Bill C-70

Countering Foreign Interference Act

An Act respecting countering foreign interference

Part 1 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Act to, among other things,
(a) update provisions respecting the collection, retention, querying and exploitation of datatsets;
(b) clarify the scope of section 16 of that Act;
(c) update provisions respecting the disclosure of information by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(d) provide for preservation orders and production orders as well as warrants to obtain information, records, documents or things through a single attempt;
(e) expand the circumstances in which a warrant to remove a thing from the place where it was installed may be issued; and
(f) require a parliamentary review of that Act every five years.
It also makes a consequential amendment to the Intelligence Commissioner Act .
Part 2 amends the Security of Information Act to, among other things, create the following offences:
(a) committing an indictable offence at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with a foreign entity;
(b) knowingly engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State or being reckless as to whether the conduct is likely to harm Canadian interests; and
(c) engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct, at the direction of or in association with a foreign entity, with the intent to influence, among other things, the exercise of a democratic right in Canada.
It also amends that Act to remove as an element of the offence of inducing or attempting to induce — at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity or terrorist group — by intimidation, threat or violence, a person to do anything or cause anything to be done, that the thing be done for the purpose of harming Canadian interests when the person who is alleged to have committed the offence or the victim has a link to Canada.
It also amends the Criminal Code to, among other things, broaden the scope of the sabotage offence to include certain acts done in relation to essential infrastructures and ensure that certain provisions respecting the interception of “private communications” as defined in that Act apply to certain offences in the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act .
Finally, it makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 amends the Canada Evidence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts to, among other things,
(a) create a general scheme to deal with information relating to international relations, national defence or national security in the course of proceedings that are in the Federal Court or the Federal Court of Appeal and that are in respect of any decision of a federal board, commission or other tribunal;
(b) permit the appointment of a special counsel for the purposes of protecting the interests of a non-governmental party to those proceedings in respect of such information; and
(c) allow a person charged with an offence to appeal a decision, made under the Canada Evidence Act with respect to the disclosure of certain information in relation to criminal proceedings, only after the person has been convicted of the offence, unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying an earlier appeal.
It also adds references to international relations, national defence and national security in a provision of the Criminal Code that relates to the protection of information, as well as references to international relations and national defence in certain provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that equally relate to the protection of information.
Part 4 enacts the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act which, among other things,
(a) provides for the appointment of an individual to be known as the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner;
(b) requires certain persons to provide the Commissioner with certain information if they enter into arrangements with foreign principals under which they undertake to carry out certain activities in relation to political or governmental processes in Canada;
(c) requires the Commissioner to establish and maintain a publicly accessible registry that contains information about those arrangements;
(d) provides the Commissioner with tools to administer and enforce that Act; and
(e) amends the Public Service Superannuation Act , the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act .

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 113 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. Pursuant to the order of reference referred to the committee on Wednesday, May 29, and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, May 27, the committee resumes its study of Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference.

Before we begin, I would like to ask all members and in-person participants to consult the cards on the table for guidelines on preventing audio feedback incidents. Please take note of the following preventative measures in place to protect the health and safety of all participants, particularly the interpreters. Only use an approved black earpiece. The former grey earpieces must no longer be used. Keep your earpiece away from all microphones at all times. When you're not using the earpiece, place it face down on the sticker placed on the table for this purpose.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format.

I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of members and witnesses.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. All comments should be addressed through the chair.

I have some specific comments on Bill C-70. I would like to remind members that amendments to Bill C-70 must be submitted to the clerk of the committee by 4 p.m. Eastern Standard Time tomorrow, Friday, June 7. It is important for members to note that, pursuant to the order adopted by the House on May 30, the 4 p.m. deadline to submit amendments is firm. This means that any amendments submitted to the clerk after the deadline and any amendments moved from the floor during the clause-by-clause consideration of the bill will not be considered by the committee.

I would like now to welcome our first witnesses today. We have with us the Hon. Dominic LeBlanc, PC, MP, Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs. We also have the Hon. Arif Virani, PC, MP, Minister of Justice.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

If, in a bill like Bill C‑70, I find four significant semantic differences between the French and English versions, should I be concerned?

