Dominic LeBlanc Liberal
This bill has received Royal Assent and is, or will soon become, law.
This is from the published bill.
Part 1 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Act to, among other things,
(a) update provisions respecting the collection, retention, querying and exploitation of datatsets;
(b) clarify the scope of section 16 of that Act;
(c) update provisions respecting the disclosure of information by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(d) provide for preservation orders and production orders as well as warrants to obtain information, records, documents or things through a single attempt;
(e) expand the circumstances in which a warrant to remove a thing from the place where it was installed may be issued; and
(f) require a parliamentary review of that Act every five years.
It also makes a consequential amendment to the Intelligence Commissioner Act .
Part 2 amends the Security of Information Act to, among other things, create the following offences:
(a) committing an indictable offence at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with a foreign entity;
(b) knowingly engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State or being reckless as to whether the conduct is likely to harm Canadian interests; and
(c) engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct, at the direction of or in association with a foreign entity, with the intent to influence, among other things, the exercise of a democratic right in Canada.
It also amends that Act to remove as an element of the offence of inducing or attempting to induce — at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity or terrorist group — by intimidation, threat or violence, a person to do anything or cause anything to be done, that the thing be done for the purpose of harming Canadian interests when the person who is alleged to have committed the offence or the victim has a link to Canada.
It also amends the Criminal Code to, among other things, broaden the scope of the sabotage offence to include certain acts done in relation to essential infrastructures and ensure that certain provisions respecting the interception of “private communications” as defined in that Act apply to certain offences in the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act .
Finally, it makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 amends the Canada Evidence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts to, among other things,
(a) create a general scheme to deal with information relating to international relations, national defence or national security in the course of proceedings that are in the Federal Court or the Federal Court of Appeal and that are in respect of any decision of a federal board, commission or other tribunal;
(b) permit the appointment of a special counsel for the purposes of protecting the interests of a non-governmental party to those proceedings in respect of such information; and
(c) allow a person charged with an offence to appeal a decision, made under the Canada Evidence Act with respect to the disclosure of certain information in relation to criminal proceedings, only after the person has been convicted of the offence, unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying an earlier appeal.
It also adds references to international relations, national defence and national security in a provision of the Criminal Code that relates to the protection of information, as well as references to international relations and national defence in certain provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that equally relate to the protection of information.
Part 4 enacts the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act which, among other things,
(a) provides for the appointment of an individual to be known as the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner;
(b) requires certain persons to provide the Commissioner with certain information if they enter into arrangements with foreign principals under which they undertake to carry out certain activities in relation to political or governmental processes in Canada;
(c) requires the Commissioner to establish and maintain a publicly accessible registry that contains information about those arrangements;
(d) provides the Commissioner with tools to administer and enforce that Act; and
(e) amends the Public Service Superannuation Act , the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act .
All sorts of information on this bill is available at LEGISinfo, an excellent resource from the Library of Parliament. You can also read the full text of the bill.
Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON
Madam Speaker, it would require people who are conducting legitimate influence activities on behalf of a foreign government or an entity associated with that foreign government to register. It provides a deterrent for those who would not register and who would conduct illegitimate, coercive, clandestine and corrupt foreign interference activities in Canada, and so I think it strikes a balance. It would be a useful tool to strengthen Parliament and to strengthen our general elections.
The Assistant Deputy Speaker Carol Hughes
It is my duty pursuant to Standing Order 38 to inform the House that the questions to be raised tonight at the time of adjournment are as follows: the hon. member for Saanich—Gulf Islands, Climate Change; the hon. member for Kitchener Centre, Persons with Disabilities; the hon. member for Regina—Qu'Appelle, Carbon Pricing.
René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC
Madam Speaker, I cannot begin my speech without thanking the member for Wellington—Halton Hills. Without him, many of these issues would not be on our radar. He led the way. I should also say, by the way, that he basically gave the speech I wanted to give.
Soon there will be a new law. We all agree that it was necessary. It is a good law. Is it a great law? I am not so sure. Is it excellent? I am really not sure. In other words, this is the kind of law I applaud, but with only one hand.
