Bill C-70 (Historical)

Countering Foreign Interference Act

An Act respecting countering foreign interference

Part 1 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Act to, among other things,
(a) update provisions respecting the collection, retention, querying and exploitation of datatsets;
(b) clarify the scope of section 16 of that Act;
(c) update provisions respecting the disclosure of information by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(d) provide for preservation orders and production orders as well as warrants to obtain information, records, documents or things through a single attempt;
(e) expand the circumstances in which a warrant to remove a thing from the place where it was installed may be issued; and
(f) require a parliamentary review of that Act every five years.
It also makes a consequential amendment to the Intelligence Commissioner Act .
Part 2 amends the Security of Information Act to, among other things, create the following offences:
(a) committing an indictable offence at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with a foreign entity;
(b) knowingly engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State or being reckless as to whether the conduct is likely to harm Canadian interests; and
(c) engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct, at the direction of or in association with a foreign entity, with the intent to influence, among other things, the exercise of a democratic right in Canada.
It also amends that Act to remove as an element of the offence of inducing or attempting to induce — at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity or terrorist group — by intimidation, threat or violence, a person to do anything or cause anything to be done, that the thing be done for the purpose of harming Canadian interests when the person who is alleged to have committed the offence or the victim has a link to Canada.
It also amends the Criminal Code to, among other things, broaden the scope of the sabotage offence to include certain acts done in relation to essential infrastructures and ensure that certain provisions respecting the interception of “private communications” as defined in that Act apply to certain offences in the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act .
Finally, it makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 amends the Canada Evidence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts to, among other things,
(a) create a general scheme to deal with information relating to international relations, national defence or national security in the course of proceedings that are in the Federal Court or the Federal Court of Appeal and that are in respect of any decision of a federal board, commission or other tribunal;
(b) permit the appointment of a special counsel for the purposes of protecting the interests of a non-governmental party to those proceedings in respect of such information; and
(c) allow a person charged with an offence to appeal a decision, made under the Canada Evidence Act with respect to the disclosure of certain information in relation to criminal proceedings, only after the person has been convicted of the offence, unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying an earlier appeal.
It also adds references to international relations, national defence and national security in a provision of the Criminal Code that relates to the protection of information, as well as references to international relations and national defence in certain provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that equally relate to the protection of information.
Part 4 enacts the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act which, among other things,
(a) provides for the appointment of an individual to be known as the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner;
(b) requires certain persons to provide the Commissioner with certain information if they enter into arrangements with foreign principals under which they undertake to carry out certain activities in relation to political or governmental processes in Canada;
(c) requires the Commissioner to establish and maintain a publicly accessible registry that contains information about those arrangements;
(d) provides the Commissioner with tools to administer and enforce that Act; and
(e) amends the Public Service Superannuation Act , the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act .

Strong and Free Elections Act

[Brad Vis, Conservative, Mission—Matsqui—Abbotsford, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I will acknowledge that Canada does need to improve its relationship with China, but we need to be clear-eyed and realistic about it. Like my colleague from Yorkton—Melville, I was concerned when the government recently signed a new security agreement with the People's Republic of China, even though we have not enacted our foreign registry yet. There would have been much less apprehension about any such type of agreement had the government already fulfilled its duty on Bill C-70, as it said it was going to do over a year ago today.

Again, I encourage the government members to push their minister of democratic institutions to take the steps he said he was going to take and enact the registry today.

[Brad Vis, Conservative, Mission—Matsqui—Abbotsford, BC]

Mr. Speaker, in my time today, I want to talk about two specific issues. One is foreign interference in the context of the Hogue commission, and the second is my own experience in the 2015 election and my previous nomination contest at the time.

Let us start with the Hogue commission. What did the Hogue commission say about foreign interference? It concluded that foreign states are actively attempting to interfere in Canada's democratic institutions and electoral processes. The threat is persistent and evolving, with the main state actors identified as China, India, Russia, Iran and Pakistan. The commission noted that their tactics include covert influence, disinformation, cyber activity, intimidation and the use of proxies within Canada.

The Hogue commission outlined that the 2019 and 2021 elections were not undermined, but that there was foreign influence. The commissioner found no evidence of widespread or systematic manipulation. At most, though it is still very significant, a small number of ridings may have been impacted, but that impact could not be determined with certainty; in other words, the ability of the government to determine our security apparatuses did not have the tools. There was no evidence that members of Parliament were elected because of foreign state support.

