Dominic LeBlanc Liberal
This bill has received Royal Assent and is, or will soon become, law.
This is from the published bill.
Part 1 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Act to, among other things,
(a) update provisions respecting the collection, retention, querying and exploitation of datatsets;
(b) clarify the scope of section 16 of that Act;
(c) update provisions respecting the disclosure of information by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(d) provide for preservation orders and production orders as well as warrants to obtain information, records, documents or things through a single attempt;
(e) expand the circumstances in which a warrant to remove a thing from the place where it was installed may be issued; and
(f) require a parliamentary review of that Act every five years.
It also makes a consequential amendment to the Intelligence Commissioner Act .
Part 2 amends the Security of Information Act to, among other things, create the following offences:
(a) committing an indictable offence at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with a foreign entity;
(b) knowingly engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State or being reckless as to whether the conduct is likely to harm Canadian interests; and
(c) engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct, at the direction of or in association with a foreign entity, with the intent to influence, among other things, the exercise of a democratic right in Canada.
It also amends that Act to remove as an element of the offence of inducing or attempting to induce — at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity or terrorist group — by intimidation, threat or violence, a person to do anything or cause anything to be done, that the thing be done for the purpose of harming Canadian interests when the person who is alleged to have committed the offence or the victim has a link to Canada.
It also amends the Criminal Code to, among other things, broaden the scope of the sabotage offence to include certain acts done in relation to essential infrastructures and ensure that certain provisions respecting the interception of “private communications” as defined in that Act apply to certain offences in the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act .
Finally, it makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 amends the Canada Evidence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts to, among other things,
(a) create a general scheme to deal with information relating to international relations, national defence or national security in the course of proceedings that are in the Federal Court or the Federal Court of Appeal and that are in respect of any decision of a federal board, commission or other tribunal;
(b) permit the appointment of a special counsel for the purposes of protecting the interests of a non-governmental party to those proceedings in respect of such information; and
(c) allow a person charged with an offence to appeal a decision, made under the Canada Evidence Act with respect to the disclosure of certain information in relation to criminal proceedings, only after the person has been convicted of the offence, unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying an earlier appeal.
It also adds references to international relations, national defence and national security in a provision of the Criminal Code that relates to the protection of information, as well as references to international relations and national defence in certain provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that equally relate to the protection of information.
Part 4 enacts the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act which, among other things,
(a) provides for the appointment of an individual to be known as the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner;
(b) requires certain persons to provide the Commissioner with certain information if they enter into arrangements with foreign principals under which they undertake to carry out certain activities in relation to political or governmental processes in Canada;
(c) requires the Commissioner to establish and maintain a publicly accessible registry that contains information about those arrangements;
(d) provides the Commissioner with tools to administer and enforce that Act; and
(e) amends the Public Service Superannuation Act , the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act .
All sorts of information on this bill is available at LEGISinfo, an excellent resource from the Library of Parliament. You can also read the full text of the bill.
Dominic LeBlanc LiberalMinister of Public Safety
Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from La Prairie for his question and for his contribution to the implementation of the Hogue commission. I would also like to thank him, his party and all the other partners for the important work being done today to support Bill C-70, for example. This bill will strengthen our national security institutions and our collective ability to recognize and counter foreign interference. For that, I sincerely thank him.
Alistair MacGregor NDP Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC
Thank you, Chair.
I'll read it into the record officially. I move:
That, in relation to its study of Bill S-210, An Act to restrict young persons' online access to sexually explicit material, and pursuant to Standing Order 97.1(1), the committee request the approval of the House for a 30-sitting-day extension in order to properly and adequately study the bill, hear from witnesses, and conduct clause-by-clause consideration of the bill with amendments, before it is otherwise deemed reported back to the House without amendment on June 7, 2024.
I'll be very brief here, Mr. Chair. This is a simple housekeeping motion. If we get to June 7, this bill will be deemed reported back to the House. I think it would be a dereliction of duty for us to not study the bill and hear from additional witnesses.
I'm not going to speak any further on this motion. I have canvassed the room. I believe the majority of this committee is willing to vote, and vote in the affirmative, on this motion. I'd appreciate it if we could keep our remarks to a minimum and arrive at a quick vote so that we can then proceed with the business of Bill C-70 for the remainder of the week.
Thank you.
René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Stanton, in your opinion, would the passage of Bill C‑70 have prevented the situation that occurred at the National Microbiology Laboratory located in Winnipeg?
Associate Professor, Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
It's a good question, and I have to admit, in all humility, that it's not an aspect I understand well. So I don't have a firm position, either for or against. I think I'd need more details on how the process works.
I know you put this question last week to officials from the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness during a meeting of this committee, and their response referred to the workload it would involve.
