Bill C-377

An Act to amend the Parliament of Canada Act (need to know)

This enactment amends the Parliament of Canada Act to specify that a member of the Senate or the House of Commons who applies for a secret security clearance from the Government of Canada is, for the purposes of the consideration of their application, deemed to need access to the information in respect of which the application is made.

[Eric Duncan, Conservative, Stormont—Dundas—South Glengarry, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good morning to colleagues and to the witnesses helping us out with this thorough clause-by-clause.

I'll build on what Mr. Calkins said.

I want to start by saying this: Through all of this, including the amendment he proposed, which we passed a few minutes ago, Mr. Ruff has made a very concerted effort to narrowly target the issue at hand here. I think, for example, that the amendment that he proposed and we passed further clarifies what this is. It goes back to the right of parliamentarians to apply—end of story. The amendment and subamendment here are getting into secondary and later phases that are not affected. It does not jeopardize our national security, intelligence or classified documents in any way.

As Mr. Ruff asked our witnesses again this morning to confirm, and what Dr. Giles said in testimony to us on Thursday.... I'll read what was said on Thursday and reiterate it again here this morning:

A security clearance is sometimes misunderstood or portrayed as a special designation, a set of privileges or an earned qualification like a rank.... Since clearance holders work in every part of government, a security clearance does not automatically grant the holder access to all information or assets at that level of clearance.

We've gone on to have many conversations or debates about the need for safeguards, which I don't deny. I'm not denying we need to have safeguards. There's no discussion or debate on that. However, what Mr. Ruff has put a concerted effort into doing is narrowly dealing with the right of parliamentarians to apply for a clearance. This does not automatically mean that a parliamentarian gets one. They still have to go through the process like everyone else. It further clarifies that it does not mean that once.... For example, if I were to apply and be granted this, I can't suddenly walk up to any of you and say, “I'd like to see the following 15 documents on X, Y and Z.” The safeguard already exists for any of the quarter million clearances that were applied for in the last decade. If you're a staff member for a minister in the public service, being given that clearance does not give you, as Dr. Giles said the other day, a right to go on from there.

When we talk about the subamendment and amendment being proposed, and our argument about scale and it being out of scope, it is Mr. Ruff's intention of how we're doing this, because, at the end of the day, that safeguard is there. Anybody who gets the clearance does not automatically get.... The point Mr. Calkins raised, which has been raised a few times in discussions of Bill C-377, is that if a parliamentarian receives it, it's there. They are more turnkey-ready should a committee or an individual parliamentarian.... For example, if they are a victim of foreign interference, they are more turnkey-ready and prepared. At that time, as we saw with the Winnipeg lab and the Afghan detainee documents going back a few Parliaments now, a lot of the details are negotiated at that point in the discussion. We say, “This committee, special committee or whatever it may be, needs to see X, Y and Z.” Those can be negotiated or discussed as part of a disclosure to parliamentarians in a certain setting at that time. That's been done in the past. That is a safeguard at the time when the decisions are made.

I'll go back to make the same argument again, one we've repeated. Mr. Ruff has done a very good job of clarifying, umpteen times—I have lost track—this legislation and what he's proposed in good faith through an amendment. We've seen other efforts he's made and will be making again for the right of a parliamentarian to apply. Right now, if I were to put in an application, I would be rejected. This is just the right to apply to get the clearance. That's the end of the story. It does not entitle me or any parliamentarian to extra information or any other right going from there. What it can do is get more people at that level prepared to receive it, in the event we need it.

I think part of the effort and the reason for the continued expressed intent from Mr. Ruff is that if more members can get up to that level on various committees, as they choose, with the right to apply and to have that, I think, from a national security perspective, in the important roles we have in passing the budgets that you all work under and in passing the legislation that you interpret and operate in, it gives that opportunity, down the road, should the need or the circumstance arise, to have this clearance, to have it prepared and to be ready for it. I think that is essential.

The subamendment and the amendment that are proposed here, I will say again, are above and beyond the scope of Mr. Ruff's bill and his intentions. He's made that very clear. It is not to say that safeguards should not exist. The argument is that they do exist already because, again, when someone applies for and passes a security clearance, it does not automatically mean they're granted access to a single document because of that aspect.

I'll leave my comments there and will continue to encourage my colleagues to reject this subamendment and amendment. Let's get back to the scope and the level that Mr. Ruff is dealing with. It is very reasonable. It is very narrow and targeted for a specific reason. I think we could have a very good piece of legislation that does not jeopardize any safeguards that are there. They can use the existing ones that are in place now for the circumstance.

I'll leave it at that, for now, for my comments.

[Terry Duguid, Liberal, Winnipeg South, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to move the following amendment from the floor. My staff have emailed it to the clerk in both official languages.

I move that Bill C-377, in clause 1, be amended by adding after line 20 on page 2 the following:

Prohibition

(3) A member or former member of the Senate or the House of Commons must not knowingly disclose information to which they were given access under a security clearance, except if the disclosure is made during an in camera meeting of a committee of the Senate or the House of Commons, or of a joint committee, and every individual in attendance has also been granted the necessary security clearance by the Government of Canada.

While we wait for the email to be distributed, I'll offer our reasoning on this side.

This amendment provides a necessary safeguard measure to prevent inappropriate disclosure of classified information to individuals who have not been granted a security clearance by the Government of Canada.

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Thank you, Chair. I will just read it in.

I move that Bill C-377, in clause 1, be amended by replacing lines 15 and 16 on page 2 with the following:

eration of their application, deemed to need that security clearance.

As I was trying to explain earlier, this addresses the concerns that were raised by the officials last week about the term “need to know”. It clears up that ambiguity and clearly focuses on the fact that, as I've mentioned in all my speeches and testimony, the only purpose of my bill is to allow parliamentarians to apply for secret security clearance. It has nothing to do with how the government controls access to that information or ever disseminates it.

The purpose of my bill, to clarify, is just to apply for that security clearance, so that's why I'm putting this change forward.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ben Carr]

Good morning, everyone.

I hope you've had a good couple of days since we last saw one another.

I call meeting number 127 of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs to order.

Today, we commence the clause-by-clause study of Bill C-377, an act to amend the Parliament of Canada Act with regard to the need to know.

To colleagues and, particularly, to our witnesses, this is a friendly reminder that if your headsets are not in use, please make sure that they are put on the stickers in front of you in order to avoid doing damage to the health and well-being of our interpreters, who are working so hard on our behalf.

We have a number of officials with us today, who are here to provide guidance when necessary.

I would like to welcome Tracy, chief of strategic policy from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. From the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, we have Justin Chan, director of counterterrorism policy. From the Privy Council Office, we have Sean Jorgensen, director general and chief security officer. From the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, we have Chief Superintendent Jeffrey Beaulac, acting chief security officer of departmental security. From the Treasury Board Secretariat, we have Adam Hatfield, executive director of policy on government security.

Thank you very much to our officials for being here.

Colleagues, there were obviously a number of changes and moving pieces over the course of the past couple of days, but I believe we have landed in a place that should allow for what I hope is a fruitful and efficient discussion today. I ask for everybody's patience. We should not be frustrated with colleagues should they have questions or a need for clarity, given how much has changed over the course of the past few days.

(On clause 1)

With that, we are going to begin. The first amendment that was put forward was G-1.

Access to Information

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I have two petitions to present today.

The first petition, signed by a number of my constituents, supports my private member's bill, Bill C-377, which would allow parliamentarians to apply for a secret security clearance. They call upon the House to swiftly pass my bill to allow parliamentarians the ability to apply for a secret security clearance.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

In fact, what I am seeing right now is that there is a major obstacle. Sometimes there is a Liberal government and sometimes there is a Conservative government. The important thing, however, is for us to get disclosure of the information we need in order to do our job properly.

Bill C‑377, which we are currently considering, is one way of circumventing that obstacle, or finding another way to get access to information that may be declassified when a committee requests it in order to avoid having to raise questions of privilege in Parliament week after week.

So I want to know whether this bill has enough teeth and whether it is going to enable us to move forward. Ultimately, if the right to know is within the purview of Parliament rather than the government of the day, we are talking about something completely different.

Do you agree with me?

[Terry Duguid, Liberal, Winnipeg South, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to all of our witnesses for their testimony today.

I listened with interest to Mr. Wark's presentation, and I'm sure you listened to it as well. He has strong opinions. He referred to the Five Eyes and our international partners. He said they would not view this legislation very favourably; they do not have this kind of provision as proposed in Mr. Ruff's bill in their systems, and they are looking at NSICOP and other innovations we have introduced very favourably.

I wonder if you might comment on his testimony and whether you agree with it, and summarize the risks you see of passing this legislation. I haven't heard a crisp opinion from you on whether you support or don't support Bill C-377.

I'll then cede my time to Mr. Turnbull.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much for enlightening us, Dr. Giles. I understood very clearly from your opening remarks what the distinction is between need to know and right to know.

What concerns me when it comes to parliamentary privileges is actually whether I can get access to the information that is going to be useful to me in my role as a legislator. You have reassured me tremendously on that point.

Where you worried me is when you talked about international relations, particularly with the Five Eyes member countries, about CSIS's image and about potentially sullying its reputation. I heard that clearly.

I also heard clearly that Bill C‑70, which lacks teeth, in my opinion, has also contributed to providing us with more information in order to potentially avoid what we are experiencing in our legislative menu, which is going to last a very long time and is coming back to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.

So I am trying to understand what benefit is provided by Bill C‑377 when I could get the information I need by making a request, unless the government decides not to authorize access, obviously.

I would like to get your opinion.

Since there is some delay in answering me, I am thinking my question was a very good one, Mr. Chair.

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Thanks, Chair.

Thanks, Ms. Giles, for the opening remarks.

Thanks to everybody here for what you do on a daily basis to help keep our country safe. There are some very familiar faces sitting at the table.

Ms. Giles, you talked about the threats, about the need to up our game and about the important changes that Bill C-70 allows that will allow CSIS, in particular, to share additional information. However, one of those conditions upon sharing additional classified information—and we're talking only at the secret level here, with my bill—is that you're still going to want those people to have a clearance before you share that information. That could be other levels of government. That could be—in particular here with Bill C-377—parliamentarians, so that's MPs and senators. That's a necessary safeguard that they're going to need in order to get that information.

Is that correct?

I would just ask if that is part of the reason this was evident and brought forward by CSIS—whether to NSICOP through reporting up to the government—and why it was included in Bill C-70.

Is it that there is that recognition that more classified information needs to be shared at a much wider level in order to address the ongoing security threats?

[Dr. Nicole Giles, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy and Strategic Partnerships, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Good morning, Chair and members of the committee. It's an honour to join you today and to have the opportunity to discuss Bill C-377.

We hope to provide some insight to this committee on government security screening processes and policies, as well as on access to classified information and the importance of protecting it.

In the interest of time, as the chair mentioned, I have the honour of providing opening remarks on behalf of the entire panel of witnesses.

Security screening is a fundamental practice that makes it possible to establish and maintain a relationship of trust within the government, between the government and Canadians, and between Canada and foreign countries.

Security screening involves the collection of personal information from individuals with their informed consent, as well as information from law enforcement, intelligence sources and other sources, using methods to assess their reliability and loyalty to Canada. My colleagues here from TBS and PCO will be very pleased to expand upon these issues.

A security clearance is sometimes misunderstood or portrayed as a special designation, a set of privileges or an earned qualification like a rank. It is none of these. Simply put, in the Government of Canada, it is an administrative decision taken by the deputy head of an organization that an individual is an acceptable security risk when accessing government information, assets and facilities, and when working with others in government.

The deputy head makes their decision based on the information and advice provided by the police and intelligence services, including the RCMP and CSIS. A security clearance may be granted, denied or revoked by the deputy head at any time.

Since clearance holders work in every part of government, a security clearance does not automatically grant the holder access to all information or assets at that level of clearance.

