Bill C-70 (Historical)

Countering Foreign Interference Act

An Act respecting countering foreign interference

Part 1 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Act to, among other things,
(a) update provisions respecting the collection, retention, querying and exploitation of datatsets;
(b) clarify the scope of section 16 of that Act;
(c) update provisions respecting the disclosure of information by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(d) provide for preservation orders and production orders as well as warrants to obtain information, records, documents or things through a single attempt;
(e) expand the circumstances in which a warrant to remove a thing from the place where it was installed may be issued; and
(f) require a parliamentary review of that Act every five years.
It also makes a consequential amendment to the Intelligence Commissioner Act .
Part 2 amends the Security of Information Act to, among other things, create the following offences:
(a) committing an indictable offence at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with a foreign entity;
(b) knowingly engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State or being reckless as to whether the conduct is likely to harm Canadian interests; and
(c) engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct, at the direction of or in association with a foreign entity, with the intent to influence, among other things, the exercise of a democratic right in Canada.
It also amends that Act to remove as an element of the offence of inducing or attempting to induce — at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity or terrorist group — by intimidation, threat or violence, a person to do anything or cause anything to be done, that the thing be done for the purpose of harming Canadian interests when the person who is alleged to have committed the offence or the victim has a link to Canada.
It also amends the Criminal Code to, among other things, broaden the scope of the sabotage offence to include certain acts done in relation to essential infrastructures and ensure that certain provisions respecting the interception of “private communications” as defined in that Act apply to certain offences in the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act .
Finally, it makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 amends the Canada Evidence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts to, among other things,
(a) create a general scheme to deal with information relating to international relations, national defence or national security in the course of proceedings that are in the Federal Court or the Federal Court of Appeal and that are in respect of any decision of a federal board, commission or other tribunal;
(b) permit the appointment of a special counsel for the purposes of protecting the interests of a non-governmental party to those proceedings in respect of such information; and
(c) allow a person charged with an offence to appeal a decision, made under the Canada Evidence Act with respect to the disclosure of certain information in relation to criminal proceedings, only after the person has been convicted of the offence, unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying an earlier appeal.
It also adds references to international relations, national defence and national security in a provision of the Criminal Code that relates to the protection of information, as well as references to international relations and national defence in certain provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that equally relate to the protection of information.
Part 4 enacts the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act which, among other things,
(a) provides for the appointment of an individual to be known as the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner;
(b) requires certain persons to provide the Commissioner with certain information if they enter into arrangements with foreign principals under which they undertake to carry out certain activities in relation to political or governmental processes in Canada;
(c) requires the Commissioner to establish and maintain a publicly accessible registry that contains information about those arrangements;
(d) provides the Commissioner with tools to administer and enforce that Act; and
(e) amends the Public Service Superannuation Act , the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act .

RCMP Allegations of Foreign Interference by the Government of India

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Madam Speaker, I have asked my Liberal colleagues a question a few times. They have yet to respond.

I just listened to the minister's speech. She was very passionate and emphatic. I could tell she really believed in what she was saying. Someone on the Liberal side will have to explain to me, then, why it took so long.

A motion was adopted here in the House of Commons in November 2020 to establish a foreign agent registry. The Liberals who are here tonight speaking so passionately took three years to begin public consultations to come up with Bill C‑70, which finally passed in 2024.

My question is simple. If the government takes its responsibilities seriously, why did it wait three years to begin consultations and take four years to come up with a bill, since the motion dates back to November 18, 2020?

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Madam Speaker, I do not want to say whose experiences are worse than others, but I can say that certainly during the testimony on Bill C-70, we did hear from Canada's Tibetan community. Witnesses certainly relayed the transnational repression that the community is feeling from the People's Republic of China and the fact that family members who are still in mainland China regularly receive threats. The family members here in Canada are told to stay in line and to not misbehave, because their family is vulnerable in China.

Whatever nationality is being affected by whatever country, we need to stand united and call out foreign interference, especially the criminal kind, for what it is. This is a moment that demands all members of Parliament to stand firm and united, and to say to our foreign adversaries that we see them, that they are on notice and that we will no longer put up with this.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Madam Speaker, I am very pleased to rise for the very serious emergency debate that has seized the House of Commons, which was brought forward by the leader of the NDP, the member for Burnaby South. What we are talking about tonight is, of course, the very serious allegations that have come forward over the last week, presented by the RCMP.

Before I get into the crux of my speech tonight, I want to say that as the member of Parliament for Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, I represent a fairly large South Asian population. I want to tell them directly that we are taking this issue seriously. I know there is a lot of fear in that community, and I know there are some very complicated relationships with the Indian government.

I also want to say that I bear no personal ill will toward the country of India or the Government of India, but the circumstances that have presented themselves to us demand that we as parliamentarians stand up and act. No self-respecting country would let these types of allegations slip by without a firm and serious response. That is precisely what we in the NDP are doing.

