes it healthier. This is why we have taken important steps to provide youth opportunities to participate in our democracy in recent years. For example, in 2018, the government passed Bill C-76, the Elections Modernization Act, which created a voluntary register of future electors, providing Canadians between the ages of 14 to 17 who wish to vote with the option to register early with Elections Canada. If they choose to sign up early, these youth are automatically included in the National Register of Electors upon turning 18, as well as the list of electors, so they are registered to vote and will receive their voter information card. The Elections Modernization Act also facilitated the ability of Elections Canada to hire 16- and 17-year-olds to work as election officers, giving young people an opportunity to be at the front lines of Canada's electoral process.

Our youth can and do participate in our democracy and continue to make a valuable contribution in a variety of ways. At the same time, our government recognizes that it is important that we continue to support ways to encourage participation. All of us here can and should do more to encourage the turnout of all electors. We need to be an example for our youth.

In March of this year, our government introduced Bill C-65, the electoral participation act, which seeks to enhance voter participation for all electors, including youth and students—

Electoral Participation Act

[Vance Badawey, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport]

Madam Speaker, it is a pleasure to speak to Bill C-65 this evening in the House, the electoral participation act. As the title of this bill suggests, one of its key priorities is to encourage participation in the electoral process. We know that democratic engagement rests on trust in our electoral system, and that is why Bill C-65 proposes to enhance safeguarding measures in the Canada Elections Act.

As we all know, Canada's democracy is among the strongest and most stable in the world thanks in large part to the Canada Elections Act, which is the fundamental legislative framework that regulates our elections in this great nation. We have every reason to be proud of this legislation, but we are not immune to the global challenges that modernized democracies face. The integrity of the electoral process in the lead-up to, during and after elections is a prerequisite for trust in our democracy. This is why it is essential that we continue to address evolving threats to our democracy through regular improvements to the Canada Elections Act. This helps ensure that our system remains robust, resilient and equipped to keep pace with the issues of our time.

It should come as no surprise that safeguarding our elections includes measures to mitigate foreign interference. Foreign interference can take many forms, including social media campaigns designed to sow disinformation. The Communications Security Establishment's latest report highlights that online foreign influence activities have become a new normal, with adversaries increasingly seeking to influence our elections. We and all Canadians have a right to be concerned about these threats. This is why the government has been proactive in taking steps to counter foreign interference.

Our government's work to protect our democracy began as early as 2016, when we tabled Bill C-22. It led to the creation of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, a committee that assembles members from both chambers of Parliament to review matters concerning national security and intelligence.

In 2018, the government put forward Bill C-59, which enacted the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, giving the agency the mandate to review and investigate all Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities. That same year, we also introduced Bill C-76, which modernized the Canada Elections Act and introduced a number of prohibitions, including a prohibition preventing foreigners from unduly influencing electors, a prohibition against foreign third parties from spending on election-related activities and a prohibition against third parties from using any foreign funds.

In 2019, we put in place the plan to protect Canada's democracy, which included the security and intelligence threats to elections, or SITE, task force. The plan was subsequently updated in advance of the 2021 general election.

Most recently, we introduced Bill C-70, the countering foreign interference act, which complements measures to further safeguard our federal elections and mitigate foreign influence in Bill C-65, which I am speaking to today. Finally, last September, our government launched the public inquiry into foreign interference. We look forward to receiving the commissioner's final report as well as recommendations.

These substantial government-wide initiatives demonstrate this government's commitment to remaining vigilant in our efforts to protect our electoral system. This commitment is further reflected in the safeguarding measures proposed through Bill C-65. I would like to highlight how this bill proposes to better protect our elections from foreign influence, disinformation campaigns and the misuse of technology, all of which seek to erode trust in our institutions. We do this so that Canadians can feel safe and confident when participating in our democracy.

First, we know that election interference can happen at all times and not just during elections. This is why Bill C-65 proposes to extend the application of the existing ban on undue foreign influence at all times, rather than being limited to the election period. This means, for example, that the ban on foreign entities unduly influencing voters to vote a certain way or influencing them to refrain from voting would extend to all times.

Second, Bill C-65 would create a clearer and more consistent definition of foreign entity activities under the act to close any and all gaps. For example, currently foreign entities can circumvent the law by having more than one purpose, where the ban on undue influence is limited to a foreign entity whose only purpose is to unduly influence voters. That would no longer be possible under Bill C-65. The bill proposes that foreign entities who have even just one of their primary activities as unduly influencing electors would be captured.

Third, Bill C-65 proposes important new financing rules to increase transparency and prevent anonymous foreign and dark money from entering our elections. This includes banning the use of crypto asset contributions, money orders and prepaid instruments such as prepaid credit cards or store gift cards for regulated activities by third parties and political actors.

Bill C-65 would introduce important new financing rules for third parties. Allow me to explain. Bill C-65 would allow third parties to use only contributions they have received from Canadian citizens and permanent residents to pay for regulated election expenses. This includes partisan activities, partisan advertising, election advertising and election surveys. This means that third parties would no longer be able to use funds received from any other third parties, such as corporations or businesses, for regulated expenses. For greater transparency, third parties would also need to report on the details of the individuals who contributed in total over $200, including names, addresses and amounts of each contribution.

