Bill C-70 (Historical)

Countering Foreign Interference Act

An Act respecting countering foreign interference

Part 1 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Act to, among other things,
(a) update provisions respecting the collection, retention, querying and exploitation of datatsets;
(b) clarify the scope of section 16 of that Act;
(c) update provisions respecting the disclosure of information by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(d) provide for preservation orders and production orders as well as warrants to obtain information, records, documents or things through a single attempt;
(e) expand the circumstances in which a warrant to remove a thing from the place where it was installed may be issued; and
(f) require a parliamentary review of that Act every five years.
It also makes a consequential amendment to the Intelligence Commissioner Act .
Part 2 amends the Security of Information Act to, among other things, create the following offences:
(a) committing an indictable offence at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with a foreign entity;
(b) knowingly engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State or being reckless as to whether the conduct is likely to harm Canadian interests; and
(c) engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct, at the direction of or in association with a foreign entity, with the intent to influence, among other things, the exercise of a democratic right in Canada.
It also amends that Act to remove as an element of the offence of inducing or attempting to induce — at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity or terrorist group — by intimidation, threat or violence, a person to do anything or cause anything to be done, that the thing be done for the purpose of harming Canadian interests when the person who is alleged to have committed the offence or the victim has a link to Canada.
It also amends the Criminal Code to, among other things, broaden the scope of the sabotage offence to include certain acts done in relation to essential infrastructures and ensure that certain provisions respecting the interception of “private communications” as defined in that Act apply to certain offences in the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act .
Finally, it makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 amends the Canada Evidence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts to, among other things,
(a) create a general scheme to deal with information relating to international relations, national defence or national security in the course of proceedings that are in the Federal Court or the Federal Court of Appeal and that are in respect of any decision of a federal board, commission or other tribunal;
(b) permit the appointment of a special counsel for the purposes of protecting the interests of a non-governmental party to those proceedings in respect of such information; and
(c) allow a person charged with an offence to appeal a decision, made under the Canada Evidence Act with respect to the disclosure of certain information in relation to criminal proceedings, only after the person has been convicted of the offence, unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying an earlier appeal.
It also adds references to international relations, national defence and national security in a provision of the Criminal Code that relates to the protection of information, as well as references to international relations and national defence in certain provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that equally relate to the protection of information.
Part 4 enacts the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act which, among other things,
(a) provides for the appointment of an individual to be known as the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner;
(b) requires certain persons to provide the Commissioner with certain information if they enter into arrangements with foreign principals under which they undertake to carry out certain activities in relation to political or governmental processes in Canada;
(c) requires the Commissioner to establish and maintain a publicly accessible registry that contains information about those arrangements;
(d) provides the Commissioner with tools to administer and enforce that Act; and
(e) amends the Public Service Superannuation Act , the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act .

Electoral Participation Act

[Vance Badawey, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport]

Madam Speaker, it is a pleasure to speak to Bill C-65 this evening in the House, the electoral participation act. As the title of this bill suggests, one of its key priorities is to encourage participation in the electoral process. We know that democratic engagement rests on trust in our electoral system, and that is why Bill C-65 proposes to enhance safeguarding measures in the Canada Elections Act.

As we all know, Canada's democracy is among the strongest and most stable in the world, thanks in large part to the Canada Elections Act, which is the fundamental legislative framework that regulates our elections in this great nation. We have every reason to be proud of this legislation, but we are not immune to the global challenges that modernized democracies face. The integrity of the electoral process in the lead-up to, during and after elections is a prerequisite for trust in our democracy. This is why it is essential that we continue to address evolving threats to our democracy through regular improvements to the Canada Elections Act. This helps ensure that our system remains robust, resilient and equipped to keep pace with the issues of our time.

It should come as no surprise that safeguarding our elections includes measures to mitigate foreign interference. Foreign interference can take many forms, including social media campaigns designed to sow disinformation. The Communications Security Establishment's latest report highlights that online foreign influence activities have become a new normal, with adversaries increasingly seeking to influence our elections. We and all Canadians have a right to be concerned about these threats. This is why the government has been proactive in taking steps to counter foreign interference.

Our government's work to protect our democracy began as early as 2016, when we tabled Bill C-22. It led to the creation of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, a committee that assembles members from both chambers of Parliament to review matters concerning national security and intelligence.

In 2018, the government put forward Bill C-59, which enacted the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, giving the agency the mandate to review and investigate all Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities. That same year, we also introduced Bill C-76, which modernized the Canada Elections Act and introduced a number of prohibitions, including a prohibition preventing foreigners from unduly influencing electors, a prohibition against foreign third parties from spending on election-related activities and a prohibition against third parties from using any foreign funds.

In 2019, we put in place the plan to protect Canada's democracy, which included the security and intelligence threats to elections, or SITE, task force. The plan was subsequently updated in advance of the 2021 general election.

Most recently, we introduced Bill C-70, the countering foreign interference act, which complements measures to further safeguard our federal elections and mitigate foreign influence in Bill C-65, which I am speaking to today. Finally, last September, our government launched the public inquiry into foreign interference. We look forward to receiving the commissioner's final report as well as recommendations.

These substantial government-wide initiatives demonstrate this government's commitment to remaining vigilant in our efforts to protect our electoral system. This commitment is further reflected in the safeguarding measures proposed through Bill C-65. I would like to highlight how this bill proposes to better protect our elections from foreign influence, disinformation campaigns and the misuse of technology, all of which seek to erode trust in our institutions. We do this so that Canadians can feel safe and confident when participating in our democracy.

First, we know that election interference can happen at all times and not just during elections. This is why Bill C-65 proposes to extend the application of the existing ban on undue foreign influence at all times, rather than being limited to the election period. This means, for example, that the ban on foreign entities unduly influencing voters to vote a certain way or influencing them to refrain from voting would extend to all times.

Second, Bill C-65 would create a clearer and more consistent definition of foreign entity activities under the act to close any and all gaps. For example, currently foreign entities can circumvent the law by having more than one purpose, where the ban on undue influence is limited to a foreign entity whose only purpose is to unduly influence voters. That would no longer be possible under Bill C-65. The bill proposes that foreign entities who have even just one of their primary activities as unduly influencing electors would be captured.