Let us go back to the bombshell RCMP announcement that came on Thanksgiving Monday, October 14, which presented evidence that agents of the Government of India were involved in “serious criminal activity in Canada”: homicides, extortions and other criminal acts of violence; the use of organized crime to create a perception of an unsafe environment targeting the South Asian community in Canada; and, of course, interference in the democratic process.

This is not new. This is something our country has been exposed to for over a year. It started in September 2023 when the Prime Minister stood in this chamber and used the power given to him as a member of cabinet to make an explosive statement about the Government of India's interference in our internal processes. Since then, the Hogue commission has released an interim report, and in that report, we see references to India's clandestine activities littered throughout. That was followed, of course, by the report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, which detailed everything India has been doing, from election interference to the use of criminal activity to terrorize the South Asian population.

This is not just coming from hearsay. Both of these reports are based on credible and solid intelligence gathered by the RCMP and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. It is from the men and women out there in the field working on our country's behalf, and they are ringing the alarm bell of what India and other countries are currently doing in Canada.

I think the most worrying part of the NSICOP report is in paragraph 73. I am going to quote it because it was quite the revelation: “This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described India’s alleged interference in a Conservative Party of Canada leadership race.”

We know those tentacles are running deep. We know that members of Parliament for several months now have been operating under a cloud of suspicion because some members have been named as witting or semi-witting participants in foreign interference. They are taking direction and sometimes monetary resources from a foreign power to do that power's bidding and to influence the processes in this place. Canadians have a right to be concerned about that.

We came together in a rare moment at the end of June as the spring session was running out and passed Bill C-70. The Senate then passed it in short order and it found its way to the Governor General to receive royal assent. I was directly involved in that bill. I serve as the NDP's public safety critic and serve on the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. The bill gave our law enforcement and intelligence agencies the important legislative tools they need in order to do their jobs. In fact, I talked with many CSIS members, and they felt that with the previous law, they were operating under an analog law that was out of sorts with what is required in the digital world. It is not enough, though, because we find ourselves here today following October 14 and the RCMP's announcements.

I briefly want to go over what the NDP has been doing since then, because we are the party in this place demonstrating to Canadians a solid commitment to uncovering the truth on this issue.

We started off last week by spearheading a call for an emergency meeting of the public safety committee. I led the way in getting unanimous support for that, which is very rare. We had a meeting on Friday and were able to pass a motion to start a study on this. We are going to call upon the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Public Safety, national security experts and members of the RCMP to come before our committee to provide us with the answers that Canadians deserve.

That motion successfully passed, and I would like to thank members from all parties for passing it, as it was unanimous. I followed that motion up with another one, which basically called on the committee to report to the House the need for “all federal party leaders to apply for the appropriate security clearance level in the next 30 days in order to review classified information and take necessary actions to protect Canadians.” However, the Conservatives immediately started filibustering that motion, and I suspect they are going to continue tomorrow. They are the only party in this place whose leader has refused to get the necessary security clearance to protect Canadians, and that is absolutely shameful. I will get back to that near the end of my speech.

Today, our leader asked for unanimous consent to establish a special committee on Canada-India relations, and unfortunately the Liberal member for Winnipeg North rushed in to shout out no. At a time like this, when we need to focus our attention on the fraught relationship between our two countries, it is absolutely unbelievable that the Liberals would say no to the formation of a special committee to investigate this very serious issue.

That brings us to the emergency debate tonight, which was spearheaded by the leader of the NDP and has allowed members of Parliament to stand in this place and report back on the serious things that are happening in our communities. We will not waiver on this issue. We will continue to show the leadership necessary to get to the bottom of it. When the Liberals and the Conservatives are too busy throwing insults at each other, the country needs moral clarity. It needs to see leadership that stands up on behalf of all Canadians, and the NDP will continue to do that.

I have been listening to the Conservatives dodge, weave and provide the most flimsy excuses for their leader not getting security clearance. Let me note what some of the top national security experts in Canada have said. I am talking about former CSIS executives and former advisers to prime ministers, both Liberal and Conservative. They have described the Conservative leader's position as nonsense, as ridiculous and as nonsensical, as there is no reasonable justification.

We are at a point where the Leader of the Opposition's continued refusal to get security clearance is raising far more questions than necessary at this time. This is a time when need to present a united front. We need to show our foreign adversaries that in this place, we may have our partisan differences, but when they mess with our internal affairs, we stand united, we are unshakable and we are unbreakable. It is absolutely shameful that the Conservative leader, who aspires to be prime minister, continues to refuse to get his security clearance. He is putting the partisan interests of his party over the interests of the country. He needs to be held to account. It is time for him to step up to the plate and get the security clearance that is necessary so we can tackle this issue with the united front it deserves.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

Mr. Speaker, tonight we are talking about foreign interference. After listening to all of my colleagues' speeches and concerns, it occurred to me that the word “interference” rhymes with the words “negligence”, “indifference” and “complacence”.