We understand that third parties may not all receive contributions and may have their own revenue they wish to use for regulated expenses. In those instances, third parties who meet the threshold of 10% or less of their overall annual revenue and contributions would also be able to use their own revenues to pay for regulated activities. In addition, third parties would be required to provide financial statements to Elections Canada proving the revenue is their own.

The amendments to enhance transparency on the source of third party funding are important. Under the current rules, third parties are required to report only on contributions given to them for election purposes. Contributions received for other purposes may be mixed into the third party's general revenue, leaving a transparency gap as to where the funds came from.

The Chief Electoral Officer spoke to this concern in his June 2022 recommendations report tabled here in Parliament. He noted that the proportion of third party reporting on the use of their own funds for regulated expenses increased significantly, from 8% in 2011 to 37% in 2019 and 63% in 2021. This increasing trend in third party financing is concerning, which is why the government is taking action through Bill C-65. Let me reiterate, however, that third parties who do not meet the threshold would still be able to participate in regulated activities, but they would have to do so with the contributions they received as donations from Canadian citizens and permanent residents.

The next element I would like to speak on is disinformation. Disinformation, a key tactic by malign actors, aims to fuel discord and erode public trust in the electoral process. It seeks to manipulate voters and electoral processes through intentional falsehoods, often spread online, as well as, quite frankly, intimidation at times.

In 2022, the Chief Electoral Officer called disinformation about the electoral process the most important threat to Canada's election mandate. Security agencies have noted that disinformation is a persistent threat to election integrity. In the 2021 national electors study conducted by Elections Canada following the 44th general election, 71% of electors were concerned that the spread of false information online could have a moderate or major impact on the electoral outcome. This included 37% who thought it could have a major impact. As noted by the Chief Electoral Officer, intelligence officials and leading academics, the use and impact of disinformation is not limited to the election period.

Bill C-65 aims to build confidence in our electoral process and our democratic institutions through new and expanded prohibitions to address these threats. In particular, the bill would introduce a ban on false statements about the voting process that are deliberately made to disrupt the conduct or the results of an election, all while respecting the principles of free expression and open dialogue.

Amendments provide clear guidance on the type of intentional false statements that could be made or published to ensure that contraventions of the act are clear and enforceable. This includes making or publishing false or misleading statements relating to who may vote in an election; the voting registration process; when, where and how to vote; whom to vote for; the process to become a candidate; how votes are validated or counted; or the results of an election.

Another element I would like to address is the potential misuse of technology. Technology, as we all know, has helped revolutionize democracy, but it also gives rise to risks. For example, content generated by artificial intelligence is becoming harder to distinguish from reality. When paired with disinformation, artificial intelligence such as deepfakes poses a significant threat. Today, with a computer and a few keystrokes, malicious actors can generate highly realistic videos, audio and text content that can depict people saying or doing things they never said or did.

To address this emerging issue, Bill C-65 would amend existing prohibitions in the act that can lend themselves to the misuse of artificial intelligence, namely false statements, impersonation and misleading publications, to provide clarity that they apply regardless of the means used. This would mean, for example, that the prohibition on impersonating the Chief Electoral Officer, an election official, or a candidate would apply regardless of the technology that might be used now, to include deepfakes or other technologies that may evolve in the future.

Bill C-65 would also extend the scope of the existing ban on using a computer to affect the results of an election, to now apply to the use of a computer to disrupt the conduct of an election.

The last element I would like to speak about and highlight is the importance of the personal safety of those people who participate in our electoral process. As my hon. colleagues know well, the threat environment continues to evolve. There has, sadly, been a surge in vandalism at constituency offices, increasingly violent online discourse and threats made against party leaders, candidates and election officials, as witnessed during the 2021 general election.

Bill C-65 therefore seeks to address some of these concerns by providing increased privacy and safety to electoral participants. For example, returning officers' personal information would be better protected by removing the requirement for them to publish their home address in the Canada Gazette; rather, only their municipality and province of residence would be published.

We have also seen reports of or have personally experienced a growing uncivil discourse and behaviour targeting members of Parliament, including me. Members from all parties have spoken out against unacceptable harassment and threats, as well as intimidation.

Indeed, the Sergeant-at-Arms and Corporate Security Officer of the House of Commons recently noted that harassment of people elected to serve this very institution has skyrocketed, increasing 800% in the last five years. To respond to this alarming trend, Bill C-65 proposes two changes to the disclosure of requirements for regulated fundraising events over $200 that include a prominent attendee, such as a party leader. To ensure the safety of all participants, the requirement to provide five days' advance public notice of such regulated fundraising events would be repealed. To ensure ongoing transparency, precise location details for events would continue to be provided to the Chief Electoral Officer as part of the party's postevent reporting requirements under the act.