As I said, I don't understand this specific issue well enough to take a position and say I'm for or against it. However, I must still express some sympathy, in general, for the answer they gave you, insofar as this department, like the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, like other departments or community agencies, suffers from a serious lack of human, financial and other resources, and not only in terms of their powers; this is what Bill C‑70 will improve, in part.
Any new initiative, such as Bill C‑70, and particularly this notion of dual registration, implies an additional burden, and it's a very real problem.
In general, I'd like to point out to the committee that this issue of resources is a major problem.
I think that's the hope. I think one thing that's saddened me a bit in the last few years, with all the talk on foreign interference in committees and media and things like that, is that some Canadians are going to start profiling communities, which is fundamentally wrong.
I think that's why the more education we have, the more we're talking, and the more we have things like this initiative, Bill C-70, and the reviews we've had, the less likely we are to see stereotyping and profiling. We've now had, I think, five commissions or inquiries related to national security, and Canadians are actually learning more about it.
That has always been my concern. That's part of the reason I speak out publicly on this. I don't want Canadians to think , because of what we're hearing through the media, that a particular group or community is in any way of questionable loyalty or reliability.
Sukh Dhaliwal Liberal Surrey—Newton, BC
In your opinion, do you believe that Bill C-70 does enough to ensure that the diaspora communities are not stigmatized and victimized by the efforts to combat foreign interference?
Sukh Dhaliwal Liberal Surrey—Newton, BC
It's my understanding that agents of foreign governments may have played through a chain of command. It may be very difficult to trace that chain of command to individuals abroad. Does Bill C-70 do enough to address and deter foreign interference and to penalize those who are not in Canada but overseas, or would we do something to do that?
Sukh Dhaliwal Liberal Surrey—Newton, BC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to thank the witnesses for appearing today on this very important matter.
My questions will be for Mr. Stanton.
Mr. Stanton, following the tragic killing of Mr. Hardeep Singh Nijjar—a Canadian on Canadian soil, my constituent—at a place of worship in my riding of Surrey—Newton, I introduced a private member's motion, M-112, for the government to take action to deal with foreign interference, whether it's intimidation, violence or interference that they create.
Following that, the government brought in Bill C-70 to combat foreign interference. It is clear that there have been, and likely currently are, agents in Canada working on behalf of foreign states in order to undermine our sovereignty and our democratic institutions.
Do you believe that the amendments to the Criminal Code and the Security of Information Act will sufficiently address concerns related to transnational threats and violence to Canadians? If not, what else can be done?
Daniel Stanton Former Operations Manager, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, As an Individual
Thank you, Chair. Good afternoon, committee members.
I'm going to talk about the disclosure of intelligence, the new regime that's proposed in Bill C-70, as well as the criminalization of foreign intelligence. I'm going to echo in some ways Thomas Juneau's remarks with respect to transparency, and I do confess we didn't have time to collaborate on this. It's purely coincidental.
The proposal to amend section 19 of the CSIS Act is going to amplify the range and scope of disclosures from where they are currently. It is something I had some personal experience with. I was an intelligence officer in CSIS for 32 years and I was seized with the disclosure regime.
The proposal, of course, under the rubric of building resiliency against threats, is that the service may disclose intelligence to those outside federal departments. We're hearing about the private sector. We're hearing about universities, particularly those engaged in sensitive research. We're hearing about other levels of government, including indigenous government bodies as well, and municipal government and law enforcement. A wider orbit is being proposed where intelligence will be shared in the interests of national security.
This is going to be a significant overhaul in terms of both the mandate of CSIS and of national security. I do say that this is way beyond foreign interference. This covers other programs that CSIS collects intelligence on. The government is going to decide in some ways how this intelligence is going to be shared.
Nobody's going to be opening taps and turning on spigots and declassifying information, but I think there's a lot of expectations in various sectors in Canada that this is actually going to be happening. We're still going to have the need-to-know principle. We're still going to have to have people who are security cleared to receive that intelligence. They're going to actually have to have a clearance. They're going to have to have background checks. We're going to have to ensure that this intelligence has the physical and IT protection to safeguard it. You can't have intelligence being provided to new partners and then a week later be reading it on social media.
I'm enthusiastic about it. I think it's going to really enhance the government's more holistic view and assessment of threats. It gives CSIS a lot more leverage as well. Echoing my colleague's remarks, it makes more transparency clearly with government.
The other aspect I wanted to make reference to is the criminalization of foreign intelligence and the measures to counter foreign intelligence. We're talking about clause 50. We're talking about the foreign interference and security of information act for the amendment. I'm very enthusiastic about this. When I testified at a committee a year ago in March, one of the comments I made was that unlike for terrorism and for espionage, there actually is no legislative hammer. There actually are no legal consequences of any significance for enablers of foreign interference. That's changing with this new legislation. I'm very excited about it. This will allow the government to basically prosecute, whether it's transnational repression or whether it's interference in our democratic processes.
