Bill C-70

Countering Foreign Interference Act

An Act respecting countering foreign interference

Part 1 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Act to, among other things,
(a) update provisions respecting the collection, retention, querying and exploitation of datatsets;
(b) clarify the scope of section 16 of that Act;
(c) update provisions respecting the disclosure of information by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(d) provide for preservation orders and production orders as well as warrants to obtain information, records, documents or things through a single attempt;
(e) expand the circumstances in which a warrant to remove a thing from the place where it was installed may be issued; and
(f) require a parliamentary review of that Act every five years.
It also makes a consequential amendment to the Intelligence Commissioner Act .
Part 2 amends the Security of Information Act to, among other things, create the following offences:
(a) committing an indictable offence at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with a foreign entity;
(b) knowingly engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State or being reckless as to whether the conduct is likely to harm Canadian interests; and
(c) engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct, at the direction of or in association with a foreign entity, with the intent to influence, among other things, the exercise of a democratic right in Canada.
It also amends that Act to remove as an element of the offence of inducing or attempting to induce — at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity or terrorist group — by intimidation, threat or violence, a person to do anything or cause anything to be done, that the thing be done for the purpose of harming Canadian interests when the person who is alleged to have committed the offence or the victim has a link to Canada.
It also amends the Criminal Code to, among other things, broaden the scope of the sabotage offence to include certain acts done in relation to essential infrastructures and ensure that certain provisions respecting the interception of “private communications” as defined in that Act apply to certain offences in the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act .
Finally, it makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 amends the Canada Evidence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts to, among other things,
(a) create a general scheme to deal with information relating to international relations, national defence or national security in the course of proceedings that are in the Federal Court or the Federal Court of Appeal and that are in respect of any decision of a federal board, commission or other tribunal;
(b) permit the appointment of a special counsel for the purposes of protecting the interests of a non-governmental party to those proceedings in respect of such information; and
(c) allow a person charged with an offence to appeal a decision, made under the Canada Evidence Act with respect to the disclosure of certain information in relation to criminal proceedings, only after the person has been convicted of the offence, unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying an earlier appeal.
It also adds references to international relations, national defence and national security in a provision of the Criminal Code that relates to the protection of information, as well as references to international relations and national defence in certain provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that equally relate to the protection of information.
Part 4 enacts the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act which, among other things,
(a) provides for the appointment of an individual to be known as the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner;
(b) requires certain persons to provide the Commissioner with certain information if they enter into arrangements with foreign principals under which they undertake to carry out certain activities in relation to political or governmental processes in Canada;
(c) requires the Commissioner to establish and maintain a publicly accessible registry that contains information about those arrangements;
(d) provides the Commissioner with tools to administer and enforce that Act; and
(e) amends the Public Service Superannuation Act , the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act .

Countering Foreign Interference Act

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety]

moved that Bill C‑70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to have the opportunity to rise in the House today to speak to Bill C‑70, which will enable the government to take other measures against the growing threat of foreign interference.

The countering foreign interference act will strengthen the government's ability to detect and disrupt foreign interference and to better protect all Canadians against the threats posed by hostile states. As an open and free democracy, Canada has long been the target of hostile states that are seeking to obtain Canadian intelligence to defend or advance their own interests. Foreign interference is a deliberate attempt to undermine the fundamental values and freedoms that we cherish as Canadians and that are at the very core of our free and open society. By so doing, hostile states seek to promote their national interests to the detriment of our own.

Today, foreign interference poses one of the most important threats to our Canadian way of life, our economic prosperity, our national security and our sovereignty. As stated by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, “foreign interference threatens the fundamental values of our country” and our national security.

Over the years, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service has observed and investigated multiple instances of foreign states targeting Canada and Canadian interests. We know that foreign states target our country using any means possible. This includes, of course, human intelligence operations, state-sponsored or foreign-influenced media and sophisticated cyber-attacks to name just a few. These hostile actors also engage in other activities, such as spreading misinformation and disinformation to undermine public confidence in public institutions, in mainstream media or in electoral processes. How do they accomplish this? They do so by cultivating witting or, in some cases, unwitting individuals to assist them. This not only helps to achieve their aims, but also enables foreign states to operate with plausible deniability on Canadian soil.