However, to protect the security of hosts of events who engage in politics or book a political event, the requirement for a public-facing postevent report 30 days later would only include the municipality and the province of the event. This approach aims to prevent bad actors from undermining the safety of participants and hosts at these events. It aims to strike an appropriate balance between the very real security threats faced and the ongoing need for transparency.

In closing, I know that safeguarding our democracy is a priority shared by all of my hon. colleagues in this House. The amendments to the Canada Elections Act proposed in Bill C-65 build on existing safeguards and propose a number of targeted but critical improvements to continue to build trust in our democratic processes.

I am confident that all members of Parliament can work together to ensure that Bill C-65 is studied and passed in time for all measures to come into force before the next fixed-date general election.

[Chandra Arya, Liberal, Nepean, ON]

Mr. Speaker, despite the growth in popularity of advance polls and special ballots, voting on polling day still remains the most popular option for how Canadians vote. That is why our government also wants to pave the way to make it easier and more convenient for those who vote on election day to eventually be able to vote at any polling station in their electoral district. This would shorten lineups for voting, provide more options for voting, make voting more convenient and allow election officers to make better use of their time. However, this significant change can only be done after the appropriate technology and procedures have been tested, to ensure the integrity of the voting process.

This is why Bill C-65 asks the Chief Electoral Officer to prepare two reports for Parliament on implementing voting at any polling station through a phased approach.

The first report, which must be tabled 120 days before the next fixed-date election, would outline the measures that would be put in place for the 2025 election, so that voters can vote at any table within their riding's polling station in 2025. This is a critical first step for voters, to be able to walk into their polling station and go to whoever is available to cast their ballot, rather than waiting in line based on alphabetical order of their last names. This is possible because Elections Canada has been testing the use of an electronic list of electors to ensure the success of this technology, including in the Durham by-election earlier this year.

The second report, to be tabled in 2027, would look at what is needed for voters to be able to vote at any polling station anywhere in their riding by 2029. This report would outline expected costs, new technology and any legislative amendments needed for full implementation. These are critical milestones toward giving electors the flexibility to be able to vote in person anywhere in their riding.

I also want to take a moment to highlight the targeted new initiatives that would make voting easier for post-secondary students, residents of long-term care facilities and electors who may require assistance in marking their own ballot, such as electors with disabilities.

For students, Bill C-65 would enshrine the vote on campus program that Elections Canada has offered in past general elections. Working with willing post-secondary institutions, as it did in 2015 and 2019, Elections Canada would set up offices on campus so that Canadian students studying anywhere in Canada would be able to easily vote for any candidate in the student's home riding during a general election. In 2015, close to 70,000 electors cast their votes through this initiative at 39 post-secondary campuses. In 2019, more than 110,000 electors voted at approximately 100 post-secondary campuses. Currently, an estimated 120 campuses across the country are set to host the program at the next general election.

With respect to residents in long-term care, the pandemic highlighted for all of us in this chamber the challenges faced by those residents when trying to vote. During the 2021 election, the Chief Electoral Officer rose to this challenge and established a process for those residing in long-term care facilities to vote safely. Bill C-65 would facilitate voting for the residents in long-term care homes across Canada, building on the success of the Chief Electoral Officer's temporary changes made in 2021.

First, returning officers would work with the staff of these facilities to identify the most convenient dates and times for residents to vote. Voting would continue to be 12 hours in total but could be spread over more than one day to take into account the specific needs of residents.

Second, proof of address would no longer be required for those residents choosing to vote in their long-term care facilities. Many residents have difficulty proving their residence because identity documents are often in the possession of family members, or they no longer have a driver’s licence, which is the most common proof of residence. This change removes an unnecessary obstacle to voting for those in long-term care.

In addition, the Canada Elections Act already permits electors to request and receive assistance at the polls, including to mark their ballot, from Elections Canada officials, friends or family. However, this assistance is currently limited to a friend, spouse or family member. Bill C-65 proposes to remove these restrictions and give electors the freedom to choose their assistant, including caregivers or personal support workers. To maintain both the integrity and the secrecy of the vote, a solemn declaration would continue to be required from the assistant. Election workers would also continue to be available to assist electors if needed.

The final measure to support participation in our electoral process that I will speak to is the proposal that the Chief Electoral Officer prepare a report for Parliament on a three-day election period for any general elections held in 2029 and beyond. This report would allow for a detailed consideration of the feasibility and the path forward, given the considerable operational shift and electoral integrity implications that a three-day election period would bring. It would also identify challenges and potential solutions for implementation.

The second key priority of Bill C-65 is further protecting the personal information of Canadians. In this day and age, personal information is a coveted commodity that must be protected, including in the electoral process and by federal political parties.

In order to do so, the government took a first step in 2018 through Bill C-76, the Elections Modernization Act, introducing the first-ever policy requirements as a condition of party registration. Another step was taken last year through Bill C-47, the Budget Implementation Act, 2023, to affirm that the Canada Elections Act is the exclusive and national regime applicable to federal political parties and those acting on their behalf.