Third, Bill C-65 proposes important new financing rules to increase transparency and prevent anonymous foreign and dark money from entering our elections. This includes banning the use of crypto asset contributions, money orders and prepaid instruments such as prepaid credit cards or store gift cards for regulated activities by third parties and political actors.

Bill C-65 would introduce important new financing rules for third parties. Allow me to explain. Bill C-65 would allow third parties to use only contributions they have received from Canadian citizens and permanent residents to pay for regulated election expenses. This includes partisan activities, partisan advertising, election advertising and election surveys. This means that third parties would no longer be able to use funds received from any other third parties, such as corporations or businesses, for regulated expenses. For greater transparency, third parties would also need to report on the details of the individuals who contributed in total over $200, including names, addresses and amounts of each contribution.

We understand that third parties may not all receive contributions and may have their own revenue they wish to use for regulated expenses. In those instances, third parties who meet the threshold of 10% or less of their overall annual revenue and contributions would also be able to use their own revenues to pay for regulated activities. In addition, third parties would be required to provide financial statements to Elections Canada proving the revenue is their own.

The amendments to enhance transparency on the source of third party funding are important. Under the current rules, third parties are required to report only on contributions given to them for election purposes. Contributions received for other purposes may be mixed into the third party's general revenue, leaving a transparency gap as to where the funds came from.

The Chief Electoral Officer spoke to this concern in his June 2022 recommendations report tabled here in Parliament. He noted that the proportion of third party reporting on the use of their own funds for regulated expenses increased significantly, from 8% in 2011 to 37% in 2019 and 63% in 2021. This increasing trend in third party financing is concerning, which is why the government is taking action through Bill C-65. Let me reiterate, however, that third parties who do not meet the threshold would still be able to participate in regulated activities, but they would have to do so with the contributions they received as donations from Canadian citizens and permanent residents.

The next element I would like to speak on is disinformation. Disinformation, a key tactic by malign actors, aims to fuel discord and erode public trust in the electoral process. It seeks to manipulate voters and electoral processes through intentional falsehoods, often spread online, as well as, quite frankly, intimidation at times.

In 2022, the Chief Electoral Officer called disinformation about the electoral process the most important threat to Canada's election mandate. Security agencies have noted that disinformation is a persistent threat to election integrity. In the 2021 national electors study conducted by Elections Canada following the 44th general election, 71% of electors were concerned that the spread of false information online could have a moderate or major impact on the electoral outcome. This included 37% who thought it could have a major impact. As noted by the Chief Electoral Officer, intelligence officials and leading academics, the use and impact of disinformation is not limited to the election period.

Bill C-65 aims to build confidence in our electoral process and our democratic institutions through new and expanded prohibitions to address these threats. In particular, the bill would introduce a ban on false statements about the voting process that are deliberately made to disrupt the conduct or the results of an election, all while respecting the principles of free expression and open dialogue.

Amendments provide clear guidance on the type of intentional false statements that could be made or published to ensure that contraventions of the act are clear and enforceable. This includes making or publishing false or misleading statements relating to who may vote in an election; the voting registration process; when, where and how to vote; whom to vote for; the process to become a candidate; how votes are validated or counted; or the results of an election.

Another element I would like to address is the potential misuse of technology. Technology, as we all know, has helped revolutionize democracy, but it also gives rise to risks. For example, content generated by artificial intelligence is becoming harder to distinguish from reality. When paired with disinformation, artificial intelligence such as deepfakes poses a significant threat. Today, with a computer and a few keystrokes, malicious actors can generate highly realistic videos, audio and text content that can depict people saying or doing things they never said or did.

To address this emerging issue, Bill C-65 would amend existing prohibitions in the act that can lend themselves to the misuse of artificial intelligence, namely false statements, impersonation and misleading publications, to provide clarity that they apply regardless of the means used. This would mean, for example, that the prohibition on impersonating the Chief Electoral Officer, an election official, or a candidate would apply regardless of the technology that might be used now, to include deepfakes or other technologies that may evolve in the future.

Bill C-65 would also extend the scope of the existing ban on using a computer to affect the results of an election, to now apply to the use of a computer to disrupt the conduct of an election.

The last element I would like to speak about and highlight is the importance of the personal safety of those people who participate in our electoral process. As my hon. colleagues know well, the threat environment continues to evolve. There has, sadly, been a surge in vandalism at constituency offices, increasingly violent online discourse and threats made against party leaders, candidates and election officials, as witnessed during the 2021 general election.

Bill C-65 therefore seeks to address some of these concerns by providing increased privacy and safety to electoral participants. For example, returning officers' personal information would be better protected by removing the requirement for them to publish their home address in the Canada Gazette; rather, only their municipality and province of residence would be published.

We have also seen reports of or have personally experienced a growing uncivil discourse and behaviour targeting members of Parliament, including me. Members from all parties have spoken out against unacceptable harassment and threats, as well as intimidation.

Indeed, the Sergeant-at-Arms and Corporate Security Officer of the House of Commons recently noted that harassment of people elected to serve this very institution has skyrocketed, increasing 800% in the last five years. To respond to this alarming trend, Bill C-65 proposes two changes to the disclosure of requirements for regulated fundraising events over $200 that include a prominent attendee, such as a party leader. To ensure the safety of all participants, the requirement to provide five days' advance public notice of such regulated fundraising events would be repealed. To ensure ongoing transparency, precise location details for events would continue to be provided to the Chief Electoral Officer as part of the party's postevent reporting requirements under the act.

However, to protect the security of hosts of events who engage in politics or book a political event, the requirement for a public-facing postevent report 30 days later would only include the municipality and the province of the event. This approach aims to prevent bad actors from undermining the safety of participants and hosts at these events. It aims to strike an appropriate balance between the very real security threats faced and the ongoing need for transparency.

In closing, I know that safeguarding our democracy is a priority shared by all of my hon. colleagues in this House. The amendments to the Canada Elections Act proposed in Bill C-65 build on existing safeguards and propose a number of targeted but critical improvements to continue to build trust in our democratic processes.

I am confident that all members of Parliament can work together to ensure that Bill C-65 is studied and passed in time for all measures to come into force before the next fixed-date general election.