The commission found that there were no parliamentarians influenced by foreign agents. While there were some concerning and naive interactions with foreign actors, the evidence did not support allegations of systemic betrayal or treason in the context of those elections.

The commissioner outlined that the greatest threat from foreign actors is disinformation and misinformation, especially online. Those things cause the most serious, long-term threat to Canadian democracy. Social media, foreign-language platforms and AI-enabled tools are increasingly used to amplify division, discourage participation and undermine trust. Even when election outcomes are unchanged, disinformation damages confidence in democracy, which is in itself a strategic objective of hostile state actors.

The commission found that diaspora communities in Canada are disproportionately harmed. A central finding of the Hogue commission was on the human impact of foreign interference. Diaspora communities are the primary targets. Many experience transnational repression, including threats, intimidation, surveillance of family abroad and coercion. Indeed, I believe the member for Wellington—Halton Hills North had his family impacted by these very problems. These activities, in many cases, chill political participation in Canada and undermine self-expression and trust in Canadian institutions.

While government responses have improved, we have been too slow and opaque as a nation to address many of our shortcomings. Our government is slow to react to intelligence. There is poor coordination, and there are unclear responsibilities. There have been failures in intelligence flow to decision-makers, and there is insufficient transparency and public communication about the real threats that Canada faces.

Our intelligence is fragile and has limits. Much of the information about foreign interference comes from unverified or partial intelligence. Intelligence must be handled carefully to avoid unfair conclusions about individuals. The intelligence-to-evidence problem makes prosecutions difficult and requires non-criminal disruption tools.

Foreign interference, the commission notes, has already harmed our democracy by undermining trust. It has been successful in weakening public confidence in the outcomes of our elections.

The commissioner also noted that we need a whole-of-society response. We need greater transparency in public education, digital and media literacy, stronger coordination across government, engagement with civil society, and targeted action against disinformation and transnational repression.

The bottom line from the Hogue commission is that foreign interference is a real and serious threat. Although our democracy has proven resilient, we have seen some gaps and some damage because our government has not moved fast enough.

I will say that the Conservatives will be supporting Bill C-25 at second reading to go to committee so we can make improvements to our democracy. I am glad to see this type of collaboration in the House of Commons.

What would Bill C-25 do? It would extend foreign interference protections year-round. It would close channels for foreign and opaque political financing, such as cryptocurrencies, money orders and prepaid cards. It would tighten third party financing rules so that only Canadian citizens' or permanent residents' funds could be used for regulated partisan activities. It would prohibit using foreign money, property or services to influence elections in Canada. While there are still a few more loopholes we want to address at committee, this is a step in the right direction.

Bill C-25 would protect nomination and leadership contests from interference. It would ban deceptive AI deepfakes tied to elections. It would criminalize false information meant to disrupt voting. It would strengthen enforcement penalties. There would be increases to administrative monetary penalties, up to $100,000 for organizations. I think we might even consider going higher on some of those penalties if in fact our intelligence community found that foreign actors were using funds in a nefarious manner. It would improve party data protection obligations and boost foreign information threat detection capacity for our government.

This is all very important. However, I will note as well that in the last Parliament, we had Bill C-70, which was a response to the troubling findings of the Hogue commission. Still, today, despite many repeated promises, the Government of Canada has not enacted a foreign registry. Many of the things in Bill C-25 cannot be operationalized, cannot be used to their full effect, until the government fulfills its responsibility on legislation that received royal assent over a year ago. The threats to democracy are real, that has been concluded in Canada, but we have not seen the requisite action from the government to move at a speed that undermines the real problems Canadians are facing.

A foreign registry would protect democratic debate in Canada. It would address that grey zone between influence and interference. It would deter covert and deceptive behaviour. It would strengthen trust in our institutions without stigmatizing communities. It would give parliamentarians and officials a basic due diligence tool. It would align Canada with all of our Five Eyes allies, who already have a similar policy in place. It would reinforce the principle that sovereignty includes the information space and that how we conduct ourselves as MPs and engage with foreign agents or foreign governments matters in the context of protecting Canadian sovereignty.