I also find it interesting that in this bill there's an extraterritorial application going into this foreign interference and transnational repression. This makes a lot of sense, because CSIS's mandate in security intelligence is not limited to Canada; CSIS works around the world. In many ways this will complement their subsection 2(b) activities in terms of intelligence collection on transnational repression as well as interference in an election so that it can actually be prosecuted.
I'm going to quote specifically. They're saying that “Despite subsection 26(1), a person who commits an act referred to in subsection (1) while outside Canada is deemed to have committed it in Canada if...the victim is in Canada” or if the victim is abroad.
Let's say they're in India or they're in the People's Republic of China; they can still be prosecuted in Canada. There's no sanctuary in the fact that this activity or an aspect of this activity is taking place outside of Canada.
The legislation also calls for the same thing with consequences on influencing political government processes. Proposed subsection 20.4(1) reads:
20.4 (1) Every person commits an indictable offence who, at the direction of, or in association with, a foreign entity, engages in surreptitious or deceptive conduct with the intent to influence a political or governmental process
and continues:
2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable to imprisonment for life.
This is serious. This is what you get with espionage and this is what you get with terrorism. I'm delighted to see this coming into the foreign interference file. The particular SOIA amendments will offer criminal sanctions against clandestine foreign interference designed to benefit a foreign state in actions against the Canadian state, its interests or the exercise of democratic rights. This will open the way to laying foreign interference charges in Canada—something we have not seen and that I think we'd all agree is fairly relevant these days.
Lastly, I want to mention that there have been some adjustments to CSIS authorities in section 16. That's the non-threat-related foreign interference. I'm very enthused about that. I know it's giving CSIS a lot more of a holistic view in terms of the foreign intelligence mandate they have. I know the bill has its limitations, but I would like to see, at some point, the government scrap section 12 and section 16, because it's an anachronistic classification we have from the Cold War. I think this change signifies that the government is recognizing that we don't need collection within Canada of what is considered to be foreign intelligence.
That's it, and thank you.
Dr. Thomas Juneau Associate Professor, Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Today, I'm going to analyze Bill C‑70 from the perspective of transparency.
For three years, I chaired the National Security Transparency Advisory Group, an independent body that advises the deputy minister of Public Safety Canada and the intelligence community.
We produced three reports between 2019 and 2022, one of which focused on relations between security and intelligence agencies and minority communities. This is a relevant topic for the committee. I have stepped down as chair of the group, but am continuing my research into transparency issues.
In general, transparency is a tool that democracies underuse in the fight against their adversaries. More transparency, up to a point, of course, improves our national security. It's not an obstacle, quite the contrary.
In the context of the fight against foreign interference, transparency must occupy a central place. Our first line of defence against interference is often societal resilience. Public trust in institutions is an essential ingredient of this, and transparency is key to building that trust. Transparency is also essential to raise awareness among the public, civil society and the private sector, all of whom have a role to play in the face of the threat of interference. Lack of transparency, a major issue today, undermines our ability to protect ourselves against interference.
In Canada, the situation regarding transparency and national security is much better today than it was 10 or 20 years ago, but we can do much better.
I will address part I of Bill C‑70 on the modernization of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, or CSIS Act.
The first element I'm interested in is enabling CSIS to better communicate with actors outside the federal government. The service is seriously handicapped, given that the targets of foreign interference are often outside the federal government. However, greater transparency is essential in the exercise of these potential new powers. As part of the work of the National Security Transparency Advisory Group, we heard from a number of civil society activists. Mistrust of CSIS remains very high. We must patiently build bridges.
Concretely, what does this mean? Transparency must be practised more broadly. Communication with new partners, particularly in civil society, must be proactive and sustained, not just reactive or passive. This communication will be the result of exercising these new powers. We need to build trust, understand these new partners, and actually pass on information, not just symbolically. After the fact, CSIS must be transparent with Canadians and clearly explain what was done, why it was done, and disclose the results.
It's easy to say, but I recognize that it's very difficult to put into practice. It takes additional resources, which CSIS is sorely lacking at the moment. It also takes a change of culture, without which it will only partially work at best, because CSIS, despite the progress it has made, remains today far too insular an organization.
Bill C‑70 would also confer new powers on CSIS in terms of investigations, data collection and data management. Transparency is essential here, too. We must ensure that the relevant accountability mechanisms are adapted to the new powers. For example, the CSIS annual report should include as much information as possible on the use of these new powers. CSIS could also communicate proactively not only with the public and its partners, notably in civil society and the media, but also with parliamentarians, about the use of these new powers. This is essential, once again, to gain the public's trust and to enable accountability mechanisms to function properly.