We have also heard this recently at the public hearings of the Hogue commission, the Foreign Interference Commission, which was set up with the support of all recognized parties in the House. We heard from witnesses that some foreign state actors monitor, intimidate and harass diaspora communities in Canada. They attempt to silence dissidents and to promote narratives that are favourable to their own autocratic regimes. Members from diaspora communities testified that either they have directly experienced, or they know others who have experienced, the effects of foreign interference. This includes threats to them or to their families back home.

While traditional interference in human intelligence operations remains the greatest danger to Canada, interference through hostile cyber activities is of growing concern.

Thanks to the work of the security and intelligence community, we know that an increasing number of states have built and deployed programs dedicated to online influence as part of their day-to-day operations. For example, the 2022 CSIS public report indicates that foreign states “exploit social media to influence their intended targets. For example, state actors leverage it as a means to spread disinformation, divide public opinion and generally interfere in healthy public debate and [public] discourse.”

Some foreign states are using these malicious activities to try and delegitimize the concept of democracy and other values that may run counter to their own ideological views.

These are fundamental values that we hold dear as Canadians and, of course, as parliamentarians.

Through their various attempts to influence Canadian elections and opinions, these hostile states seek to bias our policy development and our decision-making. In so doing, they also seek to divide Canadians and to sow discord in Canadian society. As parliamentarians, we all know that we are vulnerable to these very attempts as well.

As we have heard during many debates in the House on this topic, foreign interference is a non-partisan issue that is of deep concern to all parliamentarians. Indeed, foreign interference is a cross-cutting issue for all members of the House, not simply as parliamentarians, but as Canadians, and I want to thank the many colleagues in the House who have worked with me and who have talked to me about how we can collaborate, not only on this legislation, I hope, but on other issues as well that would strengthen our democracy and the ability of our security and intelligence agencies to protect Canadians.

These activities threaten the integrity of our political systems, democratic processes and social cohesion. While the threat of foreign interference is not new, these activities have increased in recent years, and as we know, all too well, they continue to grow. The former national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister, Jody Thomas, said, “We cannot paint an overly optimistic picture. Things change. Tools and methods change. Our adversaries adapt quickly and find innovative ways to interfere in our affairs”.

With a quickly changing landscape, we must ensure that Canada is in a position to keep up with those who wish us harm, and we must ensure that we can hold accountable those individuals who threaten Canada, our national security or Canadian sovereignty.

All the examples I have given today show that this is a matter of the utmost urgency.

For all these reasons, I am pleased to rise to speak to Bill C‑70, an act respecting countering foreign interference for the first time. This new legislation will enable us to further strengthen Canada's tool kit against foreign interference. Combatting this threat while defending Canada's interests, values and principles is a top priority for our government and, I believe, for all parliamentarians. Transparency is a top priority in our government's approach to combatting foreign interference.

To further increase transparency, this legislation would create a foreign influence transparency registry. Through this registry, all individuals or entities who enter into an arrangement with a foreign principle and who undertake activities to influence a government or political process in Canada would be required to publicly register these activities. By registering, individuals and entities would be more transparent about their connections to foreign states, and this would obviously support Canada's national security objectives.

The goal of a foreign registry would be to promote transparency from all people who advocate on behalf of a foreign government or entity as well as accountability from those who would seek to do so in a non-transparent or clandestine way. Under Bill C-70, the government proposes to have Canada's registry overseen by an independent foreign influence transparency commissioner. This commissioner would be responsible for independently administering and promoting compliance with the act.

Foreign interference is a complex national security threat that requires a multi-faceted response.

We recognize that the registry is just one more tool to help Canada adopt an approach to combat this interference. A foreign influence registry would build on our government's long-standing and ongoing efforts to protect our democratic institutions from this threat.

CSIS continues to investigate threats and to advise the government on appropriate actions. Many members here today have benefited from briefings from CSIS officials, which continue to be held with different caucuses, both in this place and in the Senate. These briefings are delivered to all parties at the federal level, and we are working with provincial and municipal orders of government to ensure that the best practices and defensive postures can also be adopted by these legislators as well. The RCMP continues to play an important and effective role in investigating criminal offences related to foreign interference, including those targeting democratic institutions.

To equip CSIS to combat emerging global threats and to keep pace with technological developments, further investments in intelligence capabilities and infrastructure are also being made. Budget 2024 proposes to provide $655 million over eight years, and $114 million ongoing, to CSIS to enhance its intelligence capabilities. The previous year's budget, budget 2023, also provided almost $50 million to the RCMP to protect Canadians from harassment and intimidation by foreign actors, to increase its investigative capacity and to co-operate more proactively with communities that are obviously at the risk of being targeted.