[Emmanuelle Rheault]

Based on my knowledge of Bill C‑70, the list you mentioned would not have any consequences on the Criminal Code or the Canada Evidence Act, logically, since the Criminal Code applies to offences committed in Canada, with certain exceptions. In addition, it focuses primarily on individuals, not entities. You can't prosecute a country under the Criminal Code.

As for the rest, I apologize, but it's somewhat outside my area of expertise.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Okay. Thank you for that.

I also want to recognize that, from your comments, you see Bill C-70 as a bare minimum, and you did mention other statutes that you wish could have been enacted.

We're limited by what's before us. We can't go beyond the scope of the bill, but in the amendments to the CSIS Act, you did make mention of the fact that a lot more could have been done with section 16. However, are you happy with what the government is proposing here in its amendment to section 16 as an addition? Do you see any improvements that we can make as a committee?

[Doug Shipley, Conservative, Barrie—Springwater—Oro-Medonte, ON]

I would like to move to Mr. Neiman.

Mr. Neiman, in a letter to the previous minister of public safety, the Business Council of Canada stated that you wanted to see, and I'll quote this, amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to allow CSIS to proactively share threat intelligence with employers where it is in the public interest and subject to all necessary safeguards and oversights.

Can you speak to these new information-sharing powers in C-70, and if they meet your requirements?

[Doug Shipley, Conservative, Barrie—Springwater—Oro-Medonte, ON]

I appreciate that. That's a good start. It's a little disheartening to hear, but at least we're doing something now to try to correct it a bit.

I'd like to stick with you, sir, if I could, because we've heard different perspectives in favour and opposed to Bill C-70's country-agnostic approach to the foreign registry list. I think in the beginning you mentioned that you definitely see a benefit to listing countries. Expand on why you see that being a benefit, and you mentioned persons too.

[Trevor Neiman, Vice-President, Policy, and Legal Counsel, Business Council of Canada]

Mr. Chair and committee members, thank you for the invitation to take part in your study of Bill C-70.

We're an organization representing Canada's most innovative and successful businesses, so I will restrict my comments today to the portion of the bill that has the most direct relevance to the Canadian private sector. That is subclause 34(3), which seeks to amend the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to enable CSIS to disclose threat intelligence to stakeholders outside the Government of Canada for the express purpose of increasing their awareness and resiliency against foreign interference.

However, before commenting on this clause, I want to make clear that Canada's business community is broadly supportive of Bill C-70. From the establishment of a foreign influence transparency regime to the creation of updated offences for attacks directed against essential infrastructure, this urgently needed bill will help protect Canadians' lives and livelihoods by providing our government with the tools it needs to better protect our economy and society.

I'll start my substantive remarks by noting that, while the current discussion in Canada surrounding foreign interference has been rightly focused on the integrity of our democratic processes and the safety and security of targeted ethnic and cultural groups, it is important for us all to acknowledge that state actors actively target all aspects of Canadian society to advance their strategic interests. This includes the Canadian economy.

Indeed, in an era of growing geopolitical rivalry, in which supply chains, infrastructure networks and technological innovation increasingly determine strategic advantage, Canadian businesses are often the primary target of our adversaries. This should concern all Canadians. Economic security threats are not abstract, nor do they exist in a vacuum. These threats target the critical infrastructure needed to heat and power our homes. They target the supply chains that provide our families with low-cost medicine and food. They target the intellectual property that creates good jobs and pays our bills. In short, these threats put Canadians' very safety, security and prosperity at risk.

To be sure, Canadian businesses and governments invest billions each year to keep Canadians safe from these and related economic attacks. However, if we want to be truly effective in protecting our way of life, we must replace our independent efforts with collective action. Key to building this partnership is the sharing of threat intelligence. Unlike the domestic security agencies of Canada's Five Eyes partners, such as the United States' FBI or the United Kingdom's MI5—which possess modern authorities that allow them to share detailed threat intelligence with their respective business communities—CSIS is presently prohibited from sharing all but the most generalized information with the Canadian private sector. This represents a significant gap in Canada's defences.

Despite CSIS having both the knowledge and expertise to help companies withstand growing threats, its outdated legislation means Canadian businesses are left fending for themselves. It is for this reason that the Business Council strongly supports subclause 34(3).

With new threat-sharing authorities, CSIS could communicate more specific and tangible information with Canadian companies. This would give business leaders a clear understanding of the growing threat and the protective measures that could be taken to better safeguard their employees and customers, as well as the communities in which they operate.