Safeguarding sensitive information is critical to the Government of Canada's ability to function and to keep Canada and Canadians safe. There are rigorous measures in place to prevent the release of classified information to anyone who does not strictly require it.

These measures are imposed with very good reason. The inadvertent release of sensitive information can result—and, very sadly, has resulted—in serious harm to individuals, even costing lives, Canada's national interest and our international relations. Mitigating this risk underpins everything that members of the security and intelligence community do. The release of information could mean risking the safety of human sources, exposing the tradecraft and other methodologies used to conduct investigations, and threatening the stability of indispensable allied relationships upon which Canada depends so heavily for intelligence. Put simply, if partners cannot trust Canada with their information, they will no longer provide it to us.

Similarly, if human sources do not trust that CSIS can protect them by safeguarding the information that they provide to us, our ability to recruit sources and collect information vital to Canadian security will be seriously impeded. We could also lose access to a valuable technical collection source that took years and expensive investments to develop.

What may appear in the first instance as information that's not especially sensitive or harmful, when viewed in conjunction with other publicly released information, can be used by adversaries to make inferences with very serious consequences. This is called the mosaic effect. Our adversaries carefully watch and track every word we say and release publicly, and we're very confident that they are watching now. They put together many pieces of information to identify our sources, our methodologies, our tradecraft and intelligence gaps. Many adversaries are very good at their jobs.

There are important principles that reinforce this system and that lie at the foundation of safeguarding all sensitive information. This is the need-to-know principle. An individual's specific duties and functions and the files they were working on at that particular moment in time are what establish their need to know for relevant sensitive information. Even the most senior officials at CSIS, who have the highest possible clearance levels, do not receive sensitive information that is not relevant to the current job and files that they're working on. In other words, there is no deemed need to know.

We need to ensure that sufficient information is disclosed to hold the government to account while also ensuring that classified information is protected. There are several critical avenues for review and oversight of classified information, including the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, the National Security Intelligence Review Agency, the intelligence commissioner and the Federal Court, among others.

The people who work for these organizations have the necessary security clearances; they will receive the information classified as secret that they need for performing their specific jobs.

There are safeguards in place to ensure that no national security injury occurs as a result of disclosure of that information. These individuals are bound to secrecy under the foreign interference and security of information act, formerly known as the Security of Information Act, SOIA, and they must not knowingly disclose any information they obtained or to which they had access in the course of their duties and that a department is taking measures to protect.

At the same time, CSIS is making efforts to enhance its transparency, including in its public annual reports, which now say more than ever about its operations and the threat overview, and in its discussions with the media and the information it communicates to the public proactively.

We have taken extensive efforts to “write for release” information, for example in the proactive provision of chronologies of events to parliamentary committees. We've done that in the last couple of months.

Recent amendments to the CSIS Act through Bill C-70 further enhance CSIS's ability to share information, and we look forward to working more closely with parliamentarians as we up the national security conversation in this country.

We will be happy to answer your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ben Carr]

We are getting going with our second hour of testimony.

We have a number of witnesses with us here today. I would like to welcome them.

From the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, we have Nicole Giles, senior assistant deputy minister, policy and strategic partnerships, as well as Bo Basler, director general and coordinator, foreign interference. From the Privy Council Office, we have Sean Jorgensen, director general and chief security officer. From the RCMP, we have chief superintendent Jeffrey Beaulac, acting chief security officer, departmental security. From the Treasury Board Secretariat, we have Mike MacDonald, senior assistant deputy minister, security policy modernization.

Thank you very much to all the witnesses who are here today to add their insight and guidance as we delve further into Bill C-377.

Ms. Giles, I understand you'll be speaking on behalf of the entire group. I will turn the floor over to you for five minutes.

I just have a friendly note for our witnesses. If you're not used to appearing in front of committees, you have those earpieces. If you are not using them, please make sure you place them on those stickers in front of you. Obviously, if they're on your ears, you can go ahead and use the function as normal.

With that, Madam Giles, it's five minutes for you.

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

I have no concerns with the ask. However, it really has nothing to do with my bill, because it deals with that next step. Should a committee down the road ever decide it wants access to secret information—no different from the special committees we've referred to already a number of times—in that process, the House of Commons assists in working with the security agencies to set up the appropriate protections necessary to have those meetings in a secure location or to handle the files, etc.

Will there be implications? Absolutely, but they're not really that relevant to my bill, because my bill addresses only applying for security clearance. I have no issues with the ask; I just don't think it's really relevant to the actual clause-by-clause study of Bill C-377.

[Michel Bédard]

In the context of Bill C-377 there is a “saving clause” for parliamentary privilege, and parliamentary privilege is not affected, so the intent of the bill—

[Michel Bédard]

I thank the member for her question.

I think this question puts an issue on the floor that is more general than what is before the committee right now, that is, the relationship between Parliament and the government when it comes to obtaining information. The bill sponsored by Mr. Ruff is about a very specific policy that would enable members to have access to the clearance process, while not guaranteeing a clearance.

If Bill C‑377 is enacted, I presume that some governance process will be established within the parties. The whips may have a role to play in selecting the members who will request clearances and determining what is done if a clearance is denied. I don't think that 338 requests would be sent to the government as soon as the bill is passed. I presume that the parties would exercise governance.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

This suggests to me that our committee should first review the operation of the NSICOP, in the sense that it should meet the needs arising from the privilege of knowing, the right to know, rather than instituting a security clearance about what we do with the information we have, to make sure that when we request information, we can get it, so we are able to do our work properly. If we focused more on governance and how the parliamentary committee operates at present, might that be a potential solution, rather than enacting Bill C‑377 as is?

[Michel Bédard]

It would still be the government's processes and parameters that would apply. You have to understand that Bill C‑377 is not an exercise of the privilege of parliamentarians in the House of Commons. It is really about access to information that belongs to the government.

[Mona Fortier, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier, ON]

In your opinion, if Bill C‑377 were enacted, what organization would be responsible for doing the security checks of members and holding the authorizations?

[Mona Fortier, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier, ON]

In your opinion, are there already processes or mechanisms that would allow parliamentarians to get the same level of access as what is proposed in Bill C‑377?

[Michel Bédard]

Bill C‑377 would mean that members who so request would be able to follow the process provided to get a security clearance. There is a clear saving provision in the bill, to avoid weakening the privileges.

The purpose of the bill is neither to claim nor to create new privileges. It would therefore not allow members to get more rights to access information, but it would allow them to get the necessary security clearance for accessing the information the government might disclose to them. It would still be the government that made these decisions, because it is still information that belongs to the government.

[Mona Fortier, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier, ON]

Does Bill C‑377 as it now stands have an impact on those privileges?

[Mona Fortier, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for being here today, Mr. Bédard.

I think, thanks to your expertise, we are finally able to understand your interpretation of Bill C‑377 and the repercussions it will have if it is passed as it stands.

My questions will relate to your expertise and experience. If you have any suggestions to make to clarify anything for members of the committee, we are always prepared to consider them.

My first question relates to parliamentary privilege.

What can you tell us about the relationship between this privilege and the right to information?

Do parliamentarians have an inherent right to information?

[Michel Bédard, Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel, House of Commons]

Mr. Chair, members of the committee, thank you for your invitation to appear today regarding Bill C‑377, An Act to amend the Parliament of Canada Act (need to know), which has been referred to the committee after second reading in the House.

As you said, Mr. Chair, I am joined today by Marie‑Sophie Gauthier, senior legal counsel and acting team leader in my office.

We hope our testimony today will assist the committee in its consideration of this legislative initiative.

My office provides legal services and legislative drafting services to the House of Commons, its committees, members of Parliament, the Board of Internal Economy and the House administration. Our legislative drafting services include the drafting of private members’ bills, such as Bill C-377, and motions and amendments at committee and report stages. Our legislative drafting services are provided confidentially to members of Parliament, and the information I will provide today to the committee will factor in these expectations with regard to my office.

Bill C-377 proposes to amend the Parliament of Canada Act so that members of Parliament and senators who apply for a security clearance from the Government of Canada are, for the purposes of the consideration of their application, deemed to need access to the information in respect for which the application is made.

Access to information of the Government of Canada that is either protected or classified is a two-step process. First, there must be a need or justification to initiate the security screening process, which will result in the individual receiving a reliability status for protected information or a security clearance for classified information. Such a need or justification is traditionally identified by a government department or agency.

Second, there is the need-to-know principle, which restricts access to sensitive information to those whose duties and functions necessitate access to the information. A person is not entitled to access information classified at a certain level merely because they have the appropriate level of classification or clearance. They need to know the information as part of their functions, regardless of their clearance. I note that the unauthorized releasing of classified information may lead to legal consequences such as prosecution under the Security of Information Act.

A distinction must be made between access to protected or classified information on a need-to-know basis by individuals holding the appropriate level of clearance and the House of Commons parliamentary privilege to send for persons and records.

This power, generally exercised by committees, supports the role of the House as the grand inquest of the nation and is essential to the proper exercise of the House’s right to institute and conduct inquiries.

The power to send for persons and records would be unaffected by Bill C‑377. Moreover, new proposed subsection 13.1(2) of the Parliament of Canada Act would make this unambiguously clear by stating that the proposal is not to be construed as a way of “limiting in any way the powers, privileges, rights and immunities of the Senate or the House of Commons or their members.”

The privilege of freedom of speech would also be untouched by Bill C‑377 and members speaking in the House and committees would continue to benefit from a criminal and civil immunity for their words spoken as part of parliamentary proceedings.

That said, this immunity does not apply outside of parliamentary proceedings and members would be, as any other citizens, amenable before courts of law for words spoken or communication outside the House and committees.

This concludes our opening remarks. We would be happy to answer questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ben Carr]

Good morning colleagues.

Good morning, everyone.

I hope you had a lovely few days in the Outaouais.

Welcome to meeting number 126 of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.

Today we are continuing our consideration of Bill C‑377, An Act to amend the Parliament of Canada Act (need to know).

I just have a friendly reminder for witnesses and colleagues. Please make sure that your earpiece, when not in use, is placed on the sticker in front of you to protect the safety and well-being of our translators, who work so hard on our behalf.

With us today, we have two witnesses: Michel Bédard, law clerk and parliamentary counsel; and Marie-Sophie Gauthier, senior legal counsel and team leader of legal services.

Welcome.

Mr. Bédard, I'm not sure if you intend to split your time or if you'll be speaking on your own. However, we'll give you the five minutes to use, and then we'll go into our regular line of questioning. Once we hit the hour, we will suspend briefly in order to transition over to our second hour.

It looks like we're ready to go.

Mr. Bédard, the floor is yours.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Mr. Chair, although I have a lot to say on this topic, I will stick to the matter before us today.

What we're trying to get is the relevant information that will help ensure our national security. I've noticed that, over the past six years, obstruction has taken place. As you said, it's partisan obstruction. On one hand, there is an attempt to hide information, possibly out of fear of shedding light on a situation, and on the other, there is Bill C‑377, which is an attempt to know everything.

I heard you say that the current organization needs more teeth. The executive branch puts out a report, which I didn't even know about. That means there's a lot of information available to us, as parliamentarians.

In the current situation, even if a bill like this one is passed, there will be changes. The roles will change. The goal is to regain the confidence of our democratic society.

I'd like to hear your thoughts on that before deciding whether or not to support the bill.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

When I said that Bill C‑377 was useless, according to you, I was referring to the fact that you called it “useless”. What you really meant was unnecessary. You rephrased it clearly. No retaliation, please.

As I understand it, the government has repeatedly tried to protect information, parliamentarians want to know the information, and there is a committee of parliamentarians—which you helped set up—but it doesn't have sufficient analysis powers.

That is why you think Bill C‑377 is certainly not necessary if we focus on the information that's already available.

Do I have that right?