Bill C-65 proposes to expand on these measures to better protect personal information. In order to be a duly registered political party with Elections Canada, each political party must already provide a policy on the protection of personal information. This condition of registration would be maintained, but Bill C-65 adds the following new privacy policy requirements.

Political parties must have the appropriate physical, organizational and technological safeguards, such as locked filing cabinets, in place and must restrict access to those who need it. It would ensure that suppliers or contractors who receive personal information from political parties have the equivalent safeguards in place. Parties must notify affected individuals in the event of a serious breach. It would also prohibit political parties from selling personal information, providing false or misleading information regarding why personal information is collected, and disclosing personal information to cause harm.

The privacy regime under the Canada Elections Act recognizes that outreach, communication and engagement between federal political parties and voters are essential to a healthy, modern democracy. Personal information is at the root of the dialogue between political parties and the Canadian electorate. It is therefore essential that this information be protected accordingly, which is exactly what Bill C-65 proposes to do.

Finally, I am proud to highlight the measures proposed in Bill C-65 to safeguard the electoral process.

This year is an important year for elections around the world. While Canada's next federal election is not scheduled until 2025, over 60 countries, encompassing almost 50% of the world's population, will have elections in 2024. I would like to highlight the elections that were just concluded this month in the largest democracy in the world, India, where about one billion people were eligible to vote, approximately 900-odd million, with about 60% turnout. I think the elections were held over a period of seven to eight weeks. Interestingly, I am told that it is proposed, going forward, that in the next general elections in India, the federal elections will be held simultaneously with about 32 states, 32 provinces, in India.

As I mentioned earlier, we are fortunate in Canada to have one of the most secure and reliable electoral systems in the world. Canada's electoral system is grounded in accessibility, fairness and integrity through the Canada Elections Act. Canadians have confidence in their electoral system. In a survey by Elections Canada following the 44th general election, 82% of participants felt that Canada's voting system was safe and reliable. Yet, Canada's democracy, like other democracies globally, is being tested. Rising security threats that undermine the credibility of democratic elections include foreign interference, disinformation, the misuse of evolving technologies and the threat against its participants.

To address these concerns, Bill C-65 introduces a series of amendments to the Canada Elections Act to further protect the integrity of the electoral system from these threats.

The Canada Elections Act already has strong and wide-ranging measures to help counter these threats to the electoral system. However, as the threats evolve, so too must our response. Currently, certain provisions of the Canada Elections Act apply only during elections. Since people and entities with ill intentions do not limit their activities to a specific time frame, Bill C-65 would expand certain provisions beyond the election period. This includes expanding existing bans so that they are not limited to the election period, specifically those against foreign influence on an elector to not vote or to vote in a certain way, and misleading publications that falsely purport to be from someone they are not, such as the Chief Electoral Officer or a political party.

Like all my hon. colleagues in this House, I have great faith in, and a deep appreciation for, Canada and its democratic institutions. Bill C-65 would further strengthen Canada's world-renowned electoral system, which is at the heart of our democratic system.

Reference to Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

[Stephanie Kusie, Conservative, Calgary Midnapore, AB]

Mr. Speaker, before I begin my remarks, I would like to state that I will be splitting my time with the hon. member for Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman. I certainly look forward to his remarks as well.

Two weeks ago, I was sitting in my constituency office when I got a message from my colleague from Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan. He informed me that there was going to be a special meeting of a small group of us, where he would inform us of a very grave and serious situation. I do not know if one has ever received news where one was told they are the target of a cyber-attack, but I will say that it is terrifying. It is a moment in someone's life when the blood drains from one's face.

When someone is told the date of those attacks, January 2021, one wonders what they were doing that month. What was going on in their life that month? How serious is this attack? It is something I do not want anyone to ever experience again, in this chamber or anywhere else in the world, but unfortunately, it happened.

One starts to wonder if this happened to me, and this also happened to other colleagues in the House of Commons, then clearly, this is also happening within our nation. Who is attempting to obtain what information? How successful are they? How many attacks like this are going on at this time? Worse than that, the Liberal government knew about this attack, yet it did not inform me, and it did not inform my colleagues. It is reprehensible. It is absolutely horrible.

I would like to thank again the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China for informing myself and my colleagues that we were the targets of such an attack. I would also like to thank the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the United States of America for once again doing the heavy lifting that the Liberal government should be doing. It is shameful that we were informed, through foreign governments, that we were under attack.

Unfortunately, it is not a surprise to me. It is not a surprise at all because we found out, just this past week, in the foreign interference report that the former member for Steveston—Richmond East was not successful in his election campaign as a result of foreign interference.

Last year, we saw the effects of a foreign government, the same PRC government, on the member for Wellington—Halton Hills, who sits in this very aisle. He was also the victim of the interference of a foreign government in an attempt to try to gain information on his family to try to intimidate him.

Unfortunately, I had the honour of being the shadow minister for democratic institutions back in 2018-19. At that time, I begged the member for Burlington to do something about it at that time, and it fell upon deaf ears.