Democratic Institutions

[Justin Trudeau, Liberal, Prime Minister]

Mr. Speaker, we just passed Bill C-70 in the House, with the support of the Bloc Québécois, and sent it to the Senate for further study. This bill will allow for more rigorous and regular information sharing with the premiers of the provinces and territories on issues of foreign interference and national security that involve them.

We are working in a respectful and collaborative way to fight to protect our democracy together.

Electoral Participation Act

[Lisa Marie Barron, NDP, Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC]

Mr. Speaker, if anything has come to light in the last few months, it is the importance of all legislation looking at the potential of foreign interference, the prevention of foreign interference and the identification of foreign interference. This needs to be implemented in all legislation. Yes, there are some components within this bill that look at addressing that, as the member mentioned, such as payments or donations that are not allowed to be made through money orders or cryptocurrencies, as well as looking at who can donate and ensuring they are permanent residents and Canadian residents. These components are part of a bigger puzzle of work that we need to be doing together to ensure that foreign interference is identified, prevented and avoided altogether and that there is accountability when it does happen.

I was happy that all members of Parliament voted together on the recent foreign interference bill, Bill C-70. My hope is that we will see that work, and this work, strengthened, so this is no longer as problematic as has come to light in the last few months.

Democratic Institutions

[Randeep Sarai, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Veterans Affairs and Associate Minister of National Defence]

Madam Speaker, it is my pleasure to rise today to speak to the vital, ongoing work that the Government of Canada is doing to protect Canada's democratic institutions.

As all members of this House are aware, threats to Canada's democracy do not affect only some Canadians; they affect all Canadians. That is why the enhancements to safeguard Canada's democratic systems and processes against foreign interference that are set out in Bill C-70 are supported across party lines.

Indeed, the Government of Canada's ongoing work to protect Canada's electoral systems and democratic institutions includes efforts to maximize public transparency while protecting what and how government documents are shared. This is because the nature of some records and how they are intended to be used is fundamental to the functioning of our democratic system of government.

I would like to take this opportunity to make clear what cabinet confidences are and why they are treated so carefully by the government so that any misunderstanding along these lines can be put to an end.

Cabinet confidences are documents that are prepared for members of cabinet. They include memoranda to cabinet, discussion papers, records of cabinet deliberations, records of communications between ministers, records to brief ministers and draft legislation.

The Canadian government is, and has been since Confederation, a Westminster system of government. This means that the principle of keeping cabinet confidences secret is older than Canada itself. It originates from the United Kingdom's Westminster Parliament, which dates back many centuries.

Cabinet confidences are central to how the Westminster system functions because of another foundational principle called cabinet collective responsibility. These principles complement each other, as members of cabinet consider all material at their disposal, deliberate, and even disagree freely around the cabinet table. Once the deliberations are finished, cabinet makes a collective decision, and all members are responsible for it.

The secrecy of these deliberations and of the materials that are used to make cabinet decisions is therefore paramount to the system functioning as designed. This has been long understood by successive Canadian governments, which have upheld the principle of cabinet confidences. In addition to the government, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized, “Cabinet confidentiality is essential to good government.”

Protecting Canada's democracy also means protecting our democratic institutions and ensuring that they can function as intended. Protecting cabinet confidences is not a nefarious act, but rather a fulfillment of the government's duty to uphold the long-established principles of Canada's system of government.

While fulfilling this duty, the Government of Canada continues to support the ongoing work of the public inquiry into foreign interference. Since the inquiry was established last year, the set of cabinet confidences specified in the terms of reference for the commission have already been provided during the commission's first phase of work. Those terms of reference were developed and agreed to by all recognized parties in the House. As it has done all along, the government will continue to provide thousands of classified documents to the commission and will continue to make government witnesses available to answer the commission's questions.

The Government of Canada looks forward to the commission's final report in December and will consider how its recommendations can further help to enhance Canada's measures against foreign interference in its electoral systems and democratic institutions.

Opposition Motion—Government's Economic Analysis on Carbon Pricing

[Han Dong, Independent, Don Valley North, ON]

Madam Speaker, on a point of order. I apologize for the interruption.

I missed the earlier vote on the third reading of Bill C-70. I humbly ask for the unanimous consent of the House to allow my vote to be recorded as in favour.

Business of the House

[Chris Bittle, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Housing]

Madam Speaker, there have been discussions among the parties and, if you seek it, I believe you will find unanimous consent for the following motion:

That, notwithstanding any standing order, special order, or usual practice of the House, when Bill C-70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference, is called later today, it shall be disposed of as follows:

(a) the report stage motion in amendment, standing on the Notice Paper in the name of the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs, be deemed adopted;

(b) the bill, as amended, be deemed concurred in at report stage with a further amendment;

(c) the bill shall be taken up immediately at the third reading stage and a member of each recognized party and a member of the Green Party each speak for not more than 10 minutes followed by five minutes for questions and comments, provided, if required, that Government Orders be extended to complete the said stage of the Bill; and

(d) at the expiry of the time provided for the debate at third reading later today, or when no member wishes to speak, whichever is earlier, any proceedings before the House shall be interrupted, and in turn every question necessary for the disposal of the said stage of the bill shall be put forthwith and successively, without further debate or amendment, and a recorded division shall be deemed requested and deferred until tomorrow after Oral Questions.

Opposition Motion—Foreign Interference in Democratic Institutions

[Mona Fortier, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier, ON]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for the question and the context she provided. As we can see, the government did take steps to set up the Hogue commission and ensure that the mandate it was given had parameters.

These parameters are numerous, and they are being followed. We will leave it to Commissioner Hogue to continue to write her report and make recommendations. The government is taking action. We see that with the introduction of Bill C‑70 and Bill C‑65.

[Mona Fortier, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier, ON]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise in the House to discuss the government's efforts to protect our democratic institutions. As members know, Canada has an enviable international reputation because of the stability of its system and democratic institutions. It is important to remember that we have a strong electoral system built on a proven legal framework, and that Elections Canada is a high-calibre election administration agency that is the envy of many.

Obviously, we do not take the threat of foreign interference lightly, and it is essential that we continue to improve our approach. Last year was eventful, to say the least, and a lot of attention was drawn to these important concerns. Just in the last few weeks, in addition to the Hogue commission's initial report, reports were also published by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.

I would like to remind members that these two agencies began their respective studies following the Prime Minister's announcement in March 2023. These accountability mechanisms are essential to ensure transparency and contribute directly to the government's commitment to continue to improve its response to this threat, which is also constantly evolving.