Consider water as an analogy. When water seeps in, when it erodes a road or shoreline, it does not happen suddenly. It happens gradually. We are here, tonight, debating foreign interference because of the previous governments' negligence and, I would say, their indifference, with one consequence being the assassination of a Sikh Canadian on Canadian soil. India considered this person a terrorist, but the RCMP questioned him and did not see fit to extradite him. Nevertheless, international regard for Canada is so low that India, through its representatives, managed to send contract killers to murder a Sikh Canadian. This is no trivial matter.

Tonight we can also talk about the fact that, when it comes to interference, the Conservative leader is more interested in being free to promote his video clips than in discovering the truth. A respectable and careful attitude would involve going to the source to find out what the whole thing is about, especially since it also appears that people in certain parties were involved in foreign interference or may have been targeted by it.

I would like to clarify something so that people understand. A Conservative member said earlier that Conservatives deserve the credit for the fact that we have a foreign agent registry and that the government was unwilling to create a foreign agent registry.

The member for Trois-Rivières tried to make that happen. His name was chosen in the private members' draw and he drafted a bill to create such a registry. In the end, the government introduced a bill in that regard, Bill C-70, but not until four years later. The government reacted. I have to give it credit for that, but it did so four years later, or as we say in my riding, an hour later in the Maritimes, which shows that the government did not really take this seriously.

There is a conflict between India and Punjab. Punjab is a province of India that borders Pakistan and India, and the Sikh community in India would like to create a country, a state, called Khalistan. The Sikh separatists are claiming their corner of the world, based on their religion, and the Indian government has totally prevented the Sikhs from obtaining that recognition since the partition of India in 1947.

This conflict, which has been going on since that time, has been marked by acts of extreme violence perpetrated by both Indian governments and Sikh representatives. These include the assassination of Indira Gandhi and the bombing of an Air India flight.

The conflict finally reached Canada's shores in 2023, when Mr. Nijjar was assassinated. The absolute worst thing a country can do is fail to defend and protect the people who live there. That is the absolute worst thing, from a disrespected G7 country. People are coming here to commit their crimes.

Canada then decided to react by expelling diplomats. We supported that. The Indian government also retaliated. What is important to remember in this story, however, is that interference in a country does not happen overnight. Give them an inch, they will take a mile. The more the government loosens the reins, the more it will come to realize that it has zero control at any given time.

I identify first and foremost as a Quebecker, as everyone knows, but I find it embarrassing as a parliamentarian in this place that we have reached this point. What I also find embarrassing is how long it took the government to be transparent. It did not want a commission on foreign interference. It appointed a special rapporteur to buy some time. The rapporteur then said what we thought he would say, namely, that there was nothing there.

There is nothing there? Come on. Perhaps we were talking about foreign interference based on election results, but interference is much broader than that, and we wanted a commission to clear up the issue of foreign interference in all its forms once and for all.

When I say that “interference” rhymes with “indifference”, “complacence” and “negligence”, that is what I am talking about. I do not think many people would tell me I am wrong. Even on the government side, I would find it hard to believe that they did not realize they were asleep at the switch.

This issue was raised by my colleague from Lac-Saint-Jean when he said that the government was dragging its feet. I do not understand. During his first four years in power, when his government had a majority, the Prime Minister seemed to be focusing only on matters of foreign policy and neglecting domestic matters.

Then he had to deal with a pandemic that revealed all the Conservative government's failures that he should have addressed, but did not. He did not care. The Prime Minister travelled around the world, but what for? Given the state of foreign interference, we have to wonder what it was all for. He took a trip to India and took some nice photos for the upcoming election, but he could not even thoroughly, properly and respectably address an issue like the one that ended in the murder of a Canadian national.

I am a little ashamed of that, not because I care that much about the Prime Minister and his indifference, but because if Quebec were a country, this type of thing would certainly never happen there.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Speaker, the member who spoke before my hon. colleague did not answer the question I put to him. I would like to ask my question again in the hopes of getting an answer from his colleague from the Liberal Party.

We are talking about taking action against foreign interference, and we are talking about government responsibility in relation to this scourge. My question is about government responsibility. On November 18, 2020, the House passed a motion calling on the government to create a foreign agent registry. The federal government did not begin public consultations until March 2023, and Bill C‑70 was not introduced until 2024.

My question is very simple. Why did it take four years when everyone was aware of the problem?

Electoral Participation Act

[Vance Badawey, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport]

Madam Speaker, it is a pleasure to speak to Bill C-65 this evening in the House, the electoral participation act. As the title of this bill suggests, one of its key priorities is to encourage participation in the electoral process. We know that democratic engagement rests on trust in our electoral system, and that is why Bill C-65 proposes to enhance safeguarding measures in the Canada Elections Act.