This was an intense exercise undertaken in a very short period of time. The process included reviews of a number of laws, including some that amend the Criminal Code. There is no doubt that the need to get the legislation in place before the next election sometimes took precedence over the desire for a more in-depth or thorough reflection. Decisions were made by reflex rather than reflection in this case. At the same time, we have to be careful, knowing that this is a very serious issue. We are not doing this just for the sake of doing it.
I will briefly sum up the bill because it amends four acts. Part 1 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Act with respect to data collection. Part 2 amends the Security of Information Act to add new criminal offences. Part 3 amends the Canada Evidence Act. Part 4 creates the foreign agent registry, to ensure transparency, of course.
Again, it is good legislation, but getting to this point has been tough. There have been several reports over the years. There was the Rosenberg report. There were CSIS alerts before that. Then there was the special rapporteur who claimed to be independent. Finally, there was the Hogue commission, which all four parties unanimously chose to engage with in order to shed light on this situation. Actually, it is more than a situation. It has become its own world.
What disappointed me when we got to that point was just seeing the culture of avoidance that is typical of the Liberal Party. If there is a problem, they close their eyes, turn away and pretend it is not there anymore. This culture of avoidance has caused major problems for us today, because while the Liberals were avoiding solving the problem, it was getting worse. Foreign interference is here today, it exists and it is still happening, even as we speak.
Still, there are elements to consider. Of course, the recent NSICOP report was a wake-up call for everyone. However, these revelations are the sum total of years' worth of observations. On April 30, the parties held a press conference, again nearly unanimously, with members of the diaspora here in the lobby of the House. On that occasion, I myself disclosed the fact that the Bloc Québécois was preparing a registry of foreign agents. Suddenly, as if by magic, Bill C-70 appeared. I think we kind of helped avoid the avoidance.
Still, when the bill was being studied, the Bloc Québécois had a few amendments to propose. There were not many, because, as I said before, the substance of the legislation is good. We presented a few points, four of which I am going to discuss here. The first had to do with what is known as two-party registration, meaning that both the foreign principal and the public office holder must register. That makes it possible to establish the relationship between the two. Obviously, if only the foreign principal registers, we have to take his or her word about who is at the other end. I do not think that is practical. I think the registry would have been simpler and more effective if it included two-party registration. Unfortunately, the public servants told us that it was a bit too complicated. However, we were studying the issue of foreign interference. To say that something is a bit too complicated is hardly an acceptable response. Considering the scope of the threat, I think that saying this would be too complicated is wrong.
We also wanted the legislation to apply to universities and Crown corporations. I must say that the universities were not enthusiastic about the idea. I think that certain foreign countries have a significant influence when it comes to research funding. Obviously, that amendment was not accepted. We also proposed a cooling-off period. The funny thing is that when we were discussing the amendment in question and the chair ruled it inadmissible, I could tell from the look on their faces that so many people were thinking about their post-election future. That made me smile.
I believe that a cooling-off period is part of the culture in the business world. These are people who do not give anything for nothing. It is smart to say that a foreign country may want to invest in someone as a public office holder, but they cannot be there for three years. I think that would have provided extra protection.
The crux of the matter is the independence of the commissioner. The commissioner will definitely be independent, but not entirely, and that is a problem. It is a problem that was raised by CSIS and several witnesses. During a study on interference at the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, several witnesses pointed out that if the commissioner is not independent, that is a problem. The commissioner will come under the Department of Public Safety. I am not suggesting that there was any bad faith, but I would have preferred the commissioner to be truly independent.
Whenever we talk about independence, I get the impression that the Liberal Party has a hard time with that term. I know that it is generally not fond of it. It had a hard time with the independent rapporteur. It had a hard time with the independent commissioner, too. As for Quebec's independence, we had better not discuss it. These amendments were rejected by the Liberals and the Conservatives. That bothers me a bit, because we had a common understanding of this bill. These four suggestions sought to amend and improve it.
However, we did manage to make one important improvement. The bill provided for a review of the act every five years, and we were able to change that to have the act reviewed one year after an election. When there is a minority government, like the one we have had for the past little while, there can be two or three elections in five years. We therefore had to move faster because the threat, like technology, is ahead of us. I think it would be rather foolish not to take note of the threat that is ahead of us.
One thing that is quite funny about the bill is that it is entitled the “Countering Foreign Interference Act”, but it does not define foreign interference. What is foreign interference? It is when one nation interferes in the affairs of another nation. It is as simple as that.