We set up things like the Leaders' Debates Commission, which housed a member of the WE Charity scandal. The commission was overseen by the former special rapporteur, who clearly failed in his mission to try to keep this chamber and to keep Canadians safe. We saw the implementation of the toothless digital charter, which achieved nothing to protect Canadians and to protect members of the House.

We spent hours going over Bill C-76, where we talked about things like vouching. We talked about things like returning officers. We talked about things like the closing of polls across our nation, yet this did very little to solve the problem that is in front of us now, which is foreign interference.

Once again, it is the absence of responsibility of the Liberal government not only to do something about foreign interference, but also to even have the courtesy, the decency and the moral placement to let members of the House know that they were under attack and under threat. We did not get that courtesy, and it is an absolute shame.

Once again, we have seen that the government has done too little, too late. We see this time and time again. We saw this in 2019, when I would try and raise questions with the member for Burlington, with the Prime Minister of Canada, and the only response I would receive was that the Prime Minister had an indication that there had been some interference by Russia in the 2015 election, which is very cold comfort at this time, given what we know now.

The 2018-19 election was, my goodness, five years ago now. The Liberals have had five years to do something. Clearly, they have not spent their time doing anything. They are, once again, doing what they do best and that is creating the illusion of doing something when, in fact, they are happy to do nothing because, as we saw with the member for Wellington—Halton Hills, as we saw with the member for Steveston—Richmond East, it benefits them to do nothing, so they have done nothing, and they will keep doing nothing.

Even if I blame the member for Burlington, I know that this direction was from the top. There is no doubt in my mind that this direction was from the top, and the same thing here. I am sure that the Liberals wanted to ignore the cyber-attack and that they wanted to ignore the potential harm it could have caused me, my family and 17 other members of the House. They wanted to turn a blind eye to that because that is what they do. They do not want to take responsibility for the types of atrocities that take place against myself, against other members of the House and against the Canadian people.

The good news about this is that this will not deter myself, and this will not deter the leader of the official opposition from continuing to stand up for democracy, human rights and the rule of law, not only in this nation, but also across the world as well. Members will continue to see us standing side by side with our allies in Taiwan, in Israel and in Ukraine. Once again, this is something that we do not see the Liberal government doing.

We see the government picking and choosing winners and losers, speaking out of both sides of its mouth, again, not only to the harm of people in the House, not only to the harm of Canadians, but also to the harm of people across the world. As I said, that is because this government will always turn a blind eye. Do members know what happens when we turn a blind eye? Evil prevails. Evil prevails in the House when the current government turns a blind eye. Evil prevails across this country when the government is not willing to take responsibility, as I begged the member for Burlington to do all those years ago; and evil prevails across the globe.

It is not a surprise that I was informed, after the fact, that this government had neglected its responsibility to keep our citizens safe and to keep members of this chamber safe, who were informed by a foreign entity, by someone else doing the work that the Liberals should be doing. Shame on them for trying to hide it from us and for keeping it from us. Once again, they would know, Canadians would know, that they had shirked their responsibility and that they had not done what they were supposed to do in overseeing the safety of the House and the safety of the members of the House.

As I said, I have, unfortunately, seen this time and time again, so it is not a surprise to me at all that we were left in this position and that we were left as targets of this foreign government and other foreign governments that are looking into us. I am not naive. I was in the Canadian foreign service, now elected to the House, and I understand that, I am sure, I will always be a target for those foreign governments. However, this government was informed by another government and was informed by another organization that is attempting to do the work that the Liberals should be doing, which is keeping Canadians safe and keeping members of the House safe.

We can refer this matter to PROC. I certainly hope that we do, but I hope it is with greater results than the previous times, when we saw Bill C-76 come out of PROC with no shield for the members of the House and no shield for Canadians. I hope, this time, that the Liberal government takes foreign interference seriously, does not pretend and actually does something about it.

Opposition Motion—Public Inquiry into Allegations of Foreign Interference

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs]

Madam Speaker, I am glad to rise today on this important topic. I found the debate earlier quite interesting. We saw the Conservatives and the NDP fight about who did what first and who is criticizing the government more.

Meanwhile, on this side of the House, we are actually getting to work to make sure that our democratic institutions are protected. While we do that, the opposition parties can stand up to fight about who did what best, whose clip came first and whose motion did what.

I think Canadians expect a government that puts partisanship aside to focus on the real issues that our country is facing. The threat of foreign interference is not a partisan issue. Every single Canadian, regardless of who they vote for or what party they support, should absolutely care about this issue. That should be reflected in the House.

The issue of foreign interference in our democratic institutions is not a new one. In fact, it is not even a unique one for Canada. We have seen instances around the world, such as the 2016 U.S. presidential election. We have seen efforts of foreign interference in France, Australia and New Zealand. All of these countries have been dealing with this issue.