As we all know, Canada's democracy is among the strongest and most stable in the world, thanks in large part to the Canada Elections Act, which is the fundamental legislative framework that regulates our elections in this great nation. We have every reason to be proud of this legislation, but we are not immune to the global challenges that modernized democracies face. The integrity of the electoral process in the lead-up to, during and after elections is a prerequisite for trust in our democracy. This is why it is essential that we continue to address evolving threats to our democracy through regular improvements to the Canada Elections Act. This helps ensure that our system remains robust, resilient and equipped to keep pace with the issues of our time.

It should come as no surprise that safeguarding our elections includes measures to mitigate foreign interference. Foreign interference can take many forms, including social media campaigns designed to sow disinformation. The Communications Security Establishment's latest report highlights that online foreign influence activities have become a new normal, with adversaries increasingly seeking to influence our elections. We and all Canadians have a right to be concerned about these threats. This is why the government has been proactive in taking steps to counter foreign interference.

Our government's work to protect our democracy began as early as 2016, when we tabled Bill C-22. It led to the creation of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, a committee that assembles members from both chambers of Parliament to review matters concerning national security and intelligence.

In 2018, the government put forward Bill C-59, which enacted the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, giving the agency the mandate to review and investigate all Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities. That same year, we also introduced Bill C-76, which modernized the Canada Elections Act and introduced a number of prohibitions, including a prohibition preventing foreigners from unduly influencing electors, a prohibition against foreign third parties from spending on election-related activities and a prohibition against third parties from using any foreign funds.

In 2019, we put in place the plan to protect Canada's democracy, which included the security and intelligence threats to elections, or SITE, task force. The plan was subsequently updated in advance of the 2021 general election.

Most recently, we introduced Bill C-70, the countering foreign interference act, which complements measures to further safeguard our federal elections and mitigate foreign influence in Bill C-65, which I am speaking to today. Finally, last September, our government launched the public inquiry into foreign interference. We look forward to receiving the commissioner's final report as well as recommendations.

These substantial government-wide initiatives demonstrate this government's commitment to remaining vigilant in our efforts to protect our electoral system. This commitment is further reflected in the safeguarding measures proposed through Bill C-65. I would like to highlight how this bill proposes to better protect our elections from foreign influence, disinformation campaigns and the misuse of technology, all of which seek to erode trust in our institutions. We do this so that Canadians can feel safe and confident when participating in our democracy.

First, we know that election interference can happen at all times and not just during elections. This is why Bill C-65 proposes to extend the application of the existing ban on undue foreign influence at all times, rather than being limited to the election period. This means, for example, that the ban on foreign entities unduly influencing voters to vote a certain way or influencing them to refrain from voting would extend to all times.

Second, Bill C-65 would create a clearer and more consistent definition of foreign entity activities under the act to close any and all gaps. For example, currently foreign entities can circumvent the law by having more than one purpose, where the ban on undue influence is limited to a foreign entity whose only purpose is to unduly influence voters. That would no longer be possible under Bill C-65. The bill proposes that foreign entities who have even just one of their primary activities as unduly influencing electors would be captured.

Third, Bill C-65 proposes important new financing rules to increase transparency and prevent anonymous foreign and dark money from entering our elections. This includes banning the use of crypto asset contributions, money orders and prepaid instruments such as prepaid credit cards or store gift cards for regulated activities by third parties and political actors.

Bill C-65 would introduce important new financing rules for third parties. Allow me to explain. Bill C-65 would allow third parties to use only contributions they have received from Canadian citizens and permanent residents to pay for regulated election expenses. This includes partisan activities, partisan advertising, election advertising and election surveys. This means that third parties would no longer be able to use funds received from any other third parties, such as corporations or businesses, for regulated expenses. For greater transparency, third parties would also need to report on the details of the individuals who contributed in total over $200, including names, addresses and amounts of each contribution.

We understand that third parties may not all receive contributions and may have their own revenue they wish to use for regulated expenses. In those instances, third parties who meet the threshold of 10% or less of their overall annual revenue and contributions would also be able to use their own revenues to pay for regulated activities. In addition, third parties would be required to provide financial statements to Elections Canada proving the revenue is their own.

The amendments to enhance transparency on the source of third party funding are important. Under the current rules, third parties are required to report only on contributions given to them for election purposes. Contributions received for other purposes may be mixed into the third party's general revenue, leaving a transparency gap as to where the funds came from.

The Chief Electoral Officer spoke to this concern in his June 2022 recommendations report tabled here in Parliament. He noted that the proportion of third party reporting on the use of their own funds for regulated expenses increased significantly, from 8% in 2011 to 37% in 2019 and 63% in 2021. This increasing trend in third party financing is concerning, which is why the government is taking action through Bill C-65. Let me reiterate, however, that third parties who do not meet the threshold would still be able to participate in regulated activities, but they would have to do so with the contributions they received as donations from Canadian citizens and permanent residents.

The next element I would like to speak on is disinformation. Disinformation, a key tactic by malign actors, aims to fuel discord and erode public trust in the electoral process. It seeks to manipulate voters and electoral processes through intentional falsehoods, often spread online, as well as, quite frankly, intimidation at times.