It would have taken courage to accept the suggestions I put forward earlier. I was told that it was complicated, expensive, and many other things. That said, let us not forget that interference costs us billions of dollars a year. Courage can be a real issue at times. I am not saying there was no courage in this case, just not enough. That is not the same thing. “Reason and respect make livers pale and lustihood deject”, as Shakespeare wrote in Troilus and Cressida. I think we would do well to take a lesson in courage from some of our predecessors.
There is no definition of foreign interference in the bill. In my opinion, we have to name it, or it does not exist. Naming it gives it meaning.
In the same vein, I want to touch on the motion that was adopted yesterday, almost unanimously. The Bloc Québécois motion asked Commissioner Hogue to look into the recent revelations in the NSICOP report.
We cannot dissociate these two elements because we are talking about foreign interference in both cases. I was pleased to see that, in light of this major threat, the House showed a lot of courage and decided to grab the bull by the horns, tackle the problem head-on and move forward.
In this case, I think that the decision made by the House yesterday was an honourable one. Unfortunately, Bill C-70 is somewhat lacking in ambition, and I am worried that that will come back to haunt us later.
Finally, there is the matter of overclassification. In the Winnipeg lab case, we saw that the redactions could have been reversed on many elements without harming national security. I always struggle with knowing that documents may have been overclassified.
I can say right away that the Bloc Québécois will support Bill C‑70. We will support it, but we will applaud it with only one hand, because it is not great, but it is better than nothing.
Jennifer O'Connell LiberalParliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety
Madam Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague for his work on the committee and for his speech today on this important bill. He spoke about the independence of the commissioner and some of the areas where he feels the bill could go further.
Would he not agree that, with the reviews after the election, as well as the five-year review of the CSIS Act that is now happening, there are opportunities for Parliament to continue this work, to allow the commissioner to be set up and to come forward with recommendations to this House with respect to areas that may need to be changed in the future, and that that flexibility has been built into this legislation?
René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC
Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for her question and for her work on the committee as well.
Of course, we had to start somewhere, but we can do better. We managed to ensure that the law will be reviewed after an election, so that should happen in the next two years or so. I think it will be a good opportunity to review certain elements.
I personally would have preferred to see those elements included from the outset, because I think they are fundamental. However, I can understand that decisions were made by reflex rather than reflection and it is better to have something than nothing at all. Still, I would have liked to aim for perfection, or at least aim a little higher. We had come up with some possible solutions, but those solutions were not even entertained in committee. They were thrown out after 30 seconds. I would have preferred the opposite.
Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON
Madam Speaker, according to the report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, the budget of the United Front Work Department, which engages in foreign interference, is $2.6 billion U.S. per year. Furthermore, 23% of that budget is allocated to foreign interference targeting every country of the world, including Canada.
What does my colleague think about the fact that China has such a large budget to spend on foreign interference here, in Canada?
René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC
Madam Speaker, my colleague's questions are always relevant. The scale is plain to see. Concerning some of the proposed amendments, we were told that they would cost too much, even though the other side is spending $2.6 billion. Of course, the amount is disproportionate, which is exactly why it demands our careful attention.
It is funny, because people wonder what purpose Chinese interference serves. Its purpose is to create chaos. Chaos is what we have been witnessing here for a while now, because we have been dealing with that for a long time, primarily because the government is dragging its feet.
Alistair MacGregor NDP Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC
Madam Speaker, part of the NSICOP report's conclusions was that Canada is a “low-risk, high reward” place to operate in, so it is obvious that we need to meet this moment with these legislative safeguards.
I want to ask the member about the first part of the bill, the updates to the CSIS Act, because the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency came out with a pretty scathing review of how CSIS has handled its datasets, and we would do important upgrades here to bring what is essentially an analog law up to speed in a digital era.
Can the member talk about some of the safeguards that we would put into place with this legislation and the updates that we would put in place to make sure that CSIS is no longer violating the statute that it operates by?
René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC
Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for the question and especially for his work, which he always does with openness and compassion.
It used to be that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, acted alone and could not communicate with the other agencies. It acted alone and was its own master in a way. It ensured its own accountability.