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Wark, I want to follow up on your last comment.

As you just mentioned, a significant gap exists between members of Parliament and the intelligence agencies when it comes to access to information. In fact, we've been studying the culture of intelligence for months, and it's clear that there is almost no such culture.

Could Bill C‑377—which is useless given what you said at the outset—help bring the two sides closer and improve the culture of intelligence?

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and, through you, I'd like to welcome the witnesses back to PROC.

My first round of questions will be for Dr. Leuprecht.

I understand that you have expertise in Canada-U.S. relations, continental security and NORAD. How would the adoption of Bill C-377 impact our largest partner in terms of defence south of the border? Would there be any impact in terms of that relationship?

[Dr. Wesley Wark, Senior Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I have just two quick comments to begin. First of all, I'm a big fan of private members' bills and have contributed to two of them in the past, both on oversight issues. Like Mr. Ruff, I have also held secret, top secret, top secret code word clearance, and I would say in that regard that security clearances are not a holy grail to understanding national security intelligence issues and threats.

Bill C-377 would establish an unprecedented power for Canadian parliamentarians, on their own initiative, to apply for a secret security clearance in order to access classified information. This power has no equivalent among the parliamentarians of our Five Eyes partners—those that are Westminster-style democracies. The parliaments of the U.K., Australia and New Zealand all share a responsibility with that of Canada to hold the government to account as a core duty. In their cases, this responsibility, when it comes to matters pertaining to national security and intelligence that involve access to classified intelligence briefings and records, is given to special committees of review and oversight. In the U.K. case it is the Intelligence and Security Committee, in Australia it's the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, and in New Zealand it's the Intelligence and Security Committee. All of these have unique features, but in the case of New Zealand the committee includes the prime minister and the leader of the opposition.

In Canada the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians is the body, established by Parliament in 2017, to undertake reviews of national security and intelligence issues. NSICOP has significant access to classified material, with some restrictions: cabinet confidences, ongoing investigations that may lead to criminal prosecutions and solicitor-client privilege, as examples. Its members must obtain top secret security clearances and relinquish the protection of parliamentary privilege should they divulge, in an unauthorized manner, classified information. NSICOP has been publishing reports for the past six years, most recently its report on foreign interference. It has, in my view, performed an important public service and issued many significant studies. I encourage all members of this committee to support NSICOP and to pay attention to its studies: Use them to hold the government to account.

NSICOP is not mentioned in Bill C-377. The effort to establish NSICOP took many years to accomplish—decades, in fact—and to undermine it now, which I think this bill would do, would be a serious mistake. The legislation was opposed by the Conservative Party at the time of its passage, but an earlier iteration dating back to a study undertaken in 2004 actually had all-party backing.

Members of Parliament may feel that there are aspects of the original legislation that established NSICOP that need review and amendment. You would not be alone in this. In the original statute, at section 34, the legislation called for a comprehensive review of the act by Parliament after five years. That review should have begun in 2022. It has not yet started, which is a serious failure of a statutory obligation and a missed opportunity by Parliament.

I believe Bill C-377 is wholly unnecessary, given the existence of NSICOP as the parliamentary entity designed to exercise accountability, in a non-partisan matter, on behalf of both the House of Commons and Senate. Even if you do not share that view, I point out the following—and there has been, of course, some discussion in the previous hour about that. In my reading, Bill C-377 does not establish any real need-to-know principle, leaving this to individual parliamentarians' discretion. Application for a secret clearance is not restricted to members of committees dealing with national security and intelligence issues. Even if it were, it would result in clear duplication with NSICOP and undermine, I believe, the purpose of NSICOP. Bill C-377 would open up security clearance processes for all parliamentarians in a way that I think is hard to justify and extremely problematic. It would have impacts on security clearance processes conducted by CSIS, potentially undermining their rigour, and leaves unanswered—as we discovered in your first hour of discussion—the question of what would happen should an applicant be denied a clearance. In my view, Bill C-377 would fatally undermine NSICOP and parliamentarians' ability to hold the government to account on important matters of national security and intelligence, and it demonstrates no real need...case. It would also heighten, potentially, the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information. A better alternative would be to have a system—and I stress “system”—in place whereby party leaders have clearances and can receive classified information, as NSICOP itself suggested.

Finally, I encourage parliamentarians to push, instead, in a different direction on a genuine declassification strategy, which I think would be a great benefit to all parliamentarians and members of the Canadian public, in terms of better informing Canadians about national security issues.

Thank you.

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht, Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for inviting me to take part in today's meeting.

I'll be giving my presentation in English, but feel free to ask questions in the official language of your choice.

I appear before you as a professor with subject matter expertise. I recently co-authored a book entitled Intelligence as Democratic Statecraft: Accountability and Governance of Civil-Intelligence Relations across the Five Eyes Security Community. It was published by Oxford University Press, which is among the world's most reputable scholarly publishers. I'm also a student of constitutional democracy, having co-edited Essential Readings in Canadian Constitutional Politics. Both areas of expertise are relevant to this bill.

The basic constitutional convention that informs Westminster parliamentary democracy is responsible government—that government, through parliament, is responsible to the people. The subsidiary principle is ministerial responsibility—that ministers are accountable for their departments and agencies.

In recent years, the role of parliament and its ability to hold government to account has been greatly diminished, this at a time when the size of the bureaucracy is up 45% since 2015 and government spending is at an all-time high.

As Donald Savoie documents in his most recent book, the civil service is atrophying and is becoming less effective. That's in part because ministers seem to take little responsibility for what happens in their departments. Instead, they seemingly prefer to blame civil servants. In response, civil servants have become highly risk-averse, yet parliament is hampered in its role of holding the government to account because the civil service reports to the political executive.

By giving parliamentarians the opportunity to apply for a secret security clearance, the bill takes a small step to bolster parliamentary supremacy and restore some balance to the relationship between parliament and the political executive. Access to documents that would otherwise be protected and the ability for civil servants to testify frankly before committee on protected material in camera improves the ability of parliament to hold government to account. The change is not to be taken lightly. It also changes the very character of the Westminster tradition of open parliament.

In 2015, this government came to power on a promise of open and transparent government. In the NSICOP, the government moved swiftly to empower security and intelligence reviews by parliamentarians. Allowing MPs and senators to apply for secret clearance is a logical next step in empowering parliament to hold government to account.

Can parliamentarians be trusted with protected, even classified, information? My book shows that indeed they can. Members of cabinet and the NSICOP are already entrusted with privileged information. Instances of intentional or inadvertent disclosure of privileged information by parliamentarians in any western democracy are far and few between. That's because they know that, as legitimately elected representatives of the people, they bear special responsibility. Access to sensitive and protected material at in camera meetings also reduces incentives for grandstanding at committee.

By contrast, political staffers leak information strategically all the time. Just last week, we had an apparent leak by a department to The Globe and Mail. Given the way that the government has instrumentalized secrecy provisions for partisan purposes—in the case of the national microbiology laboratory, for instance—and as we're learning from the Hogue commission, possibly in the selective treatment of national security intelligence, if political staffers get access to sensitive and protected material, then so should parliamentarians.

Bill C-377 conforms with the principles of who needs to know and what they need to know because parliamentary committees would ultimately put forward the case to the government of the day which material members should be able to access and for what purpose, and party leaders will be accountable for the MPs they appoint to committees.

The government may beat back calls for selectively clearing parliamentarians, arguing that parliament isn't up to the task, that the proposal is somehow American, that it doesn't work elsewhere, or even that they should all be left in the hands of judges. Does that sound familiar? Well, those were the Conservative Harper government's objections to bestowing on parliamentarians precisely the powers of review that the Liberal government subsequently gave them in the NSICOP.

Thank you for this opportunity and your interest in this issue.

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

That's why Bill C-377 has been tabled, Mr. Cooper.

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Chair, we're here today to speak to my private member's bill, Bill C-377 , an act to amend the Parliament of Canada Act, by adding the following subclause:

A member of the Senate or the House of Commons who applies for a secret security clearance from the Government of Canada is, for the purposes of the consideration of their application, deemed to need access to the information in respect of which the application is made.

Really, what does this mean? It means that for the purposes of applying for the security clearance, parliamentarians have a need to know. The most important aspect to understand is that this bill would only allow parliamentarians to apply for a secret security clearance. The government would, then, not be able to deny, regardless of which party is in government, a parliamentarian from applying. That's all it would do; it would allow them to apply.

The bill does not guarantee that a parliamentarian's application would pass, should they apply. They still must go through the same government security vetting and clearance process. I've had a secret level security clearance for decades now. I've had a top secret security clearance for over 15 years. Having a clearance does not guarantee that one gets access to whatever classified information they want whenever they want, or on any classified issue. One still must demonstrate the need to know to the government to get access to the classified information. This is, really, the second safeguard of the “need to know” principle on how the system protects classified information.

Why is it so important to allow parliamentarians a secret security clearance? The preamble of my bill, Bill C-377, states:

in the face of threats to world peace and security posed by nefarious state and non-state actors, the Government of Canada needs to make challenging decisions relating to national security, which it must do in a manner that is consistent with its constitutional duty to be accountable to Parliament and that respects the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Canadian Bill of Rights;

This highlights the need to improve transparency, accountability and education with respect to the ever-changing threats to Canada and our democratic institutions and processes, but ultimately for Parliament to rebuild the trust in those same democratic processes and institutions.

Let's look at some testimony that you have heard at this PROC committee in just the last year. You had Vincent Rigby here. He served as the national security and intelligence adviser from January of 2020 to June of 2021. He stated that transparency needed to be increased by producing annual public threat assessments, responding to the NSICOP reports, publishing intelligence priorities and, most important, sharing more intelligence with members of Parliament.

In the conclusion of Top Secret Canada: Understanding the Canadian Intelligence and National Security Community, edited by Stephanie Carvin, Thomas Juneau and Craig Forcese, it states:

Canadians (and indeed, their political leaders) must have context to avoid swinging wildly from indifference to panic when security events occur. Likewise, transparency and national security literacy help citizens tease apart real scandals from the noise. More generally, Canadians shall need to develop a renewed understanding of the hard dilemmas that frequently arise in securing a free and democratic state.

Let's look at a few real-life parliamentary examples where access to classified information has become a political hot potato both under this current Liberal government and under the former Conservative government, respectively, the Winnipeg labs and, under the previous Conservative government, the Afghan detainee file issue. How did Parliament ultimately address both of those issues? They formed ad hoc committees at the last minute and created a whole lot of undue politicization of the whole process, whereas, if Parliament had members already cleared, this would have sped up the process and helped downplay the politicization.

More recently, let's look at foreign interference. We know that parliamentarians are being targeted—and this isn't new. We can go back to the 2019 annual report by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, where they recommended that parliamentarians needed to be briefed on the threats they face from foreign interference. This, again, has been further emphasized and highlighted by the most recent and ongoing public inquiry into foreign interference, the NSIRA review, in their report, and in the most recent NSICOP report on public interference that was just tabled in May.

The point I'm trying to make here, and we've heard some of this feedback from parliamentarians who have received some of the generic defensive briefs on foreign interference, is that it's not specified and it doesn't have enough detail to actually make them understand the threats that parliamentarians are facing.

In response to these reports, the government tabled Bill C-70, and kudos to Parliament for fast-tracking that bill with all-party support, because there's one relevant aspect of Bill C-70 that made changes to the CSIS Act. These changes now allow CSIS to share classified information beyond the federal government with other levels of government—provinces and territories, municipalities and first nations—and with industry and other stakeholders.

However, one key caveat that still needs to be cracked is that those individuals still must gain a security clearance to be briefed. If they're not cleared, they cannot get access to that information unless it's an imminent threat, if it's going to save somebody's life or if it's a grave public threat. There are all sorts of caveats that allow our national security agencies, including CSIS, to help out.