I have a lot of confidence in the work that the RCMP and CSIS do with their partners across the country, but I think we can all do more to continue to support these brave women and men who serve our country in this important way. We have also made investments of $5.5 million to build capacity in civil society partners to prevent disinformation, to promote democratic resilience and to raise awareness about foreign interference.

Bill C-70 is the result of consultations with Canadians. Obviously, that includes community organizations, diaspora communities, academics, the private sector, indigenous governments and provincial and territorial stakeholders.

One of the key themes emerging from these consultations was that a registry is no panacea. It has to combine other initiatives that strengthen Canada's response to foreign interference.

For example, targeted amendments to the CSIS Act would better equip the Government of Canada to build resilience and to counter modern threats that Canada and Canadians face. The CSIS Act was enacted in 1984 at a time when the prolific use and the expansion of technology may have meant someone had two fax machines: one for incoming faxes and one to send faxes. Today, digital technologies are part of every aspect of our lives and the critical infrastructure of our country. CSIS must be able to operate in a digital world that is constantly and rapidly changing.

This legislation would also increase CSIS's ability to be more agile and effective in investigations by introducing tailored warrants for specific investigative techniques. It would also enhance CSIS's capacity to collect and to use datasets. Among other changes, it would enable a broader disclosure of CSIS information to key partners outside the Government of Canada. With the appropriate safeguards, this information would help our partners, provincial governments, universities and the private sector to build resilience to emerging national security threats.

It is important to underscore that these legislative amendments would continue to respect Canadians' fundamental rights and freedoms, with strong review, oversight and transparency measures still in place and unchanged. Judicial oversight remains unchanged, including for all new authorities that we are asking Parliament to consider. These proposals have been developed while also considering the high expectation of privacy that the people of Canada properly have, including respecting all of their protections under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians also play an important role in the activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Some activities, like dataset collection and retention, are subject to review and approval by the intelligence commissioner as well.

While Canada may be no stranger to foreign interference, Canadians can rest assured that our government is using every tool at its disposal at every opportunity to protect them.

The government remains committed to enhancing a whole-of-society resilience against malicious foreign interference and hostile foreign state actors. We will do so through continued transparency and by upholding the confidence of Canadians in our democratic institutions.

This is, I hope, a moment when the House and our colleagues in the other place can come together to work in a non-partisan, constructive way to reinforce the legislative instruments that the national security agency should have to properly protect the national security of Canadians and to detect, disrupt and defeat attempts at foreign interference.

We think that the legislation would benefit from, obviously, the study in a committee of the House and in the other place. I have said to colleagues on both sides of the aisle here who have talked to me that we would work collaboratively with colleagues in terms of amendments that might strengthen the legislation. Canadians, I think, are expecting us to act in the national interest. It is certainly our intention to work in an collaborative way with all parties in the House and our colleagues in the other place to see whether we can take a significant step forward in terms of modernizing the legislative tool kit to counter foreign interference.

We are moving forward with clear hindsight and a clear-eyed view of the road ahead. I look forward to the debate in the House and the discussion in committee. I look forward to working, obviously, with all those who are interested, in a constructive and positive way, so that we can reinforce national security institutions.

I will conclude by saying that it has been, for me, as the public safety minister, an extraordinary privilege to see the remarkable work done by the women and men who currently serve in CSIS, who work for the RCMP, who work at the public safety department and who work at the border services agency. These are agencies that are focused on national security and the security of Canadians.

They are doing very effective work to detect and disrupt foreign interference. They have worked with our government and will be happy to work with parliamentarians, of course, if there are ways that we can modernize and strengthen the legislative instruments that govern their important work. I think that today's discussion is an important start of that process.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Mr. Speaker, part 2 of the bill would amend the Criminal Code to broaden the scope of the sabotage offence to include essential infrastructure such as transportation, information and telecommunication technology, water and waste water, energy, utilities, health care, food supply, government operations and financial infrastructure.

My simple question for the minister is this: Does the definition of essential infrastructure include, in his view, the construction of essential infrastructure?