I believe that sharing information with the other services will nonetheless contribute to limiting the actions of CSIS because it will not be alone in self-regulation. It will have to be accountable to the other agencies. I believe that simply sharing will contribute to improving the situation that, admittedly, relied on secrecy.
Alistair MacGregor NDP Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC
Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise in the House today to join my colleagues and share a few remarks on Bill C-70, a bill that I have become intimately familiar with over the last couple of weeks, given that I am a member of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.
Of course, that committee was seized with this bill last week, where we had meetings over four days, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday of last week, with extended hours so that we could hear from witnesses, because of a programming motion from the House. I think that programming motion, and the fact that we have seen all parties in this place, usually a pretty partisan environment, put those differences aside to come together, I think underscores how important this legislation is and the realization from all political parties that this is a moment in time in Canadian history when we must meet the challenge united and with a clear purpose, because the threat is certainly there.
To put it into context, last week, of course, the report from NSICOP, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, landed with the force of a bomb and, of course, has been dominating the news cycle ever since. I will not talk about the allegations toward members of Parliament in that report. I think the other parts of the report that are especially pertinent to tonight's debate are the fact that NSICOP has found, through its briefings with intelligence officials, that our intelligence community feels that our foreign adversaries regard Canada as a “low-risk, high reward” place in which to operate and pursue their strategic objectives. There are a number of reasons for this. That same report was also quite scathing of the Liberal government's response to the dire circumstances surrounding foreign interference: too little, too late.
That aside, we are at this moment and we do have Bill C-70 before us. It is important to understand that the bill has some pretty consequential amendments to existing statutes while also setting up a stand-alone law.
It is important to remember that when we are talking about foreign interference, it can be broadly separated into the interference or influence that we see publicly, coming not only from our adversaries but also from our allies, and the malicious and very pernicious aspect of foreign interference, which is the parts that happen in a clandestine way, the parts that are deceptive and underhanded, where adversaries are trying to use all tools at their disposal to influence how our democracy functions, sometimes to cause chaos, sometimes to pursue strategic objectives. It really depends on the circumstances and the country involved.
While we have had a slow response from the Liberal government, it is also very clear that our outdated national security laws are not up to the challenge of meeting that threat as they are currently written. I have used the phrase a couple of times over the last few days, as well as today, that essentially many of our laws were created in an analog era and that we need to bring them up to speed to meet the threat in what is a digital era. That is a big part of what Bill C-70 does.
What is in Bill C-70? The bill is divided into four parts. Part 1 deals with amendments to the CSIS Act. Many of those are in response to a pretty scathing report from NSIRA, which showed that CSIS has regularly broken its own statute's legislative guidelines in how it handles datasets. Again, when that law was crafted, back in 1984, the most advanced piece of technology in people's offices was probably a fax machine. We are a far cry from those days.
I think the other really consequential amendment to the CSIS Act is that it is now going to equip CSIS with the ability to share information with other interested parties, with parties that have a need to know some of this information. Under current laws, CSIS is very constrained in how it can share information. Again, if we are going to counter this threat with the seriousness it deserves, we need to equip our agencies with the tools that allow them to share this information.
Part 2 is also a very consequential update to the Security of Information Act. This part of the bill is really targeting the deceptive, clandestine nature of foreign interference. We all know that violations of any provision of the Security of Information Act come with hefty penalties, and in the bill before us, they are also there, because it underscores, again, how serious a nature these offences are. So, there are offences now for any foreign principals who are using violence, intimidation or threats to pursue strategic interests at the direction of, or in association with, a foreign principal, and there are hefty penalties going after anyone who is trying to influence governmental or legislative processes. Those are all spelled out in the Security of Information Act. Again, this is the part of the bill that is designed to go after the foreign interference that is not publicly known about, that is not going to be affected by the registry, which comes later on in the bill.
In part 4, there are also important updates to the Canada Evidence Act to really try to streamline the process. Evidence is often of a very sensitive nature and, again, we have heard a lot over the last two weeks of the gulf that exists between intelligence and evidence. However, when intelligence gets to a point where it can be used as evidence, we still need to handle it in a very secure way, and in a way that does not expose where our sources are, because, of course, that is of national interest to our country.