Next, Bill C‑70 will also lead to the creation of the position of foreign influence transparency commissioner. Here again, transparency is essential. In concrete terms, the procedures to be followed to register will have to be transparent, clear and simple, and not cumbersome and bureaucratic, including in terms of possible mechanisms for receiving and managing complaints. The National Security Transparency Advisory Group has often heard the criticism, particularly from minority communities, that various mechanisms of this kind are not sufficiently accessible. There will also need to be an important dimension of public education, for example, through newsletters and notices.
Once again, it's much easier said than done. You need the right people with the right skills, authority and mandates. In reality, this isn't always available in Ottawa. All of these elements are essential for the proper functioning of accountability mechanisms, especially to help build awareness and, again, to improve societal resilience.
Finally, it will be essential to review this law every five years to improve and adapt it. In addition, ideally, the review process will include a public and transparent element to satisfy, again, all the societal resilience and awareness objectives, which were mentioned earlier. This commitment must be binding, if possible, and respected.
In the case of Bill C‑59 and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, we passed the five-year period two years ago, and this review has still not taken place, which is very unfortunate.
Thank you for your attention.
The Chair Liberal Ron McKinnon
I call this meeting to order.
Welcome to meeting number 111 of this House of Commons standing committee.
Pursuant to the order of reference referred the committee on Wednesday, May 29, 2024, and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, May 27, 2024, the committee resumes its study of Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference.
Before we begin, I would like to ask all members and other in-person participants to consult the cards on the table for guidelines to prevent audio feedback incidents.
Please take care to note the following preventive measures in place to protect the health and safety of all participants, including the interpreters: Use only the approved black earpiece. The former grey earpieces must no longer be used. Keep your earpiece away from all microphones at all times. When you're not using your earpiece, place it face down on the sticker placed on the table for this purpose.
Thank you all for your co-operation.
Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format.
I'd like to make a few comments for the benefit of members and witnesses. Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking, and I remind you that all comments should be addressed through the chair.
I have some specific comments on BillC-70.
I would like to remind members that amendments to Bill C-70 must be submitted to the clerk of the committee by 4 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Friday, June 7, 2024. It is important for members to note that pursuant to the order adopted by the House on May 30, the 4 p.m. deadline to submit amendments is firm. This means that any amendments submitted to the clerk after the deadline and any amendments moved from the floor during clause-by-clause consideration of the bill will not be considered by the committee.
I would now like to welcome our witnesses for today.
With us we have Mr. Thomas Juneau, associate professor of public and international affairs at the University of Ottawa. We have Mr. Dan Stanton, former manager, Canadian Security Intelligence Service. By video conference, we have Mr. Benjamin Fung, professor and Canada research chair at McGill University. We also have Mr. Javad Soleimani, director, Association of Families of Flight PS752 Victims, also by video conference.
Welcome to you all, and thank you for joining us today. Your interventions will be most helpful to us, I am certain.
I now invite Mr. Juneau to make an opening statement of up to five minutes.
Please go ahead, sir.
Former Chief of the Asia-Pacific Desk, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, As an Individual
We can legislate to make sure that he or she has access to all of the information that is needed for the investigation. That is a sine qua non for the success of their investigation and a deterrent that we want to apply to foreign agents.
Rest assured, foreign interference will not finish with the passing of Bill C-70. It will continue. It has been in place for a long period of time. We dragged our feet for so long now that they have been capable of embedding themselves within all levels of government. It will continue.
My problem is with the execution. Are we giving tools to law enforcement to be capable of working adequately?
That's especially when we have evidence and testimony now that tell us that influence from the higher office has been exercised many times.
Alistair MacGregor NDP Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Shull, I'd like to start with you.
I'm glad you brought up the consistency between SOIA and the new foreign influence transparency and accountability act. When I questioned Department of Justice officials last week, they said, to paraphrase them, that the definitions used in SOIA are within the context of SOIA, and there's a reason for this difference.
It can be confusing because the definition of "public office holder", specifically in part 4, does reference other acts that are more comprehensive.
I guess you're arguing to this committee that, for harmony's sake, SOIA and this act should have the exact same list.
René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC
Thank you very much, Mr. Juneau‑Katsuya.
Mr. Shull, I'll now turn to you.
Earlier, you talked about including municipalities. Could we not also consider including universities and Crown corporations, for example? That's because part I of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act authorizes CSIS to transmit information to universities. However, part 4 of Bill C-70, which concerns the registry, is silent on universities and Crown corporations.
Former Chief of the Asia-Pacific Desk, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, As an Individual
Yes, indeed, and that is where a new culture of national security must be developed, as I mentioned a moment ago. I believe that Bill C-70 is a step in the right direction to begin shaping the operational framework for investigators, who will be able to determine whether there are threats.
In fact, I tip my hat to the government for including educational institutions. That is a very good idea, as they've been the site of the largest theft of intellectual property for decades.