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for focusing on what we think is also an important element, strengthening the Criminal Code provisions, as he properly noted, around sabotage. We are obviously conscious of the fact that with respect to lawful and peaceful protests, there has to be an intent to harm as part of the criminal amendment we are suggesting.

From my perspective, if the attempt in the particular amendment is to strengthen protections for critical infrastructure, the building of that critical infrastructure, which is always a source of concern for national security institutions, should also properly be protected. I would be happy to work with the committee, should this legislation make it to committee, to find the right way to define that in the appropriate context.

[Martin Champoux, Bloc, Drummond, QC]

Mr. Speaker, the Bloc Québécois is in favour of sending Bill C‑70 to committee.

I heard the minister talk in his speech about the broad consultations with Canadians on this issue and his intention to work in a very inclusive manner with the opposition parties in the House. My colleague from Trois-Rivières introduced a similar bill to protect Quebec and Canada from foreign interference. There are two things that I feel are particularly important and should be included in Bill C‑70.

One of them is that public office holders should not be allowed to work for a foreign government after they leave office, especially if their new job is to influence decision-makers on site. I wonder why that is not in the current bill.

The other thing we feel is very important and would be very interesting to debate in committee is two-party registration. Foreign agents must disclose their contact with public office holders in Canada. Should Canadian public office holders not also have to disclose their contact and relationships with foreign agents in the course of their duties?

I would like to hear the minister's opinion as to whether there are any amendments he would be open to supporting if the bill goes to committee.

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the member for Drummond, and I commend him and our Bloc Québécois colleagues for being open to working with the government to send the bill to committee so that we can look into exactly the kinds of issues that my colleague raised. Obviously, we took note of the bill introduced by our colleague from Trois-Rivières.

It seems perfectly reasonable to me to find a way to ensure that public office holders abide by the requirements set out in the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Sector and the Conflict of Interest Act after they leave office. We need to look at whether we can expand on that and cover working for foreign states.

However, it is important to note that many current public office holders, as part of their official duties, have completely appropriate relationships with the diplomatic corps, those who are accredited to Canada and who represent foreign countries.

I am no expert when it comes to finding the right balance so that foreign diplomats, who are accredited to serve their country in Canada, are able to do their work and so that government can have these types of international relationships, while increasing transparency when it comes to agents of foreign entities. I would be very open to examining this issue with our colleagues in committee at the right time. I am assuming and hoping that this bill will be sent to committee, where we can find the best way to resolve these completely appropriate issues raised by the member for Drummond.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to let the minister know that the NDP will be supporting the bill at second reading. In fact, the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security unanimously agreed to start a prestudy of the bill tomorrow morning because we do want to get important work under way.

I want to note a couple of things. First, the amendments to the CSIS Act, especially with respect to the dataset regime, follow a fairly scathing National Security and Intelligence Review Agency report that had found that CSIS had repeatedly breached the statutory authorities given to it with respect to handling datasets. Therefore, again, it is good to see legislation bringing analog laws up to speed in a digital age.

Second, I totally agree that foreign interference is very real. In fact, it has affected members of our caucus. That is publicly known and is something that we have to watch out for not only at the federal level but also at the provincial level and, indeed, at the municipal and indigenous levels.

Creating a registry is one thing, but I can only surmise that in Canada, as elsewhere in the world, there are serious clandestine efforts under way to do this kind of interference. I know that the actors are not going to be paying attention to a registry. Under existing laws, what success has Canada had, both in terms of charges and convictions against actors who are going to completely ignore this type of registry? We want to make sure that we are being effective on the whole spectrum of dealing with the problem.

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

Mr. Speaker, I salute the committee's decision to do a prestudy. We think that is very positive and will help our colleagues on the committee be able to judge what amendments are appropriate and how to deal with what is a series of complex legislative amendments.

I certainly share the concern of our colleague from the NDP around the appropriate handling of the datasets to move a national security institution from an analog era to a digital era. That obviously comes with the required and appropriate safeguards that need to be increased. They need to be understood and applied by CSIS at all times. I am happy to work with the service and with colleagues in this place to make sure the understandable concern around the appropriate handling of the data, and the privacy rights of Canadians in particular, is respected.

I am glad the member acknowledged that members of the House from all caucuses have themselves been targeted or affected by foreign interference, and it is a source of concern for every member of the House.