However, part 4, I think, is probably the part that has gotten the most attention in the bill. It would set up a registry so that we would have more accountability and transparency. It would be country agnostic, an important part to underline in this, so that even people who are working on the direction of, or in association with, friends and allies of Canada would still have to register if they are communicating with elected officials and if they are trying to influence some type of governmental process. It involves elected officials at the federal, provincial and municipal levels, and also with indigenous governments and organizations.
It is an important part, and I think the country agnostic feature of the bill is also important. Canadians definitely have an interest in how our adversaries are behaving here on Canadian soil. We would like to see those persons registered, but we might also have a very legitimate interest to see how our friends and allies are operating here on Canadian soil, because we would be deluding ourselves if we did not think that our friends and allies, in some way or another, are trying to influence how Canada makes its decisions, which has been a part of statecraft ever since there were states.
In the brief time that I have left, I realize that there still are concerns out there from some members of the community. I highlighted earlier the National Council of Canadian Muslims that has concerns about some of the aspects of the bill that are not very well defined. However, in my opinion, the bill does achieve a balancing act. Again, because of how dire the situation is with foreign interference, we need to meet this moment with a strong legislative response. I think that this is us, in the House of Commons, and later on in the Senate, but the Parliament of Canada as a whole, giving notice to our adversaries that their activities are now on our radar. We are aware of what they have been doing in Canada for quite some time now, and we are going to meet that challenge with a challenge of our own. This is really putting our cards on the table and showing people that we are serious about meeting this.
I am happy that there was a pretty collaborative effort at committee with amendments. The Bloc did not get all of the amendments that it wanted passed, neither did the NDP, but that is the way democracy works at committee. However, all in all, I am quite happy with the product that has been reported back to the House. I am glad to see that the House has come together to see the bill passed through by the end of tomorrow. I hope that the Senate will take the bill under way with the seriousness that it deserves.
Jennifer O'Connell LiberalParliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety
Madam Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague for his work at committee.
The member raised, toward the end of his speech, something that I care deeply about, that I know he shares, which is finding that balance. It would ensure that, as he said, we meet this moment. However, we then, through legislation, must ensure that we keep the right balance for protecting Canadians' rights. In this, we took great care and concern. We asked our officials as well to ensure that this legislation would still have the oversight and protections to ensure that it is not misused, that it is to deal with foreign interference and national security measures and not regular, normal, domestic politics.
Alistair MacGregor NDP Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC
Madam Speaker, a lot of my initial concerns with the bill, after I had the chance to speak with officials from Public Safety Canada, CSIS and the RCMP, were addressed. However I do have to admit that as a legislator, if the bill passes, I would be putting a lot of trust in the executive's hands. We can be very glad we have oversight bodies like NSICOP, NSIRA and the intelligence commissioner, because those are very important feedback loops to keep the agencies within the confines of the law they are operating under. Again, this is one small part I get to play in helping us as a country address foreign interference with the seriousness it deserves.
René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC
Madam Speaker, my colleague's speeches are always insightful.
I mentioned earlier that some aspects of the bill could have gone a bit further. Many of our amendments were rejected. I say that without bitterness.
I would like to ask this of my colleague. His colleagues had proposed several amendments as well. What more would he have liked to include? What does he think would have added value to the bill?
Alistair MacGregor NDP Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC
Madam Speaker, there was one amendment in particular submitted by my colleague, the member for Vancouver East, who, of course, has been personally and negatively impacted by foreign interference. She wanted to see an enhanced tier added to the registry part of the bill, still keeping it country-agnostic, but having an additional tier where the government could place people who were of direct concern because of the activities they were carrying out that were really quite harmful to the interests of Canada.
Having an enhanced tier would have strengthened the bill. Unfortunately, we did not get it passed. I know that my hon. colleague and the Bloc Québécois put forward a number of great amendments. One I particularly liked was giving public office holders a three-year window when they could not operate, but unfortunately that did not pass. Hopefully the Senate may take up some of our ideas. We shall see.
Doug Shipley Conservative Barrie—Springwater—Oro-Medonte, ON
Madam Speaker, it was great to work with my colleague and get this thing done so quickly in our committee.
I want to bring up an issue and ask him what he thinks about it. One of the things we heard in committee was that implementation would to take quite a while. I wonder whether the member has any thoughts on that and if it were not implemented before the next election. We discussed this in committee, so I would like to know his thoughts.