In fact, Canada was warned by CSIS in 2013 about the threat of foreign interference. The then democratic institutions minister, now the opposition leader, did absolutely nothing about it. The leader of the official opposition said in this place that he did not do anything about it because it did not serve his partisan interests at the time. That should indicate to Canadians the absolute basics of where the opposition parties are coming from on this issue.

We now have the report by the right hon. David Johnston, and before members have even had a chance to dive into that report, the leader of the official opposition and the leader of the Bloc have said no. They are going to close their eyes to facts. They do not want to receive the secure national security briefing because they want to be able to continue to still make ignorant claims. They would like to remain blind to the facts. It should not surprise anyone that a party based on conspiracy theories and clickbait would not be a mature and responsible opposition party.

Yesterday, in this very place, the Leader of the Opposition said that he did not want a national security briefing because he did not want to be silenced. That should tell Canadians the level of maturity of the Leader of the Opposition. He is not ready to lead this country. He is barely ready to lead an official opposition of this place.

For somebody to suggest that having a national security briefing silences one on this issue is not only beyond false, but also beyond comprehension. It shows how little he knows about national security matters.

I myself have national security clearance because I was a member of the NSICOP committee, yet I have debated on this issue several times. I am leading the opposition day speech in this place. I have spoken out at PROC. I have asked witnesses serious questions. In fact, in my role in the national defence committee, I brought forward a motion that we study cybersecurity. This was all while having national security briefings, sitting on NSICOP and studying foreign interference, yet I have been able to serve my constituents by raising the issues that matter.

By taking national security seriously and by understanding that one can advocate for stronger democratic institutions, one can still advocate for stronger legislation and mechanisms while also protecting the national security information of this country.

That is what responsible members do. If I can do it, as a member of this government, certainly the Leader of the Opposition should be mature enough to understand the importance of national security while still being able to advocate for stronger mechanisms and measures. The fact that he cannot comprehend how to put the national security of this country first, instead of his partisan attacks, should tell Canadians everything they need to know about the seriousness, or lack thereof, of the Leader of the Opposition and, for that matter, the leader of the Bloc.

When it comes to the issues, I have heard many times in this debate that confidence in Canadians is being eroded. Is that not ironic given the members saying it are the ones who are closing their eyes to the facts? In the right hon. David Johnston's report, he specifically talks about the balance between wanting to make a report that everyday Canadians can read and access with better understand, while at the same time protecting the national security information we all rely on to keep this country safe. He acknowledges that.

David Johnston said that he created an annex to this report with all of the information he based his decisions on. He included this annex for leaders of all recognized parties, members of NSICOP and those with national security clearance that need to have access to it. He specifically said in this report for leaders of the opposition and members of NSICOP to please read this annex, the information that he based his decisions on. He said that they can read it and come forward if they believe that, based on the information, his recommendations were ill-informed or they have taken a different approach.

It is pretty open and transparent to say there is a balance between Canadians needing to understand the positions and the recent media leaks while protecting national security. He then went on to say to everybody who has that national security clearance, such as opposition parties and NSICOP, that all of the information, which he based his recommendations and findings on, is in one easy document, and that, if they disagree with those findings, then they can come forward and say so. However, this will be done while protecting the confidential information collected by the national security community. That is quite reasonable.

In fact, it was an incredibly readable report. I have read many reports of this nature. NSICOP has produced many reports of this nature, and one of the things NSICOP always tries to do in the public version of its reports is to take care and concern in making them as digestible as possible, so any Canadian picking up a report would understand the national security dynamics happening at any given time.

David Johnston suggested to read the information to determine on one's own if one thinks his findings were reasonable, so what happens? The Leader of the Opposition covers his eyes and his ears and says, “No, no, no. I don't want facts and information. I want to be able to stand up here and make fake innuendos, fake accusations and raise some money for my election campaign.” He wants to make personal attacks against the Prime Minister and the right hon. David Johnston.

What does the Bloc do? As my hon. colleague says, it is “blue light”, and it just follows suit. Then the NDP, with this motion, calls for the removal of the special rapporteur based on his report. Its leader has at least agreed to read the annex and get that national security briefing. However, before that has been done, to my knowledge, or at least before the leader of the NDP has made any assessment on the information the right hon. David Johnston used to come to the conclusions he did, and before NDP members have had a chance to really look at it to see if all the information is relevant, they say that they do not support the report. They do so without reading the basis of the recommendations.

When it comes to national security, there is a lot more context and information required than just a few media leaks. Therefore, for any responsible government to refuse to read the national security documentation in the briefings, to refuse to wait and, even for those who have agreed to read it but refuse to actually digest it, look at it or consider it and just throw the report out, is nothing more than partisan games with Canadians' national security and with our democratic institutions. Therefore, if anybody is suggesting that confidence is being eroded, I would suggest it is by the irresponsible behaviour of our opposition parties in not actually doing the work, considering the information and making informed decisions, which is something that, regardless of party, I think every Canadian would expect their MP to be able to do.

I have talked about why I find the opposition parties irresponsible and, in particular, why I find the Leader of the Opposition not only irresponsible but also incredibly immature and unfit to lead, even a party, in this place. However, I want to also talk about some of the things we have done since 2015 because, as I started with in my speech, this is not new.