Finally, I'd like to remind the committee of your own unanimous consent recommendation from earlier this year during the report on the question of privilege related to the member for Wellington—Halton Hills and other members. Recommendation 3 states:

That the government work with recognized parties' whips to facilitate security clearances, at Secret level or higher, of caucus members who are not Privy Councillors (particularly those who sit on committees with mandates concerning foreign affairs, national defence and national security), who shall be taken as satisfying [the] requirements for a “need to know,” to ensure that they may be adequately briefed about important national security matters, including foreign intelligence threat activity directed toward Parliament, or their party or its caucus members.

Basically, this committee has already recommended and supported what Bill C-377 is trying to achieve.

I look forward to any questions from my honourable colleagues.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ben Carr]

Good morning.

I hope you had a wonderful weekend and were able to find some meaningful time in your communities yesterday in honour of the National Day for Truth and Reconciliation.

Colleagues, we are here for meeting 125 of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. As a reminder, as always, to protect the health and well-being of our interpreters, who work so hard on our behalf, please ensure that your headsets, when they are not in use, are sitting on the stickers in front of you.

I notice that we have a couple of guests today. Mr. Nater, welcome. Mr. Louis, welcome to you. Mr. Ruff, it's nice to see you here.

Colleagues, as you know, we are beginning our first set of questions and answers in relation to Bill C-377, which is an act to amend the Parliament of Canada Act. It's always nice when we have a colleague who is able to join us and provide their perspective and testimony on legislation that is before us.

To Mr. Ruff, our colleague from Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, who's the sponsor of the bill, the floor will be yours for 10 minutes. It's nice to see you here, sir. We look forward to hearing your introductory remarks, and then we will enter into our question and answer period, as usual. With that, Mr. Ruff, the floor is yours.

[Rosemarie Falk, Conservative, Battlefords—Lloydminster, SK]

Thank you very much, Chair.

In response to MP Long's misleading remarks, the Conservative leader has been very clear, and publicly on the record, that a Conservative government will not allow, nor permit to be passed, bills like Bill C-377 and Bill C-525. I just want to make sure that's on the record. I think it's been mentioned more than once in this committee what is actually on public record, and there have been attempts to mislead that.

I come from a union household. My father works in the energy sector. I'm from Saskatchewan in western Canada, so I am very familiar with the benefits that being part of a union has, not only for an individual family but also for the community, including younger kids. I know that my dad's local union, for many years, was giving scholarships to kids going into the trades or whatnot. I think that's a very important aspect to also highlight.

Mr. Archer, I want to congratulate you on becoming a grandparent for the first time. I hear it's more fun. I'm not there yet, but I hear it's more fun. Congratulations.

I do want to focus on some of your opening comments regarding the Stellantis battery plant in Windsor. The Prime Minister's offer of $44 billion in taxpayer money to a massively profitable corporation didn't even come with a promise of jobs for Canadian workers, or that it would create those jobs. In my opinion, it's a slap in the face to not only Canadian taxpayers but also Canadian workers. I believe we have the skill and the talent to build Canada, to build the things that Canadians want and that Canadians need. When the news of the 900 foreign workers was breaking, we heard excuses from the government that these replacement workers were needed, as they were contributing a specialized skill set that was needed.

From your perspective, do UA Local 663 members and our Canadian labour force have the skills and the specialized knowledge that would fill these roles and that could fill these roles?

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. It's great to be back in PROC.

When we last met, the minister was actually here at PROC. I know that coming up, we also have some legislation that we have to study: Bill C-65 and MP Ruff's Bill C-377, I believe. I would assume the minister will be invited to speak to those pieces of legislation. I know we're going to have to see him when we're doing that, so I'm wondering if, in addition, when he's here, we can have him speak to this motion. We have a lot on the schedule to do this fall, so I wonder if we can kill two birds with one stone when he appears for these pieces of legislation.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I will move a motion that I had on notice. I'll read it.

I move:

That, given the large workload the committee is managing, the committee instruct the chair to schedule five meetings between July 8, 2024, and September 13, 2024, to address the report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, entitled “Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions”, tabled in Parliament on June 3, 2024, and to continue the committee’s ongoing work on foreign election interference.

With that, Mr. Chair, I will make very brief remarks.

This committee has a lot of work outstanding. That includes Bill C-65, which has passed second reading and is going to be referred to our committee. It's government legislation that takes priority. We have Scott Reid's motion, as well as Alex Ruff's private member's bill. We're continuing our work on this study with respect to the question of privilege arising from the cyber-attack directed against 18 parliamentarians; we are continuing work with respect to the broader issue of foreign interference, and there are a number of issues that have arisen out of the NSICOP report, the NSIRA report and the Hogue report.

Having regard for all of that, I think it is necessary that this committee meet over the summer for five meetings. I think that's a very reasonable compromise to try to get some of the work around foreign interference done so that we can move on in the fall to deal with government legislation, as well as the private member's motion and private member's bill that we must review.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

At some point later in this Parliament, this committee will be studying the “need to know” legislation that's been proposed by Mr. Ruff, Bill C-377. We've had many conversations about this in our defence committee as well in terms of what level of security clearance certain members could have, should have and what have you. How important do you think that is?

As it relates to this conversation, how do members of Parliament navigate that in terms of what they do know and what they have access to in this greater-risk threat environment?

Pandemic Prevention and Preparedness Act

[Stéphane Lauzon, Liberal, Argenteuil—La Petite-Nation, QC]

Madam Speaker, I rise on a point of order. I would like to seek the unanimous consent of the House to change my vote on C‑377. I am voting against the bill.

The House resumed from May 30 consideration of the motion that Bill C-377, An Act to amend the Parliament of Canada Act (need to know), be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Parliament of Canada Act

[John Williamson, Conservative, New Brunswick Southwest, NB]

Madam Speaker, I appreciate the opportunity to rise this evening and speak to Bill C-377, an act to amend the Parliament of Canada Act, need to know. I thank the member for Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound for championing this important bill to rectify an oversight that hinders the work that we do here in the House of Commons and over in the other place.

Like the member for Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, I too recently received security clearance, as have other members who have spoken to this bill. It was granted to us by the federal government for our respective roles. The sponsor of this bill received it for his work on the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, known as NSICOP, and I received it for being on the special ad hoc committee tasked with investigating the Winnipeg lab documents and the espionage that took place there, which originated out of Beijing in mainland China.

The essence of this bill is simple yet important. It states that a member of the House of Commons or the other place, and I am referring here to the Senate as the other place, who applies for security clearance is deemed to need access to the information for which the application is made. That is it. It does not mean automatic access to classified information. It would merely establish a need-to-know basis for the application process. For example, when I was chosen by the official opposition to sit on the ad hoc committee looking at the Winnipeg lab documents, we were in the dark about how this was going to work, given that I would need to see classified information. The process was opaque, and we did not know where to go or where to turn. This bill would clarify that, and it is crucial for improving transparency and accountability, and for informing parliamentarians, as well as Canadians, about ever-changing and ever-evolving threats to our democratic institutions.

This is how the prevailing governing policy operates, and this is long standing. I have to say, listening to the Liberal Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons, who just spoke, turning it into a political football and accusing members who support this bill of bad faith and Liberals of championing a system, that the approach of the Liberals is to treat parliamentarians like mushrooms: Feed them a load of bull, and keep them in the dark. That is the Liberals' approach when it comes to national security issues. On this side of the House, we think parliamentarians have a responsibility to oversee the executive, and I hope others do as well. At times, that does mean accessing classified information. The Government of Canada's current policy is problematic because it undermines the ability of parliamentarians to perform our essential function of government oversight effectively.

Recent testimony at the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs highlights the need for the bill. Vincent Rigby, former national security and intelligence adviser, emphasized that increasing transparency by producing annual public threat assessments, responding to NSICOP reports, publishing intelligence priorities and sharing more intelligence with members of Parliament is important. Wesley Wark, a national security expert, stressed that Canadians lack awareness about national security, which could be improved through public hearings.

Now, before the Liberals get all alarmed that secrets will spill out, I sit on another committee. I chair the public accounts committee. Through the hard and diligent work of all members of that committee, this committee was the first committee within western countries to legally receive the vaccine contracts from the pandemic. We kept those documents secret. We reviewed them in camera, and the committee is set to table its report. It will do so in a way that respects those confidentiality agreements, and nothing has been leaked. Now, this didn't require classified information, but it did require going through a number of hoops that the government first resisted, although, by working together, we showed that these committees can do their work and keep classified information confidential. In this case, it was not so much national security but commercial interests that the government, as well as vaccine producers, were looking to protect. We wanted to, as they say, trust but verify, so we reviewed these documents.

The aim of this bill is to bridge the gap between the need for national security and the imperative of parliamentary oversight. Members of Parliament, as well as senators and representatives of the Canadian public, need access to critical information from time to time to hold the government accountable. That is what this is about. Even though this is a government that is on its way out, it is going to fight tooth and nail to the very end to prevent this from happening.

We should move ahead with this bill. We should pass this bill. I hope we have multi-party consensus to do that because the people in the chamber, elected officials, do not serve at the pleasure of the Prime Minister. We serve at the pleasure of our voters.

Under the existing framework, the government typically restricts access to classified information of individuals who pass the personal security screening process and who need access to the information to perform their official duties. This need-to-know principle is fundamental to protecting classified information. Applicants for security clearances undergo rigorous vetting, where their entire lives are scrutinized to ensure that they are trustworthy.

However, just so people do not think this is some small cabal, from 2016 to 2023, nearly a quarter of a million security clearance applications were processed by the Government of Canada. At the exact same time, the government's policy operates on the assumption that members of Parliament and senators do not need to know sensitive information. That is its starting point, and that should change.

As such, passing this bill is crucial for improving transparency and rebuilding trust in our democratic process and institutions, particularly at a time when foreign interference is on the rise. The government would prefer to ignore that problem, and hope and pray that it goes away, but it will not go away.

This bill would ensure that parliamentarians have the necessary clearance to access sensitive information when requested by Parliament. This is not a blank cheque. For example, while I was in my role on the Canada-China committee, an order to produce unredacted documents related to the firing of two scientists at the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg was denied by the government. An identical order through Parliament was also denied by the government, and then it went so far as to sue the House and the Speaker. It is outrageous and the first time that had happened in our country's history.

At the time, the government's position was that this information was so sensitive that only it could be trusted with it. It was later determined that this was an excuse put forward to protect the government from damning evidence of bureaucratic incompetence and ministerial malaise. Their incompetence has jeopardized our relation with other Five Eyes allies because we look like a bunch of bloody fools who cannot manage a level four, top secret lab, and we somehow let in not only officials from mainland China but also officials from the People's Liberation Army who specialize in biowarfare, but I digress.

We got that information, and Canadians can now see the incompetence of the government. It is important to clarify that this bill would not guarantee that every member of Parliament or senator would obtain security clearance. It does not grant members automatic top security clearance. As well, obtaining security clearance does not grant unfettered access to information. It merely allows the individual to be considered for access. It is an on-ramp. It is the beginning of a process, but just the beginning. Applicants must still pass the security screening process, which is stringent and thorough. I can say that. I went through it.

The bill would merely facilitate the application process, ensuring that parliamentarians who need to access that classified information for their duties can apply for clearance. The primary risk associated with this bill is political. If a member's application is denied, the reason for denial will remain private and not disclosed, maintaining individual privacy and security for members of Parliament.

In conclusion, this bill aligns with the unanimous recommendation of PROC to facilitate security clearance for parliamentarians who are not members of the Privy Council, ensuring they are adequately briefed on important national security matters. Ultimately, this bill will help parliamentarians. I hope it will pass.

[Tom Kmiec, Conservative, Calgary Shepard, AB]

Madam Speaker, I am joining the debate on my colleague's bill, Bill C-377, this “need to know” piece of legislation that I support. In some of my work in the past, it would have been useful to have at least secret level clearance in order to be able to receive a briefing from the government or even to get information on what the current state was of parliamentary work.