In that same announcement, the Prime Minister asked the hon. Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs and Janice Charette, the former clerk of the Privy Council, to present a report on the government's approach to implement certain recommendations on foreign interference. That report was presented to the Prime Minister a month later. The approach set out in that report centres on four specific themes.

The first of these themes is communication with the Canadian public, meaning the need for transparency and the need to equip citizens with knowledge in this area. Communication is a key element in the fight against attempted interference in Canadian democracy. The government recognizes the importance of better communicating information about the threat of foreign interference and the measures taken by the government to deal with it. Much has already been done in this regard. For example, intelligence agencies have been publishing reports on foreign interference in elections since 2017. In addition, one component of the plan to protect Canada's democracy is the digital citizen initiative, overseen by Canadian Heritage, which aims to build the resilience of citizens and Canadian society against online disinformation.

Our work did not stop there. Since the release of this report, rapid response mechanism Canada, located at Global Affairs Canada, has released two reports exposing foreign actors' disinformation campaigns targeting elected members of the House. The Minister of Public Safety also announced details on the funding for the Canadian digital media research network to further strengthen Canadians' resilience to the increasingly complex information ecosystem. The minister also released tool kits to resist disinformation and foreign interference for elected officials, public servants and community leaders. These tools have been shared with several partners, including provincial and territorial ministers.

These initiatives are just a few examples of how the government is communicating with Canadians on these important issues. We recognize that more work needs to be done in this regard, and we are continuing our efforts. It is important to remember that this kind of communication comes with significant challenges. While we recognize the need for transparency, it is important that it not come at the expense of national security and the safety of those who risk so much, sometimes even their lives, to enable the collection of intelligence that is essential to our efforts to combat foreign interference. In her recent report, Commissioner Hogue aptly explains how difficult it is to strike a balance.

As members of the House can see, we have already made considerable progress on this first theme, as highlighted by the minister and Ms. Charette. The same is true for the second theme, which concerns governance and legal frameworks. This report demonstrated the government's commitment to considering improvements to the legal framework supporting the capacity of intelligence agencies, in particular the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, and our electoral process.

The Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs recently introduced two important bills in the House in support of these commitments.

First, Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference, proposes important measures, including an update to CSIS' mandate. I would like to highlight the addition of offences related to foreign interference in democratic processes to the Security of Information Act.

The minister also introduced Bill C-65, an act to amend the Canada Elections Act. This bill continues to improve our electoral processes, including by implementing many of the Chief Electoral Officer's recommendations. This bill builds on the 2018 Elections Modernization Act as part of our efforts to counter foreign interference in our elections. I hope that all members in the House will support this bill.

The minister promised to advance these priorities and he did. Now it is up to members of the House and the representatives at the other place to ensure that these bills are adopted swiftly. The government continues to advance the commitments in the report discussed this evening that was submitted to the Prime Minister in March 2023. Our work continues.

This brings me to the report's third theme. It highlights the requirement for the government to have the ability to evaluate risks and vulnerabilities resulting from the growing threat posed by foreign interference in order to be able to adapt the government's tool kit to the evolving threat.

The recent reports, as well as the deliberations of the public inquiry into foreign interference in federal electoral processes and democratic institutions, provide valuable information that we can use to further improve existing measures for countering the threat of foreign interference. Among other things, this includes measures introduced under the plan to protect Canada's democracy.

As the report states, our government will continue to explore further enhancements to this plan. This will include an examination of making the security and intelligence threats to elections task force a permanent entity, with a mandate to conduct regular reporting on foreign interference activities.

Lastly, I would be remiss not to mention the final theme of the report, which involves engagement to raise awareness and improve resilience to foreign interference. I have already mentioned some of the government's efforts in this regard, including the publication of information kits to resist disinformation and foreign interference. The work on this is also ongoing, and resources have been invested to ensure active progress on these efforts.

The Government of Canada also created the protecting democracy unit within the Privy Council Office to coordinate, develop and implement government-wide measures. These teams are working with other agencies and partners within government and with stakeholders to advance these efforts.

Perhaps I should remind my colleagues that, when we swear our oath or affirmation of allegiance, we are swearing allegiance to democratic institutions and the principle of democracy. That means we have to take our responsibilities seriously, and I find it reassuring that the government is committed to better informing partners about the threat of foreign interference.

I am ready for questions.

[Francesco Sorbara, Liberal, Vaughan—Woodbridge, ON]

Madam Speaker, it is always an honour and privilege to rise in this honourable House. I will be splitting my time with the hon. member for the very near, and I say “near” because it is geographically near, riding of Ottawa—Vanier, who is a dear friend and great member of Parliament in the House.

We are having a debate on a very important topic, a topic none of us should take lightly and a topic we all need to think about, co-operate and opine on, because it impacts democracy in the country we live in. It is a topic that I know is very, very important to all of us and all of our citizens.

As the members opposite and all hon. senators know, the Government of Canada is firmly committed to combatting foreign interference.

Today, foreign interference poses one of the greatest threats to Canadian society, our economic prosperity, and our sovereignty. By giving law enforcement and intelligence agencies enhanced tools and powers, the countering foreign interference act will strengthen our ability to detect and disrupt foreign interference threats to our national security.

Activities such as the dissemination of false information and misinformation through traditional and digital means undermine public trust and sow doubt in our fundamental institutions, traditional media, and the legitimacy of elections. Not only do these activities spread misinformation, but, as we learned from testimony heard during the foreign interference commission's public hearings, foreign state actors are monitoring, intimidating, and harassing diaspora communities across Canada.

We also know from Canada's security and intelligence community that a growing number of states have developed and deployed programs to exert influence online as part of their day-to-day activities. Public Safety Canada is leading the work of this community to identify and develop the right solutions for Canada.

We are also aware of numerous reports, such as the “CSIS Public Report 2023”; the initial report of Justice Hogue's commission; and, more recently, the studies by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

Through their insidious online campaigns, foreign actors are trying to realign our decision-makers' choices, our government relations, along with our politicians' and our country's reputations. The countering foreign interference act will strengthen Canada's ability to counter the threat of foreign interference while defending Canadian values and interests and respecting the need for transparency.