I mention all of this in the context of a former member of Parliament, Han Dong. While the Hogue commission outlined that intelligence officials in Canada indicated that PRC officials likely attempted to influence the 2019 Liberal nomination contest in Don Valley North, there were limits to our intelligence, so the Hogue commission and the Government of Canada could not definitively determine whether those foreign students actually voted and whether or not coercion in fact occurred. I argue here today that if we had enacted the tools in Bill C-70, and if we enact the tools in Bill C-25, the findings of the Hogue commission would have been different regarding Han Dong. I think the findings would have been much worse for Mr. Dong.

I served on the HUMA committee with Mr. Dong in 2020, and it is on the parliamentary record that he spoke more about the need to have better processes and policies in place for foreign students than about any other subject matter when he got to the standing committee in the first place. How can we not, in this House, recognize that Mr. Dong was in fact influenced by those foreign students, or by the PRC officials who brought those foreign students to his nomination? I know that is a bit controversial, but the record stands for itself. Mr. Dong was here to advocate for foreign students from China, not to stand up for his constituents. I believe he was influenced, and I have no problem saying that in this chamber.

What I would love the government to do is to move swiftly with Bill C-25. The Liberals have the backing of the Conservatives. Let us tie together some of those third party financing obligations that serve Canadian sovereignty. Let us prevent another situation like that nefarious nomination in 2019. Let us give our law enforcement the tools it needs to protect Canadian sovereignty, and let us improve the processes in this place so there are clear lines of intelligence between our officials and our security apparatus. That does not exist today, but between Bill C-70, with the work the government needs to do today to enact a foreign registry, and the tools in Bill C-25, I believe we are moving in the right direction.

I am going to change subjects here because I would be remiss if I did not take an opportunity during a review of the Canada Elections Act to talk about the very real challenges I faced in 2015. I raise this because in 2015, tons of foreign students participated in my nomination. The most common form of identification was an Indian passport. People would go to the table to vote, and they would write a Canadian address and use an Indian passport. It was horrible. It undermined the confidence of people who had signed up in good faith as Canadian citizens to participate in our electoral process.

I will note that the Conservative Party was following all the rules and that after Liv Grewal technically “won” the nomination in 2015, the Conservative Party used the Canada Elections Act, existing measures and its own investigative powers as a political entity in Canada to remove that candidate because of what took place at that nomination. Liv Grewal's father, Gurmant Grewal, a former Conservative member of Parliament, had signed up non-Canadians to participate in that nomination.

The principal problem that happened in 2015 still exists. Under a Canadian ID issued by a province, we do not know whether someone is a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident or a foreign student. Our identification does not outline that key fact. I know this has happened in all parties. It is not a partisan issue. This is a nomination issue with Elections Canada. It happens in every political party. Even under the many good and positive improvements the Conservative Party has made within the context of the Canada Elections Act, when people go to vote, one cannot determine their citizenship. One cannot determine whether someone is simply a permanent resident or a foreign student. That is a wide gap for abuse in our system.

I will note that at the Conservative convention, we tried to pass a resolution to change this. Unfortunately, it did not pass, because many Conservative members made the rightful point that sometimes a permanent resident's first access to Canadian democracy is that vote in a nomination contest. In many parts of the country, for the Liberal Party, the Bloc Québécois and the Conservatives, the nomination itself is the determining factor in who will be the representative in Ottawa. We have to change the law. We have to eliminate the ability of non-Canadian citizens to choose our elected representatives in nomination contests.

The system is not perfect, but I believe that if Bill C-25 took this necessary step, we would avoid some of the abuse I have seen in my own political party, and that has absolutely taken place in every other political party in Canada. The gaps and the outcomes are too large and too enticing for people not to do it. Frankly, it is not even against the law right now, so why would they not do it? I believe that nomination contests to choose candidates should only be for Canadian citizens. That is not the position of my party. That is the position of Brad Vis, but I feel very strongly about that position.

In 2015, going back to my nomination, I spent a year going around to farms and to gurdwaras. I put myself out there like I had never done before in my life, and I lost. To the Conservative Party's credit, our former lawyer, Arthur Hamilton, recognized there was a problem. Liv Grewal was disqualified. Ironically, the Conservative Party then asked Mike de Jong to run. Mike de Jong was the finance minister for British Columbia at the time. Mike de Jong rejected the invitation from the Conservative Party to be appointed as a candidate, and I was subsequently appointed, three weeks into the writ. I lost that election by 1,000 votes.