In my particular case, as members will know, I am one of 18 parliamentarians who were targeted by APT31, which is a specific unit of the People's Republic of China. There are many of these APTs, but this is a specific intelligence-gathering organization responsible not only for digital surveillance but also for going after politicians and activists overseas as one of its target groups.

In fact, the U.S. Department of State has named about a dozen of these agents, or hackers. They are professional hackers essentially, but they are intelligence officers in the PRC. It would be useful for me to be able to apply to the Government of Canada in order to obtain a security level clearance so that I could actually get a security briefing. It has come to the point where this type of legislation is now needed. A lot of information is digital. It is not just in written format, but it is out there, and it would help us to do some of our parliamentary work.

What I do like about Bill C-377 is how short it is. It would basically only add one section to the Parliament of Canada Act about access to information and would add a clarifying section on our privileges as members of Parliament, which we are simply stewards of. We do not own them. They are not for us. They are for the benefit of members of Parliament in the future.

Bill C-377 would also protect senators in that other place, making sure the powers and immunities they enjoy are still protected, by us being allowed to apply for a secret security clearance from the Government of Canada. Again, for the purpose of that application, we would be considered as needing to know because we need to know.

Too often I have seen, at different standing committees, where officials either will skate around the question or will avoid the question entirely by saying that due to operational security reasons they cannot disclose the information. Even though we may sometimes offer, after the fact, to move a committee in camera, which means it is not in public, there is a transcript that is kept with the Journals branch, but it is only available 30 years after the fact. Even though the public does not have it, we cannot often use it. However, it is very rare, and I have actually never experienced it myself. I think I received one in camera briefing with FINTRAC at one point. One can go see it, because it was one of the publicly available meetings. We were given a public briefing and then a private briefing as well.

This bill, Bill C-377, would have perhaps given us the opportunity to follow up with the Government in Canada to find out more about what exactly is going on with particular files. It all starts with little things, when we start pulling at the ball of yarn, trying to get at the answers so we can better understand an issue, both from witness testimony and from government officials who come to tell us about the work they have been doing on behalf of taxpayers. For us to be able to hold them accountable, we need to know what they know. We need to know what information they have. I have noticed that when it comes to security agencies and to those responsible for national security issues, too often there is a block, and they will say that they cannot disclose it to us because we do not need to know.

My grandmother used to often say that one cannot empty the ocean with a spoon. She would say it in Polish. It turns out it is a Yiddish proverb as well. I sometimes feel like we are drowning in an ocean of information, trying to understand what is useful information and what is information that is not useful, not necessary, not relevant to the work we do. I think that is a big part of a member of Parliament's job, as well as that of senators.

The second part of it is then to realize what sensitive security information is required to do our jobs. I will go back to this APT31 group. I was the target of a digital surveillance campaign, specifically one attack, and I was not told by the Government of Canada that I had been targeted. The House of Commons cybersecurity did not tell me specifically that I was one of the targets. I had to find that out from IPAC, and then I had to find out from the FBI what exactly this digital surveillance was. I received a briefing from the FBI. I did not get a briefing from CSIS, from the RCMP or from House of Commons security to tell me exactly what it was.

I actually went to look for those emails, which were still in my inbox, unread, thankfully, because I did not know who they were from. I still had those two emails. Had I opened them, and had my browser settings been set to automatically open images, I would have been impacted by this digital surveillance campaign specifically. I would like to be able to go to the government and say that I need a security level clearance, that I need to know and that I would like to obtain more information. I would like to be able to ask the government what it can give me up to that level, let us say.

In that particular situation, I think it would have been useful for me to be able to have it. The proposed legislation would fix that; it would give me an opportunity to go to the government and ask for that clearance.

I remember being an exempt staffer. It feels like many years ago. I was dating myself with someone else, and it feels like it has been now about 16 years, so it was quite a long time ago, during the Afghan war. I know that the mover of the private member's bill is a combat veteran from Afghanistan, and around that time he was in Afghanistan. While I was at National Defence headquarters as an exempt staffer, I cleared the security level clearance for secret, but because I was born abroad, as I am a naturalized citizen of Canada, they actually had to send an agent to the Republic of Poland to do the further background checks so I would qualify for top secret-level clearance.

I thought, absolutely, that is the way it should be done. Whatever they need to do, they need to do. I accept it. I remember filling out all the forms, but in the many months that it took, I actually never cleared it because my minister was shuffled out of his portfolio before I was cleared for that information. I would always be excused out of the meetings where there was top secret-level information being discussed by other exempt staffers. I thought that it was perfectly acceptable and that was the way it should be, because I did not need to know, and I accepted that.

In a situation like this for parliamentarians, we are not very often told to leave a room because we do not need to know. I do not sit on the NSICOP committee, the way the mover of this particular private member's bill does, so I am not affected by that type of information that I might have to receive, but there are other situations, like the one that personally impacts me and the work I do as a parliamentarian involving this intelligence office, APT31, from the People's Republic of China, where I do have a need to know. I do have a need to know because it has impacted my work and it has impacted how I relate to human rights activists in Canada and diaspora groups. I also meet with legislators and former legislators who are sometimes members of the opposition, sometimes members of the government or out of government, or exiled to Canada.

I meet with journalists who are exiled to Canada as well. One of my favourite people to speak about is Arzu Yildiz, who is a very famous Turkish journalist and is very well known in Turkey. At least, she was well known, almost a decade ago now, when she reported on activities of the Turkish government and for all her troubles, she was basically forced into exile to Canada.

In my dealings with people like this, it would be good to be able to ask the Government of Canada, “I need to know. These are the types of people I am meeting with. Can the government share some information with me about their backgrounds?” I think we all have this experience if we are working with cultural communities and diaspora groups, working on legislation. We would like to have a bit more information available. What do our national security agencies know, and can they share it with us?

I am glad that the member for Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound has proposed now that members of Parliament be deemed needing to know so we could get that type of clearance, and it would also be extended to members of the Senate. There are two Houses of Parliament, and the Senate plays an important role as well, making sure that, in the work that we do, we get it right. It is the House of sober second thought.

My grandmother used to always say to start with little bits and that we cannot empty the ocean with just a spoon. This is now that beginning. It would be increasing our capacity to obtain information that is valuable to us. We have Order Paper questions, but as public information, we can file access to information requests, which I do quite often. That is privately held information up until it appears on the Treasury Board Secretariat's website as a released ATIP. Sometimes these take several years. Some of my ATIPs are coming close to being eligible for a member of Parliament pension at this point, because I still have not obtained them, but Treasury Board Secretariat is working diligently to make sure they are further delayed. They know who they are.

I support the bill. I support initiatives generally like this, for more transparency and more access, so that parliamentarians who are not members of the cabinet can get access to information they need to know. There are a lot of constituents who simply expect it now. It is an expectation in our work that we do get access to more information from our government. Members of the cabinet know a lot more, and I think parliamentary secretaries do enjoy some more access than just plain backbenchers like me. We have a role to play in this democracy, and we should be able to play it fully.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Madam Speaker, I am grateful to have the opportunity to speak to Bill C-377. First of all, I want to acknowledge the member for Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound. We have worked on a few things together. I have a deep amount of respect for him and the work that he does in this place, so I am very pleased to be able to speak to this piece of legislation.

I think it is a very interesting one, particularly in the context of the work that I have done on PROC, a committee that was overseeing a study on foreign interference. As we were going through that process, what we heard again and again was that the members of the committee were not vetted and did not have the clearance to access information that would really make the process for us a lot more logical, a lot less partisan and more focused on the important issues we were dealing with, so this bill, Bill C-377, really would allow for parliamentarians to be vetted and to go through that process. However, it is really important to underline the fact that this would not give them that clearance unless they were to go through that process. It would mean that parliamentarians would be able to apply, to go through all the interviews and to have things checked out to make sure they could be trusted to have secret information that the government may not necessarily want them to see, or they may simply not have the appropriate clearance, which would block that pathway for parliamentarians. Therefore, whether a parliamentarian would actually get that clearance is based on their history and on their capacity to get that. This bill, Bill C-377, addresses that and allows for parliamentarians to get that done.

I think where this is really important, and Canadians need to think about this, is that we see a lot of drama sometimes in this place, which is largely based on hearsay. I know, as a parliamentarian, one challenge I have had with respect to the work put before me, especially around the foreign interference file, was that I was trying to understand what was happening without all the information. I understand that some of that information could not necessarily be shared. I think it is really important that Canadians understand that our relationship with other countries really matters. When we have information shared with us because of our partnerships with other countries, we must have a very clear process, and that needs to be protected because if it is not, it will lessen the trust other countries have in us and their ability to share information with us. Therefore, we need to assess all those things.

Even if we are able, at committee, to have all the members of the committee vetted, if somebody from a particular party cannot get that vetting, then if we were to have somebody sit in their place who is vetted, that would mean the committee could actually do some of that work, and there is a transparency at least to members of Parliament. When we talk about foreign interference, we know that is part of the challenge we have been facing. People who have been specifically targeted do not have the clearance and do not have a clear process in this place that allows them to know they are being targeted, which is horrible. I know, as an MP having gone through that process, I have been very concerned about who is being targeted, how we would know if we were being targeted and what that would look like.

The other part of this, and why I will be supporting this bill, Bill C-377, is that we know Parliament and government are already slow places. Things move far too slowly, and it really builds a sense of frustration sometimes for Canadians. Therefore, if we have a process whereby MPs and senators, who are either appointed or elected to their positions, could go out and do the appropriate tasks, could do the thorough assessment and could have that secret clearance, then they would be able to know information and would be able to clearly explain the process, but not the details. I think we have to be very aware of that. Parliamentarians would know things that they would not be able to tell, but they would be able to say that they saw it, that they know what is happening, and they would have information that might allay or grow people's fears.

In this day and age, where we see such a vast, changing reality, and I think of last weekend when I was at the NATO Parliamentary Association where we talked about the development of AI, what that means for military action and what it means to have that information sent out to all people in the world and to have our constituents included in that, we need to assess those things and understand them.

The world is becoming trickier. It is trickier for parliamentarians in our particular roles, and it is trickier for Canadians. When we look at this, we have to look at what is disinformation and what, in terms of trust, is being broken or poisoned by disinformation for everyday Canadians. It is a lot to try to understand all the different things that are happening, and it is hard sometimes to know what information is thorough, which is researched, and what is actually from bad actors selling disinformation specifically because they want to attack our democracy. This is not the only tool, and we could talk a long time about the other tools that we need, but this tool would allow parliamentarians to come together.

Right now, we do have NSICOP, which is one committee where all the people in it are cleared, and they have access to information. That is a good process. I have no problem with it, but we need to have that expanded to this degree. I think this bill, Bill C-377, really does a good job of talking about how we could do that. It would not fix all the problems, but it would certainly address some of them.

One thing I learned really clearly in the work I was doing around foreign interference is that particular communities are vulnerable to misinformation. I was particularly passionate because what I understood as I went through that process is that rural and remote communities are one of those areas that are more vulnerable to disinformation. The reason they are more vulnerable is that often their local media has been shut down as they do not have enough money to keep going, which means when information comes out that they may need to know, local radio stations or local newspapers may or may not be there to actually report it, and it does mean that there are particular challenges. We heard very clearly that some ethnic media was also having particular challenges.

When we look at this as a whole of building trust, we want to build trust with Canadians and build trust with our institutions of government. When we look at having parliamentarians be more aware, more accountable and have tools to do that work, these things all have to come together. I appreciate that it is one part, and we need to definitely see more.

As we move through this new world that we are facing, we have to look at how to educate everyday Canadians more about security measures, about what they look like and about why we have to follow them so that people understand where we should push and where we should not push. I think that is really important because those relationships, internationally, and that information can make us extremely vulnerable.