One of the key pillars of the act and its commitment to transparency is the creation of a foreign agent registry to ensure transparency when it comes to foreign influence. This registry will require the public registration of the activities of any person or corporation entering into an agreement with a foreign official and engaging in activities to influence a government or political process in Canada. The purpose of a foreign agent registry is to promote transparency for all those who advocate on behalf of foreign governments or entities, as well as to ensure accountability for those who seek to do so in secret. This will reinforce how seriously we take our political and democratic processes, and will align Canada's process with international best practices

By aligning ourselves with international best practices, we can assure our allies that our mutual security will be respected and that our shared values of democracy, openness and human rights will be defended.

Canada has remained open to learning from the experiences of our international partners. Many other countries have already adopted a similar foreign registry. For instance, foreign agent registries already exist in other Five Eyes countries, such as the United States and Australia.

With Bill C‑70, the government is proposing that Canada's registry be overseen by an independent foreign interference commissioner to independently administer and promote compliance with the act. The act is by no means a single solution to foreign interference. This is a complex national threat that requires a multi-pronged approach. That said, a foreign registry would build on our government's long-standing and ongoing efforts to protect our democratic institutions from the threat of foreign interference.

While our security intelligence community is working to identify and counter threats and develop strategies to protect our country and our citizens, we cannot become complacent or overly optimistic about mitigating these threats in the current geopolitical context. Targeted amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act would enable the government and other Canadian institutions and entities to better strengthen their resilience and counter the modern threats that Canada is facing today.

When the Canadian Security Intelligence Service was established in 1984, the federal government was our adversaries' main target. However, as members know, foreign interference is now omnipresent in all spheres of Canadian society. Our adversaries boldly target not only the federal government, but also the provinces, territories, indigenous governments, industry, academics, community groups and individuals, both online and in person.

Among other changes, Bill C‑70 would allow wider disclosure of CSIS intelligence to those outside of the Government of Canada. With appropriate safeguards, this intelligence would help Canadians build resilience to threats. The bill would also allow CSIS to be more agile and effective in its investigations by introducing new Federal Court orders and warrants, and it would also improve the ability of CSIS to use data sets.

The proposed changes take into account the feedback received during consultations with individuals and entities from across Canada, and from various communities, industries and entities. Canadians have high expectations when it comes to the protection of personal information, including protection under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It is with this in mind that these proposals have been developed. CSIS already has several layers of protection in place to ensure accountability and respect for the rights of Canadians.

I welcome any questions and comments that my colleagues may have.

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Surrey Newton, BC]

Madam Speaker, regarding the question from the hon. member for Mirabel, I already answered it when the member from Calgary East raised the issue.

I can tell the member what the Prime Minister and the government have done. We set up the national security and intelligence committee, which is made up of parliamentarians. Members from all parties sit on it, do the work, know exactly who these people are and know their boundaries. I have introduced Motion No. 112, which the Bloc Québécois supported, and our government put forward Bill C-70 to further protect Canadians and Canadian democratic institutions from foreign interference.

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Surrey Newton, BC]

Madam Speaker, as the members opposite and all hon. colleagues know, the Government of Canada is deeply focused on combatting foreign interference. Today, foreign interference poses one of the greatest threats to our Canadian society, our economic prosperity and our sovereignty.

Following the tragic killing of Mr. Hardeep Singh Nijjar at a place of worship in my riding of Surrey—Newton, a Canadian who was assassinated on Canadian soil, I introduced private member's Motion No. 112, which called for the government to protect diaspora communities from acts of political interference, violence and intimidation on Canadian soil by persons or agents of foreign states.

With Motion No. 112 receiving support from all members who had voted, our government also introduced Bill C-70, the countering foreign interference act, to further combat foreign interference. By giving our law enforcement and intelligence agencies enhanced tools and authorities, the countering foreign interference act would strengthen our ability to detect and disrupt foreign interference threats to our national security.

Activities such as spreading misinformation and disinformation through traditional and digital means undermine public confidence and spread doubt in our fundamental institutions, mainstream media and the legitimacy of elections. Not only are they spreading misinformation, but, as we know from testimony at the public hearings of the foreign interference commission, foreign state actors are monitoring, intimidating and harassing diaspora communities across Canada.

We also know from our security and intelligence community that a growing number of states have built and deployed programs dedicated to undertaking online influence as part of their everyday activities. Public Safety Canada is leading work across this community to identify and develop the right solutions for Canada. As well, we have this knowledge from numerous reports, such as from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service entitled “CSIS Public Report 2023”, Justice Hogue’s interim report of the foreign interference commission and, most recently, studies from the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

Through their deceptive online campaigns, foreign actors are attempting to reshape our policy-makers’ choices, our government relationships, and the reputation of our politicians and our country. The countering foreign interference act would further strengthen Canada’s ability to counter the foreign interference threat, while upholding Canadian interests, values and the need for transparency.

One of the main pillars of this bill and its commitment to transparency is the creation of a foreign influence transparency registry. This registry would require that all individuals or entities who enter into an arrangement with a foreign principal and who undertake activities to influence a government or political process in Canada would be required to publicly register these activities. The goal of a foreign registry would be to promote transparency from all people who advocate on behalf of foreign governments or entities, as well as to ensure accountability from those who would seek to do so in secret ways.

This would reinforce the seriousness with which we take the protection of our political and democratic processes and would align Canada with international best practices. This is what we would like to see for Canada. By aligning with international best practices, we could reassure our allies that our mutual security would be upheld and our shared values of democracy, openness and human rights would be defended.

Canada has remained open to learning from the experiences of our international partners. Many other nations have already adopted a similar foreign registry of their own. For example, foreign agent registries already exist in other Five Eyes countries, including the United States and Australia.

In Bill C-70, the government proposes Canada's registry be overseen by an independent foreign influence transparency commissioner, who would be responsible to independently administer and promote compliance with the act. However, the act is by no means a single solution to foreign interference. It is a complex national security threat that requires a multipronged approach.

This said, a foreign registry would build on the government's ongoing and long-standing efforts to protect our democratic institutions against the threat of foreign interference. While our security and intelligence community has been doing the hard work of detecting and countering threats and developing strategies to protect our country, we cannot become content or overly optimistic that these threats will decrease given the current geopolitical environment.