When I went back and did a poll-by-poll analysis, the neighbourhoods with the highest concentration of Conservative memberships were getting about 10% Conservative support on the day of the election. Every election since then, I go to Homestead Crescent. In 2015, I got 10% there. In 2019, I got about 30% and it has gone up every election. We cannot deny the fact that there were nefarious political actions that were not just. I know for a fact that people who signed up for the Conservative Party absolutely voted Liberal. I know for a fact that there were many people assigned addresses in West Abbotsford who were not Canadian citizens. That skewed our political data, because we did not have the tools to verify citizenship, as I mentioned earlier.

One of the best ways to improve the integrity of our elections, for all Canadians and for all political parties, is to limit nomination contests solely to Canadians. It is not perfect, but in a country as diverse as ours, with so many foreign pressures and so many diaspora communities that may be influenced by non-state actors in Canada, we have to take that necessary step to protect the integrity of our local races.

I love our democracy. I like the fact that even in challenging times, we can come together and we can agree on improvements in Bill C-25 that would benefit all political parties. That is the right way to go. I hope that all members of Parliament on the procedure and House affairs committee review nomination contests. I know Elections Canada has made a similar recommendation based on stories it has heard from across Canada.

I hope, in good faith, that this bill is amended to include a provision that does not allow for non-Canadians to vote in candidate selections and nominations across Canada.

Opposition Motion—Serious crimes and refugee claims

[Parm Bains, Liberal, Richmond East—Steveston, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I talked about how criminals adapt fast and how we have to stay ahead.

Many of the measures we have introduced, many of which the member just indicated, build upon things that we have done, things like Bill C-70, the foreign interference act. It has many measures that will help us deal with the issues around extortion.

We need to move quickly on all of the measures that have been introduced in this House over the past few months to continue not only to adapt to what the criminals are doing but also to move ahead of them and make these changes quickly. We need the Conservatives to join us.

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Surrey Newton, BC]

Mr. Speaker, in his speech, the hon. member mentioned foreign interference. In fact I am very familiar with the issue because I brought in a motion in the previous Parliament to deal with foreign interference. In fact our government brought in Bill C-70 to deal with those situations as well.

I would like the hon. member to tell the House what kind of foreign interference he is hearing about on the ground, and what his leader is doing to curb that situation.

Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act

[Parm Bains, Liberal, Richmond East—Steveston, BC]

Mr. Speaker, fentanyl, precursors and issues related to crime and strengthening our borders have had an impact on our communities. Over time, these issues change and evolve, and we need to evolve and bring in new measures. That is what we are doing at this point.

If we look at strengthening the borders by adding police and CBSA officers, with the new search warrant measures and all the resources and tools they would be given, everything from going after ghost guns, which we announced earlier to new offences, such as in Bill C-70 with respect to transnational threats, that is a holistic approach. There is a whole level of different measures we have put forward to combat the ever-evolving challenges that this country is facing.

Main Estimates, 2025-26

[Gary Anandasangaree, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood—Rouge Park, ON]

Madam Chair, I look forward to bringing forward regulations as well as other measures to implement Bill C-70.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

Madam Chair, regarding foreign interference, several measures in Bill C‑70 were adopted during the last Parliament, but the regulations still have not been implemented.

When are you going to adopt these measures?

Strong Borders Act

[Parm Bains, Liberal, Richmond East—Steveston, BC]

Madam Speaker, the hon. member and I shared some time on committee, and he will know that I worked quite hard in the 44th Parliament to address the issue of foreign interference. That is why we brought in Bill C-70, which includes the registry and other measures like security of information. Through it, enforcement can take place on issues of foreign interference when it has to do with things like the passage of misinformation on social media or through other channels, such as when Mr. Chiu felt he was targeted. All members in this House have been targets of misinformation and disinformation.

I am happy to continue that hard work on Bill C-70 to make sure that the security of information and shared information and where it is coming from are top of mind.

Resumption of Debate on Address in Reply

[Jenny Kwan, NDP, Vancouver East, BC]

Mr. Speaker, let me congratulate you on taking the seat in the Speaker's chair as Deputy Speaker.

We saw in the throne speech that there was a lot of discussion about the threat towards Canada from the Trump administration, and rightfully so. Canadians and, I believe, every member of the House will be very focused on taking that issue to heart and on protecting Canada and our sovereignty.

At the same time, we also have another threat, and that is the issue of foreign interference. We knew that, heading into the election, our democratic institutions were under threat from foreign interference actors, yet the Liberal government, in the previous administration, did not put in place Bill C-70. We did not have that during the election, and there has yet to be any mention of that anywhere from the government bench, including from the Prime Minister.