The use of these new authorities could also benefit the Government of Canada by helping CSIS build greater trust with the Canadian private sector. This would encourage Canadian business leaders to share more with Ottawa about the threats they're seeing on the ground, which would better inform government policy as well as improve CSIS's ability to respond to emerging threats.

Of course, the granting of any new authorities must be consistent with the values we share in our democratic society, including respect for individuals' rights and freedoms. On this front, we are very pleased to see that the Government of Canada has incorporated rigorous standards and safeguards into subclause 34(3), such as those ensuring that individual disclosures protect Canadians' privacy interests.

Before concluding, I want to stress the need for urgency. The Business Council of Canada agrees with many lawmakers that the protections contained within Bill C-70 must be put in place before the next general election. The preservation of our democratic system is of utmost importance.

However, I will add that, when it comes to strengthening the resiliency of our economy, Canada is falling well behind our allies. This exposes everyday Canadians to unnecessary risks. By failing to move in lockstep with our closest allies, we risk being perceived as a weak link. This could jeopardize our country's relationship with our closest allies, especially the United States, at a pivotal moment when the global order is being reshaped and partnerships matter most.

I'll conclude by noting that Bill C-70 is just one of many economic security reforms that must be undertaken urgently to protect Canadians. As a priority, the Business Council urges the Government of Canada to complement subclause 34(3) with a formalized threat exchange to securely receive and disseminate Bill C-70's threat intelligence broadly across the Canadian economy. This and nearly 40 other much-needed reforms are included in the Business Council's recent report, “Economic Security is National Security”. That report is available on our website.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak. I look forward to your questions.

[Emmanuelle Rheault, Attorney, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Members of the committee, I want to begin by thanking you for the opportunity to speak to you.

I have been a lawyer for 10 years and I exclusively practise criminal law, on the defence side. The Criminal Code and certain sections of the Canada Evidence Act are therefore part of my daily life. Therefore, I will focus most of my remarks on these two acts, but I will make a brief incursion into the Security of Information Act to talk about some of the provisions you wish to add to the Criminal Code.

First, I have several observations to make with respect to the proposed amendments to the sabotage offence, which is currently dealt with in section 52 of the Criminal Code. Some efforts are commendable, but many others are alarming.

First of all, as far as I know, the offence of sabotage does not exist in Great Britain. In the United States, federal laws restrict the scope of the offence. In New Zealand, sabotage is also a much more limited offence than what is intended by Bill C‑70.

Subsection 52(1) of the current Criminal Code defines the offence of sabotage as “a prohibited act for a purpose prejudicial to …”. In all transparency, I say to the committee that I think the way this paragraph is formulated right now is incomprehensible. The proposed amendment is therefore very commendable and welcomed by the law clerks, because the proposed wording is much clearer. In addition, proposed subsection 52(5), which provides an exception for certain groups, is an advantage compared to the current version of the Criminal Code. However, I feel the clarification is too restrictive.

The proposed new subsections 52(1) and 52(2) are much more problematic.

Subsection 52(1) that the bill proposes to add to the Criminal Code creates a new sabotage offence in relation to essential infrastructure. First of all, I want to say that this is far too broad. Under proposed subsection 52.1(1)(c), the offence applies to anyone who intends to “cause a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or any segment of the public”. However, the concept of “segment of the public” could be interpreted as meaning two individuals. So it wouldn't have to be the majority of the population. In addition, the bill is far too broad when it talks about a serious risk to safety. I say this because the broader the provisions are, the less they will stand up to the test of the courts as far as constitutionality and Canadian criminal law are concerned.

Next, proposed subsection 52.1(2) defines essential infrastructure. However, I'd like to point out that this definition includes facilities or systems belonging to private companies. If we push the interpretation of this proposed subsection, the facilities or systems of a private video game company like Ubisoft could be considered essential infrastructure, since they are information and communication technology infrastructure. So you're not only targeting public entities, and even companies owned by the federal government or a provincial government, but also private companies, which is very problematic.

Furthermore, the concept of economic well-being, which is added in proposed subsection 52.1(2), is also problematic because it's very broad. It's not restrictive enough and, to my knowledge, it's not defined anywhere in the Criminal Code.