In 2022, the Chief Electoral Officer called disinformation about the electoral process the most important threat to Canada's election mandate. Security agencies have noted that disinformation is a persistent threat to election integrity. In the 2021 national electors study conducted by Elections Canada following the 44th general election, 71% of electors were concerned that the spread of false information online could have a moderate or major impact on the electoral outcome. This included 37% who thought it could have a major impact. As noted by the Chief Electoral Officer, intelligence officials and leading academics, the use and impact of disinformation is not limited to the election period.

Bill C-65 aims to build confidence in our electoral process and our democratic institutions through new and expanded prohibitions to address these threats. In particular, the bill would introduce a ban on false statements about the voting process that are deliberately made to disrupt the conduct or the results of an election, all while respecting the principles of free expression and open dialogue.

Amendments provide clear guidance on the type of intentional false statements that could be made or published to ensure that contraventions of the act are clear and enforceable. This includes making or publishing false or misleading statements relating to who may vote in an election; the voting registration process; when, where and how to vote; whom to vote for; the process to become a candidate; how votes are validated or counted; or the results of an election.

Another element I would like to address is the potential misuse of technology. Technology, as we all know, has helped revolutionize democracy, but it also gives rise to risks. For example, content generated by artificial intelligence is becoming harder to distinguish from reality. When paired with disinformation, artificial intelligence such as deepfakes poses a significant threat. Today, with a computer and a few keystrokes, malicious actors can generate highly realistic videos, audio and text content that can depict people saying or doing things they never said or did.

To address this emerging issue, Bill C-65 would amend existing prohibitions in the act that can lend themselves to the misuse of artificial intelligence, namely false statements, impersonation and misleading publications, to provide clarity that they apply regardless of the means used. This would mean, for example, that the prohibition on impersonating the Chief Electoral Officer, an election official, or a candidate would apply regardless of the technology that might be used now, to include deepfakes or other technologies that may evolve in the future.

Bill C-65 would also extend the scope of the existing ban on using a computer to affect the results of an election, to now apply to the use of a computer to disrupt the conduct of an election.

The last element I would like to speak about and highlight is the importance of the personal safety of those people who participate in our electoral process. As my hon. colleagues know well, the threat environment continues to evolve. There has, sadly, been a surge in vandalism at constituency offices, increasingly violent online discourse and threats made against party leaders, candidates and election officials, as witnessed during the 2021 general election.

Bill C-65 therefore seeks to address some of these concerns by providing increased privacy and safety to electoral participants. For example, returning officers' personal information would be better protected by removing the requirement for them to publish their home address in the Canada Gazette; rather, only their municipality and province of residence would be published.

We have also seen reports of or have personally experienced a growing uncivil discourse and behaviour targeting members of Parliament, including me. Members from all parties have spoken out against unacceptable harassment and threats, as well as intimidation.

Indeed, the Sergeant-at-Arms and Corporate Security Officer of the House of Commons recently noted that harassment of people elected to serve this very institution has skyrocketed, increasing 800% in the last five years. To respond to this alarming trend, Bill C-65 proposes two changes to the disclosure of requirements for regulated fundraising events over $200 that include a prominent attendee, such as a party leader. To ensure the safety of all participants, the requirement to provide five days' advance public notice of such regulated fundraising events would be repealed. To ensure ongoing transparency, precise location details for events would continue to be provided to the Chief Electoral Officer as part of the party's postevent reporting requirements under the act.

However, to protect the security of hosts of events who engage in politics or book a political event, the requirement for a public-facing postevent report 30 days later would only include the municipality and the province of the event. This approach aims to prevent bad actors from undermining the safety of participants and hosts at these events. It aims to strike an appropriate balance between the very real security threats faced and the ongoing need for transparency.

In closing, I know that safeguarding our democracy is a priority shared by all of my hon. colleagues in this House. The amendments to the Canada Elections Act proposed in Bill C-65 build on existing safeguards and propose a number of targeted but critical improvements to continue to build trust in our democratic processes.

I am confident that all members of Parliament can work together to ensure that Bill C-65 is studied and passed in time for all measures to come into force before the next fixed-date general election.

Democratic Institutions

[Justin Trudeau, Liberal, Prime Minister]

Mr. Speaker, we just passed Bill C-70 in the House, with the support of the Bloc Québécois, and sent it to the Senate for further study. This bill will allow for more rigorous and regular information sharing with the premiers of the provinces and territories on issues of foreign interference and national security that involve them.

We are working in a respectful and collaborative way to fight to protect our democracy together.

Electoral Participation Act

[Lisa Marie Barron, NDP, Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC]

Mr. Speaker, if anything has come to light in the last few months, it is the importance of all legislation looking at the potential of foreign interference, the prevention of foreign interference and the identification of foreign interference. This needs to be implemented in all legislation. Yes, there are some components within this bill that look at addressing that, as the member mentioned, such as payments or donations that are not allowed to be made through money orders or cryptocurrencies, as well as looking at who can donate and ensuring they are permanent residents and Canadian residents. These components are part of a bigger puzzle of work that we need to be doing together to ensure that foreign interference is identified, prevented and avoided altogether and that there is accountability when it does happen.