Why was that not mentioned in the throne speech?

Democratic Institutions

[Jenica Atwin, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Indigenous Services]

Madam Speaker, it is my pleasure to rise today to speak to the paramount issue of combatting foreign interference in our democratic institutions. I certainly take this matter very seriously. I have respect for the House, and I wish the member would demonstrate the same. The allegations referenced here are misleading and defamatory, and he is simply peddling misinformation.

On this side of the House, the Prime Minister and ministers of the Crown have security clearances and have been vetted by national security. That is more than I can say for the Leader of the Opposition, who the member opposite is sitting closer and closer to. That is why I would like to turn my attention to what matters, which is what the government is doing on foreign interference.

In September 2023, the government announced the establishment of the public inquiry into foreign interference in federal processes and democratic processes following extensive consultations with all recognized parties in the House of Commons. All parties agreed to the terms of reference and the appointment of the commissioner, Justice Marie-Josée Hogue, a judge of the Court of Appeal of Quebec. The commissioner is mandated to examine and assess interference from China, Russia and other foreign state or non-state actors, including any potential impacts, to confirm the integrity of and any impacts on the 2019 and 2021 federal general elections at the national and electoral district levels.

As members of the House know, the commissioner's interim report was delivered on May 3, 2024. Some of the key findings from this initial report were that foreign interference did not affect the overall outcomes of the 2019 and 2021 elections, and the administration of these elections were sound. Foreign interference did not undermine the integrity of Canada's electoral system.

The commission's initial report did not make any recommendations for the government or other stakeholders. These will be included in the commission's final report. The government looks forward to reviewing the final report and any recommendations the commissioner may have for better protecting federal democratic processes from foreign interference. These will help inform future measures. In the meantime, the government continues its work to counter the evolving threat of foreign interference in Canada's democratic institutions.

Since the commissioner was appointed, the government has taken a number of steps. In September 2023, the Prime Minister made a statement in the House of Commons that there were credible allegations of a potential link between agents of the Government of India and the killing of a Canadian citizen in British Columbia. In October 2023, the government issued a second public statement on a probable Chinese government's “spamouflage” disinformation campaign targeting dozens of Canadian parliamentarians and issued letters to those parliamentarians who were targeted.

In December 2023, Canada joined the United Kingdom's attribution of malicious cyber activity in Russia that targeted U.K. politics and democratic processes. In January 2024, early preparations for the critical election incident public protocol panel began with individual briefings to panel members. Also in January 2024, the government published and shared a tool kit to resist disinformation and foreign interference and “Countering Disinformation: A Guidebook for Public Servants”.

In March 2024, the government introduced Bill C-65 which proposes amendments to the Canada Elections Act, including measures to further strengthen federal electoral processes against foreign interference. This bill has passed second reading in the House and is currently being studied in committee. In June 2024, unclassified briefings on foreign interference were provided to members of Parliament. On June 20, 2024, Bill C-70, the Countering Foreign Interference Act, received royal assent.

The Government of Canada has taken a range of measures to address the evolving threat of foreign interference in Canada's democratic processes. We look forward to reviewing any recommendations that Commissioner Hogue may have in her final report. In the meantime, the government continues to take steps to protect Canada's democracy.

[Irek Kusmierczyk, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Employment]

Madam Speaker, it is my pleasure to rise today to speak to the vital, ongoing work that the Government of Canada is doing to protect Canada's democratic institutions.

As all members of the House are aware, threats to Canada's democracy do not affect only some Canadians; they affect all Canadians. This is why the enhancements to safeguard Canada's democratic systems and processes against foreign interference set out in Bill C-70 are supported across party lines. Indeed, the Government of Canada's ongoing work to protect Canada's electoral systems and democratic institutions includes efforts to maximize public transparency while protecting what and how government documents are shared. This is because the nature of some records, as well as how they are intended to be used, is fundamental to the functioning of our democratic system of government.

I would like to take this opportunity to make clear what cabinet confidences are and why they are treated so carefully by the government. In this way, any misunderstanding along these lines can be put to an end. Cabinet confidences are documents prepared for members of cabinet. They include memoranda to cabinet, discussion papers, records of cabinet deliberations or decisions, records of communications between ministers, records to brief ministers and draft legislation.