In addition, the safeguard that's added by proposed subsection 52.1(5), which excludes from the definition of the offence acts committed in the course of advocacy, protest or dissent, is not sufficiently restrictive, because it's conditional on the lack of intent to cause any of the harms referred to in proposed paragraphs 52.1(1)(a) to (c). In New Zealand, for example, the exception applies purely and simply to acts committed as part of a protest or as part of a claim, with no conditions attached. Proposed subsection 52.1(5) could lead the courts to interpret it very broadly, even speculatively, in certain situations.

Another thing I note in the proposed provisions is the concept of mischief. The offence of mischief already exists in section 430 of the Criminal Code. However, you want to include in these new provisions almost any type of mischief committed for one of the purposes intended. As a result, mischief will become an even more serious offence, with a maximum sentence of 10 years' imprisonment, rather than two years, or five or 10 years in some cases. You want to make that offence much more serious.

As for proposed section 52.2, there are some issues. I'm thinking in particular of the definition of “device” in proposed subsection 52.2(3). The term “device” is not limited to computer programs. This term is defined in a number of places in the Criminal Code, and the definition includes many more things than computer devices. Devices can be explosives or weapons, for example. That could be a problem in court.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to echo my colleagues in thanking all the witnesses for being here today to help us through this study.

I don't think you're going to find anyone around this committee table who doesn't understand the importance of the issue before us. That's why, with respect to Bill C-70.... You know, it is quite rare to see a moment of unanimous consent to get a bill through committee this quickly. That being said, it puts a lot of pressure on us committee members because it is a fairly large and consequential bill. We need to do our thorough review of it because it still has to go through the Senate. Of course, if the Senate finds that we didn't do our job properly, they'll amend it and send it back to us, adding to further delay, so we want to make sure we're doing our job properly here.

Mr. Fadden, I'd like to start with you.

I took note of your comment that putting in a registry is not going to stop the clandestine nature of so much foreign interference. Of course, we have various consequential amendments to the Security of Information Act, otherwise known as SOIA. However, putting a law in place is one thing. Making sure we use that law to prosecute and convict is another. I know there's often quite a wide gulf between what is considered intelligence and what is considered evidence—what would stand up in a court of law.

What we haven't talked about a lot is how there are some pretty consequential amendments to the Canada Evidence Act to set up a framework to safeguard sensitive information. I know CSIS has to, by the very nature of its raison d’être, be quite careful with the intelligence it has, because you don't want to get rid of an intelligence source. At the same time, in addition to its detection and disruption activities, we also want to see some prosecutions and convictions happen.

As you look through this bill, are you satisfied that we have the legislative changes in place that can lead us down that path?

[Gloria Fung]

First of all, I am not a lawyer. However, we have been working with a lot of lawyers with respect to the act. All of our coalition member organizations consider Bill C-70 to be a good and strong bill.

[Chris Bittle, Liberal, St. Catharines, ON]

I appreciate simplicity. Despite being a lawyer and the excitement of a make-work project for lawyers, simplicity is generally the best way to go.

With the changes proposed in Bill C-70, how, in your mind, does this compare us with our Five Eyes allies, especially the U.S.?

[Katherine Leung, Policy Adviser, Hong Kong Watch]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'm the policy adviser for Hong Kong Watch in Canada, and I am before the committee today to speak to Bill C-70.

Hong Kong Watch supports the speedy passage of the countering foreign interference act such that it will be in place before the next election. We support the bill as a whole, but I will use my time to speak with emphasis on suggested amendments that would ensure that the scope of the bill would thoroughly address foreign interference.

We support the proposed amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, especially amendments related to equipping national security partners to build resiliency to threats by enabling broader disclosure of CSIS information to key partners beyond the Government of Canada. Foreign interference is not limited to governmental targets but rather affects individuals and organizations across various sectors.

We know, from media reports and previous committee testimony, that there are considerable foreign interference activities targeting Canadian universities, businesses and technology. This is why broadened information disclosure will allow institutions to better understand and anticipate potential threats and to take proactive measures to safeguard their operations and intellectual property.

We're also supportive of the proposed measures to counter foreign interference under part 2 of the bill. The creation of new offences for foreign interference, including deceptive acts that undermine democratic processes and harm Canadian interests, is much needed. These amendments address the reality that foreign interference often targets individuals at the grassroots level, thereby indirectly influencing democratic processes and Canadian interests.