I also think we need to look at education. I know that some countries are doing a phenomenal job and are starting to invest more resources into educating kids from a very young age about how disinformation is spread and about the capacity of a green screen to make things that are not real look real. Some places have colleges and universities with courses in any kind of training, from becoming a scientist, to a carpenter, to a welder, to a business person, and they actually have components where they educate people about what is happening in the world, about how to decipher misinformation and about how to develop that critical thinking process, which is so important.

I look forward to supporting this bill, Bill C-377. I look forward to it going to committee to make sure it does all the things we want it to do. I also hope to see more work in this place around educating everyday Canadians as we go into a technology world that is changing so rapidly.

[Marilène Gill, Bloc, Manicouagan, QC]

Madam Speaker, Bill C-377, introduced by the Conservative member for Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, raises extremely important but sensitive issues.

The member is correct in saying that the current situation is not working and needs to be improved. When we talk about parliamentarians' access to classified information, there are two conflicting principles. Both of these principles are important, and so we must find a way to reconcile them before our deliberations come to an end.

On the one hand, there is responsible government, which is the very basis of democracy. Ministers are responsible for everything that happens in their departments. Cabinet members are collectively responsible for everything that happens in government. They are not accountable to the Holy Spirit, but rather Parliament.

We have a parliamentary system, and Parliament is the boss. The government must be accountable to Parliament, to the representatives of the people. To do that, Parliament must have access to all the information it needs, including documents that are to be produced.

When classified documents are involved, the situation is more sensitive. Those documents are classified secret for a reason, and disclosing them can be dangerous. Doing so can expose the identity of confidential sources, which burns them. It can make impossible co-operation with the intelligence agencies in friendly countries, which is necessary for ensuring security both at home and abroad. It can set off an international crisis or even uncover military secrets that would make us all vulnerable; it could cause an ongoing investigation to derail.

In the somewhat outdated words used in Bourinot, the old procedural guide that was consulted by the Chair during the Afghan prisoner crisis, it is important to preserve the roughly 140 years of collaboration between the House, the grand inquest of the nation, and the government, the defender of the realm. It is old language, but we understand the principle. When it comes to classified documents, there is no real mechanism that allows for this collaboration to work. This gap was made clear during the Afghan prisoner crisis and the Winnipeg lab crisis.

The Afghan prisoner crisis occurred under the Conservative government of Stephen Harper and the Winnipeg lab crisis under the current Liberal government. This is not a partisan issue. It is an institutional gap.

I want to say a few words about the story of the Afghan prisoners. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the United States felt it had been the victim of aggression. It invoked NATO's collective defence clause and asked its allies for help. This marked the start of the Afghanistan campaign, in which Canada took part.

In 2007, whistle-blowers made some alarming statements to journalists. Whenever the Canadian army took prisoners, it handed them over to the Afghan government, at which point they were tortured. This contravenes international law. Of course, it was extremely serious.

In 2009, there was another leak. A memo prepared by Canadian diplomats in Afghanistan confirmed the 2007 allegations. The special committee on the war in Afghanistan asked to see the memo, but the government denied its existence. The committee asked to see all the documents relating to the affair, but the government refused. It was the start of a tug-of-war. The government eventually released 4,000 pages of documents, but so much had been redacted that it was impossible to know what information they actually contained. Worse still, new leaks showed that the redacted parts did not contain information that needed to remain secret. They contained information that was simply inconvenient to the government.

The Speaker confirmed that the House had a right to know. The House declared the Harper government in contempt of Parliament and the government fell in 2011.

However, this did not resolve the matter. The Harper government, which managed to win a majority because the Bloc Québécois had been weakened, created a committee of former judges and parliamentarians, all with security clearance. In the end, 40,000 pages of lightly redacted documents were made public in 2014 and confirmed the allegations.

Canada had indeed handed over some prisoners to the Afghan government. They were subjected to torture. Canada knew it. Soldiers and diplomats had concerns about it. They are not to blame. However, the government turned a deaf ear. Seven years had gone by. The practice had long since stopped. The Canadian army's combat mission ended in 2011. It was too late to do anything.

The Winnipeg lab affair is quite similar. In 2019, we learned that two researchers were fired and deported to China, but the government refused to say anything more. This was the start of another tug-of-war. The House asked for documents, and the government refused. The head of the Public Health Agency of Canada was found in contempt of Parliament and was admonished by the Speaker. The Liberal government, however, doubled down. Worse still, it took legal action against the Speaker of the House and then dissolved Parliament.

Last week, after a committee composed of security-cleared former judges and parliamentarians reviewed the documents, the report was finally made public. Our worst fears were confirmed: These two researchers were spying for the Chinese government. Five years had passed since the information first came to light. Clearly, the system is broken.

There is the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, which the government legislated into existence in 2017. However, the story of the Winnipeg laboratory, which occurred two years after the committee was created, laid bare its limitations. Not only are its members bound to secrecy, but it does not report to Parliament. It does not really allow Parliament to do its job.

This is where Bill C‑377 comes in.

When it comes to giving access to classified documents, the government has two requirements. First, individuals must have security clearance. Second, the documents must be required in the course of the individual's work. In the case of civil servants with well-defined responsibilities, it is fairly difficult to determine whether they need access to a particular document. In the case of parliamentarians, it is more complicated. The government is accountable to Parliament for all its activities and the government should not have the right to decide what Parliament can legitimately investigate, which is essentially the situation we have now.

Bill C-377 proposes a simple solution. Proposed subsection 13.1(1) reads as follows:

A member of the Senate or the House of Commons who applies for a secret security clearance from the Government of Canada is, for the purposes of the consideration of their application, deemed to need access to the information in respect of which the application is made.

The bill respects the privileges of parliamentarians, so this is a step in the right direction. The government will no longer be able to decide, on a case-by-case basis and in a completely arbitrary manner, what a parliamentarian should have access to. However, Bill C-377 is missing something. Parliamentarians who have security clearance will have easier access to classified information. That is good, but they will obviously have to keep it to themselves. I do not know whether the House of Commons, as an institution, will be strengthened by this or how the situation will be any different from what we are experiencing with the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, whose limitations we have seen.

The United States has the Gang of Eight. The government regularly provides this group with confidential briefings and access to documents. Who is on that panel? For each house of Congress, it is the leaders of both parties, plus the individuals responsible for intelligence in both parties. They must keep the information to themselves, of course, but having access to it guides their work, both in Congress or in the Senate, and at committee. This approach, in addition to giving representatives and senators access to information, feeds the institution and guides its work.

However, such an institutional mechanism is missing from Bill C-377. That is why I just said the bill is missing something. It is nonetheless interesting, and I sincerely thank the member for Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound for introducing it. The debate on this bill is important, very important indeed. The Bloc Québécois is approaching this in a non-partisan, open-minded way, because we are all interested. We remain open-minded, as we reflect and listen, which is the hallmark of a healthy parliamentary system.

The House resumed from April 15 consideration of the motion that Bill C-377, An Act to amend the Parliament of Canada Act (need to know), be read the second time and referred to a committee.

[Wayne Long, Liberal, Saint John—Rothesay, NB]

I'll end with this, Minister.

It was my ninth ceremony. I've been fortunate to be a member of Parliament for nine years now. I will say this: The support and the appreciation from union members towards our government on Bill C-377 and Bill C-525, the anti-scab legislation which we reversed, are deep. Members are very appreciative of what you've done and what we've done as a government.

Thank you, Minister.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Madam Speaker, I rise to speak in support of Bill C-377, an act to amend the Parliament of Canada Act, which was introduced by my colleague, the hon. member for Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound.

This legislation would amend the Parliament of Canada Act to specify that when a member of Parliament or a senator requests a secret security clearance, that the member would be treated as being deemed to need to know the information for which the security clearance is sought. This is important because, as it presently stands, it is highly unlikely that any individual member of Parliament or a senator would receive a security clearance.

Unless a member or a senator already has a security clearance as a result of their profession prior to being elected or appointed, or has served as a member of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, or NSICOP, the chances of a member of Parliament or a senator successfully obtaining a security clearance are almost zero. That is because security clearances are issued on a need-to-know basis. Essentially, the policy of the Government of Canada is that members of Parliament and senators do not need to know.

That may come as a surprise to Canadians. I would submit that it is problematic, which I will get into momentarily, but that is the policy. This bill would change that; it would amend the Parliament of Canada Act such that, for the purposes of processing security clearance applications, members of Parliament and senators are deemed to know. In short, it provides a presumption that when a member of Parliament or a senator applies, they be granted a secret security clearance. That is what Bill C-377 would do. That is all Bill C-377 would do.

It is important to note what this bill would not do. It would not guarantee that a member or a senator would be granted a security clearance. They would have to be vetted, just as any Canadian who applies for a security clearance must be vetted. If they are deemed untrustworthy, or if there are security issues or other red flags associated with the member or the senator, pursuant to the security clearance review process, they would be turned down. They would not obtain a security clearance. This bill would not change that.

Moreover, this bill is targeted insofar as it applies specifically to secret security clearances, and I emphasize “secret” security clearances. It does not apply to, and will not create, a presumption of issuing a top secret security clearance to members of Parliament and to senators. Further, it is important to note that just because someone has a security clearance, it does not mean they have the unfettered ability to obtain whatever information they want. Obtaining a security clearance merely gets one's foot in the door.

I would further note that this bill would importantly establish a certain level of uniformity with respect to how applications for security clearances involving members of Parliament and senators are dealt with because, at present, the process has been one that is ad hoc in nature. Members of NSICOP have security clearances, quite appropriately so. However, if members of NSICOP have security clearances, would it not also make sense for members who serve on committees such as the national defence committee, the foreign affairs committee and the public safety committee to also have security clearances, provided they are properly vetted?

The government has established, for instance, a special committee to review the classified Winnipeg lab documents. Members on that committee were granted security clearances. Similarly, with respect to reviewing the Afghan detainee documents, the Harper government established a special committee in which members again had security clearances. Therefore, there is no consistency and no uniformity, with the granting of such clearances being done on an ad hoc basis. I would submit that this is not desirable and can be improved; this bill would improve it by providing greater certainty and transparency around the application process.

As I noted at the beginning of my speech, I find it problematic that, as a general rule, members of Parliament and senators are unable to access security clearances. After all, Parliament deals with matters of national security and intelligence, which fall within its purview.

It is the responsibility of Parliament to hold the government accountable and to provide meaningful oversight on these matters. It follows that not having a security clearance and, therefore, not having the ability to access what may be pertinent information around national security and intelligence matters impedes the ability of members of Parliament and senators to do their jobs, to hold the government to account and to provide proper oversight and accountability.

In addition, there is value in members having security clearances, insofar as this enables them to better understand national security and intelligence matters. It creates a culture of greater awareness and enables a member to, in certain areas, perhaps fill in the blanks and have a better context with respect to national security and intelligence issues that they might be dealing with as, for example, a member of a parliamentary committee or a shadow minister.

In that regard, I cite the ruling of Speaker Milliken in April 2010 concerning the Afghan detainee documents. Speaker Milliken said the following: “In a system of responsible government, the fundamental right of the House of Commons to hold the government to account for its actions is an indisputable privilege and in fact an obligation.” He quoted, “The right of Parliament to obtain every possible information on public questions is undoubted, and the circumstances must be exceptional, and the reasons very cogent, when it cannot be at once laid before the houses.”

With respect to members of Parliament and senators being trusted with sensitive information, Speaker Milliken said:

The insinuation that members of Parliament cannot be trusted with the very information that they may well require to act on behalf of Canadians runs contrary to the inherent trust that Canadians have placed in their elected officials and which members require to act in their various parliamentary capacities.