Targeted amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act would better equip the government and other Canadian institutions and entities to build resilience and to counter the modern threats Canada faces today.

When the Canadian Security Intelligence Service was first created in 1984, the federal government was the primary target of our adversaries. However, as we know today, foreign interference is widespread across all facets of Canadian society. Our adversaries boldly target not just the federal government, but provincial, territorial and indigenous governments, industry, academics, community groups and individual Canadians, both online and in person.

Among other changes, Bill C-70 would enable a broader disclosure of Canadian Security Intelligence Service information to those outside the Government of Canada. With appropriate safeguards, this information would help Canadians build resiliency to threats. This legislation would also increase the ability of CSIS to be more agile and effective in its investigation, by introducing new Federal Court orders and warrants. It would also enhance the capacity of CSIS to use datasets. These proposed changes incorporate the input we received during the consultations with individuals and entities across Canada and from diverse communities, industries and entities.

People in Canada have a high expectation of privacy, including the protection provided by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. These proposals have been developed with that in mind. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service already has multiple layers of protection to ensure it is accountable and that the rights of people in Canada are protected. The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians also provide an important review function for CSIS activities.

I want to reassure my colleagues in the House and Canadians the government is and will be using every possible tool at our disposal to keep them safe.

[Julie Vignola, Bloc, Beauport—Limoilou, QC]

Mr. Speaker, democracy is a very meaningful word. It signifies power by the people, and I would add that it is also power for the people. Democracy has gone through changes since its very early days in ancient Greece, but the foundations remain. The people should be the ones making choices about their own future.

In light of the report on foreign interference, it behooves us to ask which people we are talking about, when we get right down to it. We may think that Quebec and Canadian parliamentarians represent the people of Quebec and Canada, but the report on foreign interference raises an important question: Are some members here for their constituents on Quebec and Canadian soil, or for foreign countries?

I think it is important first and foremost to clarify the difference between diplomacy and interference. Next, I will discuss certain troubling parts of the report. I will not discuss all of them, because we would be here until tomorrow morning. Lastly, I will go over some of the repercussions of this report.

Diplomacy is the branch of politics that concerns relations between nations. It involves representing a government's interests abroad, administering international affairs, and leading and conducting negotiations between nations. Diplomacy is the ability to resolve disputes. Diplomacy is also a skill. It is the tact involved in conducting state business effectively. Both definitions are important in our current situation. When we travel abroad for bilateral meetings with parliamentarians from other countries, we engage in diplomacy. We talk together to explain our realities. We share points of view and emphasize the important items to consider during negotiations between the governments concerned. Our ambassadors have the same duty to discuss and negotiate. Diplomacy serves the interests of nations and their people.

Interference occurs when one nation attempts to influence the domestic affairs of another nation. This definition illustrates the difference between diplomacy and interference. Interference is when one foreign state intervenes in another's domestic affairs. If we were to look a little closer at the history of humanity as a whole, we would see that several wars over the centuries have come about because of one country interfering in the affairs of another. Whereas diplomacy serves the interests of nations and their people, interference serves the interests of just one nation, and sometimes not the interests of any citizens.

With these two definitions in mind, we can only conclude that Canada has truly been a victim of interference, as have other countries around the world. Certain people have attempted to influence this country's domestic affairs, either wittingly or unwittingly. The report contains a number of elements, but I will focus on two or three of them. On page 25, paragraph 55 states:

Some elected officials, however, began wittingly assisting foreign state actors soon after their election. [*** Three sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described examples of members of Parliament who worked to influence their colleagues on India's behalf and proactively provided confidential information to Indian officials. ***]

It says that they provided confidential information. That is worrisome. Despite the redactions, we understand that members helped facilitate Indian interference. We also found out that consulates and embassies would coordinate the actions of their networks. During the 2019 federal election, 11 candidates and 13 campaign staffers had close ties to China, including several who appeared to be wittingly working for the People's Republic of China. Despite the redactions, we understand that candidates and staffers had close ties to China. In this particular case, the involvement of consulates and embassies is worrisome since they breached their duty, which is to promote diplomacy.

How does interference happen? There is a list of methods, including the use of social media. Countries can intimidate the diaspora. Disinformation and misinformation are also used. Countries can use clandestine networks. They can even buy influence. That is just a short list of methods that can be used.

What worries me about all this is the lack of interest from successive governments of all stripes. The current Prime Minister's entourage dismisses intelligence reports on the pretext that they contain only unproven allegations, while the Prime Minister himself admitted when he appeared before the commission that he did not even read intelligence reports. That is worrisome. The least they could have done would have been to meet with the people who were mentioned, to ask for some explanations. How can they know that the allegations are unproven if the reports are systematically dismissed? If the RCMP or CSIS are not being questioned, how can they be sure that they are just allegations? How can they be sure, when the Prime Minister does not even read the reports?

When I first entered politics, one old-timer told me that a person cannot be accused of what they do not know. My own view is that, if I know about a problem, then I can act and improve it. Unfortunately, I see that the Prime Minister's team is very old school when it comes to a duty to act. They are like the three wise monkeys: see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil. However, now we all know, or at least, we know some things. The Minister of Public Safety raised an important point. We cannot mention people's names without making sure that the alleged offences are facts and not just unproven allegations. However, it is up to the RCMP and CSIS to determine that. It is not up to us.

I would like to know that these people will never again have the opportunity to facilitate foreign interference, either wittingly or unwittingly. I would like to know that real action is finally being taken to ensure the vitality of our democracy, without interference, without foreign interference. I want to be clearly, meaningfully and officially assured that the people of Quebec and Canada can have full confidence in their democracy. The current situation is just one more factor fuelling cynicism towards members who put their heart and soul into their work. The government is taking last-minute, urgent action because the report was released. The government quickly cobbled together Bill C-70. Here again, there was no planning, no preparation and no long-term vision.

In short, it is important to make sure that the people's elected representatives represent the people who elected them. They must be free from any collusion resulting in interference. This is essential to protecting our democracy. We are requesting that the terms of reference of the Hogue commission be expanded because we have a duty to protect our democracy. In doing so, we protect all the interests of our fellow citizens. In other words, we protect their confidence in us, and we protect our economy and its ability to provide good jobs and a bright future. We protect those who chose to make their home in Canada, far from strife. We protect people who left countries where they were being treated poorly.