While intimidation, threats and violence are tactics used by foreign entities to silence dissent within diaspora communities, discrimination is another method employed to suppress opposition. We have seen cases in which individuals in Canada have faced job loss or eviction from their homes due to their political opinions.

We would be supportive of proposed amendments that acknowledge the tactic of discrimination and provide mechanisms to counter it effectively. We also support the creation of the foreign influence transparency registry. By imposing obligations on individuals and entities to register arrangements and disclose foreign influence activities, the Government of Canada can increase transparency and accountability.

However, it is important to expand the scope of the act beyond political processes. Much of foreign interference occurs at the community level, where it can suppress public discourse and indirectly influence democratic processes.

Let me illustrate how transnational repression as a form of foreign interference can have an impact on political processes. This is from a case study of a Hong Konger in Canada, which I heard about through my work at Hong Kong Watch. A pro-democracy activist from Hong Kong fled to Canada in 2020, after participating in the 2019 protests and encountering police altercations that led to the detention of her friends. She claimed asylum, settled in Calgary and continued her advocacy for democracy in Hong Kong. She is one of the founding members of a group of volunteers who assist persecuted Hong Kongers seeking asylum in Canada.

Since publicly criticizing the Chinese government, she has received anonymous threats on Telegram, including harassing messages about her appearances and advocacy, and graphic videos, including a bloody video of a woman suffering severe blunt force trauma to the head and a video of a beheading, with captions referencing her involvement in pro-democracy organizations. The sender also disclosed personal details about her life, including her boyfriend's name, her employer and her workplace address. She has reported these threats to CSIS and the RCMP.

As Bill C-70 is written, the anonymous sender in this case would not trigger a requirement to register as a foreign agent. This is not an activity directly related to parliamentary or legislative proceedings, development of a legislative proposal, development or amendment of a policy or program, decision-making by a public office holder or government body, elections, referendums or nomination contests. Rather, this is something that has silenced this individual. Due to fears for her safety, she no longer participates in pro-democracy advocacy for Hong Kong, despite permanently living in Canada.

Foreign states use transnational repression to discourage dissent by diaspora communities, thereby undermining democratic participation and the ability of elected officials to represent their constituents fully. Expanding the act to encompass all levels of foreign interference activities, including transnational repression and intimidation, will provide a more comprehensive safeguard against these threats.

With that, I conclude my remarks here.

[Gloria Fung, Immediate Past President, Canada-Hong Kong Link]

Mr. Chair and distinguished members of the committee, I thank you for this opportunity to comment on Bill C-70, the countering foreign interference act.

I'm the immediate past-president of Canada-Hong Kong Link and convener of the Canadian coalition for a foreign influence transparency registry. The coalition established in 2021 consists of 33 multicultural community organizations, think tanks and human rights groups across Canada. Our mission is to advocate for a foreign influence registry to be enacted in Canada to enhance transparency in the democratic process.

Over the past two decades, both CSIS and Canadian civil society have repeatedly warned our government about foreign interference and transnational repression in Canada, but they have remained complacent. The transnational repression faced by diaspora communities includes telephone threats, cyberbullying and smearing of Canadians through disinformation campaigns, surveillance, coercion and harassment through counterprotests and physical attacks.

The Chinese Communist Party is by far the most active state player in this interference operation through its sophisticated network involving hundreds of proxies, posing a major threat to our national security, sovereignty and democracy. Canada is at the back door to the U.S., China's adversary. By infiltrating Canada, China can access sensitive intelligence information of the U.S., the Five Eyes allies and NATO.

CCP agents capitalize on the openness of our democratic system to infiltrate community, media, academic and business sectors. They are active in undermining our democratic institutions at all levels of government.

As we recently brought together eight MPs from all five federal parties to call for the immediate introduction of legislation to counter foreign interference, our coalition welcomes the bill and strongly supports the emerging non-partisan consensus to get the registry passed and to get it up and running before the 2025 election call. We hope the House can send it to the Senate before it rises for the summer.

I would like to make the following recommendations.

Number one, the government should set up an independent commission to coordinate and monitor the implementation and future periodic reviews of the act.

Number two, the act and corresponding regulations should be reviewed and updated within one to two years after the 2025 federal election. After this, they can be reviewed once every five years in accordance with the rapidly evolving foreign threats.