The Canadian government is a Westminster system of government and has been since Confederation. This means that the principle of keeping cabinet confidences secret is older than Canada itself. It originates from the United Kingdom's Westminster Parliament, which dates back many centuries. Cabinet confidences are central to how the Westminster system functions because of another foundational principle called “cabinet collective responsibility”. The two principles complement each other. Members of cabinet consider all material at their disposal; they deliberate freely, and even disagree, around the cabinet table. Once the deliberations are finished, cabinet makes a collective decision, and all members are responsible for it.

Therefore, the secrecy of these deliberations and of the materials that are used to make cabinet decisions is paramount to the system functioning as designed. This has long been understood by successive Canadian governments, which have upheld the principle of cabinet confidences.

In addition to the government, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that cabinet confidentiality is essential to good government. Protecting Canada's democracy also means protecting our democratic institutions and ensuring that they can function as intended. Protecting cabinet confidences is not a nefarious act; rather, it is a fulfillment of the government's duty to uphold the long-established principles of Canada's system of government.

While fulfilling this duty, the Government of Canada continues to support the ongoing work of the public inquiry into foreign interference, which it has done since the inquiry was established last year. The set of cabinet confidences specified in the terms of reference for the commission were already provided during the commission's first phase of work, and those terms were developed and agreed to by all recognized parties in the House.

As it has done all along, the government will continue to provide thousands of classified documents to the commission and to make government witnesses available to answer the commission's questions. The Government of Canada looks forward to the commission's final report in December, and it will consider how its recommendations can further help to enhance Canada's measures against foreign interference in its electoral systems and its democratic institutions.

RCMP Allegations of Foreign Interference by the Government of India

[Parm Bains, Liberal, Steveston—Richmond East, BC]

Mr. Speaker, we have seen not just one instance of media; we have seen a former Indian army official who literally stated that $100 million should be spent to elect a Conservative government. It is clear that we have not heard the Conservatives really talk today about how we are going to tackle these issues they raise. They were talking about our Prime Minister and what he is not doing, when the Liberals are doing these things, with Bill C-70 and making arrests; the RCMP is actively engaged; and quite frankly, we have uncovered some of the most nefarious incidents we could ever think of.

[Parm Bains, Liberal, Steveston—Richmond East, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I will be sharing my time with my dear colleague from Brampton North.

This past week, Canadians were taken aback, as we heard in the different speeches throughout this emergency debate, by the scope and seriousness of the Government of India's ongoing efforts to interfere in Canadian affairs. Last Monday, the RCMP made public its findings that Indian government diplomats have been engaged in serious criminal activities in Canada. These activities target Canada, Canadians and individuals residing in Canada, as well as Canadian interests. They are covert, deceptive and illegal. They threaten all levels of government, the private sector, academia, diaspora communities and the general public.

Through Canada's national task force and other investigative efforts, the RCMP has obtained evidence that demonstrates these agents supported violent extremism in both nations and links agents of the Government of India to homicides and violent acts. It demonstrates they were using organized crime to create a perception of an unsafe environment for the South Asian community in Canada and interfering in democratic processes. The most serious of these criminal acts took place in June 2023 when proxies were used to murder Hardeep Singh Nijjar in front of the Guru Nanak Sikh Gurdwara in Surrey, B.C., a holy place.

This government is determined to protect Canadians from these attacks. To push back against foreign interference, this government passed Bill C-70, amending the CSIS Act and the Security of Information Act for the first time in 40 years.

In May, I spoke to and seconded my colleague from Surrey—Newton's motion, Motion No. 112, about the real threats posed by foreign governments that seek to intimidate diaspora communities in Canada. Motion No. 112 specifically references the sharing of information and security intelligence to protect democratic institutions, maintain the rule of law and prevent violence and extremism. Information sharing with key allies is critical to pushing back against hostile actors. Since the Government of Canada made these allegations, Canada's Five Eyes allies have come out in support of Canada, because we share intelligence.

In response to the shocking revelations that Indian diplomats including India's high commissioner were actively undermining Canadian law, the Government of Canada expelled the commissioner along with five other diplomats. Evidence also shows that a wide variety of entities in Canada and abroad have been used by agents of the Government of India to collect information. Some of these individuals and businesses were coerced and threatened into working for the Government of India.

This is not the first time foreign governments have worked to intimidate diaspora communities in Canada. I mentioned this before in questions asked today. Under the previous government, the now Leader of the Opposition and Stephen Harper allowed Chinese police stations to set up shop in Canada. These became hubs where Chinese agents could intimidate, harass and even repatriate Chinese residents, claiming they were criminals.