Protecting our democracy transcends the walls of this House; it transcends politics. We must recognize that. I have said it before, and I will say it again: True statesmen and stateswomen protect human dignity, particularly the dignity of people of lesser means.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Madam Speaker, the hon. member for Cowichan—Malahat—Langford made reference to Bill C-70 on a foreign interference registry, which we fast-tracked and which I supported. I have since heard from many concerned groups, and I wonder if he has as well, that in our collaborative spirit, which is so rare in this place, to get the bill through and be heard so that we would have a foreign interference registry, I think we made the mistake in not allowing the bill to be properly studied. There are a lot of concerns being raised now.

I wonder if the hon. member has any concerns as well, as a member of the committee, as to how we might be able, in a future Parliament, to hear expert witnesses and amend the bill.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Madam Speaker, “I...do solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II.” I have uttered those words three times now: once in 2015, once in 2019 and again in 2021. Of course, now our allegiance lies with His Majesty King Charles II.

It is important to note that we are not giving our oath to the person. It is really given to the embodiment of the Crown as an institution, which is, of course, a symbol of the Canadian state, a ship that continues to sail on despite the occasional changing of its captain.

I never thought I would arrive at a moment in time when I had to seriously doubt the sincerity of that affirmation or oath from fellow members of Parliament, but given the astounding report we received last week from the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, that is the moment we have all arrived at.

I do want to note that I am incredibly proud to be a member of a caucus that has consistently led the way on trying to get results on the file we are considering. I take members back to just over a year ago, when, on May 30, 2023, my hon. colleague, the member for Vancouver East, used our opposition day in the House of Commons to make sure we debated a motion calling for a public inquiry.

As members will recall, at that time, the government had set up a special rapporteur, the right hon. David Johnston, but it was quite clear that the faith in Mr. Johnston's abilities had become compromised because of his close relationship with the Prime Minister and the Liberal Party. That is why we felt at the time, as New Democrats, that it was necessary for the House to call on Mr. Johnston to step aside in his role and for the government to finally get serious about the matter of foreign interference and urgently establish a public commission of inquiry.

I am pleased to report that, thanks to all of the opposition parties, the motion brought in by my party passed by a vote of 174 to 150; unfortunately, the Liberals were the ones who voted against it. It did have results, because Mr. Johnston resigned the following week. He understood at that moment in time that it was simply untenable for him to continue in his role while not enjoying the full confidence of the House of Commons. As well, we know that finally the foreign interference commission was set up on September 7, 2023.

I am a member of a caucus that has seen its leader, the NDP leader, the member for Burnaby South, being directly impacted by foreign interference. We know that my colleague, the member for Vancouver East, has also suffered the same. In our small, close-knit NDP caucus, we know all too well how pernicious foreign interference is, because we have seen it directly implicate, constrain and negatively affect two of our members. It is very personal for our caucus.

That brings me to the motion the Bloc Québécois has brought forward on its opposition day for the House to consider and eventually vote on. I want to break up my speech into several parts, looking at the various components of the motion.

Let us take a look at the first part of the motion, “that the House take note of the Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.” Let us take note of the report. First of all, I want to note that in the opening paragraphs, the following appears: “the Committee noted the intelligence community’s consistent assessment that threat actors continue to consider Canada a permissive environment, viewing interference activities as a low-risk, high reward way to pursue strategic interests.”

At the end of the report, there is a litany of scathing conclusions against the Liberal government, complaining that the delays in developing policy demonstrated a lack of urgency commensurate with the gravity of threat, that delays in actions undermined the government's operational responses to the threat, and that a slow response to a known threat was a serious failure and one from which Canada may feel the consequences for years to come. Let that sink in, “for years to come”.

We are very much behind the eight ball on this issue. The warnings have been there, and our country has been slow to act. Those are the findings of NSICOP. Furthermore, we know now that the Liberal government is withholding more than 1,000 pages of documents from the committee, just as it has withheld documents from the public inquiry. Those are hardly the actions of a government that is dedicated to transparency. I would argue that at this moment in time, what we need is transparency. We need to rebuild trust, and we need accountability. This is an issue that rises above any one political party. This comes to the foundations of our democratic system itself. That is not full of hyperbole; that is the actual truth.

There is a real deficit in trust in the Canadian public right now, and underpinning all of that is trust that we have faith that our democracy will continue through the turbulent times and that we can have faith that the people we elect to this place are doing their job honourably, on behalf of their constituents and in the best interests of the country we call Canada. It is clear that we have arrived at a moment when we must forcefully push back against hostile foreign powers that seek to undermine our democracy.

Let us go to the second part of the motion, which states that the House “express concern that certain elected officials may be wittingly or unwittingly working in the interests of foreign powers”. The NSICOP report landed with the force of a bomb last week. Its allegations that sitting members of Parliament are working on behalf of foreign interests are an incredibly serious issue that this House must be seized with. For example, paragraph 55 in the report talks about “Some elected officials...wittingly assisting foreign state actors soon after their election.” The paragraph was heavily redacted, but the description of the redacted elements make mention of “members of Parliament who worked to influence their colleagues on India’s behalf and proactively provided confidential information to Indian officials.”

Paragraph 56 talks about a foreign state, and it does not mention which one, supporting a witting politician. Again, it is heavily redacted. Paragraph 57 talks about the People's Republic of China establishing a quid pro quo relationship with MPs where it would mobilize its network in Canada in the members' favour in return for positive engagement with the PRC. On and on it goes, detailing clandestine networks influencing the political process, the use of proxies, covertly buying influence with candidates and elected officials, etc.

I want to take a moment to ask a question that I think is on a lot of Canadians' minds, and it is certainly on my mind. What is going on with the leader of the Conservative Party's ongoing refusal to get the clearance necessary for a top secret briefing on this matter? The NDP leader already has the clearance and is going to get the briefing on who these compromised politicians are. For the life of me, I cannot understand why there is ongoing refusal on the part of the leader of the Conservative Party. The only thing I can derive from that fact is that it seems he would rather talk about things he does not know rather than know things that he cannot talk about. The report, specifically paragraphs 72 and 73, talks about the People's Republic of China allegedly interfering in the leadership races of the Conservative Party of Canada and India allegedly interfering in the Conservative Party's leadership.