I concur wholeheartedly with Speaker Milliken. This bill is an important step in the right direction to enhance transparency and accountability around national security and intelligence matters, as well as from the standpoint of better empowering members of Parliament and senators to fulfill their oversight responsibilities.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Madam Speaker, the Conservative member for Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound is proposing that we examine Bill C-377.

It is an important bill that requires serious consideration. The bill summary states the following, and I quote:

This enactment amends the Parliament of Canada Act to specify that a member of the Senate or the House of Commons who applies for a secret security clearance from the Government of Canada is, for the purposes of the consideration of their application, deemed to need access to the information....

The whole issue of confidentiality is rather vague in the bill. Like my kind neighbour from Barrie—Innisfil, this morning, I received an email because I am a member of the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics. The committee had asked Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada for some information about TikTok because we are doing a study on that app. This morning, we got an email saying that it is none of our business. Come on. The question that has to be asked is whether parliamentarians, who have the privilege of obtaining information, should be able to get it. The answer is yes.

Now, let us look at how that should be done, what the guidelines are and what could be done.

What are we talking about here? If we want to define privacy, we are talking about a secret. What is a secret? A secret is what is not said. It is as simple as that. However, that includes things that we do not wish to say, things we cannot say and things we must not say. It can be a bit tricky.

Everyone agrees that the government must be accountable. However, it cannot be the sole judge of what it is to be accountable for. The member who spoke earlier cited the example of the special committee that studied the documents concerning the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg. I was part of this committee. It was a good initiative, but, quite frankly, we had to twist the government’s arm for nearly two years before this came about. Yes, it was a good choice, but there were many bumps in the road.

The member for Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound wants to promote a bill aiming to rectify certain situations and to ask Parliament to act wisely when it comes to accountability. The topic of secrets is by no means new. According to Voltaire, “To say the secret of another is a betrayal, to say yours is a stupidity”. The current government seems to be taking a page from Voltaire.

What is a secret? For the purposes of our discussion, it is the redacted portion. The French term for redaction, “caviardage”, dates back to the time of Nicholas I in Russia. At the time, it meant to conceal or remove. I am going to stay with the idea of conceal. To redact something is to conceal it. Over the years that I worked in the ethics field and the months that I spent on the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, I came to realize that redaction is one thing, but preventive redaction is another. Preventive redaction is when something is excessively redacted just in case. That is problematic.

According to an article that appeared in the spring 2022 edition of Foreign Affairs entitled “Keeping the Wrong Secrets”, the preference is to conceal more so as not to conceal too little. The article goes on to say that information that is kept secret often should not be. Certain information is treated like the Crown jewels, but at the same time we fail to even protect private data. This is all frustrating. The example cited in the article, which was positively ridiculous, had to do with a Christmas card that someone had redacted. Frankly, this makes no sense.

The sheer number of “overredacted” documents is huge. At the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, historians have come to tell us they cannot learn anything about the Second World War because the information is classified “Top Secret.” There are things that will always remain secret, but I cannot believe that the entire body of government decisions concerning the Second World War must be off limits. When documents are needlessly redacted, we cannot attain wisdom, we cannot do as our good friend Socrates suggested, which is “know thyself”.

If we do not know our own history, we cannot know ourselves as a population, as a people. There are things that must be kept secret, but for how long, for what purpose and from whom? These questions must be asked as part of the debate sparked by Bill C-377. That said, I understand that certain things, of an intimate, sacred, delicate or dangerous nature, must be kept secret forever. These are things we have always sought to keep secret.

However, the bill does not deal with the intimate, sacred, delicate or dangerous. It deals with classified information. We know from experience that there is a confidential level, a secret level and a top secret level. There is also a “for Canadian eyes only” level for certain documents. We can see that classified documents are often classified at too high a level. This prevents people who should know from being able to know. Of course, many pieces of information marked “Top Secret” come from a foreign source, such as a member of the Group of Five, and making the information public could well harm that member.

We have to be careful and use judgment.

It takes judgment, but the Winnipeg report basically consisted of 600 redacted pages, pages that were redacted by the ad hoc committee. When we see 600 pages redacted under the pretext of national security and in the end there are only 13 or 14 pages left, then no wonder we have questions about the “overredacting” at issue, the “overclassification” or the excessive secrecy, if you will.

Unfortunately, keeping too many secrets leads to mistrust. Not keeping enough secrets, of course, is unworkable. Too many secrets breed mistrust, and, in today's world, with its echo chambers and the conditioning created by some social media, this leads to defiance. We saw some of that defiance in the streets last winter in front of Parliament, but that is not the only form of defiance.

Let me come back to Bill C‑377, a bill to provide access to documents under two conditions. First, individuals must pass a personnel security screening process. That makes sense. Second, they must need access to the information for the purposes of their work. Of course, it is easier to define the scope and parameters of that work for public officials than it is for parliamentarians. In the case of a parliamentarian, it may be more complicated, but it can still be done.

As I said earlier, the government is accountable to Parliament for all of its activities. It should not have the right to decide on its own what needs to be kept secret from the get-go. That is a first recommendation.

Bill C‑377 takes this into account by proposing subsection 13.1(1), as follows:

A member of the Senate or the House of Commons who applies for a secret security clearance from the Government of Canada is, for the purposes of the consideration of their application, deemed to need access to the information....

The proposal is good, but let us just say that it seems an automatic approach that could go awry at times. Bill C-377 considers parliamentary privileges. It is a step forward, but it could be dangerous.

One thing I do like about this bill is that the government will not be the sole judge of its own secrets. That is a very good thing. However, it does not mean that information should be handed over lock, stock, and barrel simply upon request. That could be dangerous.

My colleague spoke earlier of the Winnipeg lab. I sat on the ad hoc committee that studied that issue, which was made up of parliamentarians from four parties. I will say again that the committee was struck as a result of a wild discussion. Nevertheless, we four parliamentarians were able to issue an opinion on the redaction in question and that opinion was submitted to three judges for arbitration. To my great surprise, their verdict was identical to that of the committee members. The document was released “unredacted”. There was no national security issue concerning that document. There was certainly some embarrassment, along with some shame and discomfort, but no national security issue.

As La Rochefoucauld, another soul I greatly admire, said, everyone agrees that a secret must be inviolable, but we do not always agree on the nature and importance of the secret, and we consult only ourselves on what we should reveal or withhold. That is the dilemma here. The problem is that the government itself decides what should be kept secret.

As a second recommendation, I propose that steps be taken to put an end to overclassification and preventive redaction. Redaction keeps us from knowing who we are and what happened, and it exacts a great cost in terms of maintaining the secrets in question.

With Bill C‑377, we have an opportunity to initiate a discussion on the very concept of secrecy. That kind of reflection is healthy for democracy. It can only make parliamentarians more confident, while boosting Canadians' confidence in parliamentarians and government, which admittedly could really use it.

Let us begin this reflection.

[Heath MacDonald, Liberal, Malpeque, PE]

Mr. Speaker, I am thankful for the opportunity to speak to Bill C-377 and the important issues therein.

The role of Parliament is crucial to protecting our democracy and holding government to account. Since 1867, members of Parliament have upheld the principles and practices of Canadian democracy, and we must ensure that they are able to continue to do so in the future. That is why the government takes the issue of transparency very seriously. In fact, in 2017, we announced the national security transparency commitment and made a number of changes within the National Security Act. The national security transparency commitment is about integrating our core democratic values into our national security activities.

Canadians need to understand what the various departments and agencies that are working tirelessly to protect each and every Canadian do. Canadians also need to understand the legal structure required to protect our national security, and how difficult choices are made every day. Finally, it is important that we engage with Canadians openly so they understand what issues have an impact on our national security. I am proud to say that the government has made great progress since the announcement of the national security transparency commitment and continues to advance that work tirelessly to ensure that everyone in Canada understands the issues at play and how we are working to protect Canadians.

The national security transparency advisory group was created in 2019 to help the government deliver on the national security commitment. The role of the NS-TAG is crucial as it provides advice to the deputy minister of public safety and other government officials on the implementation of the national security transparency commitment.

The National Security Act, 2017 also created the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, which is an independent body that is external to government. NSIRA has the mandate to review all Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities to ensure that they are lawful, reasonable and necessary. NSIRA can also investigate public complaints regarding key national security agencies and activities. The NSIRA's reports provide invaluable information to parliamentarians and Canadians, and are a way to inform them of the lawfulness of the government's actions.

I want to make it clear that no government department or agency's national security and intelligence activities are exempt from scrutiny by NSIRA, and by extension, by parliamentarians and Canadians. To be clear, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Communications Security Establishment's activities are not exempt from this scrutiny. The national security transparency commitment and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency provide important means of enabling public transparency and expert scrutiny of national security and intelligence activities.

There is also a third component that is vital to making an effective accountability framework for national security and intelligence activities, which is parliamentary oversight. The sponsor of the bill before us is right to highlight the important role that parliamentarians play. Recognizing this important role, the government enacted the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, 2017, which created a committee of parliamentarians made up of members of either House to scrutinize the national security and intelligence activities across the federal government.

The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians can look into intricate details of national security and intelligence agencies' activities. The committee may also undertake strategic and systematic reviews of the legislative and policy framework for national security and intelligence activities, including studies of expenditures and administrative decision-making structures. This is important work, and its importance is reflected in the committee's powers. To enable it to do its work, the committee has the right, under its enabling legislation, to access information needed to conduct its reviews. There are only limited exceptions to this right of access, where there is an absolute need, such as to protect the identities of human sources and witnesses protected under the witness protection program.

There are a number of aspects of the committee's legislation that I want to emphasize. The first is that the mandate of the committee, its powers, its right of access and its safeguards are legislated. It is vital that there be clear guardrails for processes that deal with the security of information and bring it near the vigorous debates we have in this place.

The second is that the committee has membership from multiple parties. We can all appreciate how important it is that the processes for managing sensitive information remain non-partisan. The multi-party nature of the committee is vital to its credibility. This also reflects the care that must be taken when dealing with sensitive information. When sensitive government information enters into the parliamentary space, it must be provided in a transparent, fair and non-partisan manner to ensure that there are not allegations of misuse.

Third, I want to note the care that is taken to ensure the security of information entrusted to members of the committee. Each member of the committee is a person permanently bound to secrecy under the Security of Information Act, meaning they may be prosecuted for disclosing special operational information. Members also swear an oath of secrecy and obtain a security clearance.

Finally, the act also provides a pathway for members to make Parliament aware of anything concerning they find. The committee provides reports to the Prime Minister, and when it does so, changes may be required to protect information. This is appropriate to ensure that sensitive information is protected, but the extent of the changes and the reasons for changes must be noted when the report is made public.

There are significant challenges to dealing with classified information in a way that enables transparency and accountability while also ensuring that what needs to be protected remains secure. The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act reflects that there needs to be care taken within the management of information. Simply providing access to parliamentarians is not enough; it needs to be done in a way that is transparent, non-partisan and secure and that provides proper mechanisms for concerns to be brought to Parliament's attention.

In addition to the NSICOP, the government has also established ad hoc processes. For instance, in 2021, when opposition parties in the House of Commons asked for the production of government documents from the Public Health Agency of Canada in relation to the March 2019 revocation of security clearances for two scientists at the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg, we established a process to ensure that parliamentarians had access to this sensitive information.

On June 2, 2021, the House of Commons adopted an order for the production of sensitive documents held by the Government of Canada in relation to that incident. In 2022, the leader of the Government and leaders of the opposition parties signed a memorandum of understanding that outlined the mechanisms for parliamentarians to both access and safeguard the requested information. An ad hoc committee composed of select members of Parliament was established, and committee members were provided with full access to all documents requested in the June 2021 House order.

In addition, the Treasury Board standard on security screening allows for any individual to be security screened by a government department, should there be a need. This applies even if the individual is not an employee, and so can be applied to a parliamentarian.