I was happy that all members of Parliament voted together on the recent foreign interference bill, Bill C-70. My hope is that we will see that work, and this work, strengthened, so this is no longer as problematic as has come to light in the last few months.

Democratic Institutions

[Randeep Sarai, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Veterans Affairs and Associate Minister of National Defence]

Madam Speaker, it is my pleasure to rise today to speak to the vital, ongoing work that the Government of Canada is doing to protect Canada's democratic institutions.

As all members of this House are aware, threats to Canada's democracy do not affect only some Canadians; they affect all Canadians. That is why the enhancements to safeguard Canada's democratic systems and processes against foreign interference that are set out in Bill C-70 are supported across party lines.

Indeed, the Government of Canada's ongoing work to protect Canada's electoral systems and democratic institutions includes efforts to maximize public transparency while protecting what and how government documents are shared. This is because the nature of some records and how they are intended to be used is fundamental to the functioning of our democratic system of government.

I would like to take this opportunity to make clear what cabinet confidences are and why they are treated so carefully by the government so that any misunderstanding along these lines can be put to an end.

Cabinet confidences are documents that are prepared for members of cabinet. They include memoranda to cabinet, discussion papers, records of cabinet deliberations, records of communications between ministers, records to brief ministers and draft legislation.

The Canadian government is, and has been since Confederation, a Westminster system of government. This means that the principle of keeping cabinet confidences secret is older than Canada itself. It originates from the United Kingdom's Westminster Parliament, which dates back many centuries.

Cabinet confidences are central to how the Westminster system functions because of another foundational principle called cabinet collective responsibility. These principles complement each other, as members of cabinet consider all material at their disposal, deliberate, and even disagree freely around the cabinet table. Once the deliberations are finished, cabinet makes a collective decision, and all members are responsible for it.

The secrecy of these deliberations and of the materials that are used to make cabinet decisions is therefore paramount to the system functioning as designed. This has been long understood by successive Canadian governments, which have upheld the principle of cabinet confidences. In addition to the government, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized, “Cabinet confidentiality is essential to good government.”

Protecting Canada's democracy also means protecting our democratic institutions and ensuring that they can function as intended. Protecting cabinet confidences is not a nefarious act, but rather a fulfillment of the government's duty to uphold the long-established principles of Canada's system of government.

While fulfilling this duty, the Government of Canada continues to support the ongoing work of the public inquiry into foreign interference. Since the inquiry was established last year, the set of cabinet confidences specified in the terms of reference for the commission have already been provided during the commission's first phase of work. Those terms of reference were developed and agreed to by all recognized parties in the House. As it has done all along, the government will continue to provide thousands of classified documents to the commission and will continue to make government witnesses available to answer the commission's questions.

The Government of Canada looks forward to the commission's final report in December and will consider how its recommendations can further help to enhance Canada's measures against foreign interference in its electoral systems and democratic institutions.

Opposition Motion—Government's Economic Analysis on Carbon Pricing

[Han Dong, Independent, Don Valley North, ON]

Madam Speaker, on a point of order. I apologize for the interruption.

I missed the earlier vote on the third reading of Bill C-70. I humbly ask for the unanimous consent of the House to allow my vote to be recorded as in favour.

Business of the House

[Chris Bittle, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Housing]

Madam Speaker, there have been discussions among the parties and, if you seek it, I believe you will find unanimous consent for the following motion:

That, notwithstanding any standing order, special order, or usual practice of the House, when Bill C-70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference, is called later today, it shall be disposed of as follows:

(a) the report stage motion in amendment, standing on the Notice Paper in the name of the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs, be deemed adopted;

(b) the bill, as amended, be deemed concurred in at report stage with a further amendment;

(c) the bill shall be taken up immediately at the third reading stage and a member of each recognized party and a member of the Green Party each speak for not more than 10 minutes followed by five minutes for questions and comments, provided, if required, that Government Orders be extended to complete the said stage of the Bill; and

(d) at the expiry of the time provided for the debate at third reading later today, or when no member wishes to speak, whichever is earlier, any proceedings before the House shall be interrupted, and in turn every question necessary for the disposal of the said stage of the bill shall be put forthwith and successively, without further debate or amendment, and a recorded division shall be deemed requested and deferred until tomorrow after Oral Questions.

Opposition Motion—Foreign Interference in Democratic Institutions

[Mona Fortier, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier, ON]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for the question and the context she provided. As we can see, the government did take steps to set up the Hogue commission and ensure that the mandate it was given had parameters.

These parameters are numerous, and they are being followed. We will leave it to Commissioner Hogue to continue to write her report and make recommendations. The government is taking action. We see that with the introduction of Bill C‑70 and Bill C‑65.