The opposition party, as the previous Conservative government, knew about foreign interference in 2013. Let me just say, too, that this is this not new, and it is never going to be over. There is no silver bullet any government could implement to say that foreign interference is no longer an issue. A serious democracy is going to always have to be diligent to the foreign forces that would love to destabilize the democracy that Canadians have fought so hard for. Therefore, the important piece of dealing with our democratic institutions is to put the partisanship aside and continually work on how to adapt and change with the changing nature of the threat. However, again, we cannot even have those types of debates in this place because we are too busy hearing partisan and personal attacks from the opposition members, who should be bringing forward recommendations and suggestions to move forward on legislation or mechanisms that would strengthen democratic institutions. Because we cannot get past personal attacks, the government is going to keep working based on experts and those who have come forward making recommendations, and based on looking at other countries and some of the work that they have done.

Some of the things that we have done since 2015 include creating NSICOP, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, which gives national security clearance to representatives from recognized parties in the House, as well as national security briefings and documents. It is a committee that I mentioned I sat on, and it was an extremely professional and serious committee that has not only produced excellent reports for Canada but also has been recognized globally for the work it has done.

We created NSIRA, which is a review of our national security community. We have also established the critical election incident public protocol, and we have created the security and intelligence threats to elections task force, often referred to as SITE.

We have established rapid response mechanisms during elections. We have also had Bill C-59 and Bill C-76, and we have created the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. That is all since 2015.

While opposition parties say that we do not take this seriously, we have right here eight examples that I have listed. I would be curious as to whether, at any point during the day, the Conservative Party will be able to name even one example of something that it did in 10 years to deal with the threats to national security and to strengthen our democratic institutions. I will wait patiently through the debate today to see if that happens.

In addition to that, I would be very curious to see whether the members opposite come forward with serious policy and a serious policy debate.

We have the Johnston report, which makes very clear recommendations, as well as criticisms, with respect to how information is being reported to those who need it. Every government needs to seriously look at and constantly review these matters. I think there has been a strong indication that we are not only taking it seriously, but that we will implement changes to make sure that, moving forward, we are constantly improving our democratic institutions and our processes, and that we are making sure that democracy is protected for Canadians. We do not own these spaces, as this is the House of Commons of Canadians, and it is our job collectively to ensure that we continue to maintain the democratic institutions in this place.

I have spoken at length about the seriousness of these issues, the fact that they are not new, and that in 2013 we had a government that did not take them seriously at all. We are now implementing several of the recommendations, as well as implementing mechanisms to constantly strengthen our democratic institutions.

I want to speak again to this, because we are going to hear personal attacks all day today on the Right Honourable David Johnston. We have already seen him referred to as a ski buddy, a neighbour, a friend, and I think it is quite interesting that Conservatives would refer to him in that way.

I would like to read a quote with respect to Mr. Johnston, which states:

Mr. Johnston has a strong record of public service, a broad base of support and an impressive list of achievements....He has extensive legal expertise, a comprehensive understanding of government and a deep appreciation of the duties and tasks now before him.

That was not the current Prime Minister, but the previous prime minister, Prime Minister Harper, who said that about David Johnston. Therefore, it is disappointing that the Conservatives use personal attacks to undermine not only his credibility, but his lifelong achievements, dedication to this country and public service. To erode all of that by saying he is just a ski buddy and that is how he was selected is an absolute insult to this place and to the people who serve their country. It is all being done for nothing more than partisan gain. He was good enough for Conservatives to make him the governor general. He was good enough for the former prime minister to speak of him in that way. His reputation and credibility have only come into question now that Conservatives are not getting their political way.

I have spoken a lot about the lack of maturity shown by the Leader of the Opposition. I know my time is wrapping up and I want to conclude by saying this. Canadians deserve opposition parties and parliamentarians who work hard for their constituents. We are not always going to agree, but at the very least this should be a place of adamant debate on policy. When the Conservative members opposite do not like the findings or the opinions of someone they have acknowledged and revered for years and decide to throw him away like he is no longer good enough for this country, it is an absolute shame. It shows how immature and ill-equipped the Leader of the Opposition is and that he should not be taken seriously in this country. He is clearly not ready now, nor probably ever, to lead this country, because he does not take national security seriously, but we will on behalf of Canadians.

[Stéphane Perrault]

Bill C-76 did increase transparency by requiring a digital registry of online advertising. Again, I do have recommendations in my recommendation report to expand and build on that in terms of the digital world.

[Stéphane Perrault]

There certainly is.

Madam Chair, I'll try to answer as best I can in the limited amount of time.

Proximity is a critical aspect of accessibility and so is the flexibility of being able to vote anywhere.

When I talked about electronic lists, this is the foundation for it. It has merit on its own because of the efficiencies and the better services to voters, but it is also the foundation for voting anywhere. You need electronic lists if you are going to allow electors to vote at any polling location. We are working on that very actively. Hopefully, we will at some point see changes in the legislation to allow more flexibility.