Regrettably, efforts by Mark Flynn, the deputy commissioner of federal policing, to meet with his Indian law enforcement counterparts and discuss violent extremism occurring in Canada and India were unsuccessful. I call again on all levels of the Government of India to co-operate with these investigations. It is the only way forward.

This is a particularly sad time for the Commonwealth and all allied nations. Together, Canadians and Indians resisted the forces of 20th-century dictatorships in both the First and Second World Wars. They did this not to conquer but to preserve their way of life and build a better, more peaceful world based on co-operation, respect and a mutual commitment to a rule-based international order.

The beginning of the Commonwealth Charter reinforces:

the commitment of member states to the development of free and democratic societies and the promotion of peace and prosperity to improve the lives of all the people of the Commonwealth.

I was born and raised in Canada, but this would not have been possible if it were not for members of my family, Sikhs who served in both India's and Canada's armed forces to fight for the safety and freedoms we enjoy. The Government of India's actions represent a gross breach of international law and also of its commitment to the principles that bind the Commonwealth of Nations together.

These are difficult revelations. I know that there is a real concern in the South Asian community. I urge anyone who has been victimized by threats or knows of others who have been threatened to come forward and report these threats to the RCMP. The safety of Canadians, regardless of their background or beliefs, is the top priority of the RCMP and of this government.

The actions being perpetrated by India and other foreign states are a threat to Canada's national interests. They undermine Canadian sovereignty and social cohesion, diminish trust in our institutions and degrade the rights and freedoms to which all Canadians are entitled. This is why the Government of Canada will continue to denounce these actions as deplorable and unacceptable in the strongest possible terms.

Up to 30 arrests have already been made, and our public safety agencies will not stop working. We will not be intimidated. We will not be harassed, and we will have justice and answers for the flagrant disregard of Canadians as well as of international law. We need to remain united on all sides of the aisle and show leadership to protect our nation and our way of life.

[Maninder Sidhu, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Export Promotion]

Mr. Speaker, I will be splitting my time with the member for Surrey Centre.

The constituents in my riding of Brampton East are very anxious. They are anxious about acts of violence targeting the Sikh and broader South Asian community, about foreign interference in our democratic processes, and about these being directly tied to agents of the Government of India, as the RCMP commissioner publicly and clearly stated last week.

The rule of law must be respected, and our citizens must be protected. We will not tolerate any form of harassment, intimidation or violence targeting Canadians. I know that all parliamentarians in this chamber would agree with that.

There is a lot of misinformation flying around, and I have had constituents reach out to me with questions, so please allow me to state some facts on the record for those watching at home. There were 22 individuals who were arrested and charged in relation to extortion and eight arrested and charged in relation to homicides. This is thanks to the hard work of the RCMP and law enforcement agencies across Canada.

Back in February 2024, the RCMP created a multidisciplinary team to coordinate and investigate public threats. Through very active investigations, it has come across very serious findings, and it felt the public needed to know, which led to the press conference it initiated last Monday. I want to ensure that words are not mixed up, so I would like to read what the RCMP commissioner very clearly stated on the record last week.

He stated:

Investigations have revealed that Indian diplomats and consular officials based in Canada leveraged their official positions to engage in clandestine activities, such as collecting information for the Government of India, either directly or through their proxies; and other individuals who acted voluntarily or through coercion.

Evidence also shows that a wide variety of entities in Canada and abroad have been used by agents of the Government of India to collect information. Some of these individuals and businesses were coerced and threatened into working for the Government of India. The information collected for the Government of India is then used to target members of the South Asian community.

This evidence was presented directly to Government of India officials, urging their cooperation in stemming the violence and requesting our law enforcement agencies work together to address these issues.

I would like to note that the United States, the U.K., Australia and New Zealand have all urged the Government of India to co-operate with our law enforcement agencies. This is a very serious matter and we all need to stand together to show a united front against any form of foreign interference. There are people out there who want to divide communities, but as leaders here in the House, it is our job as parliamentarians to bring communities together. Four out of the five party leaders represented in this very chamber have either received their security clearance or are in the process of getting it. There is only one party leader who chooses to close his eyes and remain oblivious to foreign interference and continues to refuse to get a security clearance. That is the leader of the Conservative Party of Canada.