[Mona Fortier, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier, ON]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise in the House to discuss the government's efforts to protect our democratic institutions. As members know, Canada has an enviable international reputation because of the stability of its system and democratic institutions. It is important to remember that we have a strong electoral system built on a proven legal framework, and that Elections Canada is a high-calibre election administration agency that is the envy of many.

Obviously, we do not take the threat of foreign interference lightly, and it is essential that we continue to improve our approach. Last year was eventful, to say the least, and a lot of attention was drawn to these important concerns. Just in the last few weeks, in addition to the Hogue commission's initial report, reports were also published by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.

I would like to remind members that these two agencies began their respective studies following the Prime Minister's announcement in March 2023. These accountability mechanisms are essential to ensure transparency and contribute directly to the government's commitment to continue to improve its response to this threat, which is also constantly evolving.

In that same announcement, the Prime Minister asked the hon. Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs and Janice Charette, the former clerk of the Privy Council, to present a report on the government's approach to implement certain recommendations on foreign interference. That report was presented to the Prime Minister a month later. The approach set out in that report centres on four specific themes.

The first of these themes is communication with the Canadian public, meaning the need for transparency and the need to equip citizens with knowledge in this area. Communication is a key element in the fight against attempted interference in Canadian democracy. The government recognizes the importance of better communicating information about the threat of foreign interference and the measures taken by the government to deal with it. Much has already been done in this regard. For example, intelligence agencies have been publishing reports on foreign interference in elections since 2017. In addition, one component of the plan to protect Canada's democracy is the digital citizen initiative, overseen by Canadian Heritage, which aims to build the resilience of citizens and Canadian society against online disinformation.

Our work did not stop there. Since the release of this report, rapid response mechanism Canada, located at Global Affairs Canada, has released two reports exposing foreign actors' disinformation campaigns targeting elected members of the House. The Minister of Public Safety also announced details on the funding for the Canadian digital media research network to further strengthen Canadians' resilience to the increasingly complex information ecosystem. The minister also released tool kits to resist disinformation and foreign interference for elected officials, public servants and community leaders. These tools have been shared with several partners, including provincial and territorial ministers.

These initiatives are just a few examples of how the government is communicating with Canadians on these important issues. We recognize that more work needs to be done in this regard, and we are continuing our efforts. It is important to remember that this kind of communication comes with significant challenges. While we recognize the need for transparency, it is important that it not come at the expense of national security and the safety of those who risk so much, sometimes even their lives, to enable the collection of intelligence that is essential to our efforts to combat foreign interference. In her recent report, Commissioner Hogue aptly explains how difficult it is to strike a balance.

As members of the House can see, we have already made considerable progress on this first theme, as highlighted by the minister and Ms. Charette. The same is true for the second theme, which concerns governance and legal frameworks. This report demonstrated the government's commitment to considering improvements to the legal framework supporting the capacity of intelligence agencies, in particular the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, and our electoral process.

The Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs recently introduced two important bills in the House in support of these commitments.

First, Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference, proposes important measures, including an update to CSIS' mandate. I would like to highlight the addition of offences related to foreign interference in democratic processes to the Security of Information Act.

The minister also introduced Bill C-65, an act to amend the Canada Elections Act. This bill continues to improve our electoral processes, including by implementing many of the Chief Electoral Officer's recommendations. This bill builds on the 2018 Elections Modernization Act as part of our efforts to counter foreign interference in our elections. I hope that all members in the House will support this bill.

The minister promised to advance these priorities and he did. Now it is up to members of the House and the representatives at the other place to ensure that these bills are adopted swiftly. The government continues to advance the commitments in the report discussed this evening that was submitted to the Prime Minister in March 2023. Our work continues.

This brings me to the report's third theme. It highlights the requirement for the government to have the ability to evaluate risks and vulnerabilities resulting from the growing threat posed by foreign interference in order to be able to adapt the government's tool kit to the evolving threat.

The recent reports, as well as the deliberations of the public inquiry into foreign interference in federal electoral processes and democratic institutions, provide valuable information that we can use to further improve existing measures for countering the threat of foreign interference. Among other things, this includes measures introduced under the plan to protect Canada's democracy.

As the report states, our government will continue to explore further enhancements to this plan. This will include an examination of making the security and intelligence threats to elections task force a permanent entity, with a mandate to conduct regular reporting on foreign interference activities.

Lastly, I would be remiss not to mention the final theme of the report, which involves engagement to raise awareness and improve resilience to foreign interference. I have already mentioned some of the government's efforts in this regard, including the publication of information kits to resist disinformation and foreign interference. The work on this is also ongoing, and resources have been invested to ensure active progress on these efforts.

The Government of Canada also created the protecting democracy unit within the Privy Council Office to coordinate, develop and implement government-wide measures. These teams are working with other agencies and partners within government and with stakeholders to advance these efforts.

Perhaps I should remind my colleagues that, when we swear our oath or affirmation of allegiance, we are swearing allegiance to democratic institutions and the principle of democracy. That means we have to take our responsibilities seriously, and I find it reassuring that the government is committed to better informing partners about the threat of foreign interference.