That is a five-alarm fire. That is something that all parties need to take seriously. We know, of course, of the allegations that exist out there with the Liberal Party. It has already impacted one of their sitting MPs, who is now sitting as an independent. Again, this is an issue that I think every single leader in this place needs to get up to speed on. I will tell members why.

Last week, at the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, of which I am a member, we were doing a thorough review of Bill C-70, which I will talk about later, which is designed to deal with foreign interference. One of our witnesses was David Vigneault, who is the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. I asked him about this, about whether it is in the intelligence community's interest that key members of Parliament, i.e., leaders of parties, get briefed on this information. He said yes, that it is in their interest to make sure that as many key members of Parliament as possible, of the whole Parliament of Canada, are briefed on this.

Again, I understand that there is a wide gulf between intelligence and evidence, but there are other mechanisms that party leaders can make use of within their own caucuses, so that if a party leader learns the identity of a compromised MP, there are actions that leader can take within their caucus to make sure that the Canadian people do not have a compromised person on the ballot in the next election. That is one avenue that can be taken.

It is shameful, I think, that so many times there is a deliberate choice to play partisan games rather than become informed. In my opinion, that is simply not leadership. There is a veil of ignorance on the Conservative side, but on the Liberal side, their continued reliance on judicial process and the RCMP investigating is also a cover, because, again, there is that gulf between intelligence and evidence. The intelligence does not always meet the high standard that is necessary in a court of law. Often, intelligence agencies are very loathe to share that intelligence because it could compromise their sources that gathered the information in the first place. Again, to the CSIS director's point at committee, there are actions that party leaders can take, but they can only take them if they make the conscious choice to become properly informed. We have yet to see that from the Conservative Party leader.

The final part of the motion from the Bloc Québécois is asking that the terms of reference for the foreign interference commission, known as the Hogue commission, be expanded to investigate Canada's federal democratic institutions, including members of the House of Commons elected in the 43rd and 44th Parliaments, as well as senators.

I have listened to some of the debate thus far, and some members believe that the existing terms of reference already cover this. I would say that given the heightened attention and interest that there is on this issue and the very real concern that Canadians have with it, if there is any way we could ask the government to give more specificity and direction to what the terms of reference should be to the commission, then I, for one, would be in favour of it. I do think it is reasonable to ask for that because, again, we need to make sure that the inquiry has full access to all of the classified material. We cannot have cabinet confidences blocking the inquiry's search for the truth. That is very much a fact, and I think most Canadians would very much agree with that.

I think we are all very well aware of how serious this issue is and the attention that we need to pay to it from this point forward. The next question is, where do we go from here? I love reviewing Canadian statutes, and the statute, of course, that is most at play in these circumstances is the Security of Information Act. Anyone, under that act, who is permanently bound to secrecy commits an offence when they intentionally and without authority communicate or confirm special operational information.

In this case, that would be the names of these MPs. We are in a conundrum here. On the one hand, we have the Security of Information Act, SOIA, with very stiff penalties. If one committed an offence under the SOIA, one could be found guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not more than 14 years. That is a serious punishment for breaching these conditions in the act. Again, members of NSICOP are members of Parliament, but looking at the act that created that committee under section 12, no member of that committee can “claim immunity based on parliamentary privilege”. They have waived their parliamentary privilege to be a part of that committee. As a result, they are also bound by secrecy. They cannot utter the names, because they would be found liable to imprisonment as well.

I must return to the rights of the House of Commons itself, because I think we are setting up a battle here between the rights of the House and existing statutes. We all know that two of the most powerful mechanisms that the House of Commons has are the regulation of its own internal affairs and the power to discipline. Those are the dominant rights and powers, among a few others, that the House of Commons has. I would submit to colleagues that breaking the oath of allegiance or the affirmation that we all made to have the privilege of sitting in this place is probably the most serious offence that I can think of. It is something that I think the House would be well-versed to seize itself with and to find the appropriate punishment. I am not sure where this battle is going to go, again, because we have rights as members of Parliament in that anything we say here on the floor of the House is protected by parliamentary privilege. We literally cannot be held liable for the things that we say on the floor of the House, because there can be no impediment to an MP doing their job. Members of Parliament cannot fear prosecution to be able to do their job. We have to find a way where this information becomes known. The ultimate goal I want is for no Canadian to face a possibility where there is a compromised politician on the ballot who may be working on behalf of a foreign power, rather than the interests of the community they represent or of our country as a whole.

In the last two minutes I have, I do want to mention that, in terms of where we go from here, Bill C-70 is going to go through clause-by-clause this afternoon. I am going to be there, at committee, reviewing every single one of those clauses. It is going to be reported back to the House, hopefully by Wednesday. I think there are some substantive measures in that bill. We are certainly happy to be supporting it. I think it is important that we set up a registry. I think it is important that the CSIS Act gets updated so that it can work in a digital world. I also think it is important that the Security of Information Act gets important updates so that, for clandestine interference, we have appropriate punishments for people who are engaging in those kinds of activities.

However, let me say this. With every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. I think that foreign governments need to hear the message that their meddling in our internal affairs is now clearly on our radar and we are going to act. This is an item that the country is seized with, that this Parliament is seized with, and we are now prepared to take measures to make sure we root this problem out and get the perpetrators the justice that they so clearly deserve. The allegations that MPs knowingly received help from a foreign government are deeply disturbing. No one with those interests in mind should be sitting in this House of Commons. They should not be welcome in the Parliament of Canada. Canadians ultimately do deserve to know who these MPs are, who they are in undermining our democracy, and the government must find a way forward with this. All parliamentarians have an obligation to do everything they can to address foreign interference.

With that, I will conclude by saying that we will support this motion. We will always be on the side of supporting efforts to get to the bottom of this issue and treating it with the seriousness it deserves.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague from Laurentides—Labelle for raising this matter. Last week's special report from the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians followed the testimony given by many witnesses at the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security and the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, as well as numerous other reports. Communication was identified as a problem, along with siloing.

Bill C-70 seeks to solve part of this problem, but we will study that tomorrow. For now, I feel we should allow a culture of intelligence sharing, but above all, we should develop a culture of protecting ourselves and realizing that interference exists in 2024, that it is already here and that, whether we like it or not, it is spreading. I am in complete agreement with my colleague. I hope this type of procedure can be put in place.