The Prime Minister stated, under oath I may add, “I have the names of a number of parliamentarians, former parliamentarians and/or candidates in the Conservative Party of Canada who are engaged, or at high risk of, or for whom there is clear intelligence around foreign interference”.

Is that what the leader of the Conservative Party of Canada is afraid to confront, Canadians being threatened, coerced with violence and even murdered? As a leader, would he not want to know about the risks that impact the safety and security of Canadians? Would he not want to know if someone in his party is engaged in or at risk of foreign interference? Would he not want to stand up for the protection of democracy? These are the important questions being asked by Canadians across the country with respect to the leader of the Conservative Party of Canada. Having a top-level security clearance would allow him to receive classified briefings on foreign interference.

Of Conservative Party voters, 60% said that all leaders, including the Conservative leader, should get a security clearance. He is not even listening to his own party. What is he hiding? He needs to wake up, get his clearance and start taking foreign interference seriously.

I would like to thank the Minister of Public Safety for his commitment to disrupt and counter foreign interference risks. This past June, Bill C-70 received royal assent, bringing a significant update to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, among several other legislative amendments. These amendments enhance Canada's collective resilience and uphold these values that we know are pivotal to maintaining a healthy and strong democracy.

With accountability comes transparency. That is why our government, through the public safety ministry, has established a new Canada foreign influence transparency registry. This registry imposes an obligation on individuals and entities to register their arrangements with any foreign principal and disclose any foreign influence activities in relation to governmental or political processes in Canada. Activities such as communication with a public office holder, communication or dissemination of information to the public by any means, as well as the disbursement of money or items, including providing a service or use of a facility, would result in a registration requirement.

Not reporting can lead to penalties and fines of up to $5 million and up to five years in prison. Although this is a new policy for Canada, other allied countries, such as the United States and Australia, already have foreign registries in place that require those acting on behalf of a foreign state to register their activities. The United Kingdom has also announced its plans to introduce a similar process.

Our government knows that now is not the time to sit back on our heels and wait for things to happen. Now is the time to be proactive in our efforts to ensure that policies and mechanisms we have in place protect Canadians and our institutions. With these measures in place, our government is better able to hold those in positions of influence to account by ensuring that they report on matters of importance regarding foreign principals. As the age-old saying goes, knowledge is power, which is why the proper procedures and policies must be in place so that Canadians are aware and informed.

I, like many of my hon. colleagues, have received a heightened number of emails, calls and letters from constituents who are scared and who are worried about their families and friends. Attending prayer, gathering with loved ones or attending community events should not be coupled with worrying about one's safety or the fear of being a target. Canadians have the right to express their religious beliefs, thoughts and ideas freely, without fear of persecution, without inciting any type of violence or hate.

I hope that what I have spoken to today can provide my constituents and all Canadians with reassurance that our government will always uphold their rights and freedoms and impose serious consequences on anyone who decides to infringe upon them.

I also want to take this opportunity to thank the Peel Regional Police and all of the law enforcement agencies across our country who have been vital in keeping our communities safe. Their bravery, dedication and unwavering response to answer the call of duty should be recognized and commended.

No matter what our political stripes are, I know that all members of the House can agree upon condemning any acts of foreign interference. In the essence of unity, I know that we will continue to stand together in the pursuit of justice. As the RCMP's investigation continues, maintaining a united front is paramount, and any act that impedes the pursuit of justice will not be tolerated.

I close today by saying that whether we are Buddhist, Catholic, Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Sikh or agnostic, at the end of the day, we are all Canadians. As Canadians, regardless of our political leanings, we need to continue to stand together against foreign interference that targets our communities, that wants to divide our communities, that wants to instill fear in our communities. We are united as Canadians. Let us continue looking out for each other and lean on each other, because that is what Canadians do.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Madam Speaker, I think I will be lucky. I think this is the fifth time that I am asking a member of the Liberal Party this question. What is more, I get along fairly well with my colleague who just gave an excellent speech. We have the good fortune of being able to serve together on the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, and we work really well together. It is the only subcommittee that operates by consensus and where no voting takes place. Perhaps it would do the House some good to look at how this subcommittee operates.

I will ask him the question because I know that he will answer me. Can he explain to me why, despite the fact that a motion was adopted in the House on November 18, 2020, calling on the government to create a foreign agent registry, the government waited until March 2023 before beginning the public consultations that led to the drafting of Bill C-70, which was passed in 2024? Can my colleague tell me why the government took three years to begin consultations after the motion was adopted in November 2020?