I am ready for questions.

[Francesco Sorbara, Liberal, Vaughan—Woodbridge, ON]

Madam Speaker, it is always an honour and privilege to rise in this honourable House. I will be splitting my time with the hon. member for the very near, and I say “near” because it is geographically near, riding of Ottawa—Vanier, who is a dear friend and great member of Parliament in the House.

We are having a debate on a very important topic, a topic none of us should take lightly and a topic we all need to think about, co-operate and opine on, because it impacts democracy in the country we live in. It is a topic that I know is very, very important to all of us and all of our citizens.

As the members opposite and all hon. senators know, the Government of Canada is firmly committed to combatting foreign interference.

Today, foreign interference poses one of the greatest threats to Canadian society, our economic prosperity, and our sovereignty. By giving law enforcement and intelligence agencies enhanced tools and powers, the countering foreign interference act will strengthen our ability to detect and disrupt foreign interference threats to our national security.

Activities such as the dissemination of false information and misinformation through traditional and digital means undermine public trust and sow doubt in our fundamental institutions, traditional media, and the legitimacy of elections. Not only do these activities spread misinformation, but, as we learned from testimony heard during the foreign interference commission's public hearings, foreign state actors are monitoring, intimidating, and harassing diaspora communities across Canada.

We also know from Canada's security and intelligence community that a growing number of states have developed and deployed programs to exert influence online as part of their day-to-day activities. Public Safety Canada is leading the work of this community to identify and develop the right solutions for Canada.

We are also aware of numerous reports, such as the “CSIS Public Report 2023”; the initial report of Justice Hogue's commission; and, more recently, the studies by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

Through their insidious online campaigns, foreign actors are trying to realign our decision-makers' choices, our government relations, along with our politicians' and our country's reputations. The countering foreign interference act will strengthen Canada's ability to counter the threat of foreign interference while defending Canadian values and interests and respecting the need for transparency.

One of the key pillars of the act and its commitment to transparency is the creation of a foreign agent registry to ensure transparency when it comes to foreign influence. This registry will require the public registration of the activities of any person or corporation entering into an agreement with a foreign official and engaging in activities to influence a government or political process in Canada. The purpose of a foreign agent registry is to promote transparency for all those who advocate on behalf of foreign governments or entities, as well as to ensure accountability for those who seek to do so in secret. This will reinforce how seriously we take our political and democratic processes, and will align Canada's process with international best practices

By aligning ourselves with international best practices, we can assure our allies that our mutual security will be respected and that our shared values of democracy, openness and human rights will be defended.

Canada has remained open to learning from the experiences of our international partners. Many other countries have already adopted a similar foreign registry. For instance, foreign agent registries already exist in other Five Eyes countries, such as the United States and Australia.

With Bill C‑70, the government is proposing that Canada's registry be overseen by an independent foreign interference commissioner to independently administer and promote compliance with the act. The act is by no means a single solution to foreign interference. This is a complex national threat that requires a multi-pronged approach. That said, a foreign registry would build on our government's long-standing and ongoing efforts to protect our democratic institutions from the threat of foreign interference.

While our security intelligence community is working to identify and counter threats and develop strategies to protect our country and our citizens, we cannot become complacent or overly optimistic about mitigating these threats in the current geopolitical context. Targeted amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act would enable the government and other Canadian institutions and entities to better strengthen their resilience and counter the modern threats that Canada is facing today.

When the Canadian Security Intelligence Service was established in 1984, the federal government was our adversaries' main target. However, as members know, foreign interference is now omnipresent in all spheres of Canadian society. Our adversaries boldly target not only the federal government, but also the provinces, territories, indigenous governments, industry, academics, community groups and individuals, both online and in person.

Among other changes, Bill C‑70 would allow wider disclosure of CSIS intelligence to those outside of the Government of Canada. With appropriate safeguards, this intelligence would help Canadians build resilience to threats. The bill would also allow CSIS to be more agile and effective in its investigations by introducing new Federal Court orders and warrants, and it would also improve the ability of CSIS to use data sets.

The proposed changes take into account the feedback received during consultations with individuals and entities from across Canada, and from various communities, industries and entities. Canadians have high expectations when it comes to the protection of personal information, including protection under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It is with this in mind that these proposals have been developed. CSIS already has several layers of protection in place to ensure accountability and respect for the rights of Canadians.

I welcome any questions and comments that my colleagues may have.

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Surrey Newton, BC]

Madam Speaker, regarding the question from the hon. member for Mirabel, I already answered it when the member from Calgary East raised the issue.

I can tell the member what the Prime Minister and the government have done. We set up the national security and intelligence committee, which is made up of parliamentarians. Members from all parties sit on it, do the work, know exactly who these people are and know their boundaries. I have introduced Motion No. 112, which the Bloc Québécois supported, and our government put forward Bill C-70 to further protect Canadians and Canadian democratic institutions from foreign interference.