There are already many mechanisms in place to provide parliamentarians with access to sensitive and classified information. I have just highlighted the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, as well as ad hoc approaches that have been adopted for special circumstances. These procedures and approaches require careful thought about what information is being provided to whom, and under what safeguards.

Most importantly, it is vital that there be effective, credible and transparent ways to bring information of concern to Parliament's attention, after removing information that would harm Canada's national security. It is not enough to simply provide a security clearance. Attention must also be provided to the entire process of providing, analyzing and releasing information to ensure an effective means of ensuring government accountability and contributing to public trust. The government has put in place processes that do just that, and as needs shift and evolve, the government will continue to ensure that they function properly.

I appreciate the member opposite's interest in ensuring that classified information appropriately flows to parliamentarians. I share the intent of ensuring that proper processes are in place, and I am thankful that they are. I urge all members to consider whether an additional proposal is needed and whether it appropriately considers the protection of information that is provided.

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

moved that Bill C-377, An Act to amend the Parliament of Canada Act (need to know), be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Mr. Speaker, before I get into my speech, I want to take a moment to recognize the passing of some important people who we have lost in the last week and a half.

On April 4, we lost Bob Mitchell, father of Corporal Mitchell who was killed in action on October 3, 2006, in Afghanistan, and father of Mark who passed from cancer just a few months after that in 2006. He was the husband of Carol and papa of Cameron, Ryan and Jaelyn. There have been no bigger supporters of our veterans than Bob and his wife Carol. My heart goes out to Carol in particular for the continued sorrow she faces, but I know she will still be there for our members of the Canadian Armed Forces.

As well, on April 7, we lost Shawn "Lenny" MacDonald suddenly, father of Brandon and Kaitlin, and son of Kaye. He was a well-connected and important member of our community who we unfortunately lost way too soon.

April 8 was the 17th anniversary of the loss of 22B, my six soldiers in Afghanistan who were killed by an IED: Donnie Lucas, Aaron Williams, Brent Poland, Christopher Stannix, Kevin Kennedy and David Greenslade. I will never forget them.

On April 8 of this year, the father of one of my best friends, Ben Miedema, of Kingston by-way of Cloyne, passed away. He was the husband of Carla and father of Denise, Emily, Felicia, Geoff and Ian. Both his sons Geoff and Ian are still serving members of our Canadian Armed Forces.

I offer my deepest condolences and sympathies to all of their families and friends. May they rest in peace.

We are here today to speak to my first private member's bill, Bill C-377, an act to amend the Parliament of Canada Act, need to know.

I will cover what this bill would do, what it is not and, most important, the why, not only to address the threats to our democracy but to minimize the politicization around national security in our country.

I have been dealing with classified information for over 25 years, specifically highly classified information since 2007, my first tour in Afghanistan, dealing with the incredible electronic warfare capabilities and signals intelligence capabilities we possess within the military. For the last couple of years I have had the pleasure to sit on the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, but this issue was apparent to me for years before I was elected.

What is this bill? The crux of it, and literally the bill itself is one sentence, is:

A member of the Senate or the House of Commons who applies for a secret security clearance from the Government of Canada is, for the purposes of the consideration of their application, deemed to need access to the information in respect of which the application is made.

What does this mean? It means that for the purposes of applying for a security clearance, one has a need to know. However, it does not mean that one will have access to classified information. I will get into that later.

Why is it so important to pass the bill? To improve transparency and accountability, as well as education not only with respect to the ever-changing threats to Canada and our democratic institutions and processes, but for Canadians and parliamentarians to ultimately rebuild trust in our democratic processes and institutions.

I will try to explain this in the rest of my speech through the lengthy preamble, which is much longer than the actual bill itself.

The first paragraph in the preamble states:

Whereas members of the Senate and the House of Commons play a key role in holding the Government of Canada to account and, in order to be able to fulfil that role, they must have sufficient access to critical information, including the facts and rationale underlying key government decisions;

Let us look at the testimony we have heard at PROC in recent weeks.

We had Vincent Rigby, who served as the national security and intelligence adviser from January 2020 to June of 2021. He stated that transparency needed to be increased by producing annual public threat assessments, responding to NSICOP reports, publishing intelligence priorities and, most important, sharing “more intelligence...with members of Parliament.”

Wesley Wark gave testimony at the same committee. In his view, Canadians lacked literacy about national security, a deficiency which could be improved by holding public hearings on national security, as these could increase public understanding and education about his aspect of governance.

I would argue that this is bigger than just the Canadian population. This is about Parliament too, and as the representatives of Canada, both elected in the House and those appointed in the other place. I will get more into how Parliament and the government have handled highly publicized issues a bit later in my speech.

The next paragraph of the preamble of the bill states:

Whereas the Government of Canada typically restricts access to classified information to individuals who pass a personnel security screening process and who need access to the information in order to perform their official duties (the “need-to-know” principle);

What is “need to know”, and how does it work? How do we protect classified information? First, people need to have a job and a reason to do it. Ultimately, that is why I am bringing this forward, to have that debate and make the case that Parliament has a need to know, not all the time and not to everything. However, we as parliamentarians have a need to know, but just because we have that need to know, we have to demonstrate that we are trustworthy, and that is done through the security clearance process.

When people apply for that security clearance process, again, depending upon the level, it is actually a very arduous process, or it can be. In fact, I could give a multi-hour speech on how we need to improve the process of security clearances. Ultimately, people applying for it are basically opening up their whole life to the national security apparatuses to vet them and to ensure they are trustworthy to have access to classified or sensitive information.

I will give a bit of a sample, so listeners can understand how many security clearances have been processed since 2016. I put an OPQ in that I got a response to last May. Here are the key departments that applied: DND, over 65,000 applications for secret level security clearances and, in that time frame, two were denied; ESCD, 8,916 applications and 14 were denied; Bank of Canada, 2,400 applications and one was denied; and NRCan, 8,900 applications and six were denied. Overall, just shy of a quarter of a million officials, bureaucrats, people within the government, applied for security clearances from 2016 to 2023, and only 23 were denied.

That gives us a scope of just how many people have access to this information and how many need to know within the bureaucracy.

As I mentioned earlier, just because people have that security clearance does not mean they get access. A good example is that during the convoy protests that were occurring in Ottawa, I still had my top secret security clearance. I maintained that when I released from the Canadian Armed Forces. I made the case in the House that if the government was lacking that trust with the general public and there were concerns over what the threats were, etc., why would the government not share that information with privy councillors, former privy councillors, who had already been vetted, or a number of the members of Parliament who had a security clearance of some sort.

I am going to skip to the last paragraph of the preamble, because it fits better in my speech. It states:

And whereas Parliament considers that a member of the Senate or the House of Commons must be able to apply for a secret security clearance and, if the member passes the personnel security screening process, to be granted that security clearance;

I want to ensure that this is clear. It means people can apply, but it does not mean they will pass. In fact, I would argue that there are potentially individuals within both our chamber and the other place who may not pass. Who knows why? I do not have access to that information and, frankly, it is none of my business. Most of the time, in my past experience, where people fail to get security clearances, it is because they do not really want it or they are not honest when they are doing the process. The question is this: Is there something out there that a foreign state or somebody could hold over them and basically blackmail them, which questions their trustworthiness to have access to that information?

My bill, if it passes, will not guarantee that everybody in this chamber and the other place will get access to classified, sensitive information. That is not what this does. It is the first step in allowing, and I will get into it, important debate and discussions around issues that are highly sensitive or important.

One other note I would like make is that privy councillors, government members, do not have security clearances. In fact, one of the least vetted people, and it is not a shot on the current Prime Minister who has been vetted, is the current Prime Minister, because he had the privilege of becoming the leader of his party and ultimately the Prime Minister without being a former privy councillor.

When someone is a privy councillor, being appointed by the prime minister to sit as a cabinet member, the system vets him or her. We would hope that when the current Prime Minister was going through that process, he was being vetted and that if there were a flag that the apparatus would have flagged it to the prime minister of the day, Mr. Harper, if there had been any issues. My point is that privy councillors do not have a security clearance in the traditional sense of those of us who served in law enforcement or in the military and went through the whole process, or somebody who has had the privilege of sitting on NSICOP, for example.

What are the real risks to my bill? Really, there are no risks other than the political risk to someone who applies and is denied if that information were to ever become public. However, again, that is not something that would be released; it is privacy information and not information that is tied to having access.

Why is this so important? The next portion of my preamble gets into it. It states:

...in the face of threats to world peace and security posed by nefarious state and non-state actors, the Government of Canada needs to make challenging decisions relating to national security, which it must do in a manner that is consistent with its constitutional duty to be accountable to Parliament and that respects the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Canadian Bill of Rights;

I am not going to focus on all the threats. So many committees and even the latest government defence plan update and the NSICOP report cover the threats. I do not think I need to really explain that, but I want to focus on the accountability and transparency side.

I am going to read a few quotes from the conclusion part of Top Secret Canada: Understanding the Canadian Intelligence and National Security Community, edited by Stephanie Carvin, Thomas Juneau and Craig Forcese, in which states that the Canadian “national security community” as a whole “has traditionally not been very transparent.” It further states, “In a democracy, first, transparency is—or should be—an end in itself.” It also states:

There is also a strong pragmatic and utilitarian case in favour of greater transparency.... Law enforcement and intelligence agencies need the buy-in of the society they seek to protect: when they have the trust of the population, it is far easier to gather information, to build and maintain collaborative ties with key communities, and, ultimately, to do their jobs. Yet when security agencies [the government] are closed and perform poorly in terms of transparency, it is more difficult for citizens to trust them, and it opens space for erroneous information, misperceptions, and conspiracy theories to circulate. This reinforces a dynamic of mistrust and suspicion.

The final paragraph of the book states, “ a challenge for government”, and I would say for Parliament, “remains to deepen the public’s understanding of the workings of the national security sector.” It goes on:

Canadians (and indeed, their political leaders) must have context to avoid swinging wildly from indifference to panic when security events occur. Likewise, transparency and national security literacy help citizens tease apart real scandals from the noise. More generally, Canadians shall need to develop a renewed understanding of the hard dilemmas that frequently arise in securing a free and democratic state.

I will not read the last couple of points in the preamble, but they really focus on allowing that access. That is what this speech will do. Again, it talks about two examples, under the current government and in the previous government. We had the Winnipeg lab scandal and the Afghan detainee files issue under the previous Harper government. How did Parliament address those issues? They formed ad hoc committees at the last minute and created a lot of undue politicization of that whole process. Whereas, if we had members already cleared, we could speed up that process and help downplay the politicization. We have seen this most recently, even with the foreign interference issue.

In conclusion, I want to get to what PROC passed unanimously last week in its recommendation 3. It states:

That the government work with recognized parties’ whips to facilitate security clearances, at Secret level or higher, of caucus members who are not Privy Councillors...who shall be taken as satisfying requirements for a “need to know,” to ensure that they may be adequately briefed about important national security matters, including foreign intelligence threat activity directed toward Parliament, or their party or its caucus members.

Considering that PROC has already unanimously passed what my bill is basically calling for, I could seek unanimous consent to have my bill pass at all stages. I will not, because the importance of my debating this is that it is to improve the education of Parliament and Canadians.

I look forward to any questions my hon. colleagues may have.

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

moved for leave to introduce Bill C-377, An Act to amend the Parliament of Canada Act (need to know).

Madam Speaker, my bill would basically introduce and formalize a process to enable parliamentarians to request a secret security clearance from the Government of Canada by deeming that they need access to the information for the purposes of processing that request.

Currently, individual parliamentarians have limited probability of obtaining a security clearance unless they possess one from a previous career or have the privilege of sitting on one of the special committees.

Ultimately, this bill would increase Parliament's ability to take national security and intelligence issues seriously while facilitating Parliament's ability not only to hold the government to account, but also to increase Canadians' trust in our federal democratic processes and institutions.

(Motions deemed adopted, bill read the first time and printed)