I also note his question around clandestine work. It goes without saying that some people are prepared to take injurious actions against the national security of our country. Some of the briefings I have from CSIS officials give me perhaps a unique perspective, or a perspective that not many people can have, about the nature of the threat some of the hostile state actors present to the security of our country. Therefore, I take his comments around their desire to comply with a registry with the seriousness in which he made them. The committee may have reflections on how the penalties might be strengthened. We think they are significant and severe, but we, again, will work with parliamentarians in this regard.

The member's comments around how we disrupt and ultimately prosecute some of the very hostile, threatening actors who may be operating in Canada today are ones every government has struggled with. The ability to take intelligence information and turn it into evidence in a criminal trial is something Five Eyes partners struggle with. I have had those conversations with our colleagues from the Five Eyes community.

We are always looking at ways the RCMP, which would have the investigative authority in terms of criminal activity in Canada, is able to work with its partners. However, often the very intelligence information CSIS would get from partners comes with caveats; therefore, the ability to turn it into a criminal prosecution remains a challenge, but we are very much focused on what we can do in that regard as well.

[The Deputy Speaker, Chris d'Entremont]

It is my duty pursuant to Standing Order 38 to inform the House that the questions to be raised tonight at the time of adjournment are as follows: the hon. member for Lanark—Frontenac—Kingston, Correctional Service of Canada; the hon. member for Spadina—Fort York, Diversity and Inclusion; the hon. member for Victoria, Oil and Gas Industry.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I believe if you seek it, you will find unanimous consent for me to split my time with the member for St. Albert—Edmonton.

[The Deputy Speaker, Chris d'Entremont]

Is it agreed?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Mr. Speaker, Canadians expect their institutions to protect them from the malign threat activities of authoritarian states. Canadians expect the whole of the Government of Canada, including its intelligence agencies and law enforcement, to protect our elections and democratic institutions from the coercive, clandestine and corrupt foreign interference threat activities of authoritarian states. That is what Canadians expect, and that is why Canadians were so shocked when the extent of foreign interference in our democracy was revealed to Parliament and to the public.

Justice Hogue, who was leading the foreign interference public inquiry, concluded in the inquiry's initial report that “interference occurred in the last two general elections” and became so serious that it “diminished the ability of some voters to cast an informed vote”. She also concluded that foreign interference had a negative impact on the broader electoral ecosystem in the 2019 and 2021 elections, and that it undermined public confidence in Canadian democracy.

The government was slow to act on the advice from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and other national security bodies, who had identified these threatening activities years ago, before the two general elections that followed.

The Prime Minister was first warned in 2018 by the director of CSIS of the existential threat from foreign interference threat activities of the People's Republic of China here in Canada. National security agencies advised the government to introduce a range of measures to counter these threats, including legislation. It took years for the government to introduce Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference, but finally it has been introduced. Let me outline our views on this bill.

The bill is divided into four parts. Part 1 proposes amendments to the CSIS Act. These amendments are the most significant changes to the act in decades. As my hon. colleague, the minister, pointed out, the CSIS Act was introduced in 1984, just after disco but before the introduction of the Internet, social media, smart phones and many other technologies. The amendments would allow CSIS to obtain preservation and production orders as well as warrants to obtain information, records or documents through a single attempt. They would allow CSIS to better collect, retain and analyze data for intelligence purposes. They would allow CSIS to collect foreign intelligence for the first time and would allow CSIS to disclose classified information outside of the government, to provinces, municipalities, universities and companies.

Part 2 would amend the Security of Information Act and the Criminal Code to create new foreign interference offences. The bill would create a new offence of up to life in prison for a person who commits any indictable offence under the Criminal Code or under any other act of Parliament at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity. The bill would also create new offences for a person who engages in clandestine activities at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity that is prejudicial to the safety or interests of Canada or to influence the exercise of a democratic right in Canada.

The bill facilitates foreign interference proceedings by eliminating the need for the Crown to demonstrate that the purpose of the foreign interference is to harm Canadian interests if the person who committed the offence or the victim has a link to Canada.

Finally, part 2 would amend the Criminal Code to broaden the offence of sabotage to include sabotage against essential infrastructure, which is defined as transportation, information and communication technology, water and waste water, energy and utilities, health care, food supply, government operations and financial infrastructure. Sabotage is defined as anyone who “interferes with access to essential infrastructure” or anyone who “causes an essential infrastructure to be lost, inoperable, unsafe or unfit for use” with the intent to “endanger the safety, security or defence of Canada” or the armed forces of an ally in Canada, or to cause “serious risk to the health or safety of the public”. As the minister pointed out earlier, the minister's view is that essential infrastructure includes the construction of essential infrastructure.