Proximity is important. That's where I'll come back to the previous question. When you look at the number of days of voting and you're talking about over 15,000 or close to 16,000 locations that need to be leased for their regular polling day, if you need to have those locations for three days, we expect that we would lose 25% to 40%. That would have a perverse effect—an unintended consequence—on the accessibility. When you talk about voting days, you need to look at it very carefully to see what the impact is on those communities that may lose a polling station.

The ability to vote anywhere is part of an answer to that problem, but it does not remove the hurdles for those who do not have the mobility to vote anywhere. These are complex and difficult issues. They need to be examined very carefully as we move forward on these aspects.

In terms of indigenous electors on reserve, as I said, our priority—my priority—for the next election is to leverage some of the provisions in Bill C-76 that allow for advance voting for less than four days where there are small, remote communities that cannot support and do not need four consecutive days of voting. That is a firm commitment that I've made to make sure that wherever we are desired—and I understand that in some communities there is not a wish to see Elections Canada in the community—we will be present at least for one day for advance polls. That would be a significant improvement.

As I indicated in my remarks, we are looking at a much broader review of our services to indigenous electors in Canada. That's a long-term review. We've started to meet and we've met with over 230 communities across the country in 60 sessions. We will do a second round of meetings next year. I will come back to this committee with a report on the recommendations to improve services to indigenous electors—not just on reserve, but more broadly.

In terms of voters with disabilities, you may have seen in my departmental plan that we are looking at procuring software to enable electors who are visually impaired to validate independently that they have marked their ballot in the way they intended to. Right now, we have a template that they use, but they can never be absolutely sure that they marked it properly without the assistance of someone else. In terms of independent voting—which is really important for the dignity of people with disabilities—we hope to be able to provide a solution this year and roll it out in a by-election.

[John Nater, Conservative, Perth—Wellington, ON]

Thank you, Madam Chair, and through you, thank you to our witnesses for joining us today.

I'm going to start with Mr. Perrault. In 2018, Bill C-76 received royal assent. One provision in that was the register of future electors. In your departmental plan, it states a goal of 25% being on that list. Could you tell the committee how many future electors are currently on that list?

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Ms. Byrne, NSICOP, the critical election incident public protocol, the SITE task force, the rapid response mechanism, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, the plan to protect Canadian democracy, Bill C-59 and Bill C-76 are eight things that our government has done since 2015. Can you name eight from the Harper era?

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Red Deer—Lacombe, AB]

Another rationale the government had for voting against my bill, Bill C-406, was that they were going to instead pass a government bill, Bill C-76, which, if you believe the government's talking points of the day, would have closed some of the loopholes in foreign funding of elections by third parties.

Do you think Bill C-76 has been a success?

Reference to Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons (Senate)]

Mr. Speaker, the member referenced that I was pining over the fact that the member for Carleton or the previous government had never done anything about this. However, that was just the context I was using to set the stage for telling members about all the things we did do, as well as all the things we have done since becoming elected, that Conservatives have routinely voted against, including this member.

Bill C-22 created NSICOP, which he now speaks so highly about. Conservatives voted against it. Bill C-59 created and established NSIRA. Conservatives voted against it. Bill C-76 limited foreign ability to influence elections through monetary contributions. Conservatives voted against it.

Conservatives have routinely voted against initiatives that the government has brought forward to combat foreign interference. The fact that the previous Conservative government did nothing is just the context to set in order to highlight everything that we have done.

Could the member share with the House why he and his colleagues voted against all those measures?

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons (Senate)]

Madam Speaker, foreign interference has been reported publicly through CSIS since as early as 2013, when Conservatives were in power. The member for Carleton, the Leader of the Opposition, was then the minister responsible for receiving that report. Conservatives did nothing for two years.

Since then, we brought in Bill C-76, the Elections Modernization Act, which tightened up rules around donations to campaigns, specifically limiting foreign donations. We brought in Bill C-59, which established NSIRA, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency. We brought in NSICOP, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, to oversee national security.

Conservatives voted against all of that, everything, and at times they would not even vote to let the bills go to committee. How is it they can come in here and be so interested and speak so passionately about protecting democracy against foreign interference when they have routinely and systematically voted against every single initiative?

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons (Senate)]

Madam Speaker, let us just recap for a second.

In 2013, the Conservatives and the former democratic reform minister, the member for Carleton and Leader of the Opposition, received a report from CSIS saying that election interference was real and was going to continue. He did nothing for two years and literally sat on the report.

Later on, in 2017, after we came into government, we introduced Bill C-76, which limited funding from foreign actors. The Conservatives voted against it. We introduced Bill C-22 shortly before that, to create NSICOP. Conservatives would not even let it go to committee. They voted against it after the first or second reading.

I am wondering how the Conservatives can actually stand here and try to claim that they have any credibility on the issue of foreign interference, when they did nothing and routinely voted against every measure that we brought forward.