Number three, for the purpose of the registry, “political activity” defined in the act needs to be expanded to include elections to internal political offices; political party leadership contests; appointments of individuals to public offices; government hiring decisions; third party political advertising; decision-making within parliamentary and legislative caucuses, such as the selection of officers, expulsion of members and removal of leaders; law enforcement decisions; and decisions of tribunals and regulators.

Number four, legislation should allow authorities to be proactive in implementing the registry. In Australia, for instance, authorities can send a request for information to determine whether or not individuals or entities need to register.

Thank you.

[Richard Fadden, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you on Bill C-70. I am especially grateful for this opportunity because it addresses a number of issues that I and many others have advocated on for some time.

Bill C-70 is a relatively complex and, in some cases, quite technical piece of legislation. However, its overarching thrust goes a considerable distance towards dealing with the threat of foreign interference—again, a threat that has been with us for some time. In particular, the creation of offences relating to foreign interference and the creation of the foreign influence transparency commissioner and of the registry he or she will be required to maintain will provide tools that Canada is lacking. These measures will not make foreign interference go away, but they will help deal with the threat.

As well, the provisions amending the CSIS Act, permitting the service to disclose information much more broadly than is currently the case, will assist government institutions, as well as the private sector and civil society, in understanding and dealing with threats to our national security. In this respect, these amendments will help deal not only with foreign interference but also with other threats to national security.

I have two last comments. The first deals with concerns that I have seen reported in the media to the effect that some provisions in the bill risk charter compliance issues. I am not a charter lawyer. Indeed, I am a lapsed lawyer. However, I do not see this risk in the actual words of the bill. Is there a possibility that its implementation might increase the risk? Possibly.

Having said this, it seems to me that this is frequently the case with any law that creates offences. However, I do not believe—and I hope you will agree with me—that such concerns should prevent you from approving Bill C-70. I think that there are four reasons for this. First is the certificate of the Minister of Justice, which the chair just referenced. I also think that Parliament is entitled to believe in the good-faith implementation of the law by ministers and officials. If there is a real problem, there is always recourse to the courts. Finally, if there are really serious problems, you can change the law.

My last comment relates to what I understand is the view of some: that Bill C-70 should not be dealt with on a fast track. I would suggest to the contrary that the expeditious review and passage of Bill C-70 is in the national interest. I can see no possibility that our geopolitical adversaries will in any way in the foreseeable future modify their behaviour so as to lessen threats to our national security. These threats are real and affect virtually every part of our country: the private sector, civil society, individuals and governments at all levels. NSICOP, NSIRA and the Hogue inquiry all clearly support the view that the threats you are considering are real and require action. To not deal with Bill C-70 in the days and weeks ahead and—if you'll forgive me for saying so—in an environment increasingly affected by the possibility of an election could mean the demise of Bill C-70.

My last thought is that, even if Bill C-70 were to receive royal assent next week, implementation will take some time, and I hope you will take this into account as you consider time frames relating to the bill.

Thank you for your attention, and in due course, I'd be more than happy to try to answer your questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 112 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

Pursuant to the order of reference referred to the committee on Wednesday, May 29, 2024, and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, May 27, 2024, the committee resumes its study of Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference.

Before we begin, I would like to ask all members and other in-person participants to consult the cards on the table for guidelines to prevent audio feedback incidents.

Please take note of the following preventative measures in place to protect the health and safety of all participants, including the interpreters in particular. Only use a black, approved earpiece. The former grey earpieces must no longer be used. Keep your earpiece away from all microphones at all times. When you're not using your earpiece, place it face down on the sticker placed on the table for this purpose. Thank you all for your co-operation.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format. I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of members and witnesses.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. I will remind you that all comments should be addressed through the chair.

I have specific comments to make on Bill C-70. I would like to remind members that amendments to Bill C-70 must be submitted to the clerk of the committee by 4 p.m., eastern standard time, on Friday, June 7, 2024. It is important for members to note that, pursuant to the order adopted by the House on May 30, the 4 p.m. deadline to submit amendments is firm. This means that any amendments submitted to the clerk after the deadline and any amendments moved from the floor during clause-by-clause consideration of the bill will not be considered by the committee.

I will also note, for all members of the committee, that the charter statement on Bill C-70 has been distributed, and you should find it in your inboxes.

I'd like to now welcome our witnesses for today.