The sabotage offence provided for in the bill is punishable by up to 10 years in prison, and for greater certainty, part 2 makes it clear that it exempts legal advocacy, protest or dissent that does not intend to cause harm.

Part 3 would amend the Canada Evidence Act and would make consequential amendments to other acts to create a general scheme to deal with information related to foreign affairs, national defence or national security in Federal Court proceedings. It proposes amendments that would permit the appointment of a special counsel to protect the interests of non-governmental parties in those proceedings.

The fourth and final part of the bill would establish the foreign influence transparency and accountability act, which creates a foreign influence registry and a new foreign influence transparency commissioner. Any person under the direction of or in association with a foreign state or foreign government, or any entity controlled by that state or government, and who communicates with a public office holder, who communicates or disseminates information to the public about political or governmental processes, or who distributes money or items of value, or provides a service or the use of a facility, must register.

The bill would create an indictable offence of up to five years in prison and up to $5 million in administrative monetary penalties for failing to register, for providing false or misleading information to the commissioner or for obstructing the commissioner's work. These are tough penalties for failing to register, and they will have a deterring effect on those thinking about acting on behalf of a foreign state or a foreign-controlled entity in a corrupt, coercive and clandestine manner.

For those who do act in such a manner and, as I expect, do not register, tools are available to law enforcement and other enforcement entities, such as the commissioner, to hold these individuals accountable for their activities, either through the new administrative monetary penalties of up to $5 million, which have a much lower threshold for use, or through a referral to the appropriate police of jurisdiction for criminal prosecution.

The new foreign influence transparency commissioner would oversee a public registry containing information on individuals engaged in influence activities on behalf of a foreign principal. The act provides that the commissioner is to provide reports to the public safety minister and Parliament. The commissioner is appointed by Governor in Council, effectively by the Prime Minister, after consultations with the leaders of the House of Commons and Senate. However, ultimately the decision to appoint the commissioner is a decision of the Prime Minister's alone.

In principle, we support Bill C-70. Now that it has finally been introduced, the government, the official opposition and other recognized parties in this House must work together to ensure that our democratic institutions and elections are protected from the threats of authoritarian states. Inaction and delay cannot continue. As Justice Hogue noted, the risk from the impacts of foreign interference will only increase as long as “sufficient protective measures to guard against it” are not taken.

As our general election draws closer and as the life of this Parliament draws to an end, time is running out to strengthen the confidence Canadians have in our elections through legislation.

That is why the Conservatives are proposing to work with the government and the other parties in the House to fast-track the adoption of Bill C‑70 in the House of Commons and in committee, leaving enough time to implement foreign interference protection measures before the election.

Conservatives will work in good faith to ensure the rapid progress of Bill C-70 through the House while ensuring sufficient scrutiny of its provisions. We are willing to consider amendments to the bill, but we want it to pass.

The government has often asked the official opposition to work with it, and this is an instance in which we will.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, it is nice, and I am encouraged to hear, that the official opposition sees the merit of this bill. As the government and the minister have stated on many occasions, foreign interference is something we should all be concerned about. We are far more effective if we can act as one in many different ways.

I understand the member has not had the legislation for long, but does he have a sense of any amendments that he could see being made to the legislation or, on the whole, to the principles of the legislation, which he is quite prepared to see pass relatively quickly?

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I note that part 4 of the bill provides for the creation of a commissioner. That commissioner would be situated within the machinery of government, within the Department of Public Safety Canada, and would be appointed at the advice of the Prime Minister. An amendment that would perhaps strengthen the independence of that office would be to appoint the commissioner after the Prime Minister has consulted with leaders of the recognized parties in the House of Commons and the Senate and after resolutions have been adopted by both the House and Senate. Perhaps that amendment would strengthen the independence of the office.

[Monique Pauzé, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his heartfelt speech, considering that he was the victim of interference or threats. It was a very interesting speech.

The bill will definitely be improved in committee. The Bloc Québécois had introduced a bill to improve the process. It included the principle of two-party registration. We also wanted the registry to include universities. Finally, it prohibited former public office holders from working on behalf of a foreign state for three years.

Does the member think these are worthwhile measures that would strengthen democracy